

THE END OF COMMUNISM

SANG HUN LEE

UNIFICATION THOUGHT INSTITUTE

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Preface to the English Edition

Since the publication of the Japanese edition of this book, the situation both in the free world and in the communist world has greatly changed. There are communist leaders today that are beginning to express doubts, even publicly, about the dogma of Marxism-Leninism, which for many years they believed would lead to the realization of the ideal society, the communist society. The Chinese Communist Party, for instance, in editorials published in its official paper, *People's Daily* (December 1984), publicly admitted the limitations of Marxism-Leninism, warning that if China continues to adhere to Marxism-Leninism, it will lose touch with reality and be left behind.

At about the same time, the then-politburo member Mikhail S. Gorbachev frankly admitted to the Party Congress on Party Ideology that the Soviet economy needs to be vastly reformed and should be more flexible in its dealings with capitalist economy. Mr. Gorbachev, nevertheless, insisted on the historical legitimacy and rightfulness of Marxism-Leninism. It is clear, then, that both the Chinese and the Soviet leaders are ready to admit that communist ideology cannot be strictly applied to reality. It is an important fact, however, that the two foremost communist countries of the world are now admitting publicly that Marxism-Leninism is out of touch with reality, and this is clear evidence that the death knell of the communist system is already sounding, as will be concluded in the present work.

It would be dangerous, however, to assume that communist society is ready to collapse at any time, pressured by its internal contradictions. Though communist dogma is out of touch with reality, still communists will continue ceaselessly to pursue their policy of world communization, unless the theoretical founda-

Preface

tions of communism, together with the tactics used to implement them, are utterly crushed at the roots. Clearly, then, there is today a great and increasing need for a “victory-over-communism” theory that can once and for all overcome communist dogma.

In this context, it is historically significant that the English edition of *The End of Communism* is now published, under the guidance of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, a note-worthy leader in the worldwide victory-over-communism movement. The English edition is a translation, with supplements, of the Japanese edition (1984). The statistical information given as evidence of the failure of the socialist economy (especially the economy of the Soviet Union) though somewhat dated, is nevertheless still effective. **By using the statistical data presented here, one can reasonably estimate the future of socialist economy: namely, collapse.** Since the publication of the Japanese edition, new statistical data about the situation of the Soviet economy confirm that the socialist economy is heading towards collapse.

I would like to acknowledge, with a most sincere heart, the encouragement and support received from the Reverend Sun Myung Moon during the translation and publication of the present edition. I also wish to express my appreciation to Akifumi Otani, Paul Perry, and Takeshi Furuta for their contributions in the production of this work. Finally, I sincerely hope this book will be of help to anti-communist movements and to movements for victory-over-communism all over the world.

June 1985
Sang-Hun Lee

Preface to the Japanese Edition

In 1983, which marked the one hundredth year since the death of Karl Marx, several terrorist acts shook the people of the world, such as the shooting down of the KAL airliner, the explosion in Rangoon, and the bombings in Beirut. Undoubtedly these acts of terror were carried out through the direct or indirect machinations of communists, exposing to the world, once again, their atrocious nature. It is characteristic of communists that they will not hesitate to use any means to achieve their goal of world communization,

What is it that drives them to commit such atrocities and impels them to seek to fulfill their ambition of world domination? What drives them on is communist thought, or Marxism? Even though communists, pressured by world opinion, may temporarily suspend their criminal activities, nonetheless as long as Marxism continues to exist as a living ideology, they will sooner or later commit the same kind of atrocities again, in their constant pursuit of socialist revolution.

Clearly, unless there appears some thought system that can totally overcome communism, there is no hope to block the communist plan for world communization. The facts show, however, that no religion, thought, or philosophy has been successful in overcoming communism. Accordingly, humanity is eagerly awaiting the emergence of a thought that can finally overcome communism.

At this moment, from the Korean Peninsula, where democracy and communism confront each other most intensely, a new thought has appeared, like a comet rising on the horizon. This is Unification Thought, which was received from God by Rev. Sun Myung Moon, a person called by God to clarify the hidden truths of Christianity. This thought was forged during a three-year pe-

Preface

riod of severe torture and forced labor under the communist regime. This is God's "supranational thought," which aims at building the ideal world, or Utopia, the realization of God's purpose of creation; it is intended to emancipate even the communists themselves, going beyond any feelings of hostility towards them. The present work was developed under Rev. Moon's guidance, and represents an application of this new thought to the establishment of a critique and counterproposal to communism. And in this one hundredth year since Marx's death, I publish this under the title *The End of Communism*.

I offer this work with hopes and prayers that, through Unification Thought, we may see the day when communism, the thought of hatred, will disappear; the day when peace will be brought where there is strife, and love where there is hatred; the day when the ideal world of love and peace, Utopia, the kingdom of Heaven on Earth, will be realized,

The essential points contained in this book were published in 1972 under the title *Communism: A Critique and Counterproposal*. That work accomplished much in the "victory-over-communism" movement within various countries, but it dealt effectively only with communist theory itself, not with the roots and fruits of communism, which remained to be dealt with at a later time.

In the present work I am dealing with the roots and fruits of communism. The roots consist in the theory of alienation, which is the starting point of Marx's thought; the fruits are the reality of present-day socialist economy. Here I am attempting a complete and systematic critique and counterproposal to Marx's thought, by regarding it as a tree that needs to be examined from germination to fruition. My goal has been to base the views presented here on a strong foundation of logic and argumentation by quoting as much as possible from original sources and by expanding the aspects of critique and counterproposal.

As for those of you who are engaged in anti-communism or victory-over-communism activities around the world, I sincerely

hope that this work will directly or indirectly be of help to you in your efforts to protect humanity from communist aggression. I also hope that those communists who, after walking the path of communism in search of the ideal society, have become aware that all they can find on that path is the exact opposite of the ideal, will renew their search for the true way to realize the ideal society.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the cooperation received from Akifumi Otani and Mitsuo Mori in collecting and arranging the necessary research materials for this book. May all of you, the readers, be in good health.

December 1983

Sang-Hun Lee

Contents

Introduction	i
1 Marx's Theory of Human Alienation.....	1
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY OF MARX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION	1
MARX AND THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW THOUGHT	2
THE INFLUENCE OF HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY ON MARX	5
MARX AS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG	8
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL	10
MARX'S STUDY OF ECONOMICS AND HIS THEORY OF HUMAN ALIENATION	18
MARX'S FORMATION OF THE THEORY OF REVOLUTION	22
EARLY SOCIALISM AND EARLY COMMUNISM	27
A. Saint-Simon	27
B. Fourier	28
C. Owen	29
D. Early French Communism	31
MARXISM AS AN EXTENSION OF THE THEORY OF HUMAN ALIENATION	32
2 Communist Materialism Critique and Counterproposal.....	37
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND THE PARTISANSHIP OF PHILOSOPHY	37
B. Critique and Counterproposal	40
MECHANISTIC AND FEUERBACHIAN MATERIALISM	43
A. The Communist Critique of Mechanistic Materialism	43
B. The Communist Critique of Feuerbachian Materialism	45
VIEWS OF MATTER	50
A. Past Philosophers' Views of Matter	50
B. Views of Matter of Modern Natural Scientists	54
C. The Communist View of Matter	57
D. Critique of the Communist View of Matter and Counterproposal	60
IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM	64
SUPERSTRUCTURE AND BASIS AS SPIRIT AND MATTER	69
A. The Communist View	69
B. Critique and Counterproposal	70
THE MOTION OF MATTER	71
THE COMMUNIST VIEW OF MAN	73
A. Labor and Man	73
B. The Subject of Sensuous Activity	76
3 Materialist Dialectic Critique and Counterproposal.....	79
OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF DIALECTIC	79
DIALECTIC IN HEGEL AND IN MARX	81
A. Basic Features of Hegel's Dialectic	82
B. Basic Features of Marxist Dialectic	83
C. Essential Differences Between Hegelian and Marxist Dialectic	86
CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL TO MATERIALIST DIALECTIC	87
A. Interconnection and Change	87
B. The Law of the Unity and Struggle of Opposites	92

C. The Law of Transformation of Quantitative into Qualitative Changes	105
D. The Law of Negation of Negation	112
THE FALLACY OF MATERIALIST DIALECTIC	119
4 Materialist Conception of History Critique and Counterproposal.....	123
FORMATION OF THE MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY	123
CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL	126
A. The Law-Governed Nature of Social Development	126
B. The Development of Productive Forces	129
C. The Relations of Production	138
D. Productive Forces and Relations of Production Independent of Human Will	140
E. Correspondence of Relations of Production to Development of Productive Forces	144
F. The Relations of Production as Fetters on Productive Forces	148
G. Basis and Superstructure	152
H. State and Revolution	159
I. The Forms of Society	166
FALSITY IN THE MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY	174
A. The Influence of Hegel's Dialectic	174
B. Thought Process in the Formulation of the Materialist Conception of History	177
C. The Uncritical Broadening of the Application of the Laws of History	179
OUTLINE OF THE UNIFICATION VIEW OF HISTORY	181
A. The Basic Position of the Unification View of History	181
B. The Laws of Creation	183
5 Marxist Epistemology Critique and Counterproposal	205
TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF EPISTEMOLOGY	206
A. The Origin of Cognition	206
B. The Essence of the Object of Cognition	210
C. Kant's Transcendental Method	211
MARXIST EPISTEMOLOGY	213
A. Theory of Reflection	213
B. Perceptual Cognition, Rational Cognition, and Practice	213
C. Absolute and Relative Truth	215
D. Necessity and Freedom	216
UNIFICATION EPISTEMOLOGY	217
A. The Origin of Cognition	217
B. The Essence of the Object of Cognition	218
C. Requisites for Cognition	219
D. The Method of Cognition	223
E. Cognition and Physiological Conditions	227
CRITIQUE OF MARXIST EPISTEMOLOGY	233
A. Critique of the Theory of Reflection	233
B. Critique of the Marxist View of the Process of Cognition	234
C. Critique of "Absolute and Relative Truth"	236
D. Critique of "Necessity and Freedom"	237
6 Marxist PoliticalEconomy Critique and Counterproposal.....	240
THE LABOR THEORY OF VALUE: CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL	242
A. The Labor Theory of Value	242
B. Critique of the Labor Theory of Value	246
C. The Effect Theory of Value:	256
THEORIES OF VALUE IN ECONOMICS AND UNIFICATION THOUGHT	268

A. History of the Theory of Value	268
B. Traditional Views of Value Seen From Unification Thought	273
THEORY OF SURPLUS VALUE: CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL	275
A. Theory of Surplus Value	275
B. Critique of the Theory of Surplus Value	286
C. Counterproposal to the Theory of Surplus Value	294
CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC LAWS OF CAPITALISM DEVELOPMENT	304
A. Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall	305
B. Law of the Impoverishment of the Working Class	309
C. Law of the Centralization of Capital	314
7 The Collapse of the Socialist Economy.....	318
THEORY OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM	318
A. The Transition Period	318
B. The Phase of Socialism	321
C. The Phase of Communism	323
CRITIQUE OF SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM BASED ON REALITY	324
A. Critique of the Theory of the Transition Period	325
B. Critique of the Phase of Socialism	332
C. Critique of the Phase of Communism	345
CAUSES OF THE STAGNATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY	347
A. Abolition of the Free Market System	349
B. Blocking Free Enterprise and Enforcement of Planned Economy Management	350
C. The Pursuit of Expansionism	353
D. The Fundamental Cause of the Stagnation of the Soviet Economy	354
8 A Critique and Counterproposal to Marx's Theory of Human	
Alienation	360
COMMUNISM AND MARX'S THEORY OF HUMAN ALIENATION	360
MARX'S ERRORS IN DEALING WITH HUMAN ALIENATION	365
A. Erroneous Grasp of the Essence of Human Alienation	365
B. Erroneous Grasp of the Nature of Capitalist Society	370
C. False Method of Solving the Problem of Human Alienation	371
A RETURN TO MARX'S STARTING POINT	377
UNIFICATION THOUGHT VIEW OF HUMAN ALIENATION	379
A. The Original Human Nature	379
B. The Loss of the Original Human Nature	384
C. The True Recovery of Human Nature	389
D. A Movement for New Values Based on Unification Thought	392
Conclusion	396
Notes	400
Bibliography	488

Introduction

It is well over a century since Marx and Engels published the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), and over six decades since the communist regime was established in Russia. All along communists have believed that communism would surely eradicate all the contradictions and ills of capitalist society and would realize the ideal world, the long-cherished dream of humanity. Through persistent and indomitable struggles, communists have been able to establish communist regimes in the four corners of the earth, including the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries, Mainland China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and many others.

And yet, the ideal society hoped for by Marx and all other communists has not been realized in any communist nation. What is more, the situation of freedom and human rights in these nations became worse, compared with the situation in capitalist society. And communism, which many believed would surely bring about the ideal society, has ended in total failure.

The liberal and religious movements coming to the fore, both openly and secretly, inside communist nations are eloquent evidence of that failure. Even the dictatorial leaders of communism have had to admit that fact. These leaders, however, have not at all given up their ambition to attain world communization. On the contrary, they have been steadily building up their military strength, while carrying out infiltration activities and working to heighten tensions in every corner of the world.

The slogans used by communists since their early days, such as “emancipation for the proletariat” and “liberation of the oppressed races,” have proven to be sheer lies. These slogans have turned out to be nothing but deception to force people into slavery, rather than emancipation for the proletariat or oppressed races. Communist theory has been degraded to the status of a government-sponsored ideology for maintaining and strengthening communist dictator-

ships, and has deteriorated into a deceptive strategy for invading smaller countries; it has become a means of agitation to cause disorder inside free nations by playing upon the sympathies of the intellectuals of those nations. Only the naive are deceived by the insidious tactics of communism and still lay on communism their hopes for the ideal.

These facts show that the day of the end of communism is at hand. Without exception, all tyrants and dictators in history have lost their power as soon as they lost the justification for their tyranny or dictatorship. Communism today faces the same destiny; the political, economic and social conditions in communist countries are all pointing to that fact.

Nevertheless, we must not forget that free nations still face a great deal of danger. Communist dictators, whose regimes are about to fall, may venture on an all-out offensive, openly and secretly, against the free world. If free nations fail to establish effective and adequate countermeasures against the communist offensive, which will be their last ditch stand, then they will not be able to prevent a catastrophe.

What, then, are these effective and adequate countermeasures? Certainly, free countries must stand firmly united, while maintaining military, political and economic superiority over the communist world. More essentially, there is a need to crush the theory of communism—which has become a strategic weapon for communists to invade the free world—and to encourage communist sympathizers to sever their emotional attachment to communism. To accomplish that, a most urgent task is to establish a thought system that can truly overcome communism.

In addition, in free countries there is not a small number of liberal atheists who are also anti-communists. For liberal atheism, however, it is difficult to root out communist theory (or militant atheism), even though it can wield effective criticism against it. Such has been the history of anti-communism up to now. And why is that so? The reason is that, though communism is a thoroughly anti-religious and

atheistic thought, it is, nonetheless, a kind of religion, a false religion, which Nicholas Berdyaev called "the religion of communism." Accordingly, only a true religious thought, a theistic thought, will be able to root out communism completely, because "only light can dispel darkness."

Therefore, the thought that will root out communism completely must be established by a religious leader, and that leader must receive the truth directly from God. It is my firm conviction that this thought is none other than Unification Thought, put forward by Rev. Sun Myung Moon. Its concrete application to the task of criticizing and overcoming communism is the "victory-over-communism" theory, developed under the guidance of Rev. Moon and expounded in the present work.

Before expounding the victory-over-communism theory in detail, I will begin by discussing Marx's theory of human alienation, which became the motivation of the establishment of communism. After being baptized by Hegel's philosophy at Berlin University, Marx came to hold the idea of "realizing freedom." But soon he rose against Hegel's idealistic philosophy, which defended the Prussian government, and took a stand for the emancipation of man, the realization of freedom, from a materialist position. In other words, after passing through Feuerbach's humanism, Marx began to aim at human emancipation from the standpoint of economic social reformation. Communism as the "appropriation of the human essence through the positive transcendence of private property" became the concluding solution of Marx's theory of human alienation. Thus, Marx chose communism as the way to bring about human emancipation; but as the persecution by the Prussian government relentlessly forced him to move to Paris, and then to Brussels, his hatred towards the Prussian government and capitalist system grew stronger, leading him finally to establish communism as social revolution through violence.

The next task posed to Marx was that of providing theoretical and philosophical support for social revolution. In connection with that

purpose, he formulated materialism, materialist dialectic, and the materialist conception of history. Moreover, he developed his own economic theory in *Capital*, which represents his lifework. He then declared that he had discovered the scientific laws of society, claiming that through those laws he had proven the inevitable fall of capitalist society and the inevitable emergence of socialist revolution.

A scrutiny of those theories, however, shows that they were far from being laws obtained from the objective study of nature and society; rather, they were theories ingeniously fabricated as a means to rationalize the predetermined goal of socialist revolution. This point is discussed in detail in Chapters 2 through 6, which present not only a critique of the communist position, but also a counterproposal to that position based on Unification Thought. And since communist epistemology, developed by Engels, Lenin and others, is an important area of communist philosophy, it is also included there.

Chapter 7 presents a discussion of the reality of socialist society, the society which was built in the Soviet Union as the ideal society arisen from social revolution, following the teachings of Karl Marx. It will be shown that socialist society is not the free and abundant society that Marx promised, but rather an oppressed and economically stagnant society.

Finally, in Chapter 8, it is argued that the fundamental cause giving rise to a result entirely opposite to that predicted by Marx lies in the errors of Marx's theory of human alienation. Though Marx started out in the direction of human emancipation, his thought eventually became a theory restricting human nature and alienating it even more; it happened that way because Marx's understanding of the essence of human alienation and the methods he proposed for its solution were fundamentally wrong. What, then, is the true way to attain human emancipation? The final conclusion of the present work is that the true way lies in the recovery of the original human nature, which is based on the love and the truth of God.

THE END OF COMMUNISM

MARX'S THEORY OF HUMAN ALIENATION

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY OF MARX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION

Until today, the problem of human alienation has been discussed from the perspective of Christianity, of existentialism, and from the perspective of civilization theory, both in capitalist and socialist society. Karl Marx, also, developed his theory of human alienation as a means to liberate humankind. The so-called recognized Marxists (that is, those recognized by Communists regimes), however, have continued to ignore Marx's theory of alienation--which is part of his early thought--on the grounds that that theory retains some idealistic influence from Hegel and Feuerbach, and that it has already been overcome in *Capital*. Nevertheless, the repression of the freedom and personality of the workers in socialist countries has become obvious to everyone's eyes. Furthermore, in Eastern European nations the discovery of Marx's alienation theory has given rise to dissident movements, such as socialistic humanism. Since it has become impossible for recognized Marxists to ignore such dissident movements, they have come to use Marx's alienation theory in such a way as to be advantageous to them. In other words, they argue that in *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* where he presented his theory of alienation, Marx grasped the relationship between capitalists and workers merely as a relationship between appropriating and appropriated,

and not yet in terms of the law of value (the labor theory of value), thus they claim that Marx's theory at that stage was not yet in the stage of scientific socialism, and so on.¹ In addition, recognized Marxists criticize other studies of Marx's theory of human alienation, claiming that those studies are anti-communistic, while stating that their own position represents authentic scientific socialism, in which Marx's idea of liberating man has borne fruit.

Also, there are the Neo-Marxists and the movements of the New Left, which regard existing socialist countries as not representative of true socialism. They study the thought of the early Marx and try to confront reality and carry on an active socialist movement on the basis of their studies. They look toward the process of development of Marx's thought and try to find in it the way to confront reality, the way to grasp history and class structure, and the way to analyze society.

Here I also will attempt to take up the thought of the early Marx (his alienation theory) and to examine its content. And the reason is that the thought of the early Marx became the motivation, the starting point, and the determining factor for the direction for Marx's entire thought system.

II. MARX AND THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW THOUGHT

Generally speaking, a systematic thought comes to emerge by the complex interaction of two main factors, one of which is the subjective and the other the objective factor. The subjective factor refers to the thinker's spiritual conditions, which can be his psychological disposition, character, and individuality, and also the way he views life, the world, and history. The objective factor refers to social and environmental conditions, in other words, to political, economic, and religious conditions and circumstances.

When the two factors interact centering on the ideal or purpose of the thinker, a certain thought system comes to be formed. The formation of Marxism was no exception to this.

First, let us consider the objective factor. As is well known, the first half of the nineteenth century, in which Marx grew up, was the age when liberal thoughts powerfully swept across Western Europe with the momentum of the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century. Wherever feudalism and absolutism, the old regimes, still remained, conflicts arose between conservative and liberal forces. In Germany especially, government oppression of the liberal movement was severe.

On the other hand, in advanced nations such as England and France, capitalism had been progressing since the Industrial Revolution. Capitalists severely exploited laborers and drove them hard, multiplying miserable scenes of unemployment, starvation, illness, and social crimes. During those days, Christianity should most naturally have tried to stop capitalistic exploitation by actively supporting spiritual movements and by putting the word and love of Jesus into practice. As it turned out, however, the opposite took place, and Christianity was taken advantage of by capitalists.

In a country or a society, when administrators or financiers fall into corruption and suppress the people by power, and the poverty, suffering and unrest of the working masses reach their height, then either a new thinker or a man of religion appears and tries to save the masses from social disorder and crises. It was in such circumstances and for such a purpose that Karl Marx emerged.

When a thinker is establishing a new thought, he can be greatly influenced by such social and environmental conditions; nevertheless, the more decisive factors in the development of the thought are the thinker's psychological disposition, character, and individuality, and also, based on those, the thinker's way of viewing life, the world and history,

In this context, let us consider Marx's personality and psychological make-up, which were the foremost subjective factors in the formation of his thought.

Karl Marx (1818-83) was born in Trier, Rhine province, Germany, on May 5, 1818, as the second son in a traditional Jewish rabbinical family, Karl's father, Heinrich Marx (1782-1838), who was a lawyer, converted to Christianity in 1816, swallowing his pride in being a Jew, compelled by an ordinance of the Prussian government, which purged Jewish people from public life. His previous name was Heschel, which he changed to Heinrich upon being baptized. In 1824, Marx's seven children, including Karl, also converted to Christianity, but Karl's mother Henriette (1787-1863), being a strict Jew, was opposed to conversion. The following year (1825), of necessity she did convert, but after her husband's death she returned to Judaism.

It was into such a discordant family situation that Karl Marx was born. On the one hand, they received persistent discrimination from the Christian Prussian society because they were Jews; on the other hand, after their conversion, they were looked down upon as apostates by the Jewish community.² Due to this kind of familial and social environment, Marx's childhood must have been plagued with feelings of loneliness, alienation, inferiority, humiliation, and defeat. One can easily imagine that such a state of mind would eventually be transformed into a rebellious and vengeful spirit. Such a psychological state, which Marx carried with him from childhood to adolescence, became his subconsciousness, whereby his rebellious and militant character came to be formed. Furthermore, even though Marx converted to Christianity, he nevertheless kept the latent consciousness of vocation peculiar to Jewish people (the consciousness of the chosen), which, combined with his rebellious and militant character, formed Marx's character as a revolutionist.

He also came to harbor hatred and rebellion against religion, which he perceived as the cause of the discrimination he was re-

ceiving from Christians and Jews. Though he was a theist during his childhood, he later became an atheist during his adolescence, rising in revolt against God.³

It was on the basis of that kind of mentality and character that Marx came to formulate his unique thought under the social and ideological conditions of that time. The social conditions refer to the liberal movement under the influence of the French Revolution, the suppression of it by the Prussian government, the industrialization of the Rhine Province under the influence of the Industrial Revolution in England, etc.; and the ideological conditions refer to the philosophies of Hegel, Feuerbach and others. The ideological influence of Hegel on Marx was especially decisive. This explains how Marx, though advocating a materialist position opposite to that of Hegel, nonetheless used a method in exact imitation of the Hegelian method.

In the veins and arteries of Marx's thought, elements of Hegel were always circulating; the most important of these elements were "development through contradiction," the "realization of freedom," and the "inevitable appearance of the ideal society," among others. Accordingly, Marx's theory of human alienation, the starting point for Marxism, can be properly understood only in the context of Hegel's philosophy. The area in which Marx was particularly influenced by Hegel, earliest and most strongly, was his concept of the "realization of freedom."

III. THE INFLUENCE OF HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY ON MARX

In the preface to *Philosophy of Law* (also known as *Philosophy of Right*), Hegel wrote, "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational."⁴ In interpreting this thesis, however, the Hegelian school split into two wings: the first was formed by the Right Hegelians, who emphasized the second half of this thesis, interpreted what is actual to be rational, and supported the Prussian govern-

ment; the second wing was formed by the Left Hegelians, who laid greater emphasis on the first half of the thesis, interpreting it to mean that what is rational must become actual, and claimed that the actual Prussian government must necessarily be reformed.

The Left Hegelians included D. F. Strauss, L. A. Feuerbach, B. Bauer, A. Ruge, M. Stirner and Marx and Engels. Belonging to the Left Hegelians, Marx had a liberal and critical spirit, and considered "freedom" as the essence of man; he learned the spirit of freedom from Hegel's philosophy.

Hegel had stated in his *Philosophy of History* and *Philosophy of Law* that man is a rational being, that the essence of reason is freedom, and that freedom must be realized; he held that freedom is to be realized by the state.⁵ This idea of freedom, which Marx learned from Hegel, became the starting point for his idea of the liberation of man. This idea of freedom, or the spirit of liberation, formed the basis of the theoretical system which he kept throughout his whole life. He believed that this kind of human freedom would be truly realized only through the establishment of a communist society. In fact, Marx wrote in *Capital* as follows:

Beyond [the realm of necessity] begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom [communist society], which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis.⁶

Milovan Djilas, former Vice-President of Yugoslavia, wrote in *The New Class*: "Marx believed that the results of the revolution--that is, the new socialist society--would lead to a new and higher level of freedom than that prevalent in the existing society, in so-called liberal capitalism."⁷ Hegel held that the disorder of civil society comes from the collision between individualistic desires, and that the way to solve this problem is to wait for Idea to be actualized through the administrative structure of the state. He placed his hope in the bureaucratic Prussian government. In other words, he believed that when Idea (Logos or Reason) is actualized

through the law of the state, there would then be no more disorder in civil society. Marx also watched the contradictions and ills of civil society, as Hegel did, and, as a Left Hegelian, he thought that the contradictions of civil society must be overcome and human freedom must be realized.

Here I would like to describe in detail how the Hegelian school split into the Left and Right Hegelians, and especially how the Left Hegelians gathered strength. Hegel considered that the view of "God incarnate" (*Gottmensch*), in which "God was incarnated into man," was the very nucleus of the doctrine of Christianity. Also, that which religion grasped as "representation" (*Vorstellung*) he generalized into "notion" (*Begriff*). The reason is that "for Hegel, Christianity and [the Hegelian] philosophy were not different, and between them there was only a distinction in form—one being the 'representation' and the other the 'notion'."⁸ Accordingly, the Christian doctrine that "God was incarnated into Jesus" can be expressed by philosophical generalization (conceptualization) as "God realizes Himself through man." In this way Hegel was able to assert philosophically that "Absolute Idea develops itself through man."

Hegel's view of the *Gottmensch* was inherited by Strauss, who thoroughly developed that concept in a philosophical sense. In *The Life of Jesus* (1835) Strauss maintained that the *Gottmensch* is not any particular man (Jesus); but rather refers to a personalized idea for human beings; he also said that Jesus's life as recorded in the Bible was merely a legend or a myth. Strauss's book marked the moment when the Hegelian school split into two. One branch of the Hegelian school became the Right Hegelians, who accepted Hegelian philosophy as it was, while believing in the unity between Hegelian philosophy and Christianity; the other branch became the Left Hegelians, who criticized Hegelian philosophy, stressing the non-Christian elements within it.

Bruno Bauer, who led Marx to the Left Hegelians, criticized Christianity, following a course similar to that of Strauss, and

maintained that the revelation of the Bible was not the absolute truth, but rather a truth which had become relative in the course of history. He replaced Hegel's Absolute Idea with human "self-consciousness," and criticized the claim to absoluteness of both Christianity and Hegelian philosophy.

As discussed later, Feuerbach wrote *The Essence of Christianity* (1841), through which the Left Hegelian criticism of Christianity became firmly established; also, Hegelian philosophy itself came to be thoroughly criticized.

In addition, Arnold Ruge criticized the state of Prussia from a political point of view, taking a Left Hegelian position. While a student at Halle University, Ruge was arrested for being an activist of the *Burschenschaft* ("Youth Union"), and spent six years in prison. Later, however, as a lecturer at Halle University, he published the *Hallische Jahrbücher* (founded in 1838), in which he criticized Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, saying that it replaces an actual historical nation (Prussia) with a nation in idea (the Rational State). Ruge asserted that a historical nation should be criticized and transcended to be developed into a higher dimension. Thus, he rejected the national system of Prussia.

Thus influenced by the Left Hegelians, Marx took the first step of his ideological development.

IV. MARX AS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE *RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG*

After graduating from Berlin University (March, 1841), Marx wrote an article for the *Rheinische Zeitung* entitled "Debates on Freedom of the Press and the Publication of the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates" (May 1842), and in that article he stated that freedom is the generic essence of man, and that that freedom must be realized. He said, "Is not freedom after all the generic essence of all spiritual existence, and therefore of the press as well?".

... For only that which is a realization of freedom can be humanly good."⁹

Marx, who was the main contributor to the newspaper, soon became its editor and worked actively for the liberal movement (October, 1842-March, 1843). Then several difficult problems confronted him: namely, a controversy with the *Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung* on French socialism and communism; the deliberations of the Rheinische Landtag on forest thefts and on the division of landed property; the debates on free trade and protective tariffs; the official polemic started by the Oberpräsident of the Rhine Province against the *Rheinische Zeitung* about the conditions of the Moselle peasantry, and so on.¹⁰

Especially, in a debate with the conservative *Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung*, he was unable to give an answer to that newspaper's demand to clarify his position on French socialism and communism. Concerning this, Marx said:

An echo of French socialism and communism, slightly tinged by philosophy, was noticeable in the *Rheinische Zeitung*. I objected to this dilettantism, but at the same time frankly admitted in a controversy with the *Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung* that my previous studies did not allow me to express any opinion on the content of the French theories.¹¹

While the Assembly (the Estates) said in October, 1842, that it would revise the Law on the Thefts of Wood, it in fact protected only the interests of the forest owners—in other words, the liberal legislation tolerated the wrong doings of the *Estates*.¹² Marx felt that the human rights of the poor should not be placed lower than the rights of trees, but he did not know how to react to that situation.¹³

The reason for that, he thought, was the fact that he was leaning too much toward Hegel's philosophy. In other words, from the standpoint of Hegel's philosophy, there was no way for him to interpret those problems properly. He felt strongly that Hegel's philosophy had no power to solve actual problems, and that, he realized, had something to do with economic problems. In other

words, he discovered that the actual problems he felt difficult to solve were all related to economic problems in civil society. At that time, however, he knew almost nothing about economics. After that, he resigned from his position as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* of his own accord in March, 1843, just before that paper was closed down under the oppression of the Prussian government. In October of the same year he sought refuge in Paris, together with his wife, Jenny (1814-81), the daughter of a Prussian aristocrat, whom he had married four months before.

V. MARX'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL

After resigning from the paper, Marx felt it necessary to criticize Hegel's philosophy before going on to study economics. He wrote, "The first work which I undertook to dispel the doubts assailing me was a critical re-examination of the Hegelian philosophy of law."¹⁴

At that time, he did not yet have his own standard view necessary for such a criticism, and the only thing he could do was to rely on Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* (1841), and *Preliminary Theses for the Reform of Philosophy* (1842).¹⁵ In those works, Feuerbach bitterly criticized the Christian view of God and Hegel's view of the relationship between thinking and being.

In *The Essence of Christianity*, Feuerbach criticized the Christian view of God, saying that God is "the human nature [reason, love and will] purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective"¹⁶ and that "the divine being is nothing else than the human being."¹⁷ Also, he wrote in *Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy* that in order to develop a counterproposal to Hegelian idealism, "subject" needs to be corrected to "predicate," and "predicate" to "subject"—in other words, while Hegel states that "thought is the subject, being the predicate."¹⁸ Feuerbach asserts that "being is the subject, thought the predicate."¹⁹ In opposition to Hegel's assertion that nature (being) comes from the self-

alienation of Idea (thought), Feuerbach claimed that “thought comes from being.”²⁰

Thus, Feuerbach advocated atheism and materialism, claiming that God is nothing but an objectification of the human essence, and that spirit is a product of matter.²¹ Nevertheless, though he denied God, yet he laid stress on a humanistic kind of religion and felt that the confusion of society could be resolved by improving human relationships centering on humanistic love—namely, sexual love, friendship, compassion and so on. This was at once his humanism and his religion.²² Feuerbach’s humanism is equivalent to naturalism, regarding man as a natural being, and also equivalent to sensualism, regarding man as a sensuous being.

Marx, who was having difficulty criticizing Hegel’s philosophy of law, attempted to do that by basing himself on Feuerbach’s humanism.” That is to say, Marx tried to solve political problems from a humanistic standpoint, which is obvious from certain passages of his letters, in which he insisted that Germany—the dehumanized world—must be reformed into a humanized world. For example, in two letters to Ruge (in May and in September of 1843), Marx wrote as follows:

The philistine world [Germany] is a *political world of animals*, and if we have to recognize its existence, nothing remains for us but simply to agree to this *status quo*. Centuries of barbarism engendered and shaped it, and now it confronts us as a consistent system, the principle of which is the dehumanized world.²⁴

The reform of consciousness consists only in making the world aware of its own consciousness, in awakening it out of its dream about itself, in explaining to it the meaning of its own actions. Our whole object can only be—as is also the case in Feuerbach’s criticism of religion—to give religious and philosophical questions the form corresponding to man who has become conscious of himself.²⁵

Marx tried to criticize the following points of Hegel’s philosophy of law: Citizens who live centering on their egoistic needs are always apt to conflict with one another and soon cause confusion;

this is because civil society is a system of needs in which each individual seeks to satisfy his needs.²⁶ Such a “civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and want as well as of the physical and ethical degeneration common to them both.”²⁷ On the other hand, the state aims at universal interests by carrying out law, administration, and so forth.²⁸ Therefore the direction of the citizens contradicts that of the state.²⁹ In other words, if one strengthens the administrative power in such a way as to uphold the law of the state, the citizens feel confined and rebel; yet, if citizens are given complete freedom to satisfy their needs, then disorder and confusion will occur. The civil servants of the middle class and the Estates serve as mediators between civil society and the state, which contradict each other as described above.³⁰

Hegel expressed his hope that the bureaucratic government of Prussia would liberate man from the confusion of civil society, saying, “The middle class, to which civil servants belong, is politically conscious and the one in which education is most prominent. For this reason it is also the pillar of the state so far as honesty and intelligence are concerned.”³¹ In Hegel’s view, the Idea of law would be actualized through the bureaucratic structure. In other words, if the Idea of law were actualized through the bureaucrats and the Estates, then civil society would easily become rational, while man as well would give up his egoistic needs and become a rational being. According to Hegel, man in civil society who has not yet become a rational being is nothing but “*the composite idea*,”³² and not an actual being—for in Hegel what is actual is rational.

Marx criticized this assertion of Hegel’s from a humanist position, as mentioned above, which was done in his *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law* (also known as *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law or Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State*) (March - August 1843).³³ In that book he wrote that what Hegel called the universality of bureaucracy (that is, the fact that the state aims at universal interest) was only formal, and that in actu-

ality bureaucrats were closed up in the hierarchy of authority and obedience, were becoming materialistic, and were paying most attention to their own promotion.³⁴ Thus, he saw it hard to establish a rational state in which freedom would be realized through bureaucrats, dominated by such materialistic interests. In *On the Jewish Question* (September - October 1843), written about a month later, Marx again took the viewpoint of humanism and asserted that the disorderly and egoistic man in civil society is "man in the proper sense" or "real man."³⁵

Hegel maintained that egoistic civil society can be overcome only by a state or bureaucracy in which Idea is actualized; by contrast, Marx held that man has been robbed of his species-being by the state.³⁶ Therefore, he claimed that the way to solve the disorder within civil society is for man in civil society to recover his lost species-being. Marx stated that "all emancipation is a reduction of the human world and relationships to *man himself*."³⁷ He also claimed that the recovery of species-being, or the liberation of man, must be carried out not by the power of unreliable bureaucrats, but rather by the power of each real man himself. This view follows Feuerbach's pattern for liberating man.

According to Feuerbach, man, unlike animals, has human essence, which includes reason, love, will, etc. Nevertheless, man has objectified his human essence and has turned it into God, whereby he has become a very selfish and powerless being. That was Feuerbach's explanation of human alienation. In other words, human alienation for him meant that man has lost his essence because of God. Accordingly, Feuerbach maintained that in order to recover his lost humanity, that is, to liberate himself, real man must reclaim his essence by denying God. Following this formula for human liberation, Marx asserted that, since man is alienated from (or robbed of) his species-being by the state (that is, the bureaucrats), which is the embodiment of Idea (reason), real man in civil society must recover human essence into himself, instead of entrusting that task to the state, or bureaucracy. Marx wrote that

only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a *species-being* in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his "*forces propres*" as *social forces*, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished.³⁸

Consequently, in *On the Jewish Question*, what Marx called species-being meant the man who has regained his political power, namely, the man who is an individual, and at the same time a *citoyen*. The society and the state which he had then as an ideal were, as Jean Jacques Rousseau stated, the society and the state which are "*capable of . . . transforming each individual, who by himself is a complete and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole, from which, in a sense, the individual receives his life and his being.*"³⁹

Here it can be seen that while Marx was in the humanist position, his arguing point gradually changed and developed. By the time he wrote the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, he had managed to conclude only that the power of the state cannot resolve the situation of disorder in civil society; but in *On the Jewish Question*, Marx maintained that the disorder within civil society can be solved only when the individual real man in civil society becomes a *species-being*.

How, then, does one achieve the recovery of the species-being (in other words, the liberation of man), in Marx's view? The answer relates to the continuation of his thought. When he wrote *On the Jewish Question*, what Marx called a "real man" was merely an ordinary citizen, and the recovery of the species-being was not explained in concrete terms. In *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law. Introduction* (December 1843-January 1844)—In other words, about two months after the previous book and immediately after he sought refuge in Paris—Marx's distinct orientation began to surface clearly, as shown below.

In the former book, Marx took a position similar to Feuerbach's humanism, and said that man needs to be restored to "man himself"; in the latter, however, he first asserted that religion is the "opium of the people";⁴⁰ and then he announced that the problem of human alienation should no longer be dealt with as a religious problem (as had been done by Feuerbach), instead, it must be dealt with as a legal, political problem. Concerning that, he wrote the following:

The immediate *task of philosophy*, which is at the service of history, once the *holy form* of human self-estrangement has been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in its *unholy forms*. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the *criticism of religion* into the *criticism of law* and the *criticism of theology* into the *criticism of politics*.⁴¹

His conclusion was that in order to achieve the recovery of the species-being (in other words, the recovery of human nature), one must deal with the political system of capitalism. And finally Marx made it clear that the liberation of man was to be accomplished through the "negation of private property" by a particular class, the proletariat. His words are as follows:

Where, then, is the positive possibility of a German emancipation? *Answer*: In the formation of a class with *radical chains*, . . . a sphere, . . . which, in a word, is the *complete loss* of man and hence can win itself only through the *complete rewinning of man*. This dissolution of society as a particular estate is the *proletariat*.⁴²

By proclaiming the *dissolution of the hitherto existing world order* the proletariat merely states the secret of its own existence, for it is in fact the dissolution of that world order. By demanding the negation of private property, the proletariat merely raises to the rank of a principle of society what society has made the principle of the proletariat, what, without its own cooperation, is already incorporated in it as the negative result of society.⁴³

In addition to that, he wrote:

As philosophy finds its *material* weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its *spiritual* weapons in philosophy. And once the lightning of thought has squarely struck this ingenuous soil of the people, the emancipation of the *Germans* into *human beings* will take place. . . . The *thorough* Germany cannot make a revolution without making a *thoroughgoing* revolution. The *emancipation of the German is the emancipation of the human being*. The head of this emancipation is *philosophy*; its *heart* is the *proletariat*. Philosophy cannot be made a reality without the transcendence of the proletariat, the proletariat cannot transcend itself without philosophy being made reality.⁴⁴

Here he definitively set the goal of overthrowing capitalist society (which was the political system in Germany), and also pointed out the proletariat as the only force capable of carrying out revolution.

In the transition from *On the Jewish Question to Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law. Introduction* (hereafter also referred to as *Introduction*), Marx at last was ready to give up his Feuerbachian humanist position and began to deal with the question of human alienation from a legal and political point of view. Finally he assumed the position that this problem cannot be dealt with except from an economic perspective.⁴⁵ This way, the question of the human alienation was the impetus behind the formulation of Marx's characteristic thought.

During the period of two months Marx went from believing that human liberation had to be "accomplished by the hands of real man in civil society," to believing that man could be liberated only through "the negation of private property by the proletariat." Why did he change his view so abruptly? Marx did not explain his reasons, but it may not be mistaken to presume as follows, considering the circumstances of those days. First, Marx, who had resigned from the *Rheinische Zeitung* because of strict censorship and suppression on the part of the Prussian government, harbored defiance and hostility against that government. Those feelings

were intensified when he fled to Paris. His hostile feelings are obvious when one reads passages such as the following:

War on the German conditions! By all means! They are *below the level of history, beneath any criticism*, but they are still an object of criticism. . . . Its object is its enemy, which it wants not to refute but to exterminate. . . . Its essential sentiment is *indignation*, its essential activity is *denunciation*.⁴⁶

It can easily be guessed that such a feeling of indignation toward Prussia (Germany) would drive him to the theory of revolution—the negation of private property by the Proletariat.⁴⁷

Second, in the year before Marx sought refuge in Paris, his mother, who had opposed his marriage to Jenny von Westphalen, was induced by her relatives into denying him his share of the family estate, and because of that, Marx was deprived of his means of subsistence.⁴⁸ One can imagine that Marx was indignant at that as well, and those feelings may have influenced his decision of the following year to deny private property.

Third, in *Der Sozialismus und Kommunismus des Heutigen Frankreichs* (The socialism and communism of present-day France, 1842), by Lorenz von Stein, the proletariat is described as an enlightened body united under the purpose of negating private property. It is considered that Marx found that a fitting idea and used it unconditionally. This fact has been pointed out by several scholars.⁴⁹

Fourth, it can be imagined that, influenced by P.J. Proudhon's *Qu'est-ce que la Propriété* ("What Is Property?"),⁵⁰ Marx applied materialistically to civil society the dialectic of "affirmation-negation-synthesis," learned from Hegel, and concluded that private property must be negated. That can be recognized also from the fact that Marx dealt with private property and the proletariat as opposites (namely, as affirmation and negation) in *The Holy Family* (September-November, 1844), which he wrote about one year after the *Introduction*.

Private property as private property [affirmation], as wealth, is compelled to maintain itself and thereby its opposite, the proletariat [negation], in existence. . . . The proletariat, on the contrary, is compelled as proletariat to transcend itself and thereby its opposite, private property, which determines its existence, and which makes it proletariat.⁵¹

At the time Marx had written that book he had not yet begun his studies of economics. In spite of that, however, he established revolution by the proletariat as his goal. What does that mean? It means that his subsequent studies of capitalistic economy could not but become a study for the purpose of accomplishing that goal. Actually his entire study after that proceeded in the direction of rationalizing his goal.

If one has set up one's conclusion in advance and tries to formulate a theory to fit that conclusion, then that theory will necessarily become fictitious and deceptive—except in the case of a deductive religious theory, which has God as the starting point. In other words, communism has contained fiction and deception from its very beginning. At any rate, in order to provide legal and political solutions to the problem of human alienation, Marx could not but look to economics for the key to those solutions. Therefore, in Paris, he began his study of economics.

VI. MARX'S STUDY OF ECONOMICS AND HIS THEORY OF HUMAN ALIENATION

During his stay in Paris (November, 1843—February, 1845) Marx devoted himself to the study of economics. On the foundation of *Outline of a Critique of Political Economy* by Engels, Marx made a critical survey of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say, Sismond de Sismondi, and others. Three of Marx's manuscripts, written between April and August 1844, were published together in 1932 under the title of *Economic and Philosophic*

Manuscripts of 1844 (hereafter also referred to as *Manuscripts*). In these articles, Marx's theory of human alienation developed along the materialistic and dialectical direction. Later he came to advocate violent revolution from the viewpoint of the dialectical theory of struggle.

The main points Marx discovered from studying economics while in Paris were, first, that in capitalist society "the worker has become a commodity;"⁵² and second, that the economy in capitalist society is carried on through the exploitation of the worker, in such a way that, regardless of however hard he may work, all the product of his labor would be plundered, with the result that "the worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces. . . . The worker becomes an even cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates."⁵³ What does this mean? This means exactly that the worker is alienated. Thus, Marx analyzed in detail the structure of the alienation of the workers in capitalist society and described its several aspects as below.

The first aspect is "the alienation of labor product from the worker."⁵⁴ The worker produces a product (a commodity) through his labor. Under the capitalistic relations of production, however, the worker's labor product actually belongs to others. As a result, the labor product opposes the worker and becomes alien to him. Then the labor product, which has become the private possession of the capitalist forms capital,⁵⁵ and capital dominates the workers.⁵⁶

The second aspect is "the alienation of labor from the worker."⁵⁷ In capitalist society, the act of labor itself belongs to another person, namely, the capitalist. Labor is compulsory and painful; workers experience no joy.⁵⁸

The third aspect is "the alienation of the species from man,"⁵⁹ which results from the two previous kinds of alienation. Man's species-essence is his free activity of production, his conscious activity of production, and is essentially different from that of the animal, which is merely controlled by its physical desire and pro-

duces one-sidedly only what it or its young needs directly. In other words, man has species-life when he works upon the objective world in freedom, that is, in the free activity of creation.⁶⁰ And yet, since labor has become alienated from the worker, it has also become reduced to a mere means to satisfy the needs of bodily existence; consequently, free, conscious activity has become alienated from man.

The fourth aspect is the “alienation of man from man,” which can be seen as the direct result of the third aspect of alienation. The fact that man is alienated from the species means that he has become self-alienated and comes to oppose himself; and this means at the same time that man opposes not only himself but also other people.⁶¹

That is how Marx analyzed the structure of the alienation of the workers. In a nutshell, he argued that the reason the worker has lost his human nature is that he was robbed of the product of his labor. Furthermore, Marx said that not only the worker but also the capitalist has lost his human nature.

The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-estrangement. But the former class feels at ease and strengthened in this self-estrangement, it recognizes estrangement as *its own power* and has in it the *semblance* of a human existence.⁶²

The comfortable life of the capitalist is in fact not the life of the true human nature, but rather a “semblance” of human existence. According to Marx, capitalists themselves must also recover their lost human nature. In Marx, the workers’ loss of their human nature, namely, the alienation of their labor products, brings about the loss of human nature by all people. And when the workers recover their human nature, that is, when they regain their lost labor product, the people of the other class (the capitalists) also will recover their human nature, according to him. Contrary to Feuerbach—who maintained that reason, love, and will were man’s species-essence—Marx, holding that labor is the common nature

of mankind, in which everyone must partake, asserted that the true species-essence of man is labor.

In Marx, the concept of species-essence meant, before his Paris days, “freedom,” and the concept of species-being meant “*citoyen*,” or the like; but after his studies of economics in Paris, his concept of freedom became connected with labor, and then he clearly fixed his concept of human species-essence as “labor as free activity of production (living activity).”

Incidentally, it is often pointed out that Marx’s understanding of the concept of “alienated labor” was influenced by Engels’ *Outline of a Critique of Political Economy*, and by English classical economics. More essentially, however, Marx’s view resulted from the fact that he was influenced by Hegel’s view of labor as self-objectification (self-alienation), and as something opposing the self. Marx himself explains that

the outstanding achievement of Hegel’s *Phänomenologie* and of its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of *labor* and comprehends objective man—true, because real man—as the outcome of man’s *own labor*.⁶³

Marx, in continuing with his analysis of human alienation, considered the cause of human alienation to be “the dismantlement of humanistic community,” which is the same as “the establishment of private ownership.” In other words, since the private property of the capitalists consists of the alienated product of labor (“private property is the product of alienated labor”),⁶⁴ then the private property system itself is nothing but the very structure of alienation. Accordingly, he concluded that the way to recover the alienated human nature is the transcendence (*Aufhebung*) of private property, which is, exactly, communism. He describes communism as

the *positive* transcendence of *private property*, as *human self-estrangement*, and therefore as the real *appropriation* of the *human essence* by and for man.⁶⁵

He also says,

The positive transcendence of *private property*, as the appropriation of *human life*, is therefore the positive transcendence of all estrangement—that is to say, the return of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his *human*, i.e., *social*, existence.⁶⁶

The transcendence of private property is therefore the complete *emancipation* of all human senses and qualities.⁶⁷

Thus Marx claimed that the “transcendence of private property” is the recovery of the species-being and the liberation of human nature from alienation.

VII. MARX’S FORMATION OF THE THEORY OF REVOLUTION

While in Paris, Marx started working on *The Holy Family* (Sept.-Nov., 1844), after finishing the *Manuscripts*. About that time, Engels came to Paris and helped Marx on that project, and it was published as a joint work. In the *Introduction*, Marx determined that the proletariat is the revolutionary force and called for the liberation of man by the proletariat. Then, in *The Holy Family*, Marx criticized Bruno Bauer and his group for putting down the proletariat and calling them uncritical masses, and also reaffirmed that the proletariat is the true creator of history and has the mission to liberate itself.

Since the conditions of life of the proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of society today in their most inhumane form; since man. . . through urgent, no longer removable, no longer disguisable, absolutely imperative need . . . is driven directly to revolt against this inhumanity, it follows that the proletariat can and must emancipate itself. . . . Its aim and historical action is visibly and irrevocably foreshadowed in its own life situation as well as in the whole organization of bourgeois society today.⁶⁸

Before seeing *The Holy Family* published (Feb., 1845), Marx was forced to leave Paris by the French government, which was complying with the request of the Prussian government. Expelled from Paris, he moved to Brussels, where he lived in extreme poverty. Nevertheless, thanks to the help he received from Engels, he was once again able to start working vigorously. The Prussian government, however, again interfered and pressured the Belgian government to expel Marx from that country. Finally, Marx had to give up his Prussian citizenship in order to escape persecution by the Prussian government.

Arriving in Brussels in the spring of 1845, Marx wrote *Theses on Feuerbach*, which was a complete break with Feuerbachian humanism. At the end of that year, he and Engels, who had himself moved to Brussels, began working on *The German Ideology*, which was completed in May of the following year. In that book, Marx and Engels completed their critique of *The German ideology* (the idealistic views of German thinkers of that time), He dealt with the views of Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer and Max Stirner and the German socialists.⁶⁹ What is remarkable here is that, in *The German Ideology*, Marx's early theme of the recovery of human nature disappeared, and the reforming of the world—that is, revolution—became the real and most important goal for him.

Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality (will) have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.⁷⁰

For the practical materialist, i.e., the communist, it is a question of revolutionizing the existing world, of practically coming to grips with and changing the things found in existence.⁷¹

From January 1847 Marx worked on criticizing Proudhon's idea that capitalism should be reformed peacefully. The results of his criticism were published in July of the same year, under the title *The Poverty of Philosophy*. This represented an arrangement of the first fruits of his critical inquiry into bourgeois economics, which

he started in Paris. He said there that the revolution was “the shock of body against body,” that is, a violent struggle.

Meanwhile the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a struggle of class against class, a struggle which carried to its highest expression is a total revolution. Indeed, is it at all surprising that a society founded on the opposition of classes should culminate in brutal contradiction, the shock of body against body, as its final denouement?⁷²

While writing *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels, together with several comrades, established in Brussels the “Communist Correspondence Committee” in February 1846. Marx had joined the “League of the Just,” an organization of émigré German communists, which was reorganized in the summer of 1847 in London, in accordance with Marx’s claims. That organization was renamed “The League of Communists,” and held its second assembly, also in London, late the same year. At the second meeting, Marx and Engels were entrusted with preparing a declaration in the name of the league. Then, in February 1848, they issued the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (hereafter also referred to as *Manifesto*), proclaiming communist revolution to all the world.

In the *Manifesto*, Marx and Engels explained the role of class struggle in human history, stressed the importance of the abolition of private property, criticized the various traditional types of socialism—feudalistic socialism, Christian socialism, “true socialism,” conservative socialism, utopian socialism—and also existing forms of communism. Finally, he declared that revolution is the mission of all communists, and concluded with “Working Men of All Countries, Unite!”⁷³ In the *Manifesto*, Marx Proclaimed the necessity of class struggle and proletarian revolution, that is, the inevitability of the overthrow of the bourgeois class by the proletarian class, and the inevitability of the violent subversion of order:

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.⁷⁴

Its [the bourgeoisie's] fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.⁷⁵

The immediate aim of the Communist is . . . formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the Proletariat.⁷⁶

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private Property.⁷⁷

They [the communists] openly declare that their ends can be attained only by "the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win."⁷⁸

From these statements we can get a glimpse of Marx's steadfast conviction about revolution by the proletariat. Marx, who during his Paris days had expressed in the Manuscripts the abstract view that communism is "the positive transcendence [*Aufhebung*] of private property,"⁷⁹ in the *Manifesto* (1848) asserted the concrete view that communism is "the abolition [*Abschaffung*] of bourgeois property,"⁸⁰ and the overthrow of social order through violent revolution.

As mentioned, the theory of "proletarian revolution," which Marx had left abstract in the Introduction, became a real and practical theory of revolution after his move from Paris to Brussels.

In view of this change, we should inquire into the psychological background that led Marx toward revolutionary practice. This is because—as was mentioned in the beginning—a thinker's psychological disposition, personality and so on, are the subjective factors that influence the development of his thought. Since Marx was pursued persistently by the Prussian government, even after his deportation from Paris and arrival in Brussels, he must have felt loneliness, alienation and pressure even more than before, and those feelings must have turned into even more furious hatred and hostility against the Prussian government. We can imagine that, with such a psychological background, Marx eventually

leaped to the real and practical theory of revolution.⁸¹ In other words, in Brussels Marx wrote *The German Ideology*, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, and the *Manifesto*, in which he gradually formulated the outline of his theory, especially economics and the materialist view of history. He did that in accordance with his decision to uphold the practice of revolution and in order to rationalize and substantiate the necessity of "proletarian revolution," which he had already made in the Introduction.

As we have seen, Marx's point of view concerning human liberation changed gradually. Here let us once again trace the footprints of Marx, who stated in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* (March-August, 1843), from Feuerbach's humanist position, that the disorderly men in civil society cannot be liberated by the power of the state. Then, he advocated in *On the Jewish Question* (September-October, 1843), still from Feuerbach's humanist position, that "real, individual man" must regain his species-being. Next, in the *Introduction* (Dec.1843-Jan.1844), he departed from Feuerbachian humanism, arguing that human liberation is "the negation of private property by the proletariat," and in the *Manuscripts* (April-August, 1844) he said that human liberation is possible only by "communism as the positive transcendence of private property." In *The German Ideology* (Sept.1845-May 1846), he wrote that the mission of communists is "to revolutionize the existing world, to come practically to grips with and change the things found in existence." In *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Dec.1846-June 1847), he showed that revolution is the "shock of body against body," in other words, violent revolution. And in the *Manifesto* (Dec.1847-Jan.1848), he proclaimed the "abolition of private property," which is identical to violent revolution. Finally, in the first volume of *Capital* (1867), he came to declare that the capitalist shell will finally be broken down by the growth and resistance of the proletarian class, and that "the knell of capitalist private property sounds."⁸²

The previous discussion has made it clear that Marx first set out the goal of liberating the human nature of the proletariat by the negation (transcendence) of private property—later on he changed to the “abolition of private property”—and then formulated the theory of revolution in order to attain that goal.

VIII. EARLY SOCIALISM AND EARLY COMMUNISM

Through his study of economics in Paris, Marx concluded that human alienation derives from the alienation of labor product, and that in order to regain human essence it is necessary to bring about the transcendence (and later abolition) of private property. As we have seen, however, Marx had already stated in the *Introduction* that in order to attain human liberation, one must negate private property, and that idea was formulated as a result of the direct influence of books on early socialism and early communism coming out of France.

It is likely that while in Paris Marx comprehensively studied early French socialism and communism.⁸³ Furthermore, Engels introduced him to the ideas of early British socialism.⁸⁴ Under the influence of these ideas, Marx developed his views on human liberation through the transcendence (or abolition) of private property. Therefore, since Marx seems to have studied the thought of the early socialists and communists while in Paris, I will outline that thought below, as a basis for a more detailed understanding of the growth process of Marx’s own thought.

A. Saint-Simon

Although an ardent supporter of the French Revolution, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), a French utopian socialist, was keenly aware of its limitations. He grasped the French Revolution not simply as class war between the nobility and the bourgeoisie, but rather as class war between the “idle rich people” and the “work-

ing people." By "idle rich people" Saint-Simon meant the nobility and the nonworking bourgeoisie, who lived on property income; and by the "working people" he was referring to wage-laborers, factory-owners, merchants, and bankers. He considered it proven through the experience of the French Revolution that the "idle rich people" had no capacity for spiritual and political leadership; he also considered it proven through the experience of the post-revolutionary period of terror that the propertyless masses (the wage-laborers) had no such capacity either. Thus, he placed his hopes on those who had received higher education—namely, science—and on the *industriels*, or working bourgeoisie, which included factory-owners, merchants and bankers. Thus he advocated "secular power for the *industriels*; mental power for science." Saint-Simon emphasized the importance of the ability of each person and envisioned an ideal society in which each person would be given a job according to his ability and a reward according to his labor.

With regard to the method to be employed, Saint-Simon maintained that social reform can be achieved by appealing to human reason, and he stressed that private property should be respected. Marx and Engels criticized as utopian the views proposed by Saint-Simon, but they praised some aspects of his thought. According to Engels,

to recognize the French Revolution as a class war, and not simply one between nobility and bourgeoisie, but between nobility, bourgeoisie, and the non-possessors, was, in the year 1802, a most pregnant discovery.⁸⁵

B. Fourier

Charles Fourier (1772-1837), a French utopian socialist contemporary with Saint-Simon, was from a merchant background, and based on his experience, he sharply criticized the ills of the bourgeois society established after the French Revolution. He called

commerce a “vulture” and described the factories, in which wage-laborers had become slaves, as “open prisons.”

Fourier explained the whole process of social development by the dialectic method. According to his explanation, history is divided into four stages of development, namely, savagery, barbarism, patriarchy and civilization; he considered that the present age belongs to the stage of civilization. He viewed civilization as moving in a vicious circle, continually bringing forth new contradictions; he said, “poverty is born of abundance itself.”

In his view, the ideal society is a world of harmony. He advocated a model communal society called *phalange*, characterized by harmony between mental labor and physical labor, between the whole and the individual, between the worker and the capitalist. In the *phalange*, there would exist a combination of town and country and the liberation of men and women. He actually conducted experiments in North America to implement his ideals, but his experiments ended in failure.

Marx and Engels criticized Fourier for being a utopian socialist, just as Saint-Simon had been criticized. They claimed that Fourier was not on the side of the proletariat. Engels, however, recognized the merits of Fourier’s method saying he used the dialectic as masterfully as Hegel had,⁸⁶ and in the *Manifesto*, Marx and Engels praised Fourier’s “positive propositions concerning the future society.”⁸⁷

C. Owen

In the 1770’s the Industrial Revolution started in England and brought about a rapid increase in productive power; along with that, however, labor problems also came to exist. The introduction of new machinery left numerous workers unemployed, the wages of the workers were decreased to the very minimum. Many workers became increasingly poor, and their conditions became such that the only way for them to live was for their wives and children to go to work also. Slums appeared everywhere, and unsightly

miserable conditions came into being. At that time, Robert Owen (1771-1858) emerged as one of the three great utopian socialists, together with Saint-Simon and Fourier. Owen was influenced by Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism and by 18th century French materialism. He made an effort to improve the workers' working conditions and way of life, considering that human character can be changed by improving the social environment.

Starting as an apprentice, he rose to become manager of a spinning mill in New Lanark, Scotland, in 1800. While in that position he endeavored to improve the living conditions of the workers by reducing working hours, by introducing modern labor management techniques, and by providing services such as a nursery and kindergarten—all with good result. New Lanark became widely known in Europe and America as "the holy land of social reform." In order to enlarge that movement further, and to carry out the improvement of working conditions on a national scale, he insisted that the movement of social reform should be implemented through legislation and education. His program, however, was not accepted by the government.

Later, Owen advocated the denial of what he described as the three evils of the capitalist system—that is, the existing religious system, the practice of marriage without love, and the system of private property. Because of these views, however, he came to be criticized by the public. In addition, he went to the United States to try to build a *New Harmony* society of cooperatives, which was a communistic experiment. Later on, he went back to England to try to make "labor bazaars for the exchange of the products of labor through the medium of labor-notes, whose unit was a single hour of work"⁸⁸—but both projects ended in failure. He continued, however, to devote his life to the trade union movements, and came to be called the initiator of modern socialism.

Marx and Engels criticized Owen as a utopian socialist, but they evaluated his plan for social reform as excellent. They thought of him as having made an advance in the direction of

communism, in spite of the failure in which his experiments had ended.⁸⁹

D. Early French Communism

At that time there were early communist movements in France. The representatives were Grachus Babeuf, Louis Auguste Blanqui and Étienne Cabet, among others.

Babeuf (1764-1797), who played an active role as a radical element in the French Revolution, created at the end of the Revolution a secret organization, the *Club du Panthéon*, or "Association for Equality," and planned an uprising aiming at the abolition of private property and the realization of an egalitarian society. As it turned out, however, his plan was discovered, and he was executed. Babeuf is considered a forerunner of Communism in that he insisted on the abolition of private property.

Babeuf's thought was inherited by Blanqui (1805-1881), who took part in various revolutionary movements in France, and played a key role in the affairs of the Paris Commune (1870). He asserted that a selected few should seize power through violent revolution, thereby setting up a dictatorship by a small number of revolutionaries. Blanqui was criticized by Marx and Engels for failing to recognize the significance of mass movements and economic struggle.

Cabet (1778-1856) considered inequality in wealth to be the cause of all social evils, and therefore insisted on the establishment of an egalitarian community. He expressed his views in *A Book of Travel in Icaria*. He opposed the seizure of political power by violence, and believed that a communist society could be realized by peaceful means. Later on, he settled in the United States and attempted to establish a communist society, but his effort ended in failure.

As mentioned earlier, before moving to Paris, Marx criticized Hegel from Feuerbach's humanist point of view and claimed that man could not be emancipated by the power of the state; moreo-

ver he stated that the real individual man must become a species-being. It can be supposed that Marx, who was struggling with the problem of how to emancipate man, received many suggestions from the above-mentioned early socialism and early communism. Among those suggestions were Saint-Simon's idea about the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the non-possessors, Fourier's image of a future ideal society, Owen's movement for social reform, Babeuf's assertion of the abolition of private property, and Babeuf's and Blanqui's vision of violent revolution and dictatorship by the revolutionary people, and so on.

Therefore, through his studies of economics and his analysis of early socialism and early communism during his days in Paris, Marx clarified more and more his method of liberating man: through the recovery of human essence, to come about when the proletariat would seize power from the bourgeoisie through class struggle and abolish bourgeois private property.

IX. MARXISM AS AN EXTENSION OF THE THEORY OF HUMAN ALIENATION

In many countries today revolutions have taken place, the private property system has been abolished, and socialism is being implemented. According to Marx's and Lenin's theory, the means of production have been socialized, and all profits (the product of surplus labor) have been put under social ownership (the joint ownership of the workers). This is so, at least in name. But have people in those nations achieved the recovery of human nature, which Marx so eagerly desired? The answer is no.

For example, in the case of the Soviet Union, human nature is more trampled upon and workers are more exploited in the name of the social ownership of profit than in capitalist society. It is a well-documented fact, corroborated by Alexander Solzhenitsyn,

Andrei Sakharov and many other Soviet intellectuals, that freedom and human rights are thoroughly violated in that country. Such phenomena are not confined to the Soviet Union, but can be seen in all communist nations. As mentioned in the *Introduction*, the indomitable movements for liberalization and the various religious movements, widespread in communist countries today, speak eloquently of the seriousness of this situation.

In this way, Marx's method of solving the problem of human alienation has failed completely. Moreover, communism has done, and continues to do, immense damage to humankind. Why is that so? It is because communist theory is false. As has been discussed, communist theory was developed on the basis of Marx's theory of human alienation; in fact it is simply an extension of Marx's theory of human alienation. Accordingly, Marx's theory of human alienation is the real cause of the ills and contradictions within the communist world.

According to Marx, human alienation consists of the alienation of labor product from the worker, the alienation of labor from the worker, the alienation of the species-essence from man, and the alienation of man from man. And the way to recover alienated human nature is to abolish private property and to have workers own that property jointly. Here the leading force to abolish private property (which is the recovery of species-being) is to be the proletariat who possesses nothing. In addition, Marx openly declared that the abolition of private property is to be carried out through violent methods.

Marx opposed the utopian socialists (Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen) who attempted to appeal to human reason and morality; he also opposed those who advocated the radical principle of violence, who advocated the seizing of power through temporary uprisings (Babeuf, Blanqui, and others). All of them had failed in bringing about social revolution, and Marx ascribed the cause of these failures to the poverty of their theory (philosophy) and the lack of mass organization. Marx, then, proposed to establish a

theoretical system which could appeal to the masses and gain their support. That theoretical system was composed of dialectical materialism, the materialist dialectic, the materialist conception of history, and the economic theories of *Capital*. Marx systematized those theories as weapons for the proletariat.⁹⁰

Thus, we must know that the theory of communism was set up simply as a means to rationalize and justify the abolition of private property through violent revolution; therefore, it would be false to state that Marxism is a system of truth obtained as a result of objective social research. Nevertheless, since communism started out with the theory of human alienation, which aimed at the recovery of human nature in the humanistic dimension, and since that theory was designed so as to appear truly able to emancipate human nature, Marxism has been quite convincing to those people in the free world who are aware of the contradictions and ills of capitalist society. But since that theory was skillfully fabricated through stratagems and the clever misuse of concepts to rationalize its goal (that is, violent revolution), from the beginning it has been destined to be abolished eventually, just as soon as its irrationality and falsity are disclosed.

The truth or falsity of a theory becomes clarified through practice. Thus, when the truth of a theory cannot be proven in practice, then the inconsistency between that theory and practice is seen as arising either from error within the theory itself or from error in its interpretation. That error, whether derived from the theory itself or from an incorrect interpretation of it, is likely to engender diverse and even opposing points of view in leaders following that theory, and furthermore may even cause power struggles.

With regard to Marxism (communism), the theory itself has been false from the beginning; in addition, it can be interpreted in various ways. Accordingly, in communist society there necessarily arise oppositions and contradictions of opinion among leaders. Moreover, they consider the struggle of opposites to be indispensable, according to their law of contradiction (the dialectic); and

that law thus even justifies struggles among leaders. In fact, power struggles never cease among political leaders of different communist nations and even among political leaders within the same communist nation. For instance, after the death of Stalin, the monolithic unity of international communism was broken down, and was divided into nationalistic forms of communism.

This chapter has outlined Marx's theory of human alienation and the process of how Marx, starting from his theory of human alienation, came to establish Marxism. In the following chapters I will examine, criticize, and overcome Marxism, that is, the theory of communism.

2

COMMUNIST MATERIALISM *CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL*

Although the materialistic thought system of communism is usually known as dialectical materialism, I call it here communist materialism. The reason I call it so is, in the first place, that a critique of dialectical materialism could be interpreted as a critique of something other than communist materialism; and, second, a critique of dialectical materialism does not specify whether it is a critique of the dialectic or of materialism.

Moreover, communist materialism will not be called simply materialism, so as to avoid giving the impression that humanistic materialists in free society are to be treated as communists. Humanistic materialism in free society and militant communist materialism¹ are entirely different in nature, though they are both materialism.

I. THEORY, PRACTICE, AND THE PARTISANSHIP OF PHILOSOPHY

A. The Communist View

1. Theory and Practice

Many thinkers have advocated until today that theory and practice—or knowledge and deed—are one. Socrates (470-399 B.C.), for instance, defended the unity of knowledge and deed,

maintaining that knowledge guides one's life of righteousness and is always connected with one's deeds. Chu-tzū (1130-1200) of the Southern Sung Dynasty of China, stated that, while knowledge and deeds stand in a complementary relationship to each other, knowledge is prior to deeds. Wang Yangming (1472-1529), of the Ming Dynasty of China, proposed the doctrine of the unity of knowledge and practice, asserting that knowledge becomes true knowledge when it is practiced.

Communism likewise insists on the unity of theory and practice, but we must know that, in the case of communism, their concept of theory (knowledge) and practice (deed) is not intended for leading a morally righteous life, but rather for carrying out revolution. Concerning this, Marx, Lenin and Stalin have stated the following:

The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it.²

A correct revolutionary theory . . . is not a dogma, but assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement.³

Of course, theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illuminated by revolutionary theory.⁴

2. The Partisanship of Philosophy

Communist materialism says that all philosophies necessarily serve the interest of a certain class. This is called the partisanship of philosophy, which Lenin explains as follows:

Marx and Engels were partisans in Philosophy from start to finish, they were able to detect the deviations from materialism and concessions to idealism and fideism in every one of the "recent" trends.⁵

Recent philosophy is as partisan as was philosophy two thousand years ago. The contending parties are essentially — although this is concealed by a pseudo-erudite quackery of new

terms or by a weak-minded non-partisanship — materialism and idealism.⁶

Accordingly, communists regard philosophies in history as follows: Aristotle's philosophy of the ancient Greek period served the interest of the ruling class, maintaining that the institution of slavery was decreed by nature. Thomas Aquinas's philosophy of the Middle Ages rationalized the rule of the Pope and monarchs, asserting that the universe formed a feudalistic hierarchy. Also, mechanistic materialism in modern times rationalized capitalism, holding that the worker and the capitalist, who are human atoms on an equal level, are connected by a free contract in capitalist society—just as the world consists of independent atoms.⁷

As stated before, the purpose of liberating man by the proletariat was rooted at the depth of Marx's thought. Not only did that purpose-consciousness remain unchanged, but it even became increasingly stronger in the process of the formation of Marx's thought—and, finally, this turned out to be the assertion concerning the partisanship of philosophy in Marxism. Accordingly, he would accept eagerly any thought that supported his purpose, and would utilize it to build his own thought. On the other hand, if a thought became an obstacle to the attainment of his purpose, he would criticize it mercilessly and thoroughly. In other words, Marx, who in his orientation toward the proletarian revolution, would clearly determine whether or not a certain thought stood on the side of the proletariat, serving the interests of the revolution. For example, Feuerbach, who criticized Christianity and Hegel's philosophy from the standpoint of humanism, was at first Marx's ally and teacher; but when Marx clarified his purpose-consciousness of seeking the liberation of man by the proletariat, he ceased to regard Feuerbach as his ally, and even became his mortal enemy. Furthermore, as I will explain later, Marx and Engels thoroughly criticized Feuerbach.

B. Critique and Counterproposal

1. On the Unity of Theory and Practice

From the Unification Thought perspective, there is no objection to the point of communist materialism that theory and practice are one; there is an issue, however, with regard to the content of theory and practice. In communism, practice means revolution; and theory is closely related to practice. And yet, though revolutions have occurred in many countries, where the private property of the bourgeoisie was abolished, man's species-essence—that is, freedom—has not been recovered. On the contrary, freedom in those nations is severely violated, and a small number of communist leaders have replaced the bourgeoisie and have assumed dictatorial control over the wealth of all the people. This fact means that Marx's understanding of the problem of human alienation and his method for its solution was wrong. Therefore, it also means that his theory (i.e., Marxism)—which was a development of his theory of human alienation—was wrong. Accordingly, though communist materialism insists on the unity of theory and practice, this view actually has no significance whatsoever.

From the standpoint of Unification Thought, practice is understood as practice to realize the Kingdom of Heaven, and theory is understood as theory for the sake of realizing the Kingdom of Heaven. To realize the Kingdom of Heaven means to realize the world of true freedom, peace, justice and happiness through God's truth and love. Such a world can be actualized through the attainment of the three great blessings, which God offered to man—in other words, through the perfection of one's individuality, one's family, and one's dominion over all things, centering on the Heart of God.⁸ This means that all of humanity should become brothers and sisters under God as their Parent, should love each other, and should develop politics, economics, art, science, and so on. Due to the human Fall, the three great blessings were never realized.⁹ As a result of the Fall, man lost his original nature, and

fell into the so-called state of alienation. (The theory of human alienation based on Unification Thought, will be presented in chapter eight of this book.)

2. On the Partisanship of Philosophy

Unification Thought asserts that what is essential in philosophy is not “partisanship,” but rather “truthfulness.” No great philosophy that has emerged in history has been able to escape being relative; in other words, every truth in the past has been relative. The reason is that man has been away from God, who is the absolute standard of truth. Nevertheless, man has been seeking the absolute truth, moving forward step by step throughout history. In other words, change in thought systems has repeatedly occurred in the past in such a way that, when a given period of history passes away and a new age comes, the existing thoughts of the passing period become no longer adaptable to the new age; in other words, the truthfulness of the old thought system fades away and a new thought system appears as a new truth in substitution for the old one. Such development of thought systems will continue until the absolute truth, namely, God’s Word, appears.

Accordingly, in the course of the development of history, a thought system with lower truthfulness has always given way to a thought system with higher truthfulness. Therefore, all the thoughts in history are necessarily truths limited to their historical time and circumstances, and are relative truths. Nevertheless, though thought systems of older periods may have been replaced by new thought systems, each made a necessary contribution in a given period of history and in a given part of the world. The thought of a providential person set up by God plays an especially important role in raising the truthfulness of philosophy. With regard to the thought systems that appeared in history, if any of them contained a part with a particularly high degree of truthfulness, that part would last a long time regardless of the changes of the times, or would be re-valued at a later time.

Marxism insists on the partisanship of philosophy and states that all thought systems only serve the interests of a specific class, but that is not the case. The standard of a thought system is originally based not on partisanship, but on truthfulness. In other words, any given thought should, first of all, be examined with regard to its truthfulness, and only as a second or third consideration, with regard to how much or how little it serves the interests of a given class. Actually, the only thought system that was formulated with partisanship from its very beginning is Marxism; the reason is that Marxism is a strategic thought, put together for the sake of justifying the class struggle of proletariat against bourgeoisie.

Aristotle supported slavery because his political thought was limited to the truth of the times, in the sense that his thought system was based on the particular situation of the *polis* of Greece; and it cannot be claimed that Aristotle's entire thought system was based on partisanship. Aristotle's thought possesses many non-partisan and transcendent elements, which continue to exert great influence on present-day philosophies. With regard to Thomas Aquinas, he developed a Christian thought system centered on absolute God. Even though his system contained some limitations of the times, a great portion of it has preserved its truthfulness, transcending time and place, and will continue to preserve its truthfulness, as long as Christianity continues to exist. Essentially, Aquinas's thought contained no partisanship. And neither did the mechanistic materialism of modern times, which held that all men should be regarded as equal.

Generally speaking, thought systems are not partisan at their inception; admittedly, however, it has often been the case that the rulers of a given period have taken advantage of them in order to maintain their power. As a result, there are cases where certain thought systems look as if they were developed based on partisanship from the beginning; in actuality, however, that was not the essential nature of those thought systems.

Another point must be added here: when Marxism mentions partisanship, strictly speaking it refers to the partisanship of only two thoughts, namely, materialism and idealism. Lenin refers to this when he said, "the contending parties are essentially . . . materialism and idealism."¹⁰ Maurice Cornforth says that idealism has always served the reactionary, conservative forces (the ruling class) and materialism has always served the progressive, revolutionary forces (the ruled class).¹¹

This, however, is also not correct. For example, Christianity, which suffered severe persecution under the Roman Empire (a slave society), eventually subjugated that empire.¹² And yet, it was based not on materialism, but rather on pure idealism. In the end, we realize that Marxism insisted on the partisanship of philosophy only because it needed to justify its claim that it was the only right thought system for liberating the working class.

II. MECHANISTIC AND FEUERBACHIAN MATERIALISM

The soil for the formation of communist materialism was provided by eighteenth-century mechanistic materialism and by Feuerbachian materialism. Communist materialism developed first through being influenced by those two types of materialism, and then through criticizing them.

In this section I will first discuss the basic points of mechanistic and Feuerbachian materialism and the communist critique of them; and then I will critique the communist view of these two types of materialism from the viewpoint of Unification Thought.

A. The Communist Critique of Mechanistic Materialism

Mechanistic materialism explained every movement as dynamic movement, holding that even the phenomena of life and

human consciousness are essentially identical to the physical phenomena of nature. In the 17th century, as natural science developed, some thinkers came to regard nature as independent from God and to deal with it mechanically. René Descartes advocated a mechanical view of nature based upon mathematics; Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza attempted to grasp mechanically even that which is spiritual. The mechanistic theory developed materialistically into the 18th century French materialism, which was known as mechanistic materialism. Its representative figures are Julien Offroy de La Mettrie, Paul Henri Thiry d'Holbach and Denis Diderot. La Mettrie wrote *L'homme machine* (Man a Machine, 1747) and asserted that man is nothing but another kind of machine.

Mechanistic materialism made the following assertions: just as a machine is composed of different parts, so society is composed of social atoms (that is, individuals), which interact with one another. Each individual has independent rights and individuality; all individuals are equal. Based on these views of mechanistic materialism, the ideas of freedom and equality, which were the ideals of the French Revolution, came into being. Communists held in high esteem the fact that mechanistic materialism had crushed human discrimination under the feudalistic hierarchy of the Middle Ages, and had become the driving force for the civil revolutions. Nevertheless, Marxism denounced mechanistic materialism saying that it had turned into idealism and had begun to protect the capitalist class after the establishment of capitalist society. The main points of the communist criticism can be summarized as follows:

First, just as a machine cannot move by itself but needs an outside motive power to move it, so also the universe, which is a huge mechanical device, must necessarily be seen as being moved by an outside motive power. Accordingly, certain mechanistic views, such as those of Voltaire and Thomas Paine, accepted what Isaac Newton called "a divine first impulse,"¹³ and became ideal-

ist. Secondly, mechanistic materialism recognizes movements, but they are mere mechanical movements of repetition. It did not recognize a movement of development in which a new quality emerges. Thirdly, to disregard a movement of development in nature is to disregard the development of society, and accordingly it failed to grasp the law of development in history, and did not recognize social revolution. Summarized above is the communist critique of mechanistic materialism (according to Maurice Cornforth).¹⁴

B. The Communist Critique of Feuerbachian Materialism

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) upheld sensualism, or naturalism, and from that position, he thoroughly criticized Christian theology and Hegelian idealistic philosophy, and greatly influenced Marx and Engels. Feuerbach wrote in *The Essence of Christianity* (1841), "The divine being is . . . the human essence purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective."¹⁵ Let us examine the meaning of this.

Man's essence is reason, love, will, and so on. He wishes for this essence to become perfect and infinite. Thus, he has objectified that essence as species-essence, transcending each limited individual, and has come to worship it as perfect and infinite—in other words, as God. Therefore, what constitutes the essence of God is nothing but man's essence itself. Feuerbach said, "The secret of theology is nothing else than anthropology."¹⁶

In this way he denied God and traditional religion, and came to regard religious love as human love. He held that the irrationality of society can be rooted out by human love. In his *Preliminary Theses for the Reform of Philosophy* (1842), Feuerbach criticized Hegelian idealism and put forward his materialist position that thinking is based on being—in other words, spirit is based on matter. He made his point as follows:

He who clings to Hegelian philosophy also clings to theology. The Hegelian doctrine that nature or reality is posited by the Idea, is the *rational expression* of the theological doctrine that nature, the material being, has been created by God, the non-material; i.e., abstract, being. . . . The true relationship of thought to being is this only: *Being* [matter] is the *subject*, *thought* [spirit] the *predicate*. Thought comes from being, but being does not come from thought.¹⁷

Feuerbach's materialism, however, is sensualism, whereby he comprehends man as essentially sensuous; and it is also naturalism, whereby he views nature as a living organism. Thus, his thought system cannot be considered materialism in the strict sense, which explains nature and society as purely material phenomena.¹⁸

At first, Marx and Engels enthusiastically accepted Feuerbach's views, but later they rejected them on the grounds that he had failed to deal with "real historical man," dealing only with man as an abstraction, that is, as "Man" (*der Mensch*), and that he knew no human relation other than love and friendship.¹⁹ Marx claimed that Feuerbach, though a materialist in theory, was an idealist in practice;²⁰ and Engels said that Feuerbach was "a materialist below and an idealist above."²¹ For Marx and Engels, all materialists should be revolutionaries. Referring to Feuerbach, Marx criticized philosophers, saying, "the philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it."²²

C. The Unification Thought View of Mechanistic Materialism

As stated above, all past systems of thought contained only relative truth, which necessarily faded away as soon as a new age appeared. Mechanistic materialism, also, was a relative truth; nevertheless, it certainly contributed to the society of its time, and because of it, history made a step forward toward absolute truth; it contributed mainly to the knowledge of the external material aspect of the world.

From the standpoint of Unification Thought, it was natural for some mechanistic thinkers to accept God as the cause of dynamic action in nature, even though their theories were based on mechanics. Unification Thought maintains that every phenomenon in the natural world is an expression of the give and receive action between subjective and objective elements. Such action is motivated by God's power (or Prime Force).²³

Some mechanistic thinkers admitted that at the formation of the universe God gave the first impulse, and since then the universe has been moving mechanically, all by itself. From the Unification Thought perspective, however, God not only created the universe with force in the beginning, but also, after the creation, has been causing the Prime Force to work behind and within all phenomena. (Modern physics contains detailed mathematical descriptions of universal gravitation, electromagnetic force, and so on, but no one asks why these forces are in action.)

Next, communism criticized mechanistic materialism for recognizing only mechanical, repetitive movements, and for failing to recognize developmental movement, through which new "quality" appears; but communism was unable to point out the reason for that failure. The reason is that mechanistic materialism accounted for physical forces only. If it had recognized life forces as well as physical forces, then it would have been able to recognize developmental movement as well. (Repetitive and developmental movement will be explained in the next chapter. Even though communism insists on developmental movement, it has not as yet clarified the fundamental cause of the difference between developmental movement and repetitive movement.)

It is incorrect for communists to say that mechanistic materialism fell into idealism and came to support the ruling class. The reason mechanistic materialism did not perceive developmental movement was not that it fell into idealism, but rather that it was insufficient and relative in truth. And the fact that some mechanistic thinkers accepted the existence of God does not mean that they

fell into idealism, but rather that they moved away from materialism and toward the unity of materialism and idealism, though in a quite elementary way.

In fact, the main representative mechanistic materialists, such as La Mettrie, Diderot and Holbach, denied God and proposed instead the idea of “matter in motion,” or nature as active and self-creating. They did not change to idealism at all; as a matter of fact, their views became the basis for communist materialism. Cornforth was mistaken in criticizing mechanistic materialism, claiming that it had fallen into idealism (and metaphysics). The reason, it seems, is that he was captured by the communist idea of the partisanship of philosophy, which says that the reactionary thought of the exploiting class is idealism and the progressive thought of the mass is materialism. According to that formula, Cornforth said that mechanistic materialism, the thought of the rising bourgeoisie, contributed to the overthrow of feudal society and then turned into idealism, in order to serve the new exploiting class, the bourgeoisie.

D. The Unification Thought View of Feuerbachian Materialism

For the moment, one can accept the critique that Feuerbach was a materialist in theory and an idealist in practice and that, therefore, his theory and practice do not go together. Nevertheless, there are no grounds upon which to criticize him for failing to develop a practical theory for social revolution (from a proletarian perspective), because Feuerbachian materialism is not partisan, neither does it aim at class struggle—as communist materialism does.

Criticizing both Christianity and Hegelian philosophy, Feuerbach denied God and stressed the importance of social life centering on human love. While a materialist in theory, Feuerbach was a love-centered person in practice. This is where the disunity between his theory and practice lies.

Feuerbach said that man is physical and sensuous; but he also stated that the nature of man is love. He wrote, "Love impels a man to suffer death even joyfully for the beloved one."²⁴ He concluded that "love is not only objectively but also subjectively the criterion of being, the criterion of truth and reality. *Where there is no love there is also no truth.*"²⁵ If, however, love is great enough to transcend death itself, as Feuerbach says, then it cannot possibly be a product of the physical body. Therefore, there is a fundamental contradiction between Feuerbach's materialistic position, whereby he regards man as a physical and sensuous being, and his humanistic position, whereby he recommends a love-centered way of life.

In unifying theory and practice, Feuerbach had necessarily to choose between two alternatives: either to unify centering on the materialistic way or to unify centering on the spiritual way. In other words, he had to incline either to the utilitarian way of life, based on materialism, or to an ethical, moral way of life, based on the spirit (idealism).

In Unification Thought, man is regarded as the "dual man," that is, the united body of "spirit man" and "physical man," or the united body of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*.²⁶ Love does not belong to the physical man (*Hyungsang*), but rather to the spirit man (*Sungsang*). Accordingly, in theory Feuerbach grasped the *Hyungsang* side of man and in practice the *Sungsang* side. Here lies his dilemma; the disunity between his theory and practice. Man is a united body of spirit man and physical man, which stand in a relationship of subject and object; accordingly, man was created to lead a life of love, in addition to his physical life. His life of love is primary and his physical life is secondary. It can be said that Feuerbach grasped the duality of man, albeit unconsciously and fragmentarily. Because of that, he was unable to exclude either of his two positions, namely materialism and a love-centered way of life.

God is the source of love, and when God works on man's "spirit mind" (which is the mind of the spirit man), love appears in that man. Feuerbach, however, denied God and did not know of the existence of the spirit man. Consequently, love in Feuerbach's practice became devoid of support, like a tree without roots; as it turned out, he was unable to withstand the attacks by Marx and Engels.

They criticized Feuerbach, saying that he did not engage in actual practice, in other words, he made no effort to reform history, in spite of being a materialist. What they meant by practice was the abolition of private property, or the proletarian revolution. Practice in Marx and Engels had a completely opposite direction to that in Feuerbach. Therefore, it was too much of a dogmatic criticism to say that Feuerbach, who was a materialist, should have engaged in the reformation of history, i.e., revolution.

III. VIEWS OF MATTER

Materialism is a theory that holds that the origin of the universe is matter; thus, the first task at hand is to inquire into the nature of matter. The views of matter proposed by both traditional philosophers and modern natural scientists will be summarized; then the communist view of matter will be presented; finally, a critique and counterproposal to the communist position will be offered.

A. Past Philosophers' Views of Matter

1. Democritus

For Democritus (460-370 B.C.) all things originated from a minute, indivisible material being, which he called "atom." There are no differences in properties among atoms, only in shape and size. Democritus attempted to explain the formation of all things in terms of the motion of atoms.

2. Aristotle

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) maintained that substance is an individual entity composed of “form” (*eidos*), which is the essence of a thing and makes substance what it is, and “matter” (*hylē*), which is the material element and has the potential for shape and property—in other words, it is *dynamis*. According to Aristotle, the ultimate cause of form and matter is “pure form” (*eidos of eidos*) and “prime matter” (*prote hylē*), and he regarded pure form as God. (But this god is not the same God as that of Christianity.) Prime matter has no determination whatsoever and lacks any kind of shape or property; it existed outside of God from the beginning.

3. Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the most important figure of scholasticism, accepted Aristotle’s notion of form and matter as well as pure form (God) and prime matter. He rejected, however, Aristotle’s notion that prime matter existed outside of God from the beginning; instead, he took up the view proposed by Augustine that God created matter (exactly speaking, prime matter) from nothing, and then created the world.

4. Bruno

Understanding each individual as a microcosm, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) held that the “atom” exists in physical reality as the smallest of all individual things, and that the *monas* (or *monad*) exists in metaphysical reality as the fundamental unit of life force.

5. Descartes

René Descartes (1596-1650) regarded the essence of spirit (mind) as thinking and the essence of matter (body) as extension, viewing spirit and matter as substances totally independent of each other. He regarded the essence of material objects as length, width, depth, etc.—and called it extension. He advocated the mechanistic view of nature, holding that every change in nature, which is

composed of material objects, is caused by the motion of material objects.

6. Locke

John Locke (1632-1704), an empiricist, explored the certainty of cognition and argued that since the existence of material objects cannot be known except through the senses, the existence of these objects cannot be regarded as certain. By contrast, the existence of spiritual reality is recognized intuitively, and therefore can be regarded as more certain.

7. Hume

David Hume (1711-1776), who advanced empiricism further, questioned the existence of material substance; he also questioned the existence of spiritual substance. He concluded that what exists is merely a bundle of perceptions of material and spiritual substances.

8. Leibnitz

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716) regarded substance as that which cannot be divided and which is a unit calling it "*monad*." He described each *monad* as a "living mirror of the universe," reflecting the universe; he maintained that *monads* exist in four different levels: in the first level, *monads* exist in an almost unconscious state; in the second, there are the *monads* of life; in the third, those of understanding; and in the fourth (highest) level there is "central *monad*"—God. In his view, the lowest *monads*, existing in an almost unconscious state, form matter.

9. La Mettrie

Following Descartes, Julien Offroy de La Mettrie (1709-1751) regarded matter as extension, but added that matter moves by itself. He held that the faculty of the soul (mind) depends on the brain and organs and therefore can be explained as mechanical movements; thus, he asserted that man is a machine just as an

animal is—in contrast with Descartes who regarded animals as machines, but considered man different from animals. La Mettrie was an exponent of mechanistic materialism.

10. Condillac

While Locke proposed sensation and reflection as the origin of cognition, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780) advocated pure sensationalism, holding that every mental activity is based on sensations. Though he did not deny the existence of immaterial spirit, he came close to materialism.

11. Diderot

Denis Diderot (1713-1784) maintained that matter with motion and sensitivity is the essential substance of the universe. He explained that inorganic matter shows latent sensitivity, and organic matter shows manifest sensitivity, postulating that molecules with sensitivity gather together in bundles to form organs and to constitute living beings, and thought is the motion of the bundle of molecules of the organs.

12. Helvétius

Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771) considered cognition to be based solely on sensation as Condillac had done; but he went further and declared his position to be materialism, and criticized religion and church. He also tried to reform society on the basis of hedonism and utilitarianism.

13. Holbach

Paul Henri Thiry d'Holbach (1723-1789) also developed sensationalistic epistemology and materialism. His materialism was mechanistic and deterministic, whereby he denied the divine first impulse and described motion as latent action within matter. He further developed copy theory in epistemology.

14. Cabanis

Pierre Jean George Cabanis (1757-1808), philosopher and medical doctor, based his views on physiology and held that consciousness derives from the brain. He said that the brain put forth thought in the same way as the liver secretes bile. His views are regarded as having evolved into so-called vulgar materialism.

15. Büchner

Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899), a materialistic philosopher and medical doctor, claimed that matter and force are the inseparable essence of substance, and that consciousness results from the activity of the brain. He said that even life phenomena can be explained mechanistically through the principle of energy conservation. (Engels referred to Büchner as a vulgar materialist.)

This concludes my brief survey of the views of matter of traditional philosophers. According to Marx, French materialism contained two trends, one originating from Descartes and the other from Locke. The mechanistic view of nature proposed by Descartes developed into the mechanistic materialism of de La Mettrie and Cabanis. The empiricist views of Locke turned into Condillac's sensationalism, which, with heightened materialistic color, evolved into the materialistic theory of Helvétius. This later trend became the basis for communist materialism.²⁷

B. Views of Matter of Modern Natural Scientists

1. Views of Matter in the 17th and 18th Centuries

The view of matter of Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) is considered the most representative among the natural-scientific views of the 17th and 18th centuries. He regarded matter as consisting of homogeneous ultimate particles; in contrast to mechanicism, which considered only the shape and size of particles, Newton also perceived gravitation in particles. Although he was unable to

determine the cause of gravitation, he assumed the existence of ether as the medium through which gravitation works, thinking that gravitation could be explained as something material. Newton viewed the universe as a huge machine that works through a definite kind of movement. He identified God as the creator of that machine and the one who adjusts its movement.

2. Views of Matter in the 19th Century

In the 19th century, the views of matter of the previous two centuries—namely that matter consists of homogeneous ultimate particles—developed into Avogadro's theory of the molecule (1811), starting with Dalton's theory of the atom (1808). Then, gradually the atomic and molecular properties of matter were clarified. Mendeleev's discovery of the periodic law of elements (1869) established the regularity of atoms.

Influenced by the view that natural phenomena are the manifestation of one fundamental force, a view proposed by German natural philosophy, Oersted developed the hypothesis of interaction between electric and magnetic phenomena. He confirmed that interaction through an experiment in which an electric current caused a magnetic needle to move (1820). Furthermore, Faraday's discovery of electro-magnetic induction (1831) clarified that electric current can be generated by magnetic action. Thus the relationship between electricity and magnetism gradually became clear.

When Maxwell proposed the theory of electromagnetism (1871), establishing the existence of electromagnetic waves, it was concluded that light itself is an electromagnetic wave; eventually this was verified experimentally, thus invalidating the theory of the existence of *ether*, which had been regarded as the medium for the diffusion of light.

3. Views of Matter in the 20th Century

Max Planck advanced the quantum hypothesis, providing a theoretical basis to endorse the experimental results of energy dis-

tribution in thermal radiation (1900). Planck's hypothesis states that an atom that radiates light can have either a specific amount of energy (energy quantum) or an amount of energy of the integral multiple of that specific amount.

Albert Einstein developed Planck's quantum hypothesis and published the theory of light quanta, which says that light has the particularity of a particle and travels in space as a mass of a certain amount of energy (1905). After that, in 1909, he concluded that light possesses the two (seemingly) contradictory properties of being both wave-like and particle-like.

At the same time, E. Rutherford established the theory of the transformation of radioactive elements, positing that a radioactive element transforms into another element by emitting radiation (1903). With his theory, the view of matter which states that an eternally unchanging, ultimate atom is the basic unit of matter, began to collapse.

In 1913, N. Bohr established the theory of atomic structure, which connected Rutherford's atomic model with Planck's quantum theory. Bohr explained that the electrons within an atom are arranged in definite, separate orbits (stationary state), which meet certain conditions; he also said that the atom emits light only when the electron moves from one stationary state to another.

In 1923, L. de Broglie proposed the hypothesis that not only light but also the electron exhibits the dual nature of particle and wave, and showed that Bohr's theory of atomic structure can be explained by that proposition. Developing further the hypothesis proposed by de Broglie, E. Schrödinger announced wave mechanics in 1926, dealing with electrons within an atom. On the other hand, in 1925 W. Heisenberg published a similar theory (namely matrix mechanics) from a different angle. Those two theories together became known as quantum mechanics.

Also, Einstein published the special theory of relativity (1905), by which he derived the equivalence of mass and energy. In other words, mass (m) is equivalent to energy (E) in the relation of $E =$

mc^2 (c is the velocity of light in a vacuum), and as mass increases or decreases in quantity, an equivalent amount of energy is absorbed or released. This theory was verified by Cockroft-Walton's experiment (1932).

By such scientific achievements in the 20th century, the concept of matter maintained until the 19th century was changed completely. From the fact that both light and particles have the nature of both wave and particle, and from the fact that mass and energy change into each other, the view of matter which had regarded the ultimate nature of matter as an unchangeable particle with a certain size and form had necessarily to be discarded.

C. The Communist View of Matter

Marx and Engels developed dialectical materialism from the 18th century French materialism, from Feuerbachian materialism and from Hegel's dialectic; They grasped matter as "matter in motion."²⁸ Based on the scientific view of matter of that period, they regarded matter as consisting of the smallest particles, incapable of further subdivision—i.e., molecule, atom and *ether* particle.²⁹ However, the abrupt changes in the scientific view of matter in the early 20th century compelled Marxists to change their view of matter. Details can be found in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (1909). Lenin wrote that book shortly after the failure of the first Russian Revolution (1905-1907), when revolutionaries experienced severe oppression from the czarist government. An increasing number of Marxists at that time showed interest in the ideas of the empirio-criticism of R. Avenarius of Germany and the Machism of E. Mach of Austria. Under these circumstances, the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party faced a most serious inner crisis.

That ideological disorder was aggravated by the collapse, through the advancement of natural science, of the view of matter, prevalent until the 19th century, which regarded the atom as the unchanging, ultimate unit of matter. The collapse of the prevailing

view of matter made people suspect that matter itself might disappear, which seemed to justify empirio-criticism and Machism. In other words, the previous view of matter had been shattered by Rutherford's theory of the transformation of radioactive elements (1903), by Planck's quantum hypothesis (1900), by Einstein's theory of light quanta (1905), etc. Commenting on these changes, the French mathematician and physicist H. Poincaré pointed out that all the fundamental principles of physics were in danger (1904); and the French physicist L. Houllevigue said in 1908, "The atom dematerializes . . . matter disappears."³⁰

These new scientific discoveries had echos in the philosophical world. Mach regarded pure sensations, to which no thinking is attached, as the most fundamental units of the world, and he called them "elements" or "world-elements."³¹ He explained these elements as neither material nor spiritual, but rather as neutral; and he said that matter and spirit are simply the composites of those elements. Avenarius looked for "pure experience," which transcends the difference between matter and spirit; pure experience is attained when one eliminates from experience all metaphysical ingredients. He maintained that seeing opposition between subjectivity and objectivity, between the internal world and the external world, between being and consciousness, and so on, is an error derived from subjective "introjection"; by its elimination one can recover pure experience, which is also called elements. Strictly speaking, the term "empirio-criticism" should be used to refer only to Avenarius's theory, but often it is used to refer both to Avenarius's theory and to Mach's theories together. The ideas propounded by empirio-criticism penetrated the Russian Marxists. The sympathizers were N. Valentinov, P.S. Yushkevich, and others of the Mensheviks; and A. Bogdanov, A.V. Lunacharsky, V. Bazarov, and others of the Bolsheviks. Lenin, perceiving the seriousness of the situation, determined "to carry out a firm and persistent struggle for the foundation of Marxism."³² As a result, he wrote *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

In that book, Lenin quoted Engels in Ludwig Feuerbach—namely, “with each epoch-making discovery even in the sphere of natural science, materialism has to change its form”—as a way to insist that revising the view of matter with the advancement of natural science rather suits Marxism. He said, “a revision of the ‘form’ of Engels’s materialism, a revision of his natural-philosophical propositions is not only not ‘revisionism’, in the accepted meaning of the term but, on the contrary, is an essential requirement of Marxism.”³³

Lenin then attempted to establish a philosophical view of matter that would remain unchanging—even if the natural-scientific view of matter might change—and said the following:

The sole “property” of matter . . . is the property of *being an objective reality*, of existing outside the mind.³⁴

But dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into another, that from our point of view is apparently irreconcilable with it, and so forth.³⁵

From Engels’ point of view, the only immutability is the reflection by the human mind (when there is a human mind) of an external world existing and developing independently of the mind. No other “immutability,” no other “essence,” no other “absolute substance,” in the sense in which these concepts were depicted by the empty professorial philosophy, exist for Marx and Engels. The “essence” of things, of “substance,” is *also* relative.³⁶

In conclusion, Lenin defined the concept of matter as:

a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.³⁷

Based on Lenin’s definition, the Marxist textbook of the Soviet Union, *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* by O.X. Kuusinen, explains the Marxist concept of matter as follows:

The term “matter” as used in Marxist philosophical materialism designates objective reality in all its multiform manifestations. Matter is not only the tiny particles of which all things are composed. It is the infinite multitude of worlds in an infinite universe; the gaseous and dust clouds of the cosmos; our own solar system with its sun and planets; the earth and everything existing on it. It is also radiation, the physical fields that transfer the action of one body or particle to another and connect them; electro-magnetic and nuclear fields. In short, the concept of matter embraces everything existing outside and independently of our mind.³⁸

D. Critique of the Communist View of Matter and Counterproposal

Communists praise the definition of matter given by Lenin and regard it as reasonable, in spite of changes in the scientific view of matter. Kenzo Awata, for instance, holds that definition in high esteem and considers it as having elevated dialectical materialism to a new level. He also writes:

Lenin determined the concept of matter strictly as a philosophical category and clarified the distinction between this and the physical concept of the structure of matter reached in the present stage of cognition.³⁹

Lenin’s definition of matter, however, is an evasion rather than a solution to the problem of the view of matter. This problem includes the ontological question concerning the origin of the universe, whether it is spirit or matter, and also the question concerning the essence of matter. And yet, Lenin, who attempted to account for the scientific achievements of his age in his theories, did not really answer ontological questions; he simply made the epistemological statement that matter is “the objective reality existing outside the mind” and is the object of cognition. Therefore Lenin’s definition of the concept of matter in no way elevates the position of dialectical materialism.

Moreover, even admitting Lenin's epistemological position, there would still remain the question of whether or not one can assert that all that exists objectively and independently of the human mind is matter. In fact, Plato and Hegel regarded the phenomenal world as the expression of ideas, and ideas as the objective reality independent of human consciousness. Therefore, even admitting that things do exist objectively, independently of human consciousness, one would still have to argue that they are matter, and not ideas. Lenin did not address that issue.

Next, the Unification Thought view of matter will be explained. According to Unification Thought, the ultimate origin of the universe is God, who is the united being (harmonious being) of Original *Sungsang* and Original *Hyungsang*. Original *Hyungsang* is the ultimate cause of the *Sungsangs* of all created beings; and Original *Hyungsang* is the ultimate cause of the *Hyungsangs* of all created beings. The *Sungsangs* of created beings refer to the invisible, inner functions or qualities—such as the human mind, the instinct of animals, the life of plants, the physical-chemical functions of minerals, etc.; and the *Hyungsangs* of the created beings refer to the visible (in the sense that they can be measured physically), external aspects of created beings—such as shape, structure, mass, and so forth.

Aristotle comprehended God as “pure form,” and Thomas Aquinas, who represented the peak of scholasticism in the Middle Ages, had a view similar to that of Aristotle; from the point of view of Unification Thought, however, they grasped only God's Original *Sungsang*. In God, there must exist some aspect that becomes the cause of matter in the created world. In other words, if the essence of matter in the created world is energy, then there must exist in God that which should be called “pre-energy,” that is, a potentiality that can become energy.

Therefore, from the Unification Thought standpoint, the origin of the universe is neither mind alone nor matter (i.e., the energetic element) alone, but rather a united being wherein the mental ele-

ment and the energetic element have become one. In other words, it can be said either that the origin of the universe is some mental element with an energetic component, or that it is some energetic element (pre-energy) with a mental component. This view, typical of Unification Thought, is neither spiritualism nor materialism; it is “Unitism,” or the “theory of oneness.”

Every created being results from the interaction (i.e., the give and receive action) between Original *Sungsang* and Original *Hyungsang*. Every created being resembles the correlativity (dual characteristics) of God’s Original *Sungsang* and Original *Hyungsang*, and thus, comes to have the dual characteristics of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*. Insofar as an individual created being resembles God’s dual characteristics, it is called an “individual truth being.” Accordingly, the elementary particles, atoms, molecules, etc., which constitute matter in the created world, are all individual truth beings, each containing the dual characteristics of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*. This is the Unification Thought view of matter.

When the dual characteristics of God are expressed in created beings, the lower the level of created being, the poorer the content of its *Sungsang* and the simpler its *Hyungsang*; likewise, the higher the level of created being, the richer the content of its *Sungsang* and the more complex its *Hyungsang*. Thus, according to the degree of the abundance of the content of *Sungsang*, created beings become gradually elevated, from material beings (minerals), to living beings (plants), instinctive beings (animals), and spiritual beings (humans).

It should be added that God’s Original *Sungsang* and Original *Hyungsang* are correlative elements, existing in a mutual relationship of subject and object, of activeness and passiveness, or of dominating and dominated. These two characteristics are not heterogeneous or independent from each other, but rather have commonality and continuity. Accordingly, the *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* of the things of creation, in which God’s Original *Sungsang* and Original *Hyungsang* are manifested, also have, to a

certain extent, continuity. This means that to a certain extent there is a mental element contained in matter and to a certain extent there is a material element contained in the mind. The mental element contained in matter refers to purposefulness contained in it and to an element that responds to the intellect, emotion, and will of the mind; and the material element contained in the mind refers to physical energy, or force.

Since mass and energy are equivalent, according to the 20th-century physics, elementary particles, the smallest units of matter, are regarded as having originated from energy. Incidentally, if we suppose that the universe started from energy, then we should assume that there was no purposefulness or design in it, considering the issue from a materialistic perspective. Therefore, when elementary particles originated from energy, and since their appearance came about by chance, those particles should have been of innumerable kinds, with great variety of mass and size. In reality, however, only a limited number of elementary particles appeared from energy, forming little more than one hundred elements, each of which possesses definite qualities, following the periodic law disclosed by D.I. Mendeleev.⁴⁰

This fact cannot be explained at all by materialism. The only way to solve this question is to consider that energy originally possessed purposefulness (a mental element). Moreover, if one were to admit that spirit and matter are completely heterogeneous, there would be the problem of how the interaction of the two is possible. In contrast, by saying that there is a mental element in matter and a material element in the mind, there is no problem explaining the interaction between mind and matter (or between spirit and body).

Today, in addition to the question mentioned above concerning the regularity of energy in physics, there are other areas that show that we are entering the stage where we have to acknowledge that behind material phenomena there are mental or purposeful elements—such as the studies of cognition in brain physiology and

the studies of life in molecular biology; such a realization is essential for aiming at the full development of these studies.⁴¹ This can be interpreted as an endorsement by science of the Unification Thought position that every being is a united being of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* and that, therefore, the ultimate origin of the universe is also a united being of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* (Original *Sungsang* and Original *Hyungsang*).

Materialism grasps only one aspect of the origin of the universe. That is, from the Unification Thought standpoint, it can be said that materialism grasps only the Original *Hyungsang* of God's dual characteristics. On the other hand, spiritualism, represented by Scholasticism, grasps only the Original *Sungsang* (pure form). Aristotle grasped the Original *Sungsang* (pure form) and the Original *Hyungsang* (prime matter), but he understood them separately. Leibnitz proposed the view of *monads* in four stages (the *monads* of matter, of life, of understanding, and of God); he failed, however, to perceive God as the cause of the other stages of *monads*. And Mach treated "world elements" as pure sensations, which are neither matter nor spirit; sensations, however, cannot be the origin either of matter or of spirit. What causes matter and spirit is the ultimate being, which possesses the causes of both matter and spirit in a unified way.

IV. IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM

With regard to idealism and materialism, Engels said as follows;

The great basic question of all philosophies, especially of more recent philosophies, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being. . . .

The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other . . . comprised the camp of

idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism.⁴²

St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, who are largely responsible for traditional Western Christian theology, comprehended God as a purely spiritual being. They said that God created matter from nothing and then created the world, whereby they affirmed that matter came from spirit. This is the basic way of thinking of spiritualistic, or idealistic, philosophy.

In contrast, materialism regards matter as the origin of the universe; communist materialism, specifically, asserts that spirit (mind) is the product of highly developed matter (i.e., the human brain). Engels and Stalin refer to this matter as follows:

But if the further question is raised what thought and consciousness really are and where they come from, it becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of nature, which has developed in and along with its environment.⁴³

Thought is a product of matter which in its development has reached a higher degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thought; and that therefore one cannot separate thought from matter without committing a grave error.⁴⁴

Thus, communist materialism insists that mind is a product of matter but not of every material being; rather, mind results only from highly developed matter, namely, of a human brain. If they had asserted that the mind derives from any kind of material being, their belief would have been similar to hylozoism, or panpsychism.

The problem for communists, however, is how to prove that the mind is a product of the human brain. Maurice Cornforth argues as follows:

And if you die, or if you are hit on the head or in some other way suffer a disturbance of the brain, then these remarks about your mind no longer apply. For the activities to which they refer

can then no longer be performed, since the means of performing them have been destroyed.⁴⁵

Cornforth argues that if the brain is destroyed, the mind cannot come into being, and therefore the mind can be said to be the product of brain. But there is a problem here, which can be stated as follows:

Let us compare the human brain to a radio, and let us liken mental action (consciousness) to the sound coming out of the radio. In this case, then, the sound is not produced by the radio itself, but rather originates from the electric waves arriving from outside (i.e., from the station), converted into sound waves by the radio. Therefore the radio is a device that converts electric waves into sound waves; it is not a device that generates sound.⁴⁶ Likewise, man's mental action (consciousness) can be regarded as a result of the interaction between the mind, or spirit (which can be compared to electric waves) and the brain (which can be compared to the radio). Therefore, just because mental actions are disturbed when the brain is damaged, one cannot necessarily conclude that consciousness is the product of the brain.

In some instances communists say that the mind is the product of the brain, while in other instances they assert that the mind is the function of the brain.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, in either case there are problems.

In the case of the assertion that the mind is a product of the brain, the following should be considered: just as an egg becomes separated from a chicken after it is laid, and just as agricultural products become separated from the land after they are harvested, so any product becomes separated from the body that gave its origin. Accordingly, if the mind were produced by the brain, then mind would be separated from the brain. What, then, would the mind be like, once it was separated from the brain or from the physical body? It would have to be something like a soul. From this it follows that communism acknowledges something like a soul, but such an admission would imply the collapse of material-

ism. Consequently, for communist materialism to maintain that the mind is a product of the brain is self-contradictory.

What about the assertion that the mind is a function of the brain? Communism states in its epistemology that the mind is a reflection of being (the external world) and, at the same time, it actively practices on being (the external world). In *The Foundations of Leninism*, Stalin said, "theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice;"⁴⁸ and in *On Practice* Mao Tse Tung said,

Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world [practice].⁴⁹

What they are saying is that one should practice actively by applying knowledge, which is obtained through a reflection of being on the brain.

But how is it possible for a function of the brain, which reflects the external world, to exert practice on the external world? In order to practice, one should carry out a definite course of action; one's mind should make the brain operate and move the body through the motor nerves. Since the mind, however, is a function of the brain, it follows that the function of the brain operates to the brain itself. But this is impossible. This is similar to what happens in a machine: the function of a machine emerges when a man operates that machine, but the function itself cannot operate the machine. Thus, if the mind is a function of the brain, then it becomes impossible to explain how the mind acts upon the brain and carries out conscious activity. Accordingly, describing the mind as a function of the brain does not solve the problem.

From the Unification Thought standpoint, matter does not originate from spirit, nor does spirit originate from matter. Both came about from the origin of the universe. The origin of the universe is a being in which the ultimate causes of both spirit and matter are united. In other words, the two attributes (the dual

characteristics of Original *Sungsang* and Original *Hyungsang*) of the Absolute Being are manifested as the *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* of created beings; and in the case of man, they become the mind and the body (or spirit and matter).

The Bible describes the creation of man, saying that “the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life.”⁵⁰ This means that man was created as a dual being of “spirit man” and “physical man.”⁵¹ Each of these two aspects of man has its own mind as its own functional part. The mind of the physical man is called the “physical mind,” and that of the spirit man, the “spirit mind.” What is formed through the interaction between the two minds is what is generally referred to as man’s mind (“original mind”).⁵² Consciousness, or mental action, is what results from the give and receive action between this mind and the brain cells. Accordingly, without the spirit man, no manifestation of consciousness or mental action is possible. Therefore, neither is the mind a product of brain cells nor are brain cells a product of the mind. The two of them are related in such a way that the mind is the subject being and the brain cells are the object one.

At this point, the Unification Thought view of mind and spirit will be stated. Mind is almost identical with spirit, but while ‘mind’ is a concept opposite to ‘body’, ‘spirit’ is a concept opposite to ‘matter’. Both mind and spirit are included in the concept of *Sungsang*, as the concept opposite to *Hyungsang*. The mind (spirit) has the functions of intellect, emotion, and will; as stated above, however, the mental actions of thinking, feeling, and volition—in other words, consciousness—are not the mind itself, but rather manifestations of the faculties which are expressed through the give and receive action between the mind and the brain cells. In other words, these mental actions are the workings of the mind.

V. SUPERSTRUCTURE AND BASIS AS SPIRIT AND MATTER

A. The Communist View

Communism has extended the concept of matter to comprise not only material phenomena of the natural world but also social and economic phenomena such as productive forces, relations of production, capital, labor, labor disputes, and revolution. In other words, communism attempts to explain materialistically not only natural phenomena but also social phenomena. The reason for doing this is to justify their position that social problems should be solved, not by policies, but rather by materialistic means, namely, violent revolution.

If one supposes that the aspect of society corresponding to matter is the economy, then which aspect would correspond to spirit? In the communist view, the ideological forms, or forms of social consciousness, correspond to spirit, and they include law, politics, religion, art, philosophy, etc. Communists argue that, just as spirit is a product of matter, so the ideological forms are the products of production relations in social phenomena. The ideological forms and the production relations of a given society are referred to, respectively, as the superstructure and the basis of that society (see Chapter 4). As used by communists, the term “relations of production” designates human relations centered on production and on the means of production—in short, the social system.

Accordingly, communists maintain that neither good political policies, nor a good educational program, nor an effort to encourage people to live a religious and moral life would bring about social reform. They insist that social reform is possible only by material means—that is, by reforming the relations of production through struggle and revolution. Communist materialism, then, rather than being a mere ontology, is a political theory developed in order to justify social revolution.

B. Critique and Counterproposal

Economic phenomena, such as productive forces, relations of production, capital, and labor, cannot be dealt with as merely material concepts. The concept of productive forces, for instance, refers to “labor power” and to the “means of production” (mainly “instruments of production”), but none of them are mere matter. It is not true that labor power is mere bodily power; rather, labor power is technical power, which is the unity of spiritual elements (techniques and knowledge) and material elements (bodily powers). The instruments of production, which today refer mainly to machines, are the embodiment of technical power, and therefore, they are also the unity of spiritual elements (techniques) and material elements (material components, or body of the machine and its force). Accordingly, the productive forces must also be regarded as the unity of spiritual elements and material elements. The relations of production, also, are the unity of spiritual relations and material relations because they are the relations of man and man centering on production and the means of production. (For a detailed explanation of this point, see Chapter 4) It is also not true that capital is mere matter, because capital is a unity of spiritual elements (the entrepreneur's creativity, desire for profit, etc.) and material elements (money). Thus, all economic phenomena are united beings of spirit and matter; communism, however, has expanded the concept of matter improperly, including all these economic concepts in the category of matter.

Then, when applying the concept of matter to social phenomena, how far should that concept be extended? It should be extended to include tangible economic goods, namely, production assets (such as land, raw materials, machines, factories, and facilities) and consumer goods (such as food, houses, clothes, fuel, etc.). Intangible economic goods, however, such as labor, talent, credit and rights, should be excluded from the range of the concept of matter.

On the other hand, it is also incorrect to say that the ideological forms, such as politics and religion, are merely spiritual phenomena. [Each of these forms is a unity containing spiritual elements and material elements. In the case of politics, for instance, the affairs of state are not conducted simply through establishing policies and making speeches, etc.; material factors are also required, such as expenses for various kinds of activities, different kinds of institutions and facilities, and so forth. The same applies in the case of religion: besides sermons, life of faith, and other spiritual activities, material factors are needed, such as church facilities and funds for evangelism.

In short, all social phenomena are united phenomena resulting from the give and receive action between spiritual elements and material elements. Spiritual elements refer to social will, in which all individuals' will is gathered together. Accordingly, the social realities corresponding to spirit and matter in society are not ideological forms (superstructure) and relations of production (basis), but rather, social will and economic goods.

VI. THE MOTION OF MATTER

One of the characteristics of communist materialism is that it grasps matter as "matter in motion." Engels wrote as follows:

Dialectics of natural science: Subject-matter—matter in motion. The different forms and varieties of matter itself can likewise only be known through motion, only in this are the properties of bodies exhibited; of a body that does not move there is nothing to be said.⁵³

Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. . . . Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.⁵⁴

On the same topic Stalin wrote as follows:

"The world is by its very nature *material*, and multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion."⁵⁵

Why, then, does communism grasp motion as the attribute of matter? It is simply to deny the existence of God. If motion is separated from matter, then motion must have been started by a cause other than matter, namely God (or spirit). As an excuse to oppose any such metaphysical view of matter which recognizes God, communism asserts that motion is the property of matter. Communism is convinced that, once motion is regarded as the property of matter, materialism becomes firmly established. Nevertheless, even if it is admitted that motion is the property of matter, there still remains the problem of why matter has come to have motion as its property.

After all, what is motion? Communism holds that all things contain opposites (contradictory elements), and that any change or development can take place only through the struggle of opposites. In the communist view, then, the essence of motion is the struggle of opposites. According to present-day physics, matter is considered to have been formed from energy, but here a question arises: when energy appears as matter, why does energy (which is considered to have originally been indeterminate and homogeneous) come to appear as opposites? Yet communism does not answer this question.

The view of Unification Thought is as follows: What exist in everything are not opposites (contradictory elements), but rather correlatives of subject and object. Through give and receive action between subject and object, everything exists, multiplies, acts, and moves. The reason why there exists in everything a correlativity of subject and object is that everything has been created as an individual truth being resembling God's dual characteristics. Therefore, the motion of matter (the individual being) is caused by the give and receive action between the correlative elements within matter itself, or by the give and receive action with other matter (other individual beings). For that reason, we have no objection to Engels's assertion that motion is the mode of existence of matter. Motion, however, is caused and maintained by natural forces such

as universal gravitation and electromagnetic force, and these natural forces are caused and maintained by the Prime Force, the force of God. Accordingly, the communist concept of “matter in motion” cannot deny the existence of God.

VII. THE COMMUNIST VIEW OF MAN

A. Labor and Man

Communism considers man as having evolved from apes. Engels wrote in *Dialectics of Nature*, under the title “The Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man,” as follows:

[Labor] is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labor created man himself.⁵⁶

Mastery over nature began with the development of the hand, with labor, and widened man’s horizon at every new advance. . . . The development of labor necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together. . . . Men in the making arrived at the point where *they had something to say* to each other. Necessity created the organ; the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed.⁵⁷

First labor, after it and then with it speech—these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man, which for all its similarity is far larger and more perfect. . . .

The reaction on labor and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant senses, of the increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and of conclusion, gave both labor and speech an ever-renewed impulse to further development.⁵⁸

First the ape performed labor, whereby its hand developed, and the development of the hand caused the development of labor. In social labor (joint activity), the larynx developed under the necessity to speak with one another, and language came into being.

And through the repeated development of labor and language, the brain developed, consciousness came to arise, and finally the ape became man. What Engels insists on, simply speaking, is that the ape became man through labor.

By following that process, man came to do increasingly complex types of labor, and as a result he came to do hunting, cattle raising, agriculture, trade, and industry. Art, science, law, and politics soon appeared; and even religion, which is considered as a “fantastic reflection of human things in the human mind,” came into being.⁵⁹

That ape became man through labor means that the most important essence of man is labor (productive activity). It also means that, though man has love and reason, still what is even more important is labor. And why have the communists proposed this view of man? The reason, needless to say, is that they intend to justify violent revolution by the proletariat from a materialistic position. Also, if love and reason had been considered as the essence of man, then the purpose of human liberation through the abolition of private property by the proletariat could not be justified. Accordingly, it follows from this that the problems of man and society can be solved by love and reason, that is, by religion and morality, and that there would be no need for revolution.

Contrary to the communist view, Unification Thought maintains that man was created by God. No matter how hard an ape may labor, it cannot become a man, because man has “spirit man” (soul), and the ape does not. Therefore, it could never possibly be true that first there was labor, then the need for language arose, and finally the ape’s brain developed naturally to become man’s brain, as Engels maintained. In the first place, as already explained since the brain (matter) is not a generator of the mind, it cannot give rise to mental action. Man’s love, and the functions of intellect, emotion, and will can manifest themselves only through the give and receive action between the spirit man and the brain. In the second place, though Engels stated that with language as

the stimulus, the brain of the ape developed into the human brain, still the very use of language already presupposes the human brain, in which the cerebral cortex (neocortex) has developed. Accordingly, it is utterly impossible that language has developed the ape's brain into the human brain.

Thus, the communist view that the ape, by performing labor, came to use language and to think, finally becoming man, is false. On the contrary, man was created from the beginning with personality, so as to be able to speak and to think. It was man with such qualifications that performed labor in order to live. From the Unification Thought standpoint, labor is the activity of man's dominion over all things, and as such it is important, but in itself it is not the purpose of human life. Though man lives on the necessities of life obtained by labor, yet he is created to realize love and the values of truth, goodness and beauty. In other words, the realization of love and the values of truth, goodness, and beauty is the ultimate purpose of human life, and labor is the means for attaining that purpose.

Yet communism, which considers labor as the prime essence of man, asserts that politics, economy, art, and science are all based on labor and therefore must be for the sake of the workers. What this means is that, if an individual stands on the side of the workers (in reality, on the side of the communist party, which claims to represent the workers), his individuality will be respected; but if he stands on the opposite side, it will not. Communism never respects human freedom and individuality unconditionally. Communism often advocates pacifism and humanism; they do that, however, not from true heart, but rather for strategic purposes. Communism offers no philosophical grounds which would assure freedom, human rights, and respect for human dignity. In fact, it has usually been the case that communists respect the individuality of a man while he is of value to their revolution, but once he becomes entirely of no use to them (or becomes an obstacle to them), they will slaughter him mercilessly. All of this is the inevi-

table result of the communist view of man, which regards man as an evolved higher animal.

B. The Subject of Sensuous Activity

Marx and Engels regard man as the subject of sensuous activity—in other words, man understands the world with his senses and engages in practice. This is a concept which they developed while criticizing Feuerbach. According to Feuerbach, man is a sensuous being, or a bodily being; and truth is regarded as cognition through the senses. Marx and Engels, however, criticized Feuerbach, pointing out that he failed to grasp man as engaged in sensuous activity. Marx said:

Certainly Feuerbach has a great advantage over the “pure” materialists since he realizes that man too is an “object of the senses.” But apart from the fact that he only conceives him as an “object of the senses,” not as “sensuous activity,” because he still remains in the realm of theory and conceives of men not in their given social connection, not under their existing conditions of life, which have made them *what* they are, he never arrives at the actually existing, active men, but stops at the abstraction “man,” and gets no further than recognizing “the actual, individual, corporeal man” emotionally.⁶⁰

Feuerbach, not satisfied with *abstract thinking*, appeals to *sensuous contemplation*; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.⁶¹

From the Unification Thought standpoint, cognition and practice are reciprocal circuits of give and receive action in man’s dominion over all things. Therefore, cognition without practice is incomplete, and so is practice without cognition. In this sense, Marx and Engels have a point when they insist on practice (sensuous activity) and criticize Feuerbach, saying that sensuous cognition without practice is incomplete. In addition to that, both cognition itself and practice itself result from give and receive action. In order for give and receive action to take place, a purpose is required, which becomes the center. The motivation for setting up the pur-

pose is Heart—that is, the “emotional impulse to seek joy.” Accordingly, it is not correct to say that man is a mere subject of sensuous activity; rather, man is a subject with Heart and purpose, and engages in sensuous activity.

3

MATERIALIST
DIALECTIC
CRITIQUE AND
COUNTERPROPOSAL

I. OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF
DIALECTIC

The term “dialectic” originates from the Greek word *dialektikē*, which was related to *dialogos*, meaning “conversation.” Accordingly, dialectic originally meant the art of conversation or the art of discussion. At the same time, it also referred to the act of arguing; dialectic came to be interpreted also as the art of dispute.

Zeno of Elea (circa 490 B.C.),¹ whom Aristotle called its inventor, introduced dialectic as the art of dispute for the purpose of demonstrating the correctness of one’s statements—for example, his arguments against plurality and against motion—by exposing contradictions in the opponent’s statements. The so-called sophistry, or rhetoric, of the sophists was also a kind of dialectic as an art of dispute. For Socrates (470-399 B.C.), dialectic was literally the art of discussion, a search for truth by question and answer. In Plato (427-347 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), dialectic came to possess the characteristics of the art of thinking or reasoning, rather than the art of discussion. After that, dialectic came to be regarded as the art of thinking.

For Heraclitus (circa 500 B.C.), however, dialectic was neither the art of discussion nor the art of thinking; rather, it was a means to show that all things are in constant, ceaseless flux (that is, changing and developing) through the conflicts of opposites contained in them. Hegel considered Heraclitus as the true inventor of dialectic.²

In the Middle Ages, there was almost no study of dialectic; in the modern period, however, Kant (1724-1804) referred to inferences not based on experience as dialectic in the “Transcendental Logic” of *Critique of Pure Reason*. He showed that applying pure reason to the world (the cosmos) produces at the same time, and with the same value, two mutually contradictory propositions, of thesis and antithesis, which he called antinomies. When discussing the limits of the world based on reason, for instance, one arrives at two propositions—namely, “the world is limited in time and space,” and “the world is unlimited in time and space.” And dealing with the world, which transcends the cognitive limits of man’s ability, results in a picture which Kant refers to as illusion (*Schein*). Kant’s “dialectic” is what is called the “logic of illusion,” or the art of dispute—and so he can be said to have followed the tradition of the dialectic of Zeno of Elea.³

Fichte (1762-1814), the successor of Kantian philosophy, said that the essence of the ego is “free activity,” and that “the ego posits itself” (the first proposition, thesis), and called the function of the ego “deed-act” (*Tathandlung*). That was a proposition with the same meaning as Descartes’s “I think; therefore I am.” That the ego posits itself means that it posits itself as something different from what it is not, namely, the non-ego. In other words, “a non-ego is posited in opposition to the ego” (the second proposition, antithesis). Furthermore he held that the non-ego, no matter how opposed it is to the ego, must be posited by the ego within the ego itself. About this point, Fichte said, “The ego posits within itself a limited non-ego in opposition to a limited ego” (the third proposi-

tion, synthesis).⁴ This triadic form (*Triade*) of thesis, antithesis and synthesis can be seen as the forerunner of Hegelian dialectic.⁵

The way Hegel and Marx grasped dialectic was as a general law penetrating the entire world. Hegel formulated his dialectic as the law of the development of thought, and applied it also to the development of nature and society. Karl Marx, however, remodeled the Hegelian idealistic dialectic according to materialism, and asserted that the laws of development in the material world are the basis, while the laws of development of thought are their reflection. He posited the dialectic as a general law covering nature, society, and thought. Since Marx inherited Hegel's dialectic materialistically, his dialectic is called materialist dialectic.⁶

II. DIALECTIC IN HEGEL AND IN MARX

From Hegel's idealistic dialectic Marx took the dialectical method almost exactly as it was, added materialism to it, and established a theory (i.e., materialist dialectic) to accomplish his own goals. Hegel dealt with nature, history and spirit as the continuous process of development caused by the self-development of the Absolute Spirit, and as the process of development in which the three-stage process of affirmation-negation-synthesis (or thesis-antithesis-synthesis) is repeated—in other words, as the process of development through contradiction.

Marx accepted Hegel's view, except for the Absolute Spirit, which he denied, and went on to establish materialist dialectic as a theory to rationalize class struggle. Therefore, materialist dialectic must be seen in the context of Hegel's idealistic dialectic; accordingly, I will begin by introducing the features of Hegel's dialectic.

A. Basic Features of Hegel's Dialectic

Hegel's dialectic refers to the "self-development of concept," or the "self-development of idea"—that is, the process whereby the Absolute Being (the Absolute Spirit) gradually realizes itself. For this reason, Hegelian dialectic is commonly called "conceptual dialectic," or "idealistic dialectic." According to Hegel, the dialectic refers to the law that a notion (or a thing) contains within itself a 'moment' opposing and contradicting itself, and develops into something on a higher dimension by "sublating" (*aufheben*) this state of opposition or contradiction. To "sublate" something means to negate it and at the same time to preserve it at a higher stage. Hegel referred to this process of development as a three-stage process: "in itself" (*an sich*), "for itself" (*für sich*), and "in and for itself" (*an und für sich*).⁷ These stages are generally known as "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis."⁸

According to Hegel, logic, nature, and spirit develop through the continual repetition of this three-stage process. The first thesis, the starting point of the self-development of the absolute spirit, refers to an entirely indeterminate, entirely empty, and totally abstract notion, which is called "being."⁹ As it is acquiring content, being develops to become Idea; then Idea alienates itself and becomes nature, to finally realize itself again through man.

The main point of the entire process can be described as follows: the self-development of the Absolute Spirit starts in logic and proceeds through the three-stage process of Being, Essence, and Notion. In the stage of Notion, the Absolute Spirit passes through the three stages of subjective Notion, objective Notion, and Idea. Finally, Idea reaches the level of Absolute Idea, where it objectifies itself (or alienates itself) and becomes nature, and then goes through the three stages of mechanics, physics, and organics. Next, through man, it develops through the stages of objective spirit, subjective spirit, and Absolute Spirit, whereby it returns to

the original stage, which was the starting point of the dialectical development.¹⁰

B. Basic Features of Marxist Dialectic

1. Marx's Assertion

In the "Afterword to the Second German Edition" of *Capital*, Marx stated the following:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. . . . With me . . . the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. . . . With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.¹¹

What Marx claimed, then, is that his dialectic made Hegel's dialectic turn right side up. Since Hegel's dialectic was idealistic dialectic, Marx took the idealism away from it and combined it with materialism to establish materialistic dialectic.

2. Engels' Interpretation

Engels attempted to systematize materialist dialectic and to demonstrate its validity based on the observation of nature. He said that "dialectics . . . is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought,"¹² and summarized the features of the dialectic in the following three laws:¹³ (1) The law of transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa; (2) The law of interpenetration of opposites; (3) The law of negation of negation.

The first law states that qualitative changes occur only through quantitative changes, and that when quantitative change reaches a certain level, a qualitative change occurs with a leap. The reversal of this law also occurs—that is, a qualitative change brought about by a quantitative change could conversely bring about further quantitative change. From these two, however, the essential aspect is the "law of transformation of quantity into quality." This law is

generally called “the law of transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes.”

The second law is the law of interpenetration of opposites, which was later referred to as the “law of unity and struggle of opposites,” or the “law of contradiction.” According to this law, within each thing there are opposite elements that need each other (unity) and at the same time reject each other (struggle); through unity and struggle of these two elements, development takes place. Spiritual development is the reflection of material development in the brain; accordingly, it is secondary.

The third law, that of “negation of negation,” is a law of development, which indicates that the motion of development is progressive and upward. In development a thing in one stage transfers to a new and higher stage by means of negation. Then in the new stage it transfers to an even higher third stage of development through a second negation. The transition into the third stage represents a return to the first stage on a higher level. Engels calls this process spiral development.¹⁴ The three laws stated above were originally dealt with by Hegel as the laws of development of thought.¹⁵

3. Stalin’s Interpretation

Stalin summarized the basic features of materialist dialectic in the following four points:

First:

Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena, are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by each other.¹⁶

Second:

Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous re-

newal and development, where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away.¹⁷

Third:

Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard the process of development as a simple process of growth, where quantitative changes do not lead to qualitative changes, but as a development which passes from insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes to open, fundamental changes, to qualitative changes; a development in which the qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another; they occur not accidentally but as the natural result of an accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes.¹⁸

Fourth:

Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.¹⁹

This description of materialist dialectic by Stalin can be summarized as follows: (1) it regards things from the standpoint of interconnection; (2) it looks at things from their aspect of movement, growth, development, and disintegration; (3) it understands development as a process which passes from gradual, quantitative change to abrupt, qualitative change; (4) it regards development as a process of change brought about by the struggle of opposites (contradictory elements).

C. Essential Differences Between Hegelian and Marxist Dialectic

One essential difference between Hegelian and Marxist dialectic is the fact that Hegel dealt with the process of development of thought, whereas Marx dealt with the process of development of matter, that is, the development of nature and history. Another essential difference is that the concepts of “opposition” and “contradiction” are somewhat different in the two dialectics.

For Hegel, “opposition” refers to the state in which two moments (or two elements) face each other on an identical foundation; when the opposition becomes intensified, it is called “contradiction,” which is a state wherein one element repels, or negates the other, while maintaining a mutual relationship with it. “Contradiction” does not imply that one element overthrows or exterminates the other. In the Marxist dialectic, to both “opposition” and “contradiction,” was added the concept of “struggle,” such that one element overthrows and exterminates the other.

Marxism holds that the unity and struggle of opposites is the essence of contradiction; in actuality, however, it ignores the aspect of unity within development, and stresses only the aspect of struggle. In fact, Lenin said that “the unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”²⁰ Finally, Lenin went so far as to state that “development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.”²¹

Marx inherited Hegel’s dialectic and combined it with the concept of struggle—that is, the concept that one element overthrows and exterminates the other.²² Needless to say, this was done for the purpose of providing philosophical support for the proletarian revolution.

III. CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL TO MATERIALIST DIALECTIC

The basic features of materialist dialectic, as proposed by Engels and Stalin, can be summarized as follows: (1) Interconnection and change; (2) The law of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes; (3) The law of contradiction (The law of the unity and struggle of opposites); (4) The law of the negation of negation.

Next, a critique of each one of these four laws and a counterproposal to them based on Unification Thought will be presented. The third law ("the law of contradiction"), because of its importance in Marxist dialectic, will be presented right after the first point.

A. Interconnection and Change

In advocating the interconnection of things, Stalin claimed that materialist dialectic is contrary to metaphysics; Engels, likewise, criticized the metaphysical way of thinking, saying as follows:

In the contemplation of individual things, [metaphysics] forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees.²³

In its original meaning, "metaphysics" refers to the branch of philosophy that seeks speculative knowledge of the supreme principles within existing beings. In Marxism, however, the term "metaphysics" is generally applied to anti-dialectical thought. In other words, it regards metaphysics as referring to any method of thinking that grasps things not as developing, but as unchangeable and fixed, and does not see the interconnection of things, while separating things from one another and isolating them.

Thus, communism criticizes metaphysics for being concerned only with unchangeability and individuality and for failing to perceive the aspects of change, development, and interconnection within all things. In this way, communism claims that the dialectic is correct; but is that a valid claim?

1. On Interconnection

a) Critique

It is quite correct to say that all things in the universe are connected with one another, and nothing exists in isolation. In the universe, stars are connected with stars, star clusters with star clusters, and nebulas with nebulas. On earth, men, animals, plants, and minerals are likewise connected with one another. For example, in the photosynthetic process, a plant takes carbon dioxide from the air and emits oxygen into the air, whereby sugar is produced; in contrast, an animal, in the act of breathing, uses oxygen from the air and exhales carbon dioxide. Thus, plants and animals are closely related, or interconnected. Also, it is known that stars in the universe are connected with living things on earth in the sense that cosmic rays have some influence on the physiological processes of living things. In addition, human beings are connected with one another, animals are connected with one another, and so forth. This is especially true of social life, where human beings exist in six-directional relationships of up and down, front and back, and right and left.²⁴

Indeed, interconnection is the fundamental mode of existence of all things in the universe; accordingly, insofar as materialist dialectic seeks to grasp things from the standpoint of interconnection, we have no objection to it. Nevertheless, materialist dialectic still has the following questionable aspects.

First, why is there interconnection? Materialist dialectic merely insists on the fact, and says nothing about the reason why things are interconnected. In fact, it says that it is meaningless to inquire into the reason. Yet, avoiding explaining the reason simply blocks

the solution to the problem, and prevents any further development of the theory. The second questionable point is that materialist dialectic, while emphasizing solely the aspects of interconnection of things, fails to grasp how things exist as individuals in their interconnection, in other words, it fails to grasp the individuality of things. Thus, there remain fundamental problems in the theory of interconnection in materialist dialectic.

b) Counterproposal

In the view of Unification Thought, all things in the universe are mutually connected with one another, centering on a certain purpose.²⁵ The human body, for instance, is composed of about 60 trillion cells, interconnected to form tissues, organs, and the whole body, for the purpose of maintaining life. This cellular interconnection is not accidental but purposive; it results from a blueprint, which is carefully designed. Similarly, the universe is an immense living organism, formed by countless stars, which relate with one another in accordance with a definite purpose. The animal kingdom and the plant kingdom are connected with each other, exchanging oxygen and carbon dioxide; together, they maintain their existence. That is, living beings are all connected with one another, with the purpose of maintaining their existence.

Thus, interconnection in the universe is centered on a purpose. Yet, if one admits purpose in the universe, then one must also admit that there exists a will (the will of the universe), which established that purpose before the universe came into being. Accordingly, one must admit the existence of God as the owner of that will, that is, the subject being of the will. Of course, materialist dialectic does not acknowledge purpose, and explains interconnection only in terms of law. From the Unification Thought point of view, however, the law presupposes purpose (in other words, laws were set up by God in order to accomplish the purpose of creation), and therefore there is no law without purpose. Consequently, there is no interconnection without purpose.

Next, with regard to the relationship between individuality and interconnection, Unification Thought maintains that all things are “individual truth beings,” with attributes resembling the dual characteristics of God; at the same time, they are “connected beings,” which are individuals connected with other individuals. In other words, while maintaining their peculiar properties as individual truth beings—that is, their individuality—all individual beings influence one another as connected beings. This is true whether we are talking about stars in the universe or cells in the human body. Thus, everything shows the “unity of individuality and connectedness.” And the reason why everything has these two aspects is that every individual has a dual purpose—that is, the “purpose for the individual” and the “purpose for the whole.” The former is the purpose to maintain the existence and development of the individual itself, and the latter is the purpose to contribute to the existence and development of others, or of the whole.

Materialist dialectic criticizes metaphysics for looking at things as individual and static entities, emphasizing interconnection; both views, however, are the same in one point, namely, both of them look at things from a one-sided point of view, insofar as they do not comprehend the unity of individuality and connectedness.

2. On Change: Critique and Counterproposal

Why is it that materialist dialectic emphasizes so much the aspects of development and movement in things, while criticizing metaphysics for paying attention only to the aspects of unchangeability and rest? The answer is that only a theory of development and constant change can be used as a means to rationalize revolution. Stalin explains it as follows:

Further, if the world is in a state of constant movement and development, if the dying away of the old and the upgrowth of the new is a law of development, then it is clear that there can be no “immutable” social systems, no “eternal principles” of private

property and exploitation, no “eternal ideas” of the subjugation of the peasant to the landlord, of the worker to the capitalist.

Hence the capitalist system can be replaced by the socialist system, just as at one time the feudal system was replaced by the capitalist system.²⁶

Of course, no one denies that things change and move. From that it does not follow, however, that things do not have any unchanging aspects. According to Unification Thought, the aspects of permanence and change, self-identity and development exist in inseparable unity in all things. In other words, things change and develop, while maintaining their self-identity. Plants, animals, and human beings are all changing, developing, and growing—while at the same time maintaining their unchanging characteristics. An apple tree may grow and change, but still it never becomes anything other than an apple tree, and in that sense it is unchanging. A horse grows, but it remains unchanging in the sense that it is always the animal we call a horse. Metaphysics (in Marx’s conception of it) deals with the identity-maintaining, unchanging aspects of things, while dialectic deals with the changing and developing aspects; both views, however, are one-sided and incomplete.

The person that applied dialectic to biology, emphasizing only the changing aspects of things, was T. D. Lysenko (1898-1976). As is well known, the Mendelist-Morganist theory of heredity explained the characteristics of living beings as transmitted to their descendants through genes, and propounded the unchangeability of genes and the unchangeability of the species. Accordingly such a view cannot be compatible with dialectic, which emphasizes the constant change and development of things.

Lysenko claimed to have disproved the gene theory through performing his vernalization experiment, whereby he said he had changed autumn wheat into spring wheat and had revealed that the heredity of a living thing is determined by the environment.²⁷ In addition, Lysenko attacked the Mendelist-Morganist genetic theory—calling it a bourgeois, metaphysical science—and eventu-

ally obtained firm support from Stalin. As a result, the scientists of the Mendelist-Morganist school were charged with being enemies of the people, and were sent into exile.

Lysenkoism influenced biological research in the Soviet Union for over three decades since the early 1930's. Soon, however, the falseness of that theory was demonstrated through other experiments by scholars of other countries, and it was confirmed that the Mendelist-Morganist theory was correct. At the same time, attacks on Lysenkoism began to occur from within the Soviet Union itself, whereby it finally collapsed.

Actually, Lysenko's contention was theoretically quite proper, when viewed in the context of materialist dialectic. Why, then, did Lysenko failed? The reason was simply that the theory of materialist dialectic, which emphasizes only the aspect of change in things, is mistaken, and Lysenko intentionally formulated the results of his experiment in such a way that they would be in accordance with materialist dialectic. We can say that the failure of Lysenkoism is a further evidence in support of the truth of the Unification Thought position, which regards natural phenomena as the "unity of unchangeability and changeability."

B. The Law of the Unity and Struggle of Opposites

1. Critique

a) Unity and Struggle

According to materialist dialectic, all things develop through the unity and struggle of opposites, that is, through contradiction. (The expression "unity and struggle" does not mean that unity comes first and struggle later, but rather the aim in using this strategy is to becloud the judgment of the mass, thereby accomplishing the purpose of violent revolution. The real intention is to pursue the struggle of opposites, rather than their unity, and antagonism within contradiction, rather than non-antagonism.

b) Critique of the Examples of Contradiction given by Engels

Engels said as follows:

Dialectics, so-called *objective* dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called *subjective* dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature.³⁰

Using that statement, Engels gave several examples of contradiction or opposites; a few of them are examined below.

(1) *Polarity*. Mentioning a magnet and a worm as examples of contradiction, Engels wrote the following:

Polarity. A Magnet, on being cut through, polarizes the neutral middle portion, but in such a way that the old poles remain. On the other hand a worm, on being cut into two, retains the receptive mouth at the positive pole and forms a new negative pole at the other end with excretory anus; but the old negative pole (the anus) now becomes positive, becoming a mouth, and a new anus or negative pole is formed at the cut end. *Voilà* transformation of positive into negative.³¹

What Engels intended to demonstrate was that, when one cuts a magnet into two parts, both the north and the south poles—which Engels considers to be opposites or contradictory elements—necessarily appear again on each divided part (figure 3.1). Also, when one cuts a worm into two parts, again there necessarily appear both a mouth and an anus, viewed as opposites, or contradictory elements (figure 3.2). Is it really true, though, that the north and south poles, the mouth and anus, are opposites?

If you sprinkle iron filings around a magnet, the filings will line up in curves, connecting the north and the south poles. This means that the two poles attract each other—in other words, they need each other. On the other hand, if you place two magnets facing each other so that two like poles are close together (either the

two north poles or the two south poles), then, when iron filings are sprinkled between the two magnets, the filings will form curves away from the opposite magnet. This means that like poles reject each other.




Fig. 3.1 The North Pole and South Pole of a Magnet




Fig. 3.2 The Mouth and Anus of a Worm

Accordingly, it can be concluded that contradiction, or opposition, can be applied only to the two north poles or the two south poles. The north and south poles are correlative elements forming a magnetic field. In addition, the attraction between the north and south poles is a static phenomenon, having nothing to do with development.

As for the worm, the mouth and anus of a worm complement each other to keep its whole body alive. The mouth fulfills the function of eating and the anus the function of excreting, which they do with the common purpose of keeping the worm alive and promoting its growth. There is no rejection or struggle of any kind between them. Should it ever happen that the mouth ate while the anus did not excrete or the anus excreted while the mouth did not eat, then it could be said that the mouth and the anus had rejected each other, and the worm would then stop living. In other words, the development and growth of the worm takes place, not

through the struggle (contradiction) between the mouth and the anus, but through cooperation between them.³²

(2) *The Motion of an Object.* Another example given by Engels is that of the dynamic motion of an object. He explains it as follows:

Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can only come about through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous origination and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is.³³

This way of thinking resulted from a critique of Zeno's paradox of the flying arrow—that is, the flying arrow is at rest. Zeno explained that if an arrow is at a certain point at a given moment of time, then at that point it is stationary. And if it is not at any point at a given moment of time, then the arrow has not passed through any point, and therefore it is not moving at all. Accordingly, he concluded that the flying arrow is always stationary. In answer to the puzzle, Engels explained that at any given moment an object both is, and is not at a certain place (which implies that at any given moment an object is both stationary and moving at a given place). Accordingly, Engels claimed he had explained motion and had solved Zeno's puzzle.

When, however, Zeno said that a flying arrow is at a certain point, he was referring to a mathematical point, which occupies no space. Actual motion, however, occurs within time and space. The velocity of a body in motion (v) is the distance travelled (d) divided by the elapsed time (t), expressed in the equation $v=d/t$. Therefore, the motion of a body occurs within a definite distance and within a definite period of time. Accordingly, one cannot speak about motion of any kind through a mathematical point, which has position but occupies no space. Motion must always occur within a certain space (no matter how small that distance may be) and within a certain period of time (no matter how short that period may be). Accordingly, it can be said that an object in

motion moves at a certain velocity at a certain point, as the equation shows. Thus, it is neither correct to say that a moving object is stationary, as Zeno claimed, nor is it correct to say that a moving object is both stationary and moving at the same time (in other words, to say that a moving object both is and is not at the same place at the same time), as Engels claimed.

Engels' saying that an object in motion is, and also is not, at a certain place at a certain moment of time means that an object in motion is in two places at the same moment of time. The position of an object in motion, however, is expressed as a function of time, according to mechanics. Therefore, at any given moment of time, for any given object, there exists only one corresponding position, and it is impossible for two positions to correspond at the same moment.

The following conclusions can be drawn: (1) an object in motion passes through a certain space without resting in it; and (2) an object in motion is at a certain place at a certain moment of time (in other words, it is not the case that it both is and is not).

(3) *Life and Death*. Engels also stated that the life of a living organism should be understood in the context of the opposition between life and death. He explained this as follows:

Life and death. Already no physiology is held to be scientific if it does not consider death as an essential element of life, the *negation* of life as being essentially contained in life itself.³⁴

Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in.³⁵

Then, through what kind of opposition between life and death do living organisms maintain their existence? Engels would have to say, for instance, that a seventy-year old individual has experienced an opposition between life and death for all that period of time. It will be found, however, that the brain, the nerves, the bone structure, the intestines, the muscles, the organs of the five

senses, etc, have all been living throughout his whole life, except when seriously ill or damaged. In other words, there will be found no part of his body which is sometimes living and sometimes dead; we can see only that cells are replaced by new ones (in other words, the death and birth of cells).

In fact, Engels himself states that living organisms maintain their life through the continuous life and death of cells, as follows:

In like manner, every organic being is every moment the same and not the same; every moment it assimilates matter supplied from without, and gets rid of other matter; every moment some cells of its body die and others build themselves anew; in a longer or shorter time the matter of its body is completely renewed, and is replaced by other molecules of matter, so that every organic being is always itself, and yet something other than itself.³⁶

Nevertheless, when one speaks of the opposition between life and death in man, 'life' should refer to the life of man, and 'death' to the death of man, because the concept opposite to that of 'the life of man' is that of 'the death of man'. The death of a cell has nothing to do with the death of man. Old cells die away for the sake of the life of man, and are replaced by new cells. The same can be said of all other living beings.

Furthermore, in the case of a one-celled organism (e.g., diatoms and amoebae) the death of that cell represents the end of life for that organism; therefore, even in this case, life and death do not coexist. Accordingly, there is no death in opposition to life during the period of the existence of living beings; therefore, it is entirely wrong to view life as a process of opposition between life and death.

Engels gave many other examples of contradiction, but a close examination shows that none of them are examples of contradictory elements, and most of them have nothing to do with development.³⁷

c) Critique of the Examples of Contradiction given by Lenin

Lenin said, "The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts is the *essence* of dialectics,"³⁸ and gave examples from several fields, such as the following:

mathematics: plus (+) and minus (-); differential and integral

mechanics: action and reaction

physics: positive and negative electricity

chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms

social science: the class struggle

Actually, Lenin wanted to point out only class struggle, which he lists at the end, but if he had mentioned that alone, it would not have been convincing; thus, he gave examples of supposed contradiction in natural phenomena, in order to support the validity of class struggle. Nevertheless, his examples from natural phenomena have nothing to do with development; moreover, there is no trace of struggle among them, as is discussed below.

Consider Lenin's examples from mathematics. The existence of plus and minus means simply that in quantitative measurements there are two relative directions, indicating increase or decrease. And the existence of differentiation and integration means only that there are two relative directions in mathematical calculation. We apply either one according to what we need. For example, we apply integration when measuring area and volume, and differentiation when measuring velocity. For a struggle of opposites to occur, the two opposing operations would have to be carried out simultaneously; and yet, neither in the case of addition and subtraction nor in the case of integration and differentiation are the two operations carried out simultaneously. Either one or the other is carried out in any one particular case. Thus, plus and minus, as well as integration and differentiation, never exist in a relationship of struggle. In other words, they are net contradictory elements (opposites).

Consider now action and reaction in mechanics. When body A brings force to bear on body B (action), B also brings force to bear on A (reaction); and the two forces are equal in strength, and opposite in direction. This is the law of action and reaction. Action and reaction operate simultaneously, and may at first appear contradictory. Nevertheless, these two operations are carried out by two forces which are mutually balanced—not by antagonistic forces such as one seeking to overthrow the other. Accordingly, we cannot say that action and reaction are contradictory elements; rather, we should say that they are in harmony.

In physics, likewise, no struggle exists between positive and negative types of electricity. If we wish to speak of struggle, then we should take the example of two positive charges or two negative charges, because a positive charge repels another positive one and a negative charge repels another negative one. Between positive and negative charges there is mutual attraction, whereby they become a force which forms atoms and molecules or create an electric field, causing various electric phenomena.

What about the case of combination and dissociation in chemical reactions? Seen microscopically, combination and dissociation occur simultaneously. Accordingly, they appear to exhibit opposition and struggle—but that is not the case. A particular molecule (or the particular active site involved in a reaction) is involved either in combination or in dissociation, but not in both at the same time. When these two processes are seen macroscopically, one would have to say that either the process of combination or the process of dissociation is taking place because the rate of one process is greater than the rate of the other one, in a given condition. Accordingly, contradiction and struggle do not exist in the processes of combination and dissociation; rather, these are relative processes.

Finally, Let us look at the matter of class struggle in society. Undeniably, this is a real case of struggle; nevertheless, it is not true that class struggle must necessarily occur in human society.

Furthermore, even in the cases where struggles have occurred, no social development resulted from the struggle itself. As will be explained in chapter four, where the materialist conception of history is dealt with, struggles cannot cause social development; all one can accomplish through struggle is to change the direction of history, that is, the direction in which society is going.

d) Internal Contradiction and Progressive Movement

Marxists object to the metaphysical conception of an external cause of things—which ultimately would lead to the existence of God—and propose the view of materialist dialectic, which claims that the development of things occurs through contradiction within them. Mao Tse-tung asserted that the fundamental cause of the development of things is the contradiction which exists within them, and said that external causes represent only the conditions for change; in other words, they are secondary causes of development. He explained his views as follows:

Contradictoriness within a thing is the fundamental cause of its development, while its interrelations and interactions with other things are secondary causes.³⁹

[Materialist dialectic] holds that external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, there is a difference between reversible, repetitive types of movement (such as water's turning into steam and vice versa) and irreversible, progressive types of movement with a fixed direction (such as the growth of living beings and the development of societies). Why, then, is there a difference between these two forms of movement?

In this connection, Mao Tse-tung wrote that "in a suitable temperature an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different basis."⁴¹ This means that the reason an egg can develop into a chicken is that it has an internal cause (i.e., an internal contradic-

tion). Maurice Cornforth explained that only a movement driven by an internal cause can be progressive, or forward movement, arguing that, when movement takes place according to the conditions brought about only by external causes, it has no direction, and that movement “has a direction when (however conditioned by external factors) it is impelled forward by internal causes.”⁴²

Nevertheless, contrary to such views, Mao Tse-tung said that “even mechanical motion under external force occurs through the internal contradictoriness of things.”⁴³ Likewise, Cornforth said that internal contradiction is the basis even for repetitive movement (for instance, the movement of water into steam). He explained this as follows:

Water does not boil unless it is heated. But the boiling process resulting from the application of heat comes about on the basis of the internal contradiction of attraction and repulsion characteristic of the molecules of water.⁴⁴

Thus, hardly any difference can be claimed between repetitive and progressive movement, and it becomes difficult to distinguish between the two. This means that, when materialist dialectic is applied to history, it is not possible to say that history has been performing developmental movement. Accordingly, it becomes possible to look at history as making repetitive movement, as in the ancient Greeks’ cyclical view of history. In this case, the Marxist view of a stage-by-stage development of society and its theory of revolution lose all foundation and become meaningless.

2. Counterproposal

Contrary to the position held by materialist dialectic that things develop through the struggle of contradictory opposites, Unification Thought maintains that things change and develop when the “correlative elements” (or “paired elements”) of subject and object within them engage in give and receive action centering on a common purpose.⁴⁵ Furthermore, if the subject has will or life, the give and receive action with its object results in progressive, or

developmental movement. Development refers to the appearance either of a new quality or of a new being.

Next, let us examine whether development takes place through the struggle of contradictory opposites or through the give and receive action of correlatives. Genuine contradiction is a phenomenon which takes place when the interest of one element opposes the interest of the other, or when the purposes of the two elements do not coincide with each other. When, on the contrary, the interests of the two elements coincide and share a common purpose, then no struggle takes place between them; rather, harmonious development will occur. In that case, it can be said that what is taking place is the give and receive action of correlatives.

Consider, for instance, the infiltration of germs into the human body. If the body's resistance is weak, the germs will multiply, causing disease and even death. If, however, resistance is strong, the germs are destroyed. Thus, either the body or the germs are destroyed—and the reason is that there is no common purpose, or coincident interest between them. Hence, this is a typical case of the struggle of contradictory opposites. While the struggle is going on, however, one cannot say that development and growth are taking place nor that health is being promoted; on the contrary, development is hindered. In addition, the opposition between germs and the human body is the result, not of normal healthy conditions, but rather of abnormal conditions.

The relationship between correlative elements, however, displays entirely different characteristics. In an egg, for instance, there is a relationship between the embryo on one hand, and the yolk and the white on the other. The purpose of the embryo is to become a chick; the purpose of the yolk and the white is to provide nourishment for the embryo's growth. The way the embryo relates to the yolk and the white is not in the form of repulsion; neither do the yolk and the white refuse to be absorbed into the embryo. Accordingly, the parts are correlatives, with the common purpose of giving birth to a chick; through harmonious give and

receive action between them, the egg develops into a chick.⁴⁶ We can conclude, then, that it is correlatives, not contradictory opposites, that exist in things, and that, through the give and receive action of correlatives, all beings develop.

Another point to keep in mind regards the phenomenon of the incubation of an egg. If one were to attempt to explain this according to materialist dialectic, one would have to say that the egg is the thesis and the embryo the antithesis, and that through struggle between the thesis and the antithesis the egg becomes a chick. The antithesis would have to be regarded as a non-egg; and the reason is that, contrary to the principle of contradiction in formal logic (the principle which says that "A is not non-A"), materialist dialectic affirms that "A is both A and non-A at the same time." It would be dialectical, therefore, to assume that the egg becomes a chick through struggle between the egg and the non-egg (that is the embryo). This, however, is logically invalid, for the first time the term 'egg' is used, it refers to the egg as a whole (including the embryo) and the second time it refers to the white, the yolk, and the shell, which are the elements that remain when the embryo is removed. The fallacy here is to use the term 'egg' with two different meanings in the same argument. Figure 3.3 illustrates the difference between the view of Unification Thought and that of materialist dialectic concerning this point.

As a counterproposal to the "law of the unity and struggle of opposites" of materialist dialectic, Unification Thought presents the "law of the give and receive action between correlatives." And as a counterproposal to the "law of contradiction," Unification Thought presents the "law of harmony," or the "law of correspondence." The struggle of contradictory opposites brings about only destruction and ruin—never anything like development. Development can only result from the harmonious give and receive action of correlatives centering on a common purpose.

Furthermore, as noted earlier, every case cited by Engels and Lenin as an example of contradiction in nature turned out to be an

example of correlatives, following the law of harmony. Of course, in the natural world there are elements which repel each other and which, at first sight, seem to be contradictory to each other.




Fig. 3.3 Correlatives and Opposites

For instance, repulsion exists between plus and plus and between minus and minus in electricity; between north pole and north pole and between south pole and south pole in magnets, and so on. Such phenomena, however, serve to complement and strengthen the give and receive action between correlative elements (i.e., plus and minus, north and south poles)—they are not meant to cause destruction. Accordingly, it can be said that all activities in nature follow the law of harmony.

Finally, the Unification Thought view about the difference between progressive and repetitive types of movement will be presented: Unification Thought maintains that living beings perform

progressive movement, because they have life in themselves; and inorganic substances (e.g., water) perform repetitive movement, because they have no life in them. Communism, however, regards life as merely a material phenomenon of higher dimension. As a result, it cannot make the essential distinction between mechanical, repetitive movement and developmental movement.

In order to understand the cause of progressive movement (that is, development), we must have an accurate understanding of the essence of life. In Unification Thought, life is regarded as the “autonomy and dominion of the principle,” and also as “consciousness, or will, latent within the cell.” Accordingly, progressive, developmental movement is autonomous and purposeful, following a definite direction; in contrast, mechanical, repetitive movement is heteronomous and lacks direction.

Nevertheless, even though the movement of an inorganic substance, by itself, lacks direction, when that substance is taken into a living being it becomes involved in a movement with direction. The movement of the universe, when seen through the entire period of its history, is a movement of life—in other words, it is progressive and developmental movement. The universe is a huge living organism, and the driving force underlying its movement is “cosmic consciousness,” or “cosmic life.” The movement performed by human society is also developmental, or progressive, because it is brought about by human beings who have consciousness.

C. The Law of Transformation of Quantitative into Qualitative Changes

1. Critique

a) Rationalization of Violent Revolution

According to materialist dialectic, the development of things follows the “Law of transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes,” otherwise known as the “Law of transformation of

quantity into quality." This law claims that when things develop, gradual quantitative changes are accumulated until a threshold is reached, and then a sudden qualitative change takes place in the form of a leap. Needless to say, this law was formulated for the purpose of rationalizing violent revolution. The following words by Stalin eloquently bear witness to that fact:

Further, if the passing of slow quantitative changes into rapid and abrupt qualitative changes is a law of development, then it is clear that revolutions made by oppressed classes are a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon.

Hence, the transition from capitalism to socialism and the liberation of the working class from the yoke of capitalism cannot be effected by slow changes, by reforms, but only by a qualitative change of the capitalist system, by revolution.⁴⁷

Likewise in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* as well as in *Capital*, Marx made several applications of this law to social revolution as follows:

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.⁴⁸

Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integu-

ment. Thus, integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.⁴⁹

b) Critique of the Examples of this law

Marxists explain the law of transformation of quantity into quality with concrete examples in order to prove that their law is not idealistic in the Hegelian sense, but rather scientific and materialistic. They give various examples such as the change in the condition of water, the breaking of a cord, the bursting of a boiler. Nevertheless, do these examples really prove their law?

First, it must be kept in mind that materialist dialectic proposes this law as an attempt to justify their claim that capitalist society must evolve into socialist society (and then into communist society) through the abrupt, qualitative change of revolution. The examples proposed, however, have nothing to do with development. The change in the condition of water, for instance, is a reversible phenomenon; the breaking of a cord and the bursting of a boiler represent only destruction. Therefore, it is impossible to rationalize communist revolution through these examples. Even setting this point aside, do these examples truly verify the claim that gradual quantitative change yields an abrupt qualitative change? This point will be examined and criticized below.

(1) *Change of the Condition of Water.* Engels gave the example of change of the aggregate states of water:

Under normal atmospheric pressure [water] changes at 0° C. from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100° C. from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of water.⁵⁰

The changes of water into steam or into ice originate from an alteration of the relationship between the forces of attraction (the intermolecular forces) and the repulsive forces (the molecular kinetic energy of the water molecules). But is this change in the condition of water truly a sudden qualitative change?

When water turns into ice at 0° C, the qualitative change whereby it does so does not take place in an instant. Water gradually turns into ice as heat equal to the heat of fusion is removed from it—in other words, this change occurs along with the quantitative change. The same may be said about water turning into steam at 100° C. Water turns gradually into steam as heat equal to the heat of vaporization is added—in other words, this change too occurs along with the quantitative change. Furthermore, evaporation does not occur only at the boiling point; water continues to evaporate steadily, even under normal conditions, until the vapor pressure reaches the saturation point. Hence, it is not right to say, as Engels did, that when a quantitative change reaches a definite point, a sudden qualitative change takes place with a leap.

(2) *The Breaking of a Cord and the Bursting of a Boiler.* Cornforth made the following statement to exemplify the law of transformation of quantity into quality:

A cord used to lift a weight may have a greater and greater load attached to it, but no cord can lift a load indefinitely great: at a certain point, the cord is bound to break. A boiler may withstand a greater and greater pressure of steam—up to the point where it bursts.⁵¹

These examples, however, do not constitute valid proof of the law of transformation of quantity into quality. In order for this law to be verified by these examples, first of all the cord must not be broken and the boiler must not burst; in addition, the quality of the cord and the boiler must change. In other words, when the quantitative change of the cord (i.e., the change in the length of the cord, which stretches according to the weight of the load) reaches a certain point, then the quality of the cord changes by a sudden leap, and the cord becomes a cord of a new quality. Likewise, when the quantitative change of the boiler (i.e., the change in the cubic volume of the boiler, which swells according to the pressure of the steam) reaches a certain point, then the quality of the boiler changes by a sudden leap, and the boiler becomes a

boiler of a new quality, In this example, however, the cord breaks and the boiler bursts; there is no way that a new cord and a new boiler can emerge from this situation.

Engels and Cornforth cited other examples of the law of transformation of quantity into quality, but none of the examples prove the law.⁵²

c) Critique of the Change in the Domination Relation

Mao Tse-tung said that the quality of a thing changes when the domination relation of principal and non-principal aspects in a contradiction is reversed, as follows:

The principal and the non-principal aspects of contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. . . . In each thing there is contradiction between its new and its old aspects, and this gives rise to a series of struggles with many twists and turns. As a result of these struggles, the new aspect changes from being minor to being major and rises to predominance, while the old aspect changes from being major to being minor and gradually dies out. And the moment the new aspect gains dominance over the old, the old thing changes qualitatively into a new thing.⁵³

Cornforth expressed a similar view, stating that the quality of a thing changes when the domination relation between the opposites is reversed, as follows:

Qualitative change is the result of a change in the balance of opposites. Such a change is prepared by a series of quantitative changes affecting the domination relation in the unity of opposites. As the domination relation changes, quantitative change passes into qualitative change.⁵⁴

The law of transformation of quantity into quality was put forward for the sake of rationalizing the claim that, when the development of the productive forces reaches a certain point in the course of history, social revolution occurs as an abrupt qualitative change. The above-mentioned statements by Mao Tse-tung and Cornforth are also aimed at rationalizing revolution. In other

words, their purpose is to rationalize changing the position of the working class from that of being dominated by the capitalist class to that of dominating the capitalist class.

Cornforth put forward the following argument as proof of his position: "Thus, the solid, liquid and gaseous states of bodies correspond to different domination-relationships in the unity of attraction and repulsion characteristic of molecules of bodies."⁵⁵ Let us examine what Cornforth said: if we consider the example of water, indeed there is a reversal of the domination relation when water turns into ice and when ice turns into water, because when water turns into ice the attractive forces come to dominate the repulsive forces, and when ice turns into water the forces of repulsion come to dominate the forces of attraction. Nevertheless, there is no change in the domination relation when water turns into steam or when steam turns into water. In water, the repulsive forces are slightly stronger than the forces of attraction and in steam the forces of repulsion are much stronger than the forces of attraction. Therefore, Cornforth's statement is in error. Moreover, changes in the state of water are reversible phenomena, which have nothing to do with development. Therefore, this example has no force as an argument about social development.

Consider the growth of a plant or an animal. A seed germinates and grows through the give and receive action between the embryo and the endosperm. Is it the case that the embryo is first in the position of being dominated and later changes to a dominating position? The answer is no. However small it may be, the embryo, which has life, is from the beginning in the subjective or dominating position, while the endosperm is in the objective or dominated position. Through the entire process of germination, the relationship of subject and object remains unchanging.

The same may be said of the hatching of an egg—for example a chicken egg. The embryo is the subject, and the yolk and white are object, from beginning to end. Accordingly, we cannot find any

reversal in the domination relation in the growth process of living beings.

Clearly, then, the statements by Mao Tse-tung and Cornforth concerning the change of the domination relation within things is, again, just a strategy to justify a revolution wherein the positions of ruling and ruled classes are to be reversed.

2. Counterproposal

Seen from Unification Thought, every being has two correlative aspects, *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*, and through give and receive action between these correlatives the being changes and develops or grows. *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* change simultaneously and gradually, maintaining their relationship of subject and object. The qualitative and the quantitative aspects of a thing correspond respectively to its *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*. Therefore, it follows that quality and quantity change simultaneously and gradually.

The law of transformation of quantity into quality implies that quantitative change precedes qualitative change—but this is not true. Change in quality and quantity are simultaneous, and qualitative change (i.e., *Sungsang* change) manifests itself through quantitative change (i.e., *Hyungsang* change); in other words, quantitative change is the means by which qualitative change takes place. In the case of the growth of plants and animals, for instance, the prototypes of the characteristics of fully developed plant and animal are stored from the beginning as ideas (in other words, as its *Sungsang*) in a seed or an egg—genetically speaking, all information for the growth of plants and animals is stored in the DNA of a seed or an egg—and this growth is actualized through material, quantitative substances. Seen phenomenally, quantity and quality change simultaneously; but seen from the essential relationship between them, quality is causal, or dominating, and quantity is resultant, or dominated. In other words, the change of quality and quantity is simultaneous, and their relationship is that of subject and object.

In addition, according to Unification Thought, the change and development (or growth) of things are basically effected through three stages, in accordance with the Principle of Creation. For this reason, there exist in nature three stages of matter (i.e., gas, liquid, and solid) and three stages in the growth of living beings (e.g., larva, chrysalis, and imago in the case of insects). In other words, things change and develop by stages.

In summary, according to the Unification Thought view, it is not the case that quantitative change transforms into qualitative change. Rather, it proposes the view that changes in quality and in quantity are simultaneous, gradual, and by stages. Thus, Unification Thought presents the “Law of Balanced Development of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*,” or the “Law of Balanced Development of Quality and Quantity,” as a counterproposal to the “Law of Transformation of Quantitative into Qualitative Changes” of materialist dialectic. The preceding explanation has made it clear that the law of transformation of quantity into quality does not hold true at all in the natural world. Thus, the Marxist assertion that violent revolution is inevitable, is based on fictitious, ungrounded logic.

D. The Law of Negation of Negation

1. Critique

a) The Meaning of Negation of Negation

Negation refers to the replacement of an old qualitative state by a new one through struggle of opposites (contradictory elements) within a thing. Negation of negation refers to the replacement of the second qualitative state by a third qualitative state through struggle of new opposites. Both negation and the negation of negation can also be described as arising from the opposing action of otherness within a thing. Through double negations, a thing returns to its original state on a higher dimension. Therefore, it is said that development is a progressive and upward movement

and, at the same time, a returning movement, which takes on a spiral form. This is the “law of negation of negation.”⁵⁶

Lenin explained the negation of negation as follows:

A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (negation of negation, a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line. . . .⁵⁷

. . . the repetition at a higher stage of certain features, properties, etc., of the lower and the apparent return to the old (negation of negation).⁵⁸

And Stalin offered a similar explanation, as follows:

The process of development should be understood not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher.⁵⁹

Actually, “negation” does not refer to mere destruction or the mere extermination of something. In explanation of negation, Engels said that “negation in dialectics does not mean simply no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes.”⁶⁰ And Lenin gave the following explanation:

Not empty negation, not futile negation, not skeptical negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics,—which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its most important element—no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillation, without any eclecticism.⁶¹

With regard to the law of negation of negation, Engels also said that it is “an extremely general—and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important—law of development of nature, history, and thought.”⁶² He claimed that he had validated that law through the study of phenomena of nature. In sum, negation is considered as the condition for progress whereby positive ele-

ments in the old stage of a thing are preserved and brought into the new stage. Nevertheless, this is a false “law”, fabricated on purpose as a lie—just as were the other “laws” of materialist dialectic. This can be made clear by a careful examination of the examples given by Engels.

b) Critique of the Examples given by Engels

A well known example given by Engels to illustrate the law of negation of negation is that of the grain of barley, as follows:

Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilized and finally once more produces grains of barley, and, as soon as these have ripened, the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty-, or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener’s art, we get as a result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which produce mere beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection.⁶³

The fact that the seed of barley germinates and becomes a plant is called negation by Engels; and the fact that from that plant new grains of barley are produced in tenfolds is called the negation of negation. Negation is considered a necessary phenomenon, occurring through the struggle of opposites.⁶⁴ The embryo and the endosperm, or the embryo and the seed coat, could be considered as

the opposites within the seed. In this context, the negation of the seed could be seen as the struggle of the embryo, on one hand, and the endosperm and seed coat on the other. (Another way to explain this is to say that the seed is negated by the embryo to become a plant.)

The question, however, is whether a seed indeed germinates by being negated. The answer is no. Within the seed, the embryo exists for the purpose of becoming a bud, and the endosperm exists as nourishment needed for the embryo to grow into a bud. Thus, the relationship between the embryo and the endosperm is that of subject and object. As for the seed coat, it exists to protect the embryo and the endosperm for a certain period of time. It thus plays an objective role in relation to the embryo, its subject.

Consequently, the embryo, the endosperm, and the seed coat all exist with the same common purpose, that is, to germinate and to become a plant. Therefore, in the case of a grain of barley, the embryo and the endosperm, under the protection of the seed coat, enter into give and receive action for the purpose of becoming a barley plant, affirming each other (rather than negating each other, as materialist dialectic claims). When an embryo bud emerges, it seems that it does so by struggling against the seed coat and breaking it—but there is no struggle there. When the bud emerges, it sheds the seed coat—which has now finished its role of protecting the embryo and the endosperm—as if taking off its clothes. In fact, the seed coat becomes tender, so that the bud can come out easily. Thus, no element is negated (opposed) when the seed becomes a plant. Accordingly, the seed is not negated, but grows by mutual affirmation to become a plant.

Likewise, the assertion that a plant produces its seed by being negated is also wrong. An annual plant like barley grows, blooms, produces seed, and then dies. It is not true, however, that it withers away by being negated; rather, it naturally withers away because it has fully accomplished its task (its purpose of creation). Moreover, a perennial plant, such as an apple tree, bears new fruit

every year, and yet it does not wither. There are many examples like this. Evidently, it is false that seeds and fruits emerge as a result of negation.

After discussing the example of a barley plant, Engels gave the example of a butterfly, as follows:

With most insects, this process follows the same lines as in the case of the grain of barley. Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg by negation of the egg, pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs.⁶⁵

This case, however, does not exemplify the law of negation of negation. As already shown in the example of a chicken egg, there is no such thing as a struggle between the embryo and the nutritious matter inside an egg. Accordingly, it is not true that the egg of a butterfly is negated to become a larva through the struggle between its embryo and nutritious matter. Moreover, it is not because of negation that a butterfly dies after laying its eggs; it dies because it has finished its task (its purpose of creation). In conclusion, then, it is not true that animals are negated through laying eggs or bearing offspring. And the evidence is the fact that, just as among plants there are many perennials, so among animals there are many kinds of animals that do not die after laying eggs or bearing offspring—such as chickens and dogs.⁶⁶

Engels also put forward examples of negation from mathematics as follows:

It is the same in mathematics. Let us take any algebraic quantity whatever: for example, a . If this is negated, we get $-a$ (minus a). If we negate that negation, by multiplying $-a$ by $-a$, we get $+a^2$, i.e., the original positive quantity, but at a higher degree, raised to its second power.⁶⁷

In his example, when he negated a , Engels simply added the minus sign before it (in other words, he multiplied a by -1) and obtained $-a$. But when he proceeded to negate $-a$, he did not sim-

ply add the minus sign before $-a$ as he had done before (that is, he did not multiply $-a$ by -1). Rather, he multiplied $-a$ by $-a$, and the result was a^2 . This demonstrates his deliberate scheme to fit the facts to the law of the negation of negation, always striving to apply that law to nature, one way or another.

2. Counterproposal

Materialist dialectic states that development through the negation of negation is progressive and returning. Unification Thought, however, regards developmental movement as the movement of living beings, which is characterized by purpose, time, and stages. In other words, it is the movement whereby a being progresses toward the fulfillment of a certain purpose, over a certain period of time, by stages. Unification Thought also holds that beings maintain their perpetuity by moving in circular motion through give and receive action between subject and object. Inanimate things maintain actual "circular movement in space" (for example, the earth's movement around the sun). Living beings, however, perform "circular movement in time," or "spiral movement," whereby they insure the preservation of the species, the multiplication of members within the species, and the diversification of characteristics through succeeding generations.

This explanation, however, applies only to natural phenomena; it does not apply to history. Unification Thought explains human history as follows: first, it regards human history as the process of regaining the original world of creation, which was supposed to have been established in the beginning of history, but was lost through the Fall of the first human ancestors. Second, it regards history as the process of cultural and scientific development according to the law of creation (i.e., the law of give and receive action). Thus, human history is both the history of restoration and the history of development (or of re-creation).

Therefore, it is wrong for materialist dialectic to apply the pattern of spiral movement seen in nature to social development, and

to conclude that human history will finally reach communist society as a restored form of the primitive communal society on a higher dimension. If it were the case that this pattern also applied to human history, the real result would be that, once communist society was established, it would eventually become a class society again, because the pattern of spiral movement in the natural world involves the endless repetition of circular movement.

Communists made a deliberate attempt to prove their point that the primitive classless communal society was negated to become a class society, which again will be negated to become a communist society (which is a return to classless society at a higher level) following the pattern of spiral movement in the natural world. To achieve that purpose, they emphasized the law of the negation of negation. Marx had this to say concerning this point:

The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labor of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, *with the inexorability of a law of Nature*, its own negation. *It is the negation of negation.*⁶⁸ (italics added)

We have seen, however, that the law of the negation of negation does not apply to natural phenomena. It is not an objective law but rather a subjective, pseudo-law borrowed from Hegel and used to rationalize violent revolution. Still, communists have desperately attempted to disguise it as an objective and scientific law. For that reason they include in the meaning of negation two opposite senses—that is, the negative sense of destruction and extermination and the positive sense of unity and preservation—and by doing so they pretend to be able to explain any phenomenon.

It must be kept in mind that behind the ambiguous meaning of negation, there lies the strategy to confuse people's judgment. This strategy might be explained as follows: in the case of an argument or a dispute, when the situation seems disadvantageous

to the communists, they conceal their true intentions and interpret negation in the sense of peace; but when the situation seems favorable to them, they interpret negation in the sense of struggle in order to agitate intellectuals and mass to mobilize them for revolution.

As a counterproposal to the law of the negation of negation, Unification Thought offers the “law of affirmative development.” According to this law, every being, both in nature and in society, develops affirmatively by the harmonious give and receive action carried out by the subjective and objective elements existing within that being, or by the same kind of action carried out with another being, whereby the relationship of subject and object is formed between the two beings. (In the process of social development, in addition to the law of affirmative development, which is carried out through give and receive action, the laws of restoration have been operating, as explained later.)

IV. THE FALLACY OF MATERIALIST DIALECTIC

In considering the fallacy of materialist dialectic, it might be useful to contrast it with Hegelian dialectic. Since the premise for Hegel’s dialectic was God (or the Absolute Spirit) and its starting point was the idea, Hegel was able to explain nature and history deductively—in other words, he was able to set up his conclusions beforehand and then to develop arguments leading to those conclusions—and he was also able to explain the development of idea, nature, and history as a continuum. In contrast, since Marx set up his theory on the basis of having denied God and taking matter as its starting point, he should have developed an inductive theory, rather than a deductive one. It would be improper, then, for him to set up his conclusions in advance and then to develop arguments to validate those conclusions—yet that is exactly what Marx did.

In order for Marx to be able to say that development in history occurs through struggle, first of all he should have proven that development in the natural world occurs by struggle, rather than by harmony, giving examples from the natural world (such as the development of the universe and the growth of plants). Next, he should have conducted an objective analysis of society, era by era, which should have led to the conclusion that laws similar to those in the natural world are at work also in society. And yet, without giving concrete examples from the natural world and without conducting an objective, in-depth analysis of society (this point will be explained later), Marx hastily established the outline of his theory, namely materialist dialectic and the materialist conception of history. In other words, he drew his conclusions in advance and then developed argumentation to validate them.

Unlike Marx, Engels later on tried to prove that the dialectic is in operation in the development of nature, by giving examples drawn from his years of research in mathematics, astronomy, dynamics, physics, chemistry, biology, etc. He published his views in *Dialectics of Nature* (1873-1883) and *Anti-Dühring* (1876-1878) wherein he concluded that “nature is the proof of dialectics.”⁶⁹

In “Prefaces to the Three Editions” of *Anti-Dühring*, Engels described how he set up his proofs as follows:

Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and history. But a knowledge of mathematics and natural science is essential to a conception of nature which is dialectical and at the same time materialist. Marx was well versed in mathematics, but we could keep up with the natural sciences only piecemeal, intermittently and sporadically. . . . And [I] spent the best part of eight years on it. . . .

It goes without saying that my recapitulation of mathematics and the natural sciences was undertaken in order to convince myself also in detail—of what in general I was not in doubt—that in nature, amid the welter of innumerable changes, the same

dialectical laws of motion force their way through as these which in history govern the apparent fortuitousness of events.⁷⁰

Thus, Engels admits that he “was not in doubt” that the laws of materialist dialectic operate in the natural world as well. This means that he took as his premise the assumption that nature follows dialectic, and this is nothing but the frank admission that what he was going to do was to explain natural phenomena in such a way as to fit into dialectics. Nevertheless, immediately after that, he said that to him “there could be no question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it.”⁷¹

Actually, however, he did “build the laws of dialectics into nature.” For example (discussed earlier), in order to demonstrate his law of the negation of negation, Engels asserted that a grain of barley is negated (i.e., dies) to become a plant, which is again negated (i.e., withers) to bear new seeds; and he said that the egg of a butterfly is negated (i.e., dies) to become a larva, a chrysalis, and then a butterfly, which is again negated (i.e., dies) to lay new eggs. But, as he himself admitted, these examples were limited to annual plants and to some animals which finish their life after laying eggs once. Many kinds of plants are perennial and many kinds of animals do not die after once laying eggs. Thus, he took examples that on the surface appear to conform to the laws of materialist dialectic, and presented them as representative examples of the entire natural world. Therefore, he intentionally built dialectic into nature.

If one thoroughly inquires into natural phenomena, one finds that such phenomena do not constitute “the proof of dialectic,” but rather, “the denial of dialectic.” Instead, natural phenomena constitute “the proof of the law of give and receive.” This is precisely what we have shown in this chapter. This fallacy resulted from the fact that Marx accepted Hegel’s dialectic just as it was and adapted it to his materialist outlook, without conducting a detailed and objective study of the natural world.

Finally, a brief overview of the historical background of the development of materialist dialectic will be presented. Marx, who had fallen under the influence of Hegelian philosophy while a student at Berlin University, grew keenly aware that Hegel's idealistic theory (idealistic dialectic) was powerless to eliminate the contradictions in, or heal the maladies of Prussian civil society. Eventually Marx came to believe that only economic reform by violent revolution could solve existing social contradictions.

Accordingly, it became necessary for him to develop a philosophical theory to rationalize violent revolution. At that time, Marx accepted materialism from Feuerbach. By combining materialism with Hegel's dialectic, he developed materialist dialectic, in other words, he reversed the Hegelian dialectic simply by replacing idealism with materialism.⁷² From the very beginning, therefore, materialist dialectic was devised as a means to carry out violent revolution, and this fact is evident from the following words by Marx:

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property [revolution].⁷³

In its mystified form [idealistic form], dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form [materialistic form] it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and *is in its essence critical and revolutionary*.⁷⁴ (italics added)

4

MATERIALIST
CONCEPTION OF
HISTORY
CRITIQUE AND
COUNTERPROPOSAL

I. FORMATION OF THE
MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF
HISTORY

After arriving in Paris, Marx wrote *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law. Introduction* and called Germany to revolution by the proletariat. He then wrote *The Holy Family* (September-November, 1844), where he criticized Bruno Bauer, his former comrade and teacher in the Young Hegelians, as well as Bruno Bauer's group. In this way Marx tried to break with Hegelian thinking completely.

Based on the Young Hegelian concept of self-consciousness, Bauer insisted that what leads history is the "critical spirit" of a few elected individuals; in contrast, however, Marx took the position that it is neither a supernatural force nor human self-consciousness that creates history, and asserted that the true creator of history is the people themselves and that, therefore, the proletariat has the mission to liberate itself.

Deported from Paris, Marx moved to Brussels, where Engels joined him shortly afterwards, and together with Engels he wrote *The German Ideology* (September 1845-May 1846). In this work he described and denounced the ideas proposed by Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and Max Sterner as the thought of the German ruling class; and he made concrete the materialist conception of history, the main points of which he had previously formulated. Engels wrote about this as follows:

When I visited Marx in Paris in the summer of 1844, our complete agreement in all theoretical fields became evident and our joint work dates from that time. When in the spring of 1845, we met again in Brussels, Marx had already fully developed his materialist theory of history in its main features from the above-mentioned basis and we now applied ourselves to the detailed elaboration of the newly-won mode of outlook in the varied directions.¹

The “main features” of the materialist theory of history, which Engels said that Marx had already completed by the spring of 1845, included mostly just the position that history is the history of class struggle between ruling and ruled classes and the position that the economic factor in society is the force which moves history.

When Marx and Engels concretized the materialist conception of history in *The German Ideology*, they posited as their first premise the fact that man must first have the means to satisfy his need for food, clothing and shelter—in other words, he must produce the materials necessary for his physical life. They expressed this point as follows:

We must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to “make history.” But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, housing, clothing and various other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself.²

At the time of Marx's death, Engels mentioned again this premise as follows:

Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history; the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, and have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc.³

The assertion that activities for the production of the material means of subsistence (in other words, economic activities) develop history can be considered the fundamental law of the materialist conception of history, its beginning and ending point. Based on this fundamental law, Marx developed certain formulas of the materialist conception of history, which are described in the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (hereafter also referred to as *Contribution*).

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.⁴

By adding the assertion that the development of society is law-governed, and Marx's view of the state to the explanation given

above, the materialist conception of history can be summarized in nine themes, as follows:

- (1) The law-governed nature of social development
- (2) The development of productive forces
- (3) The relations of production
- (4) The productive forces and the relations of production as independent of human will
- (5) The correspondence of the relations of production to the development of productive forces
- (6) The relations of production as fetters on the productive forces
- (7) Basis and superstructure
- (8) State and revolution
- (9) The forms of society

An outline of these various themes and a critique and counterproposal to them will be given below.

II. CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL

A. The Law-Governed Nature of Social Development

1. The Materialist Position

The materialist conception of history asserts that the process of social development follows objective laws, just as development in nature does, and that such laws exist independently of human will. In other words, it interprets history as a law-governed process. Social development differs fundamentally from natural development in that society is conducted through conscious human activity, whereas nature is not—no conscious operation is found in nature. Engels himself admitted that fact:

In nature . . . there are only blind, unconscious agencies acting upon one another, out of whose interplay the general law comes into operation . . . In the history of society, on the contrary, the actors are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals; nothing happens without a conscious purpose, without an intended aim.⁵

In spite of this statement, Engels insisted that society follows objective laws, independently of social human will:

The ends of the actions are intended, but the results which actually follow from these actions are not intended; or when they do seem to correspond to the end intended, they ultimately have consequences quite other than those intended. Historical events thus appear on the whole to be likewise governed by chance. But where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws and it is only a matter of discovering these laws.⁶

What, then, are the laws of social development? These laws are the formulas of the materialist conception of history, which Marx set forth in the preface to the *Contribution*—namely, (1) men enter into definite relations of production, which are independent of their will; (2) the relations of production correspond to a given stage in the development of the productive forces; (3) the relations of production are the basis, and forms of consciousness, the superstructure; (4) the social existence of men determines their consciousness; (5) when the relations of production turn into fetters on the development of productive forces, revolution takes place; and so on.

2. Critique and Counterproposal

As stated above, the materialist conception of history maintains that social development is governed by objective laws, which are independent of human will. Such laws, however, are not at all objective, but rather subjective and dogmatic pseudo-laws. This will be shown in detail in the sections that follow.

When Engels said “they [the actions] ultimately have consequences quite other than those intended,” he meant that in the course of history, when a society is about to enter a new stage of development, it is often the case that the people dwelling in the previous stage are unable to anticipate the nature of the new stage; this is undeniably true. Nevertheless, this does not warrant the conclusion that the objective laws guiding the development of history are material laws. According to the Unification Thought view of history (to be introduced in the last part of this chapter) the development of history has been leading towards its goal, namely, the world of the ideal of creation, under the Laws of God’s providence; and the process of the development of history on its way to that goal has often been altered by human will, especially by people in positions of leadership. Accordingly, the laws which have operated independently of human will are not material laws, but rather the laws of God’s providence.

In the materialist conception of history, social development proceeds toward a determined goal (i.e., communist society) through a determined course—just as happens in the material development of nature. But this is not the way social development takes place. Seen from the Unification Thought view of history, the goal of history is determined—that is, the realization of the world of the ideal of creation—but not the course of its development. The specific course taken by social development and the length of time necessary for a specific social development to take place, all depends on the will and efforts of the people in each age. Especially people in leadership positions play decisive roles. The influence of these leaders on the historical development of each period depends greatly on their character, way of thinking, devotion to duty, efforts, etc. In other words, the development of history has been influenced by the human portion of responsibility with its successes and failures.

B. The Development of Productive Forces

1. The Materialist Position

According to the materialist conception of history, the manner of producing and exchanging the means of subsistence is called the “mode of production,” and every social system and social activity are based on a definite mode of production.⁷ The mode of production consists of the unity of the “productive forces” (instruments of production and labor power) and the “relations of production” (the relations into which people enter with one another in the process of production). That productive forces develop constantly and become the driving force of social development, is the most fundamental law of the materialist conception of history. But then, how does the development of productive forces take place?

According to the dialectic, the development of all things is ascribed to the struggle of opposites—and the development of productive forces should not be considered an exception to this rule. Then, what kind of struggle of opposites brings about the development of productive forces? No clear answer to this question was given by Marx. He explained only vaguely, as follows:

He [man] opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway.⁸

Here, Marx can be understood as explaining that man has developed productive forces while in opposition to nature. Ishchenko, on the other hand, stated that the development of productive forces results from a dialectical interaction between productive forces themselves and the relations of production:

The cause of development of the forces of production must be sought in the inner quality of the labor process. . . . Once the forces of production have been generated, they develop through an internal dialectical process. The cause of development of the forces of production is the dialectical interaction between the forces of production and the relations of production as content and form. The forces of production always work in definite social form (which has always a definite class content specific to each period), and work in a certain type of relations of production.⁹

Stalin, also, referred to the development of productive forces when he described the interaction between productive forces and the relations of production. He said, "While their development is dependent on the development of productive forces, the relations of production in their turn react upon the development of the productive forces, accelerating or retarding it."¹⁰

2. Critique

Marx said that man, who is one of the forces of nature, develops his slumbering powers by acting on nature. In other words, man has brought about productive forces by developing those powers. Nevertheless, man has not been the only one to act upon nature; actually, all the animals have acted upon it, as "one of the forces of nature." Why, then, have the animals not developed productive forces? If man is "one of the forces of nature," then the animals (which are also one of the forces of nature) should not be very different from man.

Ishchenko said that productive forces develop through a dialectical interaction between the productive forces themselves and the relations of production, and Stalin said that through that interaction the development of productive forces is either accelerated or retarded. And yet, the materialist conception of history also asserts that (a) the development of the relations of production depends on, and corresponds to, the development of productive forces; and (b) the relations of production, once established, tend

to remain fixed and finally come to hinder (or “turn into fetters on”) the development of the productive forces (more on these two points later). How then would it be possible for productive forces to develop through interacting with the relations of production so defined?

To be congruent with its own tenets, the materialist conception of history should have begun by stating that productive forces contain within themselves the property of development. Accordingly, the development of productive forces should have been explained dialectically, so as to assert that, within the productive forces themselves, there are opposites and through the struggle between those opposites the development of productive forces is achieved. But none of this was done. Clearly then, the explanation that productive forces develop through a dialectical interaction between the productive forces themselves and the relations of production is non-dialectical.

3. Counterproposal

a) Man's Creative Power

Seen from the perspective of Unification Thought, the development of productive forces results from the give and receive action between man and nature, that is, from man's acting upon nature. Here, man and Nature are not in opposition, but rather in a correlative relationship. Also, man acts upon nature, not simply as one of the forces of nature, but rather as a being endowed with “creative power,” which is a power essentially different from that of animals.

Creativity is one of the aspects of original human nature endowed by God, and man expresses it in various fields as creative power. An artist, for instance, expresses it as artistic creative power; the scientist expresses it as technical power; and the worker as labor power. Instruments can be seen as an embodiment of technical power. Accordingly, productive forces, which are instruments of production and labor power, are expressions of

creative power. Therefore, the development of productive forces is the development of creative power.

It must be noted here that animals, also, possess a kind of creative power—as in the example of a bird making a nest. Their powers, however, differ essentially from human creative power. Man's creative power is rational and developmental, constantly producing and making new things. In contrast, the creative power of animals is instinctive; it is not endowed with reason and cannot develop new ideas or make new things. Without recognizing this essential difference between man and animals, there can be no reasonable explanation for the fact that only man developed productive forces. If men were just an animal, he would never be able to develop productive forces, no matter how much he might act upon nature.

While describing man as one of the forces of nature, Marx also said that “he develops his slumbering powers.” What are these “slumbering powers”? Actually, these are nothing other than man's “rational creative power” endowed by God. He described the development of productive forces as if it were just a material phenomenon, but implicitly he presupposed a rational or spiritual element within it.

In the case of the production of commodities, creative power is expressed as planning power and technical power. Planning power is the ability to produce a plan, and technical power is the ability to execute the plan with technique. In both cases, knowledge is necessary (mostly scientific knowledge). Accordingly, the development of creative power involves the development of knowledge; in other words, creative power develops in accordance with the development of knowledge.

b) Desires and the Development of Creative Power

What is it, then, that causes the development of knowledge? It is desire. According to Unification Thought, man is endowed with the desire to realize the “purpose of creation,” which is the pur-

pose to realize joy through love. This purpose is accomplished through the realization of the “purpose for the individual” and the “purpose for the whole.” The purpose for the individual is the physical and spiritual perfection of man as an individual; and the purpose for the whole is the attainment of the happiness, peace, and prosperity of a larger whole, such as the family, clan, tribe, nation, and the world.

Man’s desires can be classified as “*Sungsang* desires” and “*Hyungsang* desires.” *Sungsang* desires are those of man’s “spirit mind,” which pursue the values of truth, goodness, beauty, and love. These are the desires which seek a life of spiritual values. *Hyungsang* desires are those of man’s “physical mind,” which pursue food, clothing and shelter, both for oneself and for others.¹¹ *Hyungsang* desires are those which seek a life of material values. As stated above, the development of productive forces—that is, the invention of new instruments of production and the improvement of labor technique—is ascribed to the development of knowledge. And that which causes the development of knowledge is man’s desires, specifically his *Hyungsang* desires.

Moreover, man’s desires consist of “fundamental desires” and “actual desires.” Fundamental desires are the *Sungsang* and the *Hyungsang* desires described above, i.e., the desire to pursue the values of truth, goodness, beauty and love, and the desire to pursue food, clothing and shelter. Fundamental desires are those which all men possess universally, regardless of the period in which they live and regardless of where they come from, East or West.

When, however, fundamental desires manifest themselves, they do so as various actual desires. Actual desires are fundamental desires which have been extended, deformed, and mixed in a particular age, a particular society, and in the specific occupation, position, etc., of individuals. The politician’s desire for political power, for instance, is the mixture or synthesis of fundamental desires—namely, the *Sungsang* desire for the value of goodness,

seeking to establish a good government for the society or country, and the *Hyungsang* desires to improve the material conditions of life through pursuing the values of food, clothing and shelter for everyone, including the politicians themselves. An entrepreneur has the desire to pursue profit, which can be seen as an extension of the *Hyungsang* desires for food, clothing and shelter. A scholar's desire to conduct research is an extension of the desire for the value of truth. An artist's desire to create an artistic work is an extension of the desire for the value of beauty.

Actual desires change according to the environment—in other words, they manifest themselves differently according to different ages and different societies. Fundamental desires, however, are universal and absolute.

c) God's Providence and Productive Forces

Another factor that contributes to the development of productive forces is God's providence. God has been attempting to realize again (in other words, to restore) the original world of creation, which, due to the human fall, was not realized. Man's fundamental desires are the same universally, regardless of time and place. When they are in line with God's providence, however, man's knowledge develops more rapidly and productive forces also progress more rapidly. One example of this is the Industrial Revolution in England during the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

Often times scientists have attributed the new theories they have found, their inventions and their discoveries to some type of inspirational guidance. Thus, God promotes the development of productive forces by giving inspiration, a kind of revelation. Accordingly, the development of productive forces is carried out by man's fundamental desires, his creative power, knowledge, and by God's providence—in other words, this development results from two factors, man's and God's.

d) *Subject Conditions and Object Conditions*

The factors of the development of productive forces explained above, are *Sungsang* (spiritual) factors which are the subjective conditions for the development of productive forces. With these factors alone, however, productive forces cannot actually develop; other factors are necessary, namely, *Hyungsang* factors—that is, social and material conditions. The social and material (*Hyungsang*) conditions include economic (capital and resources), environmental and political conditions. These are the object conditions for the development of productive forces.

Consider, for example, the invention of the steam engine by James Watt. In the English society of his time, feudalism was rapidly disintegrating; successful farmers became farm managers, and successful craftsmen and merchants became manufacturers. At the same time, a great number of farmers were ruined and flocked into urban areas, making themselves available as wage-laborers. Accordingly, a great amount of labor power became available to manufacturers. Since England dominated the seas at that time, she was able to take control of those areas of the world supplying raw materials like cotton. At that time, the demand for cotton products over wool products was growing, and there was a great deal of urgency to develop machinery for the cotton textile industry. Another urgent need at that time was the need to develop a new source of power for machinery, one which could replace hydraulic power. These then were the economic conditions at the time of Watt's invention of the steam engine. Moreover, the geographical conditions of England were favorable for importing raw material from abroad, and its political situation was stable because of the establishment of parliamentary government. These, then, were the social and material conditions at the time of Watt's invention.

Given these environmental conditions, Watt's "desire to invent" was aroused. The desire to invent results from the transfor-

mation and mixture of fundamental desires such as the desire for truth, goodness, food, clothing, and shelter. In itself, the desire to invent is unchangeable, even though its actual content changes according to time and place. Furthermore, God's providence was also one of the major factors contributing to the Industrial Revolution in England. Accordingly, it is to be understood that God's providence also contributed to Watt's invention of the steam engine.

From what has been stated above, it can be concluded that in order for productive forces to develop, there must be both subject conditions (the desire to invent, creative power and knowledge) and object conditions (social and material conditions). Of these two kinds of conditions, the role played by subject conditions is the most decisive one. This can be likened to the relationship between a painter (the subject) and his paints and brushes (the object); or the relationship between a carpenter (the subject) and his tools and materials (the object). In other words, object conditions refer simply to the actual means necessary for the subject to exert its creative power.

It is the view of Unification Thought that productive forces (taken in the sense of instruments of production) are formed through give and receive action between the subject and object conditions. In other words, they can be seen to form a four position foundation (figure 4.1). The development of productive forces in the sense of labor-power also takes place through give and receive action between subject and object conditions. The give and receive action between subject and object conditions takes place centering on a purpose, namely, the purpose of the subject. It can be assumed, however, that, behind the subject, God's providence is operating—namely, the providence for the realization of the purpose of creation.




Fig. 4.1 The development of productive forces through the formation of a four position foundation

4. The Communist Acknowledgement of the Real Cause of the Development of Productive forces

The explanation put forward by the communists concerning the cause of the development of productive forces is ambiguous and unreasonable; and this is due to the fact that they describe that development as material and dialectical. In other words, they disregard both the mental factor and the factor of harmonious interaction in the development of productive forces.

Nevertheless, they implicitly admit that human desire (i.e., the mental factor) is related to the development of productive forces. This is illustrated in the following examples (*italics added*):

But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, housing, clothing and various other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these *needs*, the production of material life itself.¹² (Marx and Engels)

In the process of production members of society appropriate (produce, fashion) natural products in accordance with human *requirements*.¹³ (Marx)

There is no production without a need, but consumption recreates the *need*.¹⁴ (Marx)

Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his *wants*, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his *wants*; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these *wants* also increase.¹⁵ (Marx)

Comrade Yaroshenko forgets that men produce not for the producer's sake but in order to satisfy their *needs*.¹⁶ (Stalin)

Thus, communists themselves acknowledge clearly the importance of desire (need, wants, requirements) of man in the process of production. And yet, they never say that what makes productive forces develop is desire. The reason is that the acknowledgement of the necessity of desire would be equivalent to acknowledging that what makes productive forces develop is, the mental factor; but this would mean the break-down of materialism itself. Thus, they obstinately insist that the development of productive forces is absolutely material and dialectical.

C. The Relations of Production

1. The Materialist Position

Materialists hold that the relations of production are the most fundamental social relations. Such are the relations into which men enter with one another in the process of production, and their basic form is represented by property relations—that is, people's mutual relations to the means of production. In social life, men enter into definite relations of production, which are independent of their will. For example, in capitalist society, there is a domination relation between those who possess the means of production, such as factories, land and machines, and those who do not possess them; men necessarily become involved in these relations of production, belonging to one or the other side. These are objec-

tive, material relations, and are the most fundamental of all the types of relations in society.¹⁷

2. Critique and Counterproposal

Can it be true that the relations of production are the most fundamental relations in human society—as the materialist conception of history insists? No, it cannot. According to Unification Thought, there are other relations which are much more fundamental than the relations of production. Unification Thought holds that man consists of two aspects: the *Sungsang*, or spiritual aspect and the *Hyungsang*, or material aspect. In the same way, every kind of human relation consists of these two aspects of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*. In addition, human relations can also be classified into two types: a *Sungsang* type, centered on the *Sungsang* or spiritual aspect of man, and a *Hyungsang* type, centered on the *Hyungsang* or material aspect of man. The former can be called *Sungsang* human relations, and the later, *Hyungsang* human relations.

A typical example of *Sungsang* human relations is the family-type relation based on love, e.g., the love realized in the family. This is, in other words, an “ethical relation.” (In Unification Thought, society is considered to be an extension of the family; and family-type relationships should be established among the members of society.) A typical example of *Hyungsang* relations is the economic relationship, which is centered on production and consumption. Unification Thought maintains that ethical relations are the most fundamental of human relations, and that economic relations must be based on ethical relations. The reason is that the way to realize God’s purpose of creation is for human beings to love one another centering on God.

In this way, human beings should enter into ethical relations as well as into relations of production, each of which contains a *Sungsang* aspect and a *Hyungsang* aspect. The *Sungsang* aspect is subject, and the *Hyungsang* aspect is object. For example, in capi-

talist relations of production, the capitalist and the workers enter into a certain type of production relation, centering on the means of production; and in this situation, the capitalist possesses the means of production, based on his desire to possess and his desire to pursue profit, while the worker carries out productive activity, based on his desire to earn an income. Hence, the relations of production are composed of two aspects: a *Sungsang* or mental aspect (desire, will) and a *Hyungsang* or material aspect. The mental aspect is causal, and the material aspect is resultant. Essentially then, the relations of production are reduced to relations of desire.

The materialist conception of history asserts that relations of production are objective, material relations, which are independent of human will—but this is not true. The desires (the will) and thoughts of the leaders of society (especially political leaders) are the factors which play the subjective role in determining the relations of production. The true understanding of the formation of the relations of production can be shown graphically as the formation of a four position foundation, as in figure 4.2. In the diagram, “purpose” refers to the purpose of leaders; behind that purpose, however, the providence of God is working for the realization of the purpose of creation; working through the will of the leaders. On the other hand, the purpose of Satan—who is the subject of evil and has been trying to establish evil society in opposition to God’s providence—also works through those leaders who are inclined towards evil.¹⁸

D. Productive Forces and Relations of Production Independent of Human Will

1. The Materialist Position

Marx asserted that productive forces develop independently of human will, saying, “men are not free to choose *their productive forces*—which are the basis of all their history—for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of former activity.”¹⁹




Fig. 4.2 The relations of production seen from the formation of a four position foundation

As an explanation of Marx's statement, Cornforth said the following:

For example, when manufacture first started, the manufacturers who started it had no plan of creating gigantic new productive forces; they were simply seeking their own immediate advantage. To carry on manufacture they began to hire wage-labor, in other words, to initiate capitalist relations of production. They did not do this because they had an ambitious and far-seeing plan for building capitalism; they did it because that turned out to be the way in which manufacture could best be carried on.

In this way the development of new productive forces—in our example, those brought into operation by manufacture—was never decided upon but happened spontaneously, without any plan, as a result of certain people seeking their own immediate advantage.²⁰

Marx claimed that relations of production, also, develop independently of human will:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will,

namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production.²¹

Stalin summarized the above statements by Marx as follows:

The rise of new productive forces and of the relations of production corresponding to them . . . takes place not as a result of the deliberate and conscious activity of man, but spontaneously, unconsciously, independently of the will of man.²²

Thus, according to the materialist conception of history, productive forces and the relations of production rise and develop independently of human will.

2. Critique and Counterproposal

What is the true intention of communists when they say that the rise and development of productive forces and of the relations of production is independent of human will? Their intention is to justify the claim that the bearers of the productive forces in capitalist society are the workers (the ruled class); that by human effort no one can block the labor movement (that is, class struggle) whereby productive forces develop; and that the arrival of socialist society (and finally communist society) is inevitable and independent of human will. Had they admitted that the rise and development of productive forces and of the relations of production had anything to do with human will, they would also have had to admit that society could be improved through spiritual means—but that would have destroyed the justification for violent revolution.

As explained in section II. B., “The Development of Productive Forces,” productive forces develop through give and receive action between *Sungsang* factors (human desire, creative power and knowledge) and *Hyungsang* factors (social and material conditions). Accordingly, productive forces are not independent of human will.

And yet, the materialist conception of history states that, even though human desire may operate in the rise of each productive

force, nevertheless, when it is seen historically, the rise of the productive forces of a new age must be regarded as spontaneous and independent of the will of the people of the old age. Can that assertion be true? The answer can be found by examining the historical example of the Industrial Revolution.

The Industrial Revolution began with a series of inventions—such as the flying shuttle (John Kay, 1733), the spinning jenny (James Hargreaves, 1764), the steam engine (James Watt, 1765), the water frame (Richard Arkwright, 1768), the power loom (Edmund Cartwright, 1785), the steam ship (Robert Fulton, 1807), and the steam locomotive (George Stephenson, 1814). The great change in the industrial world, which was the end-result of all the changes brought about by these inventions, was the Industrial Revolution. The individual scientists may have not been aware that their inventions would bring about the Industrial Revolution or that they were contributing toward the formation of capitalist society. But, does that fact make the Marxist assertion true—namely, that the historical development of productive forces, known as the Industrial Revolution, was independent of human will?

When a scientist invents something, he does so only after he has acquired, to one extent or another, the knowledge and the techniques developed by scientists in his age and in the past. Accordingly, an invention arises out of the scientist's own desire to invent, his creative power and knowledge—and, at the same time, on the basis of the desire to invent, and the creative power and knowledge inherited from scientists who came before him.

A scientist's desire to invent and his creative power are based on universal, fundamental desire, with which all men are endowed. Therefore, we can reach the conclusion that the development of productive forces in the Industrial Revolution was brought about through scientists' desire to invent and through their creative power—in other words, through the fundamental desires. Thus, it cannot be said that such development was inde-

pendent of human will. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that God's providence to restore the original world of creation was also working through these scientists.

The same can be said about the relations of production. What determined the relations of production, as explained in section II. C., "The Relations of Production," was the will of political leaders and God's providence (or, as the case may be, the works of Satan, who opposes God's providence). Therefore, the relations of production are not material relations which are independent of human will.

Communists insist that the arrival of communist society is independent of human will, and is inevitable. And yet, publicly, they maintain that communist society will be achieved only by a sense of mission and revolutionary will on the part of the communists, as can be seen in the following words of Marx and Engels: "They [the communists] openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions." This is simply an acknowledgement of the fact that what plays the decisive role in the formation of a society is human will—that is, the will of political leaders.

E. Correspondence of Relations of Production to Development of Productive Forces

1. The Materialist Position

Marx maintained that the relations of production correspond to the development of productive forces. According to him, relations of production must be "appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production."²⁴ Stalin elaborated this as follows:

First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, *depending* on these changes and in *conformity with them*, men's relations of production, their economic relations, change.²⁵

In conformity with the change and development of the productive forces of society in the course of history, men's relations of production, their economic relations also changed and developed.

Five *main* types of relations of production are known to history: primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist.²⁶

Communists describe the correspondence of the relations of production to the development of productive forces as follows: when the productive forces consisted of stone tools and the bow and arrow, etc., the relations of production resulted in a primitive community; when slaves and metal agricultural implements appeared, society developed into slave society; when serfs and improved agricultural implements made of iron became the productive forces, feudal society appeared; and when laborers and machinery appeared, capitalist society developed. Finally, as productive forces develop within capitalist society, that development will bring about the transition to socialist society and finally to communist society.

2. Critique and Counterproposal

According to the materialist conception of history, socialist society is a more developed form of relations of production than capitalist society; furthermore, communist society is an even more developed form of relations of production. At the same time, communists maintain that relations of production correspond to the development of productive forces. Therefore, they should say that the productive forces of socialist and communist society are more developed than those of capitalist society. And yet, a comparison between them shows that the productive forces of the socialist nations, including even the Soviet Union, are very much inferior to those of advanced capitalist nations. Materialist law claims that the relations of production correspond to the development of productive forces. But we see that this does not conform to the facts. This "law," then, is just a dogmatic assertion for the purpose of rationalizing communist revolution.

Seen from Unification Thought, the relations of production do not necessarily correspond to the development of productive forces. As explained in section II C, "The Relations of Production," such relations are not objective material relations; instead, they consist in the unity of human will with social and material conditions. It was shown then that human will is subject and the social material conditions are object. Consequently, the determining factor in the development of the relations of production is the will of the political leaders of society.

When political leaders establish policies to determine the relations of production, they do so while considering the degree of the development of productive forces, in other words, the economic situation. Also, between those societies in which the economic situation is the same (in other words, in which the degree of the development of productive forces is the same), different relations of production have been established, according to differences in the aims, thought, and will of their respective political leaders. In fact, the emergence of the "communist" society of the Soviet Union did not occur spontaneously or necessarily, in correspondence with the development of productive forces. Rather, the Bolshevik revolution based on the "will" of the communist party, centered on Lenin, is what brought it into being. We see in Western nations that, based on the same level of productive forces, capitalist society developed through peaceful reform, even before the Soviet Union established socialist society.

As mentioned earlier, another factor determining the relations of production is the providence of God. This means that God is guiding society toward the realization of the ideal world of creation. He does this by working through a central figure whose will and desire are in accord with (or close to) God's will.

On the other hand, Satan, the subject of evil and God's opponent, also sets up a central figure, even before God does so, and tries to establish an ideal society in imitation of God's ideal, in order to stand against God's providence. As a result of the working

out of the law of separation (to be explained later), two types of society grew out of feudal societies in almost identical stages of economic development: on one hand, democratic, capitalist society (as in Great Britain and France), and, on the other hand, socialist society (as in the Soviet Union and mainland China). In other words, both capitalist and socialist societies grew separately out of societies with almost identical productive forces based on the feudal system—even if the two types of society arose at different times. Therefore, it is not true that socialist society appeared as the stage following capitalist society, in correspondence with the development of productive forces—as Marx would have it; rather, socialist society appeared on the evil side in opposition to democratic capitalist society.

In conclusion, it is not true that the relations of production appear in correspondence with the development of productive forces; rather, they appear through give and receive action between human will (the will of political leaders) and social, material conditions—under God’s providence. This does not mean, however, that human will is manipulated by God’s providence; rather, there must be a joint accomplishment of responsibility both by God and by man. According to Unification Thought, God’s providence is to be fulfilled only when the portion of responsibility assigned to man and the portion of responsibility assigned to God are jointly accomplished. In fact, there have been many cases where central figures appointed by God, by failing to establish policies in line with God’s purpose, failed to properly guide society, whereby they deviated from God’s providence.

F. The Relations of Production as Fetters on Productive Forces

1. The Materialist Position

Marx held that at a certain stage of the development of history, the relations of production turn into fetters on the development of productive forces. He explained that process as follows:

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.²⁷

Marx's explanation means that in correspondence with the development of the productive forces, a certain kind of production relation is established. Once established, the relations of production tend to be fixed, whereas the productive forces constantly develop. Eventually, the relations of production turn into fetters on the productive forces, restricting their development.²⁸ Then, the existing relations of production are broken down and new ones are established.

According to the materialist conception of history, the working masses, or the ruled class, are the bearers of productive forces,²⁹ and the relations of production constitute the social structure whereby the ruling class exploits the ruled class. Therefore the assertion that the relations of production turn into fetters on the development of productive forces means that conflict begins between the ruling class and the ruled class. Finally, the old relations of production are broken down through "class struggle" (that is, revolution), and new relations of production are established.

According to Marx, the development of productive forces and of the relations of production is of matter; it follows naturally that the fetters which the relations of production impose upon produc-

tive forces are also of matter. Therefore, the process whereby the relations of production turn into fetters (and the resultant revolution) is of matter, and therefore objective, necessary, and unstoppable.

2. Critique and Counterproposal

Marx claimed that social revolution takes place due to the fact that the relations of production turn into fetters on the development of productive forces, and that, therefore, social revolution is a material phenomenon. Seen from Unification Thought, however, revolution results from a collision between human desires.

Consider, for example, the French Revolution. When viewed from the materialist standpoint, the French Revolution occurred because the relations of production at that time—in which the monarch, the clergy and the nobility constituted the ruling class—hindered the development of the productive forces, which were being pushed forward by the farmers and the commercial and industrial citizens of the middle class, or the bourgeoisie.

Here the ruling class, with the monarch as the center, sought to maintain the existing relations of production, namely, feudalism. For what reason? Because they wanted to satisfy their desires: for power, for control, and for possessions. On the other hand, why did the farmers and the citizens seek to develop the productive forces? They also wanted to satisfy their desires: for possessions and for profit. Accordingly, the collision which occurred between the two sides was actually a collision of desires.

Farmers paid annual tribute and taxes to their feudal lords, but their desire was to possess their own land and to possess and dispose of their crops freely. As for the commercial and industrial citizens, their desire was to obtain more profit by acquiring labor-power freely, by expanding their factories, by producing commodities in great quantities, and by being free to sell them. The monarch, the clergy, and the nobility, however, restricted the desires of the farmers and citizens in order to fulfill their own desires

for power and control. Thus, a collision between the two sides took place as a result of the discordance and mutual repulsion of their desires. In a nutshell, then, the French Revolution was simply a collision of desire against desire.³⁰

What is the fundamental reason why any collision of desires among people exists at all? The fundamental cause is to be found in the human Fall. Due to the Fall, man's fundamental desires surfaced as self-centered, exclusive actual desires. This means that man came to lead his life centered on Satan. Human beings in their original mind are endowed with the God-centered desire to seek mutual benefit, and their nature is such that they tend to engage in harmonious give and receive action with one another. After the Fall, however, human beings became contradictory, in the sense that in their day-to-day life they behave according to exclusive desires, though in their original mind they want to actualize mutually beneficial desires.

Man's fundamental desire is given to him by God for the realization of his dual purpose: the purpose for the individual and the purpose for the whole (both for the realization of the purpose of creation). Of these two purposes, the purpose for the whole should be regarded as prior to the purpose for the individual; accordingly, man's fundamental desires should be mutually beneficial. Fallen man, however, gives priority to the purpose for the individual, whereby his fundamental desire has become self-centered and exclusive.

Were it the case that the relations of production turn into fetters on productive forces, this being a purely material phenomenon, then it would be impossible for man to control at will; on the other hand, if this is a situation in which one person's desire turns into fetters on another's desire, then it is possible to avoid a conflict by controlling the desires. Consequently, social revolution need not be carried out violently. The monarch could have chosen to restrain his self-centered desires and to administer the country for the benefit of the people. Similarly, the people could have tried to

change their leader through peaceful means. In reality, however, in the French Revolution, the monarch continued to oppress the people and the people resorted to violent revolution, killing the monarch. On the other hand, in the case of the so-called Glorious Revolution of England, the people managed to replace James II with William III, based on a decision of Parliament.

The French Revolution resulted from a number of immediate and remote causes. Among the immediate causes, were the following: bad harvests throughout the country, the peasants' discontent with heavy taxation, the dismissal by Louis XVI of the popular Secretary of the Treasury, Necker, and military threats against the Parliament. A remote cause for the Revolution was the fact that the French economy had been badly disrupted after Louis XIV abolished the Edict of Nantes (1685) and began to oppress and deport the Huguenots, who were competent merchants and industrialists. Most of these causes for the revolution stemmed from the monarch's oppressive policies, based on his self-centered desires. This means that, had the monarch oriented his desires in a good direction and thereby instituted good policies, then he could have reformed the social system peacefully, without a violent revolution.

Of importance here is the fact that the leading force in the French Revolution was not the peasant class, but rather the middle class. According to the materialist conception of history, the main bearers of the productive forces in feudal society (i.e., agricultural productive forces) are the peasants—the ruled class. And since the ruled class is the one which takes the lead in revolution, the peasants should have taken the lead in overthrowing feudal society, which had become fetters on them. And yet, the leading force which brought about the revolution was the middle class, made up of merchant capitalists, manufacturers, land-owners, bankers, and so on. When seen from the materialist conception of history, the middle class was not the ruled class, but rather the

newly emerging exploiting class, and therefore, they should not have been the bearers of the productive forces.

Also, when slave society shifted to feudal society, the slaves—who were supposed to be the bearers of the productive forces—did not actually come forward to overthrow slave society. For example, the Roman Empire was overwhelmed by the dissemination of Christianity and was destroyed by the invasion of the Germanic tribes.³¹ Then, the kings and the powerful families of the Germanic tribes became the new ruling class, that is, the feudal lords.

This means that the formulae put forward by the materialist conception of history—i.e., that the relations of production turn into fetters on the development of productive forces; that the ruled class (the bearers of the productive forces) struggle against the ruling class (the one which maintains the existing relations of production); and that the ruling class is overthrown by the ruled class—do not conform with the facts of history. It also means that what makes up the reality of social revolution is the fact that leaders who pursue a new society come into conflict with leaders who seek to maintain the old society. (Further details on this matter will be given in “Historical Change” of Section IV below.) The assertion that “the relations of production turn into fetters on the productive forces” is fictitious and was fabricated as a way of rationalizing violent revolution, aimed at the overthrow of capitalist society.

G. Basis and Superstructure

1. The Materialist Position

a) The Gist of the Theory of Basis and Superstructure

Marx stated in the *Contribution* that the relations of production, that is, economic relations, are the basis of society, upon which the “forms of consciousness” (that is, ideological form) are established as a superstructure.

The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.³²

In addition, Stalin referred to the superstructure as the “views” and “institutions” of society:

The base is the economic structure of society at the given stage of its development. The superstructure is the political, legal, religious, artistic, philosophical views of society and the political, legal and other institutions corresponding to them.³³

Here, “views” refers to what Marx called the “forms of consciousness;” “institutions” refers to organizations or groups of people that implement these “views.”³⁴

According to idealism, man first develops views; then, corresponding to these views, he establishes institutions; and, on the basis of these, he carries on his economic life.³⁵ In contrast, the materialist conception of history maintains that views and institutions are established based on the material and economic conditions of society—in other words; the relations of production. In explaining the relationship between the relations of production, and views and institutions, materialists saw that relationship as the relationship between matter and spirit, and applied to that relationship, materialism, which claims that the spirit is a product of matter. Thus, in correspondence with a given basis there appear particular views and institutions, and when that basis disappears, the views and institutions disappear with it. Stalin commented on this in the following way:

The superstructure is the product of one epoch, the epoch in which the given economic base exists and operates. The superstructure is therefore short-lived; it is eliminated and disappears with the elimination and disappearance of the given base.³⁶

Nevertheless, Stalin also said that “the superstructure is not directly connected with production, with man’s productive activity.

It is connected with production only indirectly, through the economy, through the base."³⁷

b) The Activity of the Superstructure

The materialist conception of history considers the relationship of basis and superstructure to be that of matter and spirit, and at the same time, to be that of existence and consciousness. Marx and Engels described this relationship as follows:

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.³⁸

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?³⁹

They are saying, on one hand, that human consciousness is determined by social existence, but on the other hand, they are also saying that consciousness exerts influence on the economic situation through a process of reaction. Engels wrote:

The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas—also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their *form*.⁴⁰

In spite of this "reaction" on the part of consciousness, Marxists insist that views and institutions are nevertheless determined by the relations of production. Marx and Engels had this to say:

Men are producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms.⁴¹

Therefore, it follows that the proposition “it is . . . their social existence that determines their consciousness” is still valid.

c) The Role of the Superstructure

As was mentioned, the materialist conception of history, on one hand, holds that the superstructure is determined by the basis, and on the other hand, recognizes that the superstructure has an active role. The role of the superstructure is to maintain and strengthen the basis. Stalin said that:

having come into being, [the superstructure] becomes an exceedingly active force, actively assisting its base to take shape and consolidate itself. . . . The superstructure is created by the base precisely in order to serve it, to actively help it to take shape and consolidate itself, to actively fight for the elimination of the old, moribund base together with its superstructure.⁴²

According to Cornforth, the Roman republican political system and Aristotle’s philosophical views on the natural status of the slave contributed greatly to maintaining and consolidating slavery in the Roman Empire. The medieval political system, centering on the relationship between the king and lords on one hand and knights on the other, together with Thomas Aquinas’ ideas of hierarchy contributed to maintaining and consolidating feudalism in the Middle Ages. After the establishment of bourgeois civil society, the political systems of democratic republicanism, parliamentarianism, and constitutional monarchy, together with individualistic liberalism, contributed to maintain and consolidate capitalism.⁴³

2. Critique and Counterproposal

a) The Superstructure does not Correspond to the Basis

According to Marx, the superstructure is formed on and depends on the basis. Thus, as Stalin said, the true view of the materialist conception of history is that the superstructure is a product of the basis, a product of a specific epoch, which continues to exist

and operate only as long as the basis survives, and is eliminated with the elimination of the basis.

Nevertheless, an examination of the actual development of history shows clearly that the materialist conception of history is far from conforming to historical facts. For instance, among religions, which constitute a part of the superstructure, there are some which have not disappeared, such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Such religions have remained virtually unchanged since the time of Greco-Roman society (which Marx called a slave society) until today—in spite of tremendous changes in the economic basis. This holds true not only for religions, but also for law, arts and philosophy, also a part of the superstructure. For example, ancient Greek art is highly estimated even today, and the main conceptions of Roman law have survived until now, serving as the basis for the laws of many modern Western nations.

The age of Greco-Roman slavery is long gone by, and yet Greek art and Roman law have not been eliminated, but rather continue to be alive until today. This means that they were not influenced by relations of production enough to rise or fall with them; rather, they maintained their independence—even though to a certain extent they were influenced by the economic basis. Clearly, then, the communist theory of basis and superstructure is wrong. Actually, Marx himself frankly admitted that his theory contained difficulties:

The difficulty we are confronted with is not, however, that of understanding how Greek art and epic poetry are associated with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they still give us aesthetic pleasure and are in certain respects regarded as a standard and unattainable ideal.⁴⁴

Accordingly, he frankly recognized the existence of an *aporia*, or *impasse*, in the materialist conception of history.

b) Counterproposal to Basis and Superstructure

As already explained, relations of production are actually a united body of human will and socio-material conditions; views and institutions, also, are a united body of human will and socio-material conditions. This is because views and institutions are fostered in specific human conditions and require various material conditions, such as expenditures and buildings. So, it cannot be true that the relation of superstructure and basis is the same as the relation of spirit and matter.

From the perspective of Unification Thought, views and institutions, which Marx regarded as superstructure, are centered on man's *Sungsang* fundamental desires (i.e., desires for the values of truth, goodness, and beauty); and relations of production, which Marx regarded as the basis, are centered on man's *Hyungsang* fundamental desires (i.e., desires for food, clothing and shelter). In this sense, the relationship between views and institutions on one hand and the relations of production on the other can be regarded as the relationship between *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*—where *Sungsang* is subject and *Hyungsang* is object. Therefore, it is not true that the relations of production are the basis, in conformity with which views and institutions are formed. Views and institutions on one hand and relations of production on the other develop together through give and receive action, in the respective positions of subject and object.

Slave relations of production in the Roman Empire operated under Roman law and the forms of republican government. Feudal relations of production in the Middle Ages took place under Roman Catholic views on hierarchy. Capitalist relations of production were established under the Puritan spirit, stemming from Calvinism; as well as from the democratic ideas put forward by Locke and Rousseau, the economic theories of Adam Smith, and the political idea of parliamentarianism. And socialist (or “communist”) relations of production, of course, were established on

the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, specific economic systems are established and maintained in conjunction with religions and ideologies; these latter playing the subject role.

The materialist conception of history maintains that the relations of production constitute the basis of society and that on that basis views and institutions (that is, the ideological forms) of that society are established. This position, however, is false. Consider the case of Marx's own thought, communism. His thought was formulated long before the relations of production of communist society appeared. In other words, while living within capitalist relations of production, Marx—who had grasped the contradictions and evils of early capitalist society—formulated communist thought as a theory with which to realize an ideal society to replace capitalist society.

As stated earlier, the relationship of superstructure and basis is that of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*, or that of subject and object. In give and receive action, subject and object interact with each other, but essentially in that interaction, the subject controls or changes the object. Accordingly, the changes wrought by the superstructure on the basis are greater than those wrought by the basis on the superstructure.

Furthermore, seen from the perspective of Unification Thought, both superstructure and basis consist in a unity of human will and socio-material conditions—in other words, both of them consist in the unity of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*. "Human will" refers to the manifestation of man's fundamental and actual desires, where the fundamental desires are unchanging and transcendent of time and space, while actual desires are changeable and subject to time and space. Therefore, it is to be expected that ideological forms (religions, art, etc.), which contain elements more satisfying to man's fundamental desires, would be more universal and lasting. This helps to explain why Roman law and Greek art have universal aspects that are appreciated in all types of society.

On the other hand, the relations of production, which constitute the basis of society, have changed with the periods of history—that is, changed from relations between slave-owners and slaves, to the relations between feudal lords and peasants, and further to the relations between capitalists and workers. The reason is that economic activities arise mainly from actual human desires.

As seen in chapter two, Marx dealt with the relations of production as matter and ideological forms as spirit. In contrast, Unification Thought asserts that the concept of matter can apply only to that which is limited to tangible economic goods. Therefore, according to Unification Thought, the aspects of society which correspond to spirit and matter are human will (or desire) and economic goods, respectively; through give and receive action between the two, all kinds of activities take place in society, including activities in the fields of religion, politics, and economy.

H. State and Revolution

1. The Materialist Position

According to the materialist conception of history, in primitive communal society there was no class structure, and therefore, no exploitation or domination. However, with the development of productive forces, came first a division of labor, which gave rise to private property, and finally exploiting and exploited classes appeared. Marx and Engels mentioned this process in *The German Ideology*:

How far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most manifestly by the degree to which the division of labor has been carried. Each new productive force, insofar as it is not merely a quantitative extension of productive forces already known (for instance, the bringing into cultivation of fresh land), causes a further development of the division of labor.⁴⁵

In the framework of division of labor personal relations necessarily and inevitably develop into class relations and become fixed as such.⁴⁶

Cornforth gives a detailed description of this process, arguing that the division of labor gives rise to private property, and through that to social classes:

With the development of social production beyond the primitive commune, the community is divided into groups occupying different places in social production as a whole, with different relationships to the means of production and therefore different methods of acquiring their share of the product. Such groups constitute the social *classes*, and their relations constitute the class relations or class structure of a given society.

The existence of classes is a consequence of the division of labor in social production. From the division of labor follow forms of private property, and thence the division of society into classes.⁴⁷

With the emergence of class society, one class (the minority) exploits and dominates the others (the majority, or the masses). Then the state was developed as an organ of class domination. The state has at its disposal military and police forces, which are considered the enforcement organs of the state, ready to crush any resistance by the ruled class. Engels and Lenin characterized the state as follows:

Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was above all the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labor by capital.⁴⁸

According to Marx, the state is an organ of class *rule*, an organ for the oppression of one class by another; it is the creation of "order," which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between the classes.⁴⁹

If it is true that the state is an organ of class rule, then it must also be true that it did not exist in the society prior to the division of classes (in other words, in primitive communal society), and also that it arose with the appearance of class society. In fact, Engels did refer to societies in which no state existed:

The state, then, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no idea of the state and state power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the split of society into classes, the state became a necessity owing to this split.⁵⁰

And if the class system ever ceases, which is supposed to happen through communist revolution, then, along with it "the state will inevitably fall."⁵¹ Lenin described the withering-away of the state in the following words:

State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies down of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not "abolished." It *withers away*.⁵²

The state will be able to wither away completely when society adopts the rule: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," i.e., when people have become so accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of social intercourse and when their labor has become so productive that they will voluntarily work *according to their ability*.⁵³

Once a class seizes the powers of state and becomes a ruling class, it never again voluntarily parts with it. And if the power of the ruling class is taken away, it becomes desperate to regain it. Therefore, were the working class to seize power in a final revolution, it would be necessary to establish a state; the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in which the majority would dominate

the minority (that is, the proletariat would dominate the bourgeoisie) in order to sweep away the residue of the old exploiting forces and to abolish all exploitation. Lenin argued for the necessity of a state following a communist revolution, as follows:

The proletariat needs the state. . . . The state is a special organization of force: it is an organization of violence for the suppression of some class. What class must the proletariat suppress? Naturally, only the exploiting class, i.e., the bourgeoisie. The working people need the state only to suppress the resistance of the exploiters.⁵⁴

2. Critique and Counterproposal

a) The Emergence and Disappearance of Classes

In order for this materialist view of the state to be recognized as legitimate, two fundamental questions must be clarified: why did classes emerge from classless society in the first place, and why will classes disappear in communist society?

Here, let us consider the explanation given by the materialist conception of history with regard to the emergence and disappearance of classes. As mentioned earlier, Marx and Engels had written in *The German Ideology* that through the development of productive forces there arose the division of labor, and from that, classes. Then, how will the classes thus formed ever come to disappear? Engels described the disappearance of classes in *Anti-Dühring*:

The separation of society into an exploiting and an exploited class, a ruling and an oppressed class, was the necessary consequence of the deficient and restricted development of production in former times. . . .

But if, upon this showing, division into classes has a certain historical justification, it has this only for a given period, only under given social conditions. It was based upon the insufficiency of production. It will be swept away by the complete development of modern productive forces.⁵⁵

Engels said first that through the development of productive forces there arose the division of labor, and through that, classes. Yet he later said that, if productive forces were to develop sufficiently, classes would disappear. This explanation is totally inconsistent. The development of productive forces causes the appearance of classes in the beginning, but later causes the disappearance of classes. Thus, Engels' explanation on the emergence and disappearance of classes is unreasonable. Today, the fact that classes in communist societies are far from disappearing and that a new class (that is, the Communist Party) has emerged, exploiting and cruelly oppressing the people in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is the best evidence of the fictitiousness of this view. Thus, the real cause of the emergence and disappearance of classes must be sought elsewhere.

From the perspective of Unification Thought, the reason for the emergence and disappearance of the antagonistic relations of exploitation in human society is to be found in the fact that man is fallen, and consequently his fundamental desires have become self-centered—in other words, man came to have an evil mind within himself. All of which happened because man came to be an object of Satan, the subject of evil, who now operates on human minds. As a result, man began to use even such means as plunder, exploitation and oppression to satisfy his desires. The strong became exploiters, and the weak, the exploited.

Here it must be noted that the economic manifestation of self-centered, satanic desires always work through material conditions. Accordingly, satanic desires did not surface economically in ancient clan society, where the material conditions were undeveloped. However, as material conditions increasingly accumulated with the development of productive forces, evil gradually began to surface. Finally, antagonistic classes came to emerge, where the stronger plundered the weaker.

If men had been able to get rid of their evil mind and had acted according to their original mind, they would have formed a com-

munity in which they would have cooperated with one another, even if a division of labor had taken place as a consequence of the development of productive forces. Accordingly, the real cause of the emergence of antagonistic classes was not the division of labor, but rather the operation of man's evil mind.

According to the materialist conception of history, classes will disappear through socialist revolution—which is supposed to occur necessarily with the development of the productive forces—but such a thing can never happen until man's satanic desires are eliminated. In fact, what we see in communist societies is the existence of dictatorship, and the exploitation and oppression of the people by the ruling class, to a more intense degree than in capitalist societies, contrary to the assertion of the materialist conception of history. This is the case because in capitalist society, though problems abound, still the satanic desires of the ruling class are restrained to a certain degree by the influence of religions (especially Christianity), whereas in communist society the ruling class (that is, the Communist Party) is directly controlled by satanic desires, since religions are substantially repressed there. It is a well-known fact that when communists succeed in their revolution they begin to disclose their dictatorial nature and abandon all the ideals and moral standards which they had before—as described in *The New Class* by Milovan Djilas.⁵⁶

b) Counterproposal to the Materialist View of the State

The errors of the materialist conception of history and its view on the emergence and disappearance of classes have been pointed out. Therefore, the assertion that the state first emerges as an organ of class rule, and then withers at a certain stage of communist society, naturally comes to lose its ground.

The materialist view is wrong when it claims that the state consists of antagonistic classes. If that were true, then class consciousness should be stronger than national consciousness, and should be able to surpass it—but this has not happened. For in-

stance, at the Second International during World War I, socialists from one block of nations would not cooperate with those from the opposing block; rather, each group chose to support its own government, with the consequent collapse of the Second International. Also, as can be observed in the Sino-Soviet conflict (which arose in the sixties and has never been resolved), communist nations do not necessarily unite across international borders; rather, each follows its own national communist policies. This shows that national consciousness is much stronger than class consciousness, and that therefore the essence of the state is not antagonistic relations between classes, but rather the formation of national consciousness, or of kin consciousness.

According to Unification Thought, the state is an enlargement and extension of the family. Thus, heads of state correspond to the parents of a family, and the people correspond to the members of the family. In its unfallen, original condition, the entire world should have formed a single unified state. God, as the parent of humankind, should have been the center of that unified state, and all the people should have engaged in original harmonious give and receive action as brothers and sisters centering on God. In that kind of world, people would lead an ethical life centered on love and would carry on prosperous economic activities.

It is the Unification Thought view that in the course of human history the unified state will be realized in the future, in accordance with God's providence. That will be the Kingdom of God, the kingdom of heaven on earth, the state based on Cosmic Law, the state where the spiritual world and the earthly world are united into one, and the state based on the principles of co-existence, co-prosperity and co-righteousness, which can be called a society of *tricoism* (i.e., a society of the three "co-" principles). Because of the Fall, however, human history until today has been one in which mankind is separated from God, the parent, whereby they lost brotherly, ethical relations and came to lead a material-centered life, according to self-centered desires. Conse-

quently, rulers came to regard exploitation and oppression as ordinary practice, and the state was transformed into an organ of oppression.

The state is usually considered to consist of three elements: people, land and sovereignty. The Unification Thought view holds that the basic constituents are sovereignty and people; but the relationship between these two is not like that between exploiting and exploited classes (as is claimed by the materialist conception of history); rather, that relationship should be regarded as a harmonious reciprocal relationship of subject and object, according to the original standard. History shows that, of the two elements constituting the state, the decisive one in its formation is sovereignty, which is subject. It is through the will of the leaders of nations that God's providential work (or Satan's opposition) is carried out. History proves that when the sovereignty leans toward Satan (through being enslaved by self-centered desires), the state eventually perishes, even though it may enjoy temporary prosperity; on the other hand, when the sovereignty acts according to the direction of God's providence, the state then enjoys prosperity for a long time, even though it may experience temporary hardships.

I. The Forms of Society

1. The Materialist Position

According to the materialist conception of history, societies are characterized by definite relations of production, and have changed with the development of productive forces. These are called "social formations."⁵⁷ In history, the following forms of society, or social formations, have appeared: primitive communal society, slave society, feudal society, capitalist society, and socialist (communist) society.⁵⁸ The materialist position with regard to each of these forms of society will be presented below.

a) Primitive Community

Primitive communal society, which is also called primitive communist society,⁵⁹ was one with very undeveloped productive forces, characterized by simple gathering, hunting, fishing, primitive cattle-raising, and farming. In this society, the joint labor of all the people was necessary. There was no private ownership of the means of production nor appropriation of other people's surplus product. It was, therefore, a society without classes or exploitation. With the development of productive forces, however, agriculture and cattle-raising became separated. Later, after metal tools were adopted as instruments of production, productive forces progressed even further, and handicraft arose. In this context, communal production became a hindrance to the development of productive forces; accordingly, the clan community dissolved into families, and each (extended) family became a unit of production. As a result, private ownership of the instruments of production appeared the difference between rich and poor increased, and society divided into classes.

b) Slave Society

In clan society, as the difference between rich and poor widened, those who were economically inferior gradually came to lose their position as members of the clan, becoming slaves. Also, those defeated in fighting between different clans were taken captive and made slaves. In this way the two classes of ruling and ruled, of slave owners (aristocrats) and slaves, arose. Slaves were exploited as "speaking tools"; and the slave-owning class erected a state in order to combat resistance by slaves, and to consolidate the ruling system. Thus, the state had its starting point in slave society. Under slavery, productive forces developed further. Metal instruments of production came to be widely used. Agriculture developed, the division of labor progressed further, and various kinds of handicraft appeared. By making use of the abundant

slave labor available, roads, water mains, and large buildings were constructed.

Slave systems as here described flourished in the Greek and Roman periods. Cultures were established based upon the exploitation and control of slaves. Under the slave system, however, where slaves were inhumanly oppressed, no improvement of labor skills could be expected. Gradually this form of the relations of production also became a hindrance to the further development of productive forces. Accordingly, slave society finally collapsed through slave revolts against slave owners (class struggle) and through invasion by the Germanic tribes.

c) Feudal Society

At the end of the Roman period, slave owners declined, slaves were liberated, and landowners began to employ them as peasants (or serfs). Some middle class Roman citizens, who suffered financial ruin, also became serfs. Unlike slaves, peasants were not treated as possessions, which the owner could kill or keep alive as he pleased; still peasants were bound to the land and had to offer labor services and tribute to the landowner. Thus, feudal society emerged, in which feudal landowners were the ruling class and serfs (or peasants) the ruled class, making it possible for productive forces to develop.

Through the improvement of farming techniques and the widespread use of the iron plow, agricultural productive forces grew rapidly, handicraft and trade developed, which led to the rise of towns. With the development of productive forces, manufacture (the craft industry) eventually came into being; but, under feudalism, labor supplies were blocked, whereby feudal society began to hinder the further development of productive forces. Since the peasants were subordinate to feudal landowners, they were unavailable for hire as laborers; moreover, they were not free to sell their products. Thus, feudal society turned into fetters upon the development of productive forces. Feudal society finally collapsed

through the uprising of the peasants, the ruled class, and through revolution by the bourgeois citizens, who had come to the fore with the rise of manufacture.

d) Capitalist Society

The liberation of the peasants from the land and from the feudal lords, whereby they became free workers, and the industrial revolution's development of machinery and motive power, made it possible for manufacture to develop into large-scale machine industry. After that, the bourgeoisie (the capitalist class) took over the leadership of the economy. Workers were hired by the capitalists supposedly on the basis of free contract; yet, they did not possess the means of production and had no choice but to sell their labor at any cost just to continue to live, thus subjecting themselves to exploitation by the capitalists. That is how capitalism arose, in which capitalists and workers relate as ruling and ruled. In capitalist society productive forces develop rapidly; when, however, they reach a certain stage of development, the relations of production again turn into fetters, preventing further development. The contradiction whereby production is social whereas the acquisition of products is private becomes intensified, and the poverty and suffering of the workers increase. Finally, revolution by all the workers united into one overthrows capitalism.

e) Socialist Society

Socialist society is a transition stage between capitalist and communist society. Once the capitalist class is overthrown and the means of production are brought into social ownership through revolution, productive forces are free to develop fully and without hindrance. In this stage of society, however, there are hostile elements inside the country and hostile nations surrounding it, so that the national defense force and the police force need to be strengthened. Thus, a dictatorial government is inevitable and the development of productive forces is guided by the principle,

“from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.”⁶⁰

f) Communist Society

With the arrival of communist society, all class discrimination ceases. Man, barred from full development by the division of labor, now becomes a free being. Each individual will be totally free to exert his ability; labor will no longer be performed by obligation, but rather with enjoyment; and the guiding principle of society will be, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”⁶¹ The state, in which man had been controlled by the means of production and by the products of his own labor, will be swept away; man will become master of his own social organization, and the lord of dominion and reconstruction of nature. Engels gave the following description of communist society:

The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of Nature, because he has now become master of his own social organization. . . . Only from that time will man himself, more and more consciously, make his own history—only from that time will the social causes set in movement by him have, in the main and in a constantly growing measure, the results intended by him. It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom.⁶²

Accordingly, the arrival of communist society signals the close of the prehistory of human society, as Marx himself indicated, and the beginning of human history.⁶³

2. Critique and Counterproposal

a) Errors in the Formula of the Materialist Conception of History

The formula of the social formation of the materialist conception of history states that in correspondence with the development of productive forces, there appear in history, in an ordered fash-

ion, the relations of production of primitive communal society, slave society, feudal society, capitalist society, and socialist (communist) society. It is not, however, the case that these five economic systems necessarily appear according to the development of productive forces. This is frankly admitted in an East German textbook on Marxist philosophy:

Thus, the historical development has not passed through all mentioned epochs of economic social formations in all parts of the world. For instance, in the main, Western European peoples did not pass through the so-called Asiatic social formation [primitive communal society]; on the other hand, most Asiatic peoples did not experience slavery in its classical Greek and Roman form, but rather passed from Asiatic forms of production, very gradually, into feudalism. As is well known, today not all peoples must pass through a developed form of capitalist society before entering socialism—as the examples of peoples of the Soviet Union, as well as the peoples of Mongolia, China, Korea, Vietnam have shown.⁶⁴

These forms of society did not actually appear in exactly the way that Marx said they would. Furthermore, additional evidence of the unreasonable nature of the materialist view of history can be seen in the fact that socialist revolution first took place, not in an advanced capitalist nation such as Great Britain, but rather in an underdeveloped country like Russia, where capitalist society had not fully matured. Stalin attempted to justify this fact by pointing out that, according to the Leninist theory, revolution does not necessarily begin “where industry is more developed”; rather, “the front of capital will be pierced where the chain of imperialism is weakest.”⁶⁵

The fact that Marx’s five forms of society did not appear exactly as he claimed also shows the error of the Marxist formulation. With the exception of primitive society, it may be acknowledged that to a certain extent the three formations, slavery, feudalism and capitalism did occur—at least in Western European society. Lenin’s and Stalin’s view that in a pre-modern society (such as

Russia), “where the chain of imperialism [was] weakest,” a revolution could take place and socialist society (eventually communist society) be established, whereas in capitalist society, where productive forces are fully developed, no revolution has occurred, raises certain questions. No matter how argued, their views cannot be justified, since they totally contradict what Marx said. For example, Marx clearly said that:

no social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.⁶⁶

Clearly, then, the validity of Marx’s formula cannot be demonstrated by the history of Russia or any other nation.

b) Counterproposal

Unification Thought explains that, due to the Fall of the first human ancestors, man has come to live according to selfish desires, centered on Satan; consequently, the exploitation and oppression of man by man has become common in human society. Thus, when we look at human society throughout history from the standpoint of economic structure, we see that, more or less, there have always been exploiting and exploited classes. Accordingly, it should be stated that a social structure such as primitive communal society, in which there is supposed to have been no exploitation whatsoever, could never have existed.

With the development of productive forces, slave, feudal and capitalist societies were established (if we accept Marx’s theory of the development of social formation); and yet, what played the subject role in the formation of each society was the will of the sovereign (or political leaders), and behind that will there was either God’s providence or Satan’s work in operation. What made economic systems develop from slavery to feudalism and to capitalism was the divine providence to restore the world to the

original ideal of creation. This providence, however, was confined to Western Europe, where the above mentioned transitions of economic systems can be seen in a comparatively typical form. And the reason is that, since the time of Jesus, the work of the divine providence has been centered on Europe.⁶⁷

From a political perspective, the societies of Western Europe progressed from feudalism to monarchism (absolutism). Initially, that progression was carried out by God's providence, which sought to expand the territory of the sovereignty of God's side, centering on Western Europe. Eventually, however, monarchism deviated from the direction of God's will and became despotic sovereignty centering on Satan. For that reason, God began to work to eliminate the dictatorship of monarchism and to establish democracy, in which the sovereignty rests on the people, in order to establish God's sovereignty through the will of the people.

In a similar way, from an economic perspective, when capitalism deviates from God's will and reaches the stage of imperialism (in which a small number of financial magnates greedily pursue profit and fight for colonies) God will certainly bring about a new economic system, in which property is not monopolized by a few, but is owned equally by the people. This would be socialism in the context of God's providence. The socialism mentioned here is not the same as the one pursued by the materialist conception of history; rather, this is a socialism on God's side, which is supposed to emerge through the autonomous non-violent reformation of capitalism, in accordance with God's providence.

In accordance with the providence of God, therefore, capitalism develops into socialism, and eventually, socialism into the ideal society of God's creation, which is a large, family-like society, or a society of co-existence, co-prosperity and co-righteousness, i.e., a society of *tricoism*. This is a society in which people live together, prosper together, and lead a righteous life together.

In opposition to the providence of God, Satan has attempted, centering on himself, to realize a society which would be an imita-

tion of God's ideal society. Accordingly, Satan has aimed at the realization of communist society by means of socialist revolution on the satanic side, based on the materialist conception of history.

Marx envisioned communist society as the "realm of freedom,"⁶⁸ as the ideal society. And yet, the communist society which has actually appeared, is far from being a realm of freedom; rather, it is the "realm of the absence of freedom," that is, a despotic society where human nature is trampled down. Also, with regard to its economy, it is a society whose productivity has severely stagnated. Accordingly, communist society is not the true ideal society; rather, it is a false ideal society, constructed as a satanic imitation of the society of God's ideal of creation.

III. FALSITY IN THE MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

Having presented a critique of the "laws" of the materialist conception of history, as well as various counter-proposals to them, I will now point out the falsity within the very basis which Marx used for establishing his materialist view. For this purpose, I will review the influence of Hegel's dialectic on Marx. Marx's materialist conception of history represents an exact inversion of Hegel's view of history.

A. The Influence of Hegel's Dialectic

Marx's ardent advocacy of the coming of communist society reminds one of the steadfast Jewish belief in the coming of the Messiah, as well as the steadfast Christian belief in the Second Advent and in the millennium. These Jewish and Christian beliefs seem to have exerted a certain amount of influence on Marx; nevertheless, an even greater influence came from Hegel's ideas on the inevitability of the dialectical development of history.

According to Hegel, in the self-development of the Absolute Spirit, Notion is elevated to Absolute Idea through the three

stages of subjective Notion, objective Notion, and Idea. Next, Idea becomes nature by externalizing itself and passes through the three stages of mechanics, physics and organics. Furthermore, Idea develops into subjective spirit, objective spirit, and Absolute Spirit through man, where the Absolute Spirit returns to itself in complete self-realization. In this series of developmental stages, the development of Idea within the stage of objective spirit corresponds to human history. In the stage of objective spirit, Idea develops through the three stages of law, morality and ethics.⁶⁹ The stage of ethics further develops through the three stages of family, civil society, and state. Hegel said that the essence of spirit (reason) is freedom, and asserted that the purpose of world history is to attain the level of a state where freedom is realized to the highest degree;⁷⁰ this he called the "rational state."⁷¹ The rational state assumes the form of a constitutional monarchy,⁷² where objective spirit attains the stage of Absolute Spirit.

For Hegel, the self-development of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis is, from every perspective, a necessary development, never an accidental one. This means that, whenever a thesis arises, an antithesis necessarily arises, and a synthesis necessarily results. Accordingly the rational state is not in any way accidental, but rather inevitably appears according to the necessity of dialectical development, which is the necessity of the law of historical development.

Hegel maintained that the development of nature, history and spirit occurs dialectically, through contradiction, and consists of a series of continuous and consistent phases of development along the same track. Marx accepted Hegel's theory exactly as it was, except that he turned Hegel's idealism into materialism. He asserted that just as nature develops according to dialectical contradiction,⁷³ so history develops through the contradiction between productive forces and the relations of production, that is, through class struggle. This is the core of the materialist conception of history.

There can be no discontinuity or gap in the continuous process of development of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Accordingly, the transitions from logic to nature and from nature to spirit are continuous. Therefore, once the self-development of the Absolute Spirit began, it must inevitably develop to the realization of the rational state, according to the dialectic. For Marx also, in like manner, once class society was formed from primitive communal society, it inevitably developed in the direction of communist society, according to the natural law of the dialectic. This law of social development "works with iron necessity," and society "can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development."⁷⁵ Thus, Marx held strong convictions with regard to historical development according to the natural law of dialectics, and with regard to the inevitable arrival of communist society. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Marx became a slave to the law, due to the influence of Hegel. Hegel considered Prussia the very same rational state he spoke about.⁷⁶ In reality, however, Prussia passed away without in the end ever becoming a rational state. It can be said, therefore, that the political validity of Hegelian philosophy passed away together with the passing of Prussia.

Similarly, the communist society envisioned by Marx is supposed to have been realized in the Soviet Union today. Yet, that society has turned out to be, not the "realm of freedom" which Marx wrote about, but rather a despotic state in which freedom is totally disregarded. This means that the untruthfulness of Marxism has been demonstrated. At the same time, it means that the disappearance of Marxism is inevitable. Marxism cannot escape the destiny which befell Hegelianism, since Marx's materialist conception of history was a mere follow up of Hegel's idealistic, dialectical view of history, except that he replaced "idealistic" with "materialistic."

B. Thought Process in the Formulation of the Materialist Conception of History

As seen in "Marx's Theory of Human Alienation," Marx, aiming at the realization of freedom (the realization of human essence), initiated his struggle for human liberation during the time in which he had accepted, albeit critically, Hegel's thought. While opposing Hegel's bureaucratism and nationalism, he temporarily accepted the naturalist and humanist position of Feuerbach, and finally came to advocate the sublation of private property by the proletariat (that is the proletarian revolution), which he did under the influence of early French socialism and communism.

During his time in Paris, Marx, in dealing with communism, focused on the issue of the appropriation of human essence (human liberation); as he stated in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, he regarded communism "as the real appropriation of human essence by and for man."⁷⁷ Accordingly, if indeed Marx's aim was the appropriation of human essence, then this could be attained either by a peaceful communistic method or even by a non-communistic method. But after Marx was deported from Paris to Brussels, he began to advocate "violence" in practice as a result of his great hostility towards the Prussian government. He adopted violent social revolution as his means to attain human emancipation, but, in the end, violent revolution in itself became his actual goal. Thus, Marx felt pressured to formulate and rationalize violent revolution, and, from his time with Engels in Brussels, he set about accomplishing this task.

I showed earlier, through the testimony of Engels, that, while in Paris, Marx had already completed a sketch for the materialist conception of history; in Paris, however, he only dealt with history from the point of view of class struggle and asserted that what determines history is economic activity. It was after he moved to Brussels that he came to advocate the necessity of revolution, for-

mulating the materialist conception of history. Marx referred to this as follows:

The study of this [political economy], which I began in Paris, I continued in Brussels, where I moved owing to an expulsion order issued by M. Guizot. The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding principle of my studies can be summarized as follows.⁷⁸

The “general conclusion,” which Marx said he reached in Brussels, refers to the formulation of the materialist conception of history—namely the materialist formulae that “in their social life men enter into definite relations of production which are independent of their will”; “the relations of production correspond to a definite stage of the development of productive forces”; “the relations of production are the basis, while the forms of consciousness are the superstructure”; “the social existence of men determines their consciousness”; “when the relations of production turn into fetters upon the development of productive forces, there occurs a revolution”; and so forth. Based on these formulae, Marx claimed that revolution is inevitable. In *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels argued that the goal which communists must reach is social revolution, stating that:

for the *practical* materialist, i.e., the *communist*, it is a question of revolutionizing the existing world, of practically coming to grips with and changing the things found in existence.”⁷⁹

The turning point for Marx’s views on communism came when he was writing *The German Ideology*, coauthored with Engels soon after they moved to Brussels, wherein communism “as the appropriation of the human essence” turned into communism as “social revolution.”⁸⁰ We should note here that Marx started out with the goal of human emancipation, and then deductively developed a system of thought to realize that goal; yet, after he assumed social revolution as his actual goal, he pretended to have developed his theory inductively based on objective facts. In other words, Marx pretended as if the law foretelling the fall of capitalist society and

the coming of communist society had been discovered by his having objectively studied society from the economic standpoint, starting from the premise that “what man needs to live is, first of all, to eat, drink, dwell, and wear.”

Lenin also claimed that Marx had discovered the materialist conception of history through a scientific study of society:

In their scientific works, Marx and Engels were the first to explain that socialism is not the invention of dreamers, but the final aim and necessary result of the development of the productive forces in modern society.⁸¹

The truth, however, is that the materialist conception of history is not a scientific objective view obtained through objective study of society and history. On the contrary, this represents a purposeful, subjective view of history, skillfully constructed as a means to rationalize a certain purpose. This can plainly be seen from the process whereby Marx formulated his thought.

C. The Uncritical Broadening of the Application of the Laws of History

According to the materialist conception of history, class struggle exists in each of the slave, feudal, and capitalist stages of society, and the ruling class has always fallen by a revolution of the ruled class. This, however, has not been the case in reality. For instance, the Roman Empire was indeed plagued by slave revolts, but what caused its fall was not the revolts of slaves (the ruled class), but rather invasion by foreign tribes and the dissemination of Christianity. Likewise, feudal society did not fall through the revolts of the peasants (the ruled class), but rather through revolution by the newly organized middle class, the bourgeoisie.

Accordingly, the laws of the materialist conception of history are not founded on historical fact. They are simply the result of an uncritical broadening of the application of laws which Marx claimed to have found in capitalist society and then attempted to

apply to all other societies. In fact, Marx himself admitted this in the introduction to the *Contribution*:

Bourgeois society is the most advanced and complex historical organization of production. The categories which express its relations, and an understanding of its structure, therefore, provide an insight into the structure and the relations of production of all formerly existing social formations. . . . The anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape. On the other hand, rudiments of more advanced forms in the lower species of animals can only be understood when the more advanced forms are already known. Bourgeois economy thus provides a key to the economy of antiquity, etc.⁸²

Needless to say, the expression “formerly existing social formations” refers to slave and feudal societies. “Ape” as opposed to “man” also refers to slave and feudal societies as opposed to capitalist society. This passage means that the categories and laws existing in bourgeois society (those laws which Marx had set up) are also applicable to past societies, such as slave and feudal societies. In other words, Marx implicitly admitted that he uncritically applied to past societies (slave and feudal societies) the view of society he had obtained by analyzing capitalist society (the most advanced form of society).

The introduction to the *Contribution* was added as an appendix at the end of the book. In the preface, however, Marx said, “a general introduction, which I had drafted, is omitted.”⁸³ I suspect that Marx omitted the introduction because he feared that his candid confession might expose the weakness of his theory. But, in spite of Marx's decision to leave it out, the introduction was later added, against Marx's will, by an editor who had found its manuscript.

By Marx's own admission, it becomes clear that he applied his invented “laws” of capitalist society, which aimed at proletarian revolution, to feudal and slave societies, social forms that had collapsed long before. In this way, he sought to claim that they were universal laws. Sidney Hook corroborated this point when he

said, "Marx's fundamental errors arise from an *uncritical extrapolation* of what he observed in capitalist societies to all class societies" (italics added).⁸⁴

IV. OUTLINE OF THE UNIFICATION VIEW OF HISTORY

So far, a critique of and a counterproposal to the laws of the materialist conception of history have been presented, and, in particular, the fallacies in the formulation of the materialist conception of history have been exposed. Finally, an outline of the Unification view of history will be presented here as a new view of history, put forward as an alternative to the materialist conception.

A. The Basic Position of the Unification View of History

The Unification view regards history, first, as "sinful history," which originated from the fall of man; second, as "history of re-creation," in which creation, due to the human fall, did not reach completion, and therefore is undertaken again; and third, as "history of restoration,"⁸⁵ whereby the world of the ideal of creation, lost in the beginning of human history, is regained.

Until today, human history has been that of sinful people, that is, people who had fallen under the dominion of Satan due to the Fall. Accordingly, human history, the sinful history of fallen man, has been filled with crime, plunder, slaughter, exploitation, oppression, and hatred. On one hand, if we understand it as re-creation, human history has been developing culturally and economically, through repeated advances and retreats; on the other hand, understood as restoration, human history has gradually been turning in the direction of goodness, that is, toward the realization of the lost ideal of creation, through the struggle of good and evil or between the forces of good (forces separated toward

God's side) and the forces of evil (forces separated toward Satan's side).

In that process of historical development, the goal and the direction of history are determinate, whereas the course of events and the period of time are indeterminate. For example, when Jesus came 2000 years ago, if the people at that time had fulfilled their portion of responsibility to accept and follow him, then the world of the ideal of creation would have been realized then and there. After that, productive forces would have developed steadily, along with the progress of science, under definite and invariable relations of production based on family ethics. Then, as a matter of course, the class societies spoken of by Marx—namely, slave, feudal, and capitalist societies, in which one class exploited and oppressed another—would never have appeared in history. In reality, however, the people did not fulfill their portion of responsibility, and the providence of God centering on Jesus remained unfinished. As a result, human history has continued to be the history of sin, re-creation and restoration; and the ideal of creation remains unfulfilled.

According to the Unification view of history, the providential work of God begins by setting up a nation (the chosen nation), which receives training in faith, and to which God then sends the Messiah to fulfill the providential work of salvation on the national level. After that, the work of salvation is extended to all humankind. Hence, the Unification view of history distinguishes between the history of the chosen nation and that of non-chosen nations. In the Old Testament Age, the history of the chosen nation is represented by the history of the Israelites, and after the advent of Jesus, by the history of Western Europe, based on Christianity. Consequently, the progress of social development through various societies—slave, feudal and capitalist societies—appeared in relatively typical form only in Western Europe.

Briefly stated, this is the basic position of the Unification view of history. Further, the Unification view sees that various kinds of

laws have operated in history. The materialist conception insists that human history has followed a necessary course according to objective material laws, independently of human will; in contrast, the Unification view of history sees differences in the process and in the periods of historical change, according to the degree of fulfillment of human responsibility. At the same time, it recognizes that historical change has followed certain providential laws; these are the “laws of creation” and the “laws of restoration,” as explained below.

B. The Laws of Creation

In creating the universe and humankind, God applied certain laws, called the laws of creation. Since human history is the history of re-creation—in other words, the process whereby creation is carried out again—the same laws of creation have been operating in the development of history. The laws of creation can be listed as follows: (1) the Law of Correlativity, (2) the Law of Give and Recieve, (3) the Law of Repulsion, (4) the Law of Dominion by the Center, (5) the Law of Completion through Three Stages, (6) the Law of the Period of the Number Six, and (7) the Law of Responsibility. A brief discussion of these is as follows.

1. The Law of Correlativity

In order for any created being to exist and develop, it must enter into “correlative relationships” of subject and object, both internally within itself, and externally with other individual beings. In such relationships, subject and object enter into a reciprocal relationship centering on a common purpose, the purpose of creation. Therefore, the first condition for a society to develop is that correlative elements enter into a relationship of subject and object centering on a common purpose. The correlative elements of subject and object in society and in history refer to *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* aspects (spiritual and material aspects), to principal

and subordinate individuals, and to principal and subordinate elements.

As examples, we can take spirit and body, ideology and economic (material) conditions, spiritual culture and material cultural, government and people, managers and workers, workers and instruments of production, main parts and subordinates parts in machinery, etc. The activities of any field (e.g., culture, economy, science) result from the formation of a correlative relationship of subjective and objective elements.

2. The Law of Give and Receive

When the correlative elements of subject and object form a correlative relationship either internally within a thing or externally between things, an interaction takes place, in which a certain element, or force, is given and received. Through this interaction, things are able to exist, move, change, and develop. The interaction between subject and object is called "give and receive action." Accordingly, when applied to history, the correlative elements of subject and object form a reciprocal relationship and engage in harmonious give and receive action centering on a common purpose, leading to development. For example, the existence and prosperity of a country depend on harmonious give and receive action between its government and people in a relationship of subject and object, centering on the common purpose of the prosperity of the country. Similarly, in a business enterprise, the owners, the managers, the workers, the technicians, as well as machinery, etc., must form relationships of subject and object and engage in harmonious give and receive actions centering on the purpose of the prosperity of that enterprise. Accordingly, the "Law of Correlativity" and the "Law of Give and Receive" are inseparably related, and together are called the "Law of Give and Receive" in a wider sense.

According to the materialist conception of history, development occurs through the struggle of opposites. Admittedly, struggle can

be an occasion for development; nevertheless, while struggle is going on, development either stops or retreats. Therefore, struggle cannot cause things to develop.

3. The Law of Repulsion

Give and receive action takes place between the correlative elements of subject and object, but a subject and another subject (or an object and another object) repel each other. This phenomenon is called the "action of repulsion." In the natural world, this action is usually latent and serves to strengthen or to complement the give and receive action between subject and object. For example, in the natural world two positive (or two negative) charges in electricity repel each other; but this repulsion serves the purpose of strengthening or complementing the give and receive action between subject (positive charge) and object (negative charge). Nevertheless, this repulsion is not a surface, but rather a latent, phenomenon; therefore, order in the natural world is never disturbed by the action of repulsion.

In fallen society, however, the action of repulsion is often realized in the form of struggles between subject and subject. Such struggles have brought about confusion and damage in the order of society—such as can be seen in rebellions and wars. Yet even in fallen society there have been cases in which the action of repulsion shows its proper function of complementing give and receive action. A typical case is that in which culturally and economically peaceful exchanges take place between two countries. In this situation, the sovereign (as subject) and the people (as object) in each country cooperate with each other out of patriotism, but in many cases, a kind of exclusive mental attitude works between the two sovereigns or between the two peoples of these two countries, and such an exclusive attitude is normally expressed in the form of competition in good will. In other words, the give and receive action between the sovereign and the people of one country is instead strengthened due to the exclusive mental attitude be-

tween the two sovereigns or the two peoples. (Unfortunately, however, when that exclusive mental attitude is abnormally intensified, it often happens that the two countries will engage in war or struggle.)

The law of repulsion, together with the law of indemnity and the law of separation, are factors in the struggle between good and evil, which is carried out for the purpose of restoring the world of the ideal of creation, as seen in the section, "Historical Changes," below.

4. The Law of Dominion by the Center

As explained earlier, every being contains the correlative elements of subject and object engaged in give and receive action. At the same time, every being is related with other beings in the relationship of subject and object, and engages in give and receive action with them. When that happens, the subject becomes the center and the object comes under the dominion of the subject. As a result, the object comes to perform circular movement centering on the subject. In the natural world, actual physical circular movement is performed, such that, for instance, the earth goes around the sun and electrons go around the nucleus. In human society, the sense of circular movement is that the object follows the direction of the subject.

In the history of restoration, God sets up central figures and through them guides society toward the direction of goodness, or toward the fulfillment of His providence. God first prepares a social environment, and then has the central figure control that environment in accordance with His providence. At that point, the central figure receives from God a portion of responsibility, which he must fulfill. The principle whereby a central figure controls the environment is called the "Law of Dominion by the Center." This principle applies not only to the chosen nation, but also to other nations.

In the central history of the chosen nations, God appointed central figures to carry out the work of the providence. In the history of Israel, in the Old Testament Age, the main central figures were Noah, Abraham, Moses, the Kings, and the Prophets. In the history of Western Europe, in the New Testament Age, the central figures were Christian leaders such as the popes, Martin Luther and John Calvin, and such political leaders as Charlemagne, Henry VIII, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.

In similar fashion, Satan, whose intention is to oppose the providence of God, has been setting up satanic central figures. Through them he has been trying to control the environment in order to establish his own territory. Among the satanic central figures are found Kaiser Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler, who, providentially speaking, attempted to conquer the world through the spread of pan-Germanism; Karl Marx, who established communist ideology; and Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, who led communist revolutions. Without their ideological and political leadership, the rise of totalitarianism and the outburst of communist revolutions could never have occurred.

The materialist conception of history attaches more importance to the social environment than to the leader, asserting that it is the masses that play the decisive role in social development, and leaders merely work in accordance with the social conditions developed by the masses. This assertion is based on the materialist position that spirit comes from matter, and therefore, matter should be regarded as having priority over spirit. In this context, the social environment is considered to belong to the category of matter, and leaders to the category of spirit.

This view, however, is not correct. The Unification view asserts that the leaders are the subject and the masses are the object, and that leaders have led in accordance with their religious and political ideas, guiding the masses in a definite direction. Actually, Marx himself recognized the importance of communist leadership—in other words, he admitted the subject role of leaders,

when he said that “for the *practical materialist*, i.e., the *communist*, it is a question of revolutionizing the existing world, of practically coming to grips with and changing the things found in existence.”⁸⁶

5. The Law of Completion through Three Stages

The law of completion through three stages asserts that all things reach completion through a process of three stages, namely, “formation,” “growth” and “completion.” Accordingly, in the history of re-creation, the providence of God was often accomplished in three stages.

The following are representative examples of the three stages in the history of re-creation: (1) three Adamic figures—namely, the first Adam, the second Adam (Jesus Christ) and the third Adam (the Lord of the Second Advent); (2) the three-stage providence for the restoration of the family—that is, Adam’s family, Noah’s family and Abraham’s family; and (3) the three-stage providence for the reformation of religion (which is a movement for the restoration of Hebraism) in preparation for the Second Advent of the Messiah: first, the religious reformation by Luther, Calvin and others; second, the religious revivalism by the Wesley brothers, George Fox, Philipp Spener and others; and third, the religious movement for receiving the Lord of the Second Advent. If the work of God’s providence had been successfully completed in the first stage, it would not have had to be extended into second and third stages.

In opposition to the work that God is attempting to accomplish through the law of completion through three stages, Satan has been trying to obstruct the providence of God with his own work in three stages. The providential work of God is sure to be completed through three stages. Accordingly, it follows that Satan’s works are surely doomed to fail. In other words, the “law of completion in three stages” for God’s side represents the “law of necessary failure in three stages” for Satan’s side.

This law can be applied, for instance, to the movement for the restoration of Hellenism through humanism.⁸⁷ The Renaissance, which represents the first humanism, developed through the thought of the Enlightenment, the second humanism, to bear its fruit as communism, the third humanism. Communism, the completion level of humanism on the side of Satan, is destined to perish through the appearance of the completion level of the Hebraistic revival movement on the side of God which also takes place in three stages. In other words, communism will perish with the appearance on earth of the third religious reformation.

6. The Law of the Period of the Number Six

According to the Bible, the creation of the universe by God took place through a period of the number six (that is, six days) up until the creation of Adam. In other words, the creation of Adam was preceded by a period of the number six, which can be regarded as the preparation period for his creation.

Accordingly, in the history of re-creation, God's providence entered a new stage six centuries (that is, a period of the number six) before the coming of Jesus Christ. Around the 6th century B.C., philosophy, art, science, and politics developed suddenly in Greece; Confucius and Lao-tsu appeared in China; Buddha appeared in India; and prophets such as Jeremiah and Malachi appeared in Israel. All of them contributed to the uplifting of the spiritual standard of humankind, and appeared due to the work of God's providence of preparation for the Messiah.

Carl Jaspers, noting the fact that various spiritual leaders (founders of religions and philosophies) appeared in China, India, Iran, Palestine, and Greece around 500 B.C.—with no apparent relation to one another—called that period of time the "Axial Period."⁸⁸ What is the reason for the appearance of such spiritual leaders, almost at the same time, in different parts of the world, as if they had agreed among themselves? For Jaspers, that fact is a

secret and mystery of history;⁸⁹ but its meaning becomes clear when one understands the Law of the Period of the Number Six.

Furthermore, the coming of the Lord of the Second Advent, the third Adam, is also preceded by a period of the number six as a preparation period. The movements of the Renaissance and the Religious Reformation germinated in the 14th century and bloomed fully in the 16th. The reason is that, in the history of the providence of restoration, God was planning to send the Lord of the Second Advent in the 20th century. The Unification Thought position is that many of the historical events which occurred since that time until today have been directly or indirectly connected with the preparation to receive the Lord of the Second Advent (or with the works of Satan, who attempts to obstruct that preparation).

7. The Law of Responsibility

Human beings are supposed to attain perfection by fulfilling the "human portion of responsibility," which is added to "God's portion of responsibility." Yet, the first human ancestors, Adam and Eve, fell without being able to fulfill their portion of responsibility. The providence of re-creation, also, was to be accomplished through fulfillment of the human portion of responsibility (especially by central figures), which was to be added to God's portion of responsibility. Here, fulfilling the human portion of responsibility means that out of his own free will man takes upon himself and fulfills the mission given him.

Therefore, when a certain central figure is unable to fulfill his portion of responsibility, the providence centering on him ends in failure. Then, after a certain mathematical period of time (a period of time characterized by certain mathematical principles) has elapsed, another person is set up as a central figure to take the baton of responsibility from the previous one. This is the process whereby the history of re-creation has progressed until today.

When Jesus came, if John the Baptist and the priests and scribes had fulfilled their portion of responsibility, Jesus would not have been crucified and the society of the ideal of creation would have been realized at that time. Since, however, they fell into faithlessness, that providence ended in failure and consequently the mission of Jesus was passed on to the Lord of the Second Advent.

C. The Laws of Restoration

Human history has been the history of re-creation, as stated above; at the same time, it can be seen as the history of restoration—in other words, the process to recover the ideal world of creation lost due to the human Fall. In the process of restoration, many struggles between good and evil have taken place. Hence, another series of laws, different from the laws of creation, have been operating in history. These are the Laws of Restoration, which can be listed as follows: (1) the Law of Indemnity, (2) the Law of separation, (3) the Law of the Restoration of the Number Four, (4) the Law of Conditioning Providence, (5) the Law of the False Preceding the True, (6) the Law of the Horizontal Reappearance of the Vertical, and (7) the Law of Synchronous Providence.

1. The Law of Indemnity

The human Fall refers to man's loss of his original position and state. Restoration means the recovering of that lost original position and state. There was a specific motivation and path in the process of losing the original position and state. Hence, in restoring these, one must establish certain conditions and walk a certain path in a direction opposite to that of the Fall. The establishment of conditions in order to recover the original position and state is referred to as "indemnity"; the conditions are called "indemnity conditions"; and the path to be followed in setting them up is called the "course of indemnity." The process of recovering the lost original position and state by setting up conditions of indemnity is called "restoration through indemnity."

The human Fall took place for two reasons: first, Adam and Eve failed to observe God's commandment, an indispensable condition for their growth; and second, they allowed themselves to be subjugated by Satan's temptation. Accordingly, the indemnity condition to be established by fallen men is, first, to lay a "foundation of faith" by making offerings to God or by keeping faith in God's words; and second, to lay a "foundation of substance" by wholeheartedly following the teachings and guidance of the prophets, sages and others sent by God. Once established, these conditions of indemnity become the "foundation to receive the Messiah." ⁹⁰

Yet, people have not usually been obedient to prophets, sages, and righteous persons (that is, leaders on the side of goodness), but have persecuted them instead. Accordingly, leaders on the side of goodness have inevitably had to walk a course of suffering. In the same way, the peoples or the nations set up on the side of goodness, that is, the chosen peoples (or nations) also have had to undergo persecution by surrounding nations, and to walk a course of suffering. The path along which saints and righteous persons walk is described as the course of restoration through indemnity. Taking their suffering as a condition of indemnity, God has gradually been restoring the people of the sinful world back towards His side.

The crucifixion of Jesus is a typical example of this process. Taking the sacrifice of Jesus as a condition, God has been able to forgive the sins of humankind, which had come to be claimed by Satan, due to the people's disbelief in Jesus. Having achieved that through Jesus, God continued His providence of restoration through history. Accordingly, the "law of indemnity" has actually worked in history as the "law of suffering."

2. The Law of Separation

Since God, and God alone, stands as the creator, man in his original state was to stand as object only in relationship to God.

Because of the Fall, however, man entered a position to relate both to God and to Satan. Consequently, whenever God tries to turn to man, Satan does the same. It was impossible, with man in such a situation, for God to carry on His providence. Consequently, God had to separate men into two, that is, into two sides, to one of which God could turn, and another to which Satan could turn. Accordingly, in Adam's family, God separated Adam's children, one to God's side and the other to Satan's side. The younger brother Abel was separated to God's side, and the older brother Cain to Satan's side. Thus, at the starting point of history, Cain became the first person on the side of evil, and Abel the first on the side of goodness. But, because Cain killed Abel instead of learning to follow God from him, sinful history began. Thus, in order to continue the providence of restoration, God has been compelled to separate Abel-type figures out from the evil world; and then, to carry out His providence by having these figures train people in the life of faith.

God first started by setting up an individual on God's side; next He set up a family, and then gradually expanded His territory by setting up a tribe, a nation, and a state, reaching out to the whole world. Satan, in opposition to God's providence, has been following the same pattern, except that he accomplished his work ahead of God; he set up an individual on his side, and then extended his territory to a family, a tribe, a nation, a state, reaching out to the whole world, all along obstructing the providence of God.

Throughout history, the good side has attempted to convey God's word to the evil side, but it has often happened that the evil side refuses to accept God's words and responds by attacking the good side with force. God's side is then compelled to respond, and struggles take place. For this reason, struggles have taken place in history between an individual on the side of goodness and one on the side of evil, as well as between a family, tribe or nation on the side of goodness, and one on the side of evil. Ulti-

mately, there will occur a final struggle between the world on the side of goodness and the world on the side of evil. Such struggles are going on even today; accordingly, the history of restoration has been carried out through the struggle between good and evil.

Though one side is referred to as the side of goodness and the other as the side of evil, it should be kept in mind that in the course of restoration history there can be neither perfect goodness nor perfect evil. The side which is closer to the providence of God is separated out as the side of goodness; and the side which is more distant from the providence of God is separated out as the side of evil.

The world today has come to be divided into two blocs: one on the side of goodness and the other on the side of evil—the bloc of free world nations and that of the communist nations. In the struggle between these two blocs, it is God’s providential will that the side of goodness win over the side of evil, whereby the entire world is to be restored to God’s side. Nevertheless, in order for the bloc of free world nations to be victorious, their leaders must execute policies in accordance with God’s direction. If they fail to do so, the communist bloc will continue to expand throughout the world, causing tremendous suffering in the world.

3. The Law of the Restoration of the Number Four

God’s purpose of creation is to realize His love on the basis of the “family four position foundation.” In other words, if Adam and Eve had grown according to the Word of God and perfected themselves, they would have become husband and wife, united into one, and would have borne children, whereby the family four position foundation consisting of God, Adam (the husband), Eve (the wife), and the children, would have been formed. In that family four position foundation, the love of God would have been realized. Due to their Fall, however, Adam and Eve became unable to form a family four position foundation in the original state (that is, centering on God); instead they formed a four position founda-

tion centering on Satan. Accordingly, the restoration of the family four position foundation centering on God became the primary goal of the history of restoration.

Accordingly, God carried out the providence of restoring the number four, which is a symbolic and preparatory providence to restore the family four position foundation. The restoration of the number four represents an indemnity condition carried out mathematically for the conditional recovery of the family four position foundation. The number four is restored through certain periods of time, such as forty days, forty years, or four hundred years. During such periods of time, a great deal of confusion is caused by Satan, resulting in intense suffering for the people on the side of God. Examples of the restoration of the number four have been: The forty-day rain that caused the flood at the time of Noah, the forty-year period which Moses spent in Pharaoh's palace, and the four hundred-year persecution which Christianity suffered under the Roman Empire. At the conclusion of each of these periods of indemnity, God's providence of restoration entered a new stage. These are examples that apply to the central providence. The law of the restoration of the number four, however, applies also to God's peripheral providence.

In fact, Arnold Toynbee observed that in history there are many examples of how, after a four hundred year period of confusion, unification was accomplished. For example, four hundred years elapsed from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war in Greece (431 B.C.) until the unification of the Roman Empire by Octavian (31 B.C.); in Chinese history, about four hundred years elapsed from the division of the Later Han Dynasty into three nations (A.D. 220) until the unification of the country by the Tang Dynasty (A.D. 618); in Japanese history, about four hundred years elapsed from the beginning of the Kamakura period (A.D. 1192) until the unification of the nation by Hideyoshi Toyotomi (A.D. 1590). Nevertheless, Toynbee was not clear as to the reasons why these four hundred year periods appeared in history. Furthermore, in the

history of Korea, the forty-year period of Japanese domination (from the “Eul-sa Treaty of Protection” in 1905 until the liberation of Korea in 1945) can also be seen as an example of the restoration of the number four.

4. *The Law of Conditioning Providence*

The Law of Conditioning Providence relates events in two different providential times, such that a providential event of a later time is conditioned by whether or not the central figure of a providential event of a former time has fulfilled his portion of responsibility in accordance with the will of God. While the former providential event has in itself an important meaning in the process of restoration, at the same time it conditions the later providential event. Thus, the nature and developmental course of the later event are greatly influenced by the former.

Consider, for instance, the event of Moses having struck the rock at Horeb twice to produce water (Numbers 20). In that act, Moses responded to the actual need in the situation at that time, that is, he wanted to give water to his thirsty people in the wilderness. At the same time, however, there was something else in the act of Moses, which symbolized and conditioned God’s providence for the future, when Jesus would come. According to the teaching of *Divine Principle*, the rock struck by Moses symbolized Adam—that is, before being struck, the rock symbolized the first (fallen) Adam, and after being struck, it symbolized the second (unfallen) Adam, Jesus. The water which came out of the rock symbolized life. Due to the human Fall, the first Adam died (spiritually). Therefore, metaphorically speaking, the first Adam can be compared to the rock which could not yield water (that is, the rock before being struck). And the second Adam, Jesus, can be compared to the rock giving water (that is, the rock after its having been struck). Jesus came as a man of life to revive humankind from death. Moses, however, went on to strike the rock a second time, moved by anger at the faithlessness of the Israelites. Owing

to this, a condition was created which would allow Satan to strike Jesus, who would come later as the substantial rock, if the Israelites should fail to believe and accept Him. Actually, the act of striking the rock twice became a remote cause of Jesus' crucifixion once the Israelites became faithless.

This is one example from historical facts related in the Old Testament; but this law has also operated in the same way in other providentially meaningful historical events. In other words, providential events cannot be fully explained only in the context of their own time, but were conditioned to some extent by various factors of a former time. In addition, the ways in which providential events have developed have influenced the historical events of a later time.

5. The Law of the False Preceding the True

The Law of the False Preceding the True states that in the history of restoration the false appears ahead of the true. Satan took over the world created by God, by leading the human ancestors to fall; he took the lead in establishing his own false ideal. Accordingly, God had to allow Satan to attempt to establish, in advance of God and in imitation of His providence, a non-principled world on the pattern of the Principle. Thus, God has had to carry out His providence to establish the principled world by following behind Satan. Though a non-principled society erected by Satan may appear prosperous, it is nevertheless only a false society, and is therefore temporary and destined sooner or later to collapse as God's providence advances. History bears witness to this fact.

The ultimate purpose of the providence of restoration is to realize on earth the great unified state of the ideal of creation, centering on God. In this state, the state of God or the kingdom of heaven on earth, God is the highest sovereign. It will be realized only at the coming of the Messiah. Nevertheless, since Satan knows the providence of God, he has attempted to establish such a state of his own, ahead of God and before the coming (or the

second coming) of the Messiah, taking possession of the plans of God's providence. For this reason, false messiahs and false unified states have appeared in advance of the true.

A good example of this is the Roman Empire which emerged before the coming of Jesus. Julius Caesar, who conquered all of Gaul and annexed it to the Roman territory, accomplished the unification of Rome (45 B.C.). After his death, Octavian managed to control a rebellion (31 B.C.) and unified the entire Mediterranean region, literally realizing a world empire. The prosperity of the Roman Empire under *pax Romana* (Roman peace) lasted for about two centuries. Julius Caesar and Octavian were messianic figures on the satanic side. They erected, in imitation of God's providence, a false unified world of peace and prosperity, before the true Messiah, Jesus, came to establish the great unified world of eternal love, peace, and prosperity. As it turned out, the true unified world (that is, the true ideal world) did not actually appear, because Jesus was crucified and his mission remained incomplete.

Similarly, at the time of the Second Advent, in accordance with this law, there has appeared on earth a false lord of the Second Advent and a false unified world in advance of the providence of the Second Advent. These are Stalin and the communist world. In fact, Stalin was worshipped as the sun of mankind, as if he were the Messiah himself, and his aim was to unify the whole world under communism. He died in 1953; and, from the providential point of view, that year marked the official beginning of the course of the providence of the Second Advent. The fact that international communism became divided after Stalin's death foreshadows the fall of the false unified world and the beginning of the true unified world.

6. The Law of the Horizontal Reappearance of the Vertical

The Law of the Horizontal Reappearance of the Vertical refers to the law under which the vertical reappears horizontally at the time of the Last Days in the history of restoration. "Vertical" refers to the flow of time, and "horizontal" refers to spatial extension. In other words, vertical refers to history, and horizontal refers to the present world. Accordingly, the horizontal reappearance of the vertical means that God works at the world wide level to make all providential figures and events of the past reappear at a certain period of history, that is, in the Last Days. Through this kind of providence, God attempts to solve, all at once, the various problems of human history that have remained unsolved due to failures on the part of past providential figures.

For example, the families of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob restored through indemnity, in three generations, the foundation of restoration which had been invaded by Satan during the 2000 years from Adam to Abraham. And Jesus attempted to restore through indemnity, all at once, the providential events which had been invaded by Satan during the 4000 years from Adam to his time. Also, in the providence of the Second Advent, all the historical events invaded by Satan during the 6000 years from the time of Adam must be restored through indemnity centering on the Lord of the Second Advent.

For example, the antagonism which exists between Israel and the Arab nations today can be seen as a reappearance of the struggles between the Israelites and the neighboring nations in the Old Testament age. The time of the Last Days is a time of great confusion, throughout the world, with constant eruption of unexpected circumstances, because various unresolved problems of past history are unfolding at that time through the operation of the law of the horizontal reappearance of the vertical. Finally, that confusion

will be completely solved centering on the Lord of the Second Advent.

The providential work of God makes all the historical events reappear in the Last Days, so that they may be solved completely. God's intention is to wipe away all the memories of the numerous events of misery in history, by setting up conditions whereby the sinful history of 6000 years can be regarded as history which has developed without the human Fall. His intention also is to completely subjugate Satan, through eradicating all the conditions, which have allowed Satan to accuse God.

7. The Law of Synchronous Providence

The Law of Synchronous Providence refers to the fact that certain providential events in the history of restoration can be repeated at a later providential period. The earlier and later providentially synchronous periods both show similar aspects with regard to central figures, events and mathematical time period. When a providential person fails to fulfill the human portion of responsibility in the history of restoration, the period centering on that person comes to an end; after a certain period of time has elapsed, another person will be set up to restore through indemnity the historical course of the preceding period. The preceding period is not simply repeated exactly as it happened before, but rather is repeated on a higher level, because the indemnity conditions have increased. Consequently, the development of the history of restoration proceeds in a spiral form.

Then how has the law of synchronous providence operated in history? In the 2000 year providence of restoration from Adam to Abraham, centering on the family (the providential age for the foundation of restoration), it was not possible for the Messiah to come on earth, due to the fact that the providential work was not completed. Accordingly, there followed the 2000 year providence from Abraham to Jesus, centering on the nation of the Israelites (the providential age of restoration), as the period providentially

synchronous with the previous one. When it turned out that this providence, centering on the nation of the Israelites was also not completed, due to the crucifixion of Jesus, there appeared 2000 year providence from Jesus to the present. This is the history of the West centering on Christianity (the providential age of the prolongation of restoration), which is the period providentially synchronous with the previous one. The two providentially synchronous periods from Abraham to Jesus and from Jesus to the present are displayed in Table 4.1.

The Providential Age of Restoration	The Providential Age of the Prolongation of Restoration
Slavery in Egypt (400 yrs)	Persecution under the Roman Empire (400 yrs)
The Period of Judges (400 yrs)	Christian Churches under the Patriarchal System (400 yrs)
The United Kingdom (120 yrs)	The Christian Kingdom (120 yrs)
The Divided Kingdom of North and South (400 yrs)	The Divided Kingdom of East and West (400 yrs)
The Babylonian Captivity and Return of the Jewish People (210 yrs)	Papal Captivity and Return (210 yrs)
Preparation for the Coming of the Messiah (400 yrs), Renovation of Faith, Greek Civilization	Preparation for the Second Coming of the Messiah (400 yrs), Religious Reformations, Renaissance

Table 4.1 Synchronous Providential Periods

D. Historical Change

All of the above mentioned laws of creation and restoration have operated in historical change. The most important among them are the laws of give and receive, and repulsion,⁹¹ together with the laws of indemnity and separation. In historical change, the law of give and receive is also known as “the Law of Devel-

opment"; while the other three together are known as "the Law of Turning." (The Law of Turning is identical with the "Law of the Struggle between Good and Evil," to be dealt with below.)

As was mentioned, history has developed through give and receive action. In other words, the development of all the areas of society, such as politics, economics and culture, have been made through harmonious give and receive action between the various types of subject and object, such as between spirit and matter, man and the environment (nature and society), the government and the people, one organization and another, one individual and another, and between man and machines.

Development refers to growth and improvement, that is, to the emergence of new qualities, all of which are irreversible and progressive movements. Such phenomena emerge when correlative elements of subject and object engage in give and receive action centering on a common purpose. Struggle between opposites can only lead to destruction and stagnation, not at all to any kind of development. Every type of development that has appeared in human history has, without exception, been attained through the law of give and receive.

On the other hand, subject and subject repel each other according to the law of repulsion. This has surfaced in human history in the form of antagonism between leaders. An example of this is the struggle, at the time of the French Revolution, between royalist aristocrats centering on Louis XVI, on the one hand, and the leaders of the middle class bourgeoisie, on the other—in other words, between the old leaders and the new. They were separated into two parties, according to the law of separation: one standing on the side of goodness, that is, relatively speaking in a position in accordance with the providence of God; and the other on the side of evil, that is, relatively speaking in a position to obstruct God's providence. Then, the subjects of both sides formed camps, respectively on the good and evil sides, attracting to themselves the masses in the object position (that is, the masses were divided into

two), and these two sides fought each other. It should be mentioned here that what determines which of the two leaders belongs to the good and which to the evil side is made on the basis of their being more or less in accordance with God's providence. It has often been the case that the leader of an old society is inclined to self-centered desire and rules despotically; consequently, God sets up a new leader on the good side through whom to carry out His providential work.

Good and evil here are relative notions, and the side of God, of course, is the good side; nevertheless, a new leader on Satan's side can sometimes appear to be relatively good, when compared to the leader of the old corrupt society. During the Russian Revolution, for instance, it can be said that Lenin appeared relatively good when compared with Nicholas II or with Kerensky, the leader of the provisional government. (Strictly speaking, however, such goodness is merely apparent goodness, that is, a pretense of goodness.)

When the side of goodness wins a victory in the struggle between good and evil, history turns in the direction of greater goodness. Later, when history reaches a certain stage, there again emerges a better leader. Then the previous leaders come to stand, relatively speaking, on the evil side, and again a struggle between good and evil occurs, and if the good side wins, then the direction of history again turns in the direction of greater goodness. Ultimately, history will reach the stage of perfect goodness, or the stage of the world of the ideal of creation. Only then, will the struggle between good and evil come to an end.

When the good side fails to fulfill its portion of responsibility, allowing the evil side to win in the struggle between good and evil, then the direction of history does not change for the better. However, God always guides history in such a way as to set up again, after a certain period of time, a better leader, and to have him in turn fight against the evil side. In this way, eventually the direction of history changes to the side of goodness. History, there-

fore, has not been the history of “class struggle,” but rather the history of the “struggle between good and evil.”

Thus, history has changed by developing through the give and receive action between subject and object until such time as its direction turns through the struggle between good and evil, whereupon it continues to develop through give and receive action between subject and object, and so on, time and again. This process of historical change can be illustrated as in figure 4.3.

The preceding discussion shows that in going through changes history has moved in two directions: one is the direction of development, and the other, the direction of restoration (or return). Development refers to progress in science, economy and culture; restoration refers to the recovery of the lost world of the ideal of creation, the world of love and peace. Restoration takes place through the turning of history in the struggle between good and evil. Such struggles, however, need not be by force of arms. If the evil side allows itself to be subjugated obediently and peacefully by the good side, then it is possible for a peaceful turning to be accomplished.

Thus, history has gone through the two changes of development and restoration; but development will continue eternally, while restoration will come to an end when the world of the ideal of creation, the world of goodness, is restored. After that, the ideal world will continue forever.

The materialist conception states that human history will develop until communist society is realized; there is no information as to what kind of society will come after that. According to materialist dialectic, it would be logical to assert that communist society must also develop into a new society through the struggle of contradictory elements. And yet, Marx mentions nothing of this, which is very similar to Hegel’s failure to explain why, when human history has developed dialectically to the stage of the rational state, it is then said to stop developing.

This aporia in the Marxist theory of history can be solved only when history is seen from the perspective of restoration, as it is in Unification Thought. In this perspective, if the world of goodness is restored completely such that all evil elements disappear from the world, then all struggles will cease completely, leaving no trace, and the world of goodness, the world of peace, love and happiness, will remain forever.

5

MARXIST
EPISTEMOLOGY
CRITIQUE AND
COUNTERPROPOSAL

The epistemological questions as to how man can acquire truth—in other words, the questions relating to the origin of cognition, the essence of the object of cognition, the method of cognition, and so on—are closely related to the ontological question whether idealism or materialism is correct. Such epistemological questions have been studied by many philosophers up to the present. Marxism attaches importance to epistemology, and presents its own theory from the materialist-dialectical standpoint, claiming to have overcome traditional idealist theories of epistemology. Marxist epistemology, though dealing with cognition of the natural world, focuses primarily on social development, that is, on the discovery of the laws of historical development. This theory maintains that cognition is intended for practice and is developed through practice.

“Practice” refers to various types of social activities, including the activity of production; class struggle, or revolution, is considered the most important type of practice. Mao Tse-tung states that, of the various types of social practice, “class struggle in particular, in all its various forms, exerts a profound influence on the development of man's knowledge. In class society everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with the brand of a class.”¹

Thus, Marxist epistemology is closely connected with revolution (class struggle), and represents an important aspect of Marxist theory. In order to overcome Marxism, therefore, it is necessary to criticize Marxist epistemology and to present a new view to take its place.

I. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF EPISTEMOLOGY

Traditional theories of epistemology have dealt with issues such as the origin of cognition (at which mental stage is cognition carried out), and the essence of the object of cognition (what is it and does it exist or not). For each of these two questions, two positions have been maintained, namely, empiricism and rationalism for the question of the origin of cognition, and realism and idealism for the question of the essence of the object of cognition.

A. The Origin of Cognition

The human ability to acquire knowledge comprises the aspects of perception, understanding and reason. At which stage does cognition take place? The answer to this question determines the origin of cognition. Empiricism asserts that cognition takes place at the stage of perception, in other words, through the senses. In contrast, rationalism states that cognition takes place at the stages of understanding and reason. In other words, empiricism says that cognition is acquired through experience, while rationalism says that it is acquired through reason.

1. Empiricism

a) Bacon

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) laid the foundations of empiricism, even before John Locke, who is now considered its main exponent. Bacon believed that traditional philosophy was nothing but useless verbal argumentation, substantially empty in content. He

insisted that the way to obtain the right kind of knowledge is to observe nature and to conduct experiments. In order to acquire that kind of knowledge, one must first rid oneself of all preconceived prejudices. Bacon described these prejudices as four idols.

“Idols of the Tribe” are prejudices into which man easily falls, such as an anthropomorphic way of thinking. The “Idols of the Cave” are prejudices arising from the individual’s peculiar nature and habits. The “Idols of the Market Place” are prejudices derived from the fact that knowledge is influenced by language. The “Idols of the Theater” are prejudices derived from blind belief in authority and tradition. After discarding these four idols, Bacon maintained, one must observe nature and discover the characteristics common to all phenomena. This is Bacon’s inductive method.

b) *Locke*

John Locke (1632-1704) systematized the empirical way of thinking concerning the acquisition of knowledge in his work *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. He considered the human mind to be like a blank sheet of paper (*tabula rasa*) upon which nothing is written, and maintained that all ideas come from experience. Experiences take two forms, namely, external and internal—that is, sensation and reflection. Acquired ideas are either simple or complex. “Simple ideas” are those which are acquired through “sensation” and “reflection”; “complex ideas” represent a combination of simple ideas, made higher in dimension by the faculty of understanding.

Simple ideas are caused by two kinds of qualities existing in the object: “primary qualities” and “secondary qualities.” Primary qualities are those that exist in the object just as they are perceived—such as, solidity, extension, figure, motion, rest and number. Secondary qualities are those which the object gives to the subject to cause such subjective ideas as colors, odors, tastes and sounds. Locke defined knowledge as “the perception of the con-

nexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas.”²

c) Berkeley

George Berkeley (1685-1753) denied Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities, claiming that the primary qualities are just as subjective as the secondary qualities. The idea of distance, for instance, is something which is acquired through first seeing with the eyes, and then going and touching with the hand. Therefore, the idea of distance is derived from sight and touch, and one can never perceive extension (distance) as it really is.

d) Hume

David Hume (1711-1776) carried empiricism to the extreme. He posited that the knowledge of causality and substantiality is merely empirical and in no way certain.

Regarding causality, for instance, when one sees lightning and then hears thunder, one usually thinks that lightning is the cause and thunder the effect. From Hume’s standpoint, both lightning and thunder are mere impressions, and there is no basis for connecting them as cause and effect. The idea of causality only stands on the basis of one’s subjective conviction. Thus, in Hume, empiricism fell into skepticism.

2. Rationalism

In contrast to British empiricism, continental rationalism, as developed by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and others, held that right cognition is impossible through sensation and can only be acquired through deductive, logical inference by reason.

a) Descartes

Rene Descartes (1596-1650), who is regarded as the founder of rationalism, initiated his inquiry by deliberately doubting everything, as a method of obtaining true knowledge. This is called

“methodical doubt.” He felt that the senses can be deceptive, and started out by doubting the certainty of anything of the senses. Nevertheless, Descartes could not doubt the fact that he doubted (or the fact that he thought); thus he concluded “I think, therefore I am” (*cogito ergo sum*).

That proposition became the first principle of the philosophy for which Descartes was searching. This proposition is certain, he argued, because it is clear and distinct in the mind. That led to the general rule that “the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are all true.” As a means of guaranteeing the truth of clear and distinct ideas, he posited the existence of God. If God exists, he must be honest, and an honest God could never deceive human beings. Therefore, when there is clear and distinct perception, there can be no error in cognition. Descartes demonstrated that clear and distinct cognition is certain, whereby he insisted on the certainty of rational cognition based on mathematical method.

b) Spinoza

Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677), like Descartes, considered that one can recognize any truth by reason. Especially, he tried to cognize logically, by applying geometrical method to philosophy.

c) Leibnitz

Gottfried W. Leibnitz (1646-1716) categorized cognizable truths into (1) that which is found logically through understanding; and (2) that which is acquired through experience. He named the former “truths of reason” (eternal truths) and the latter “truths of fact” (contingent truths). Between the two, he considered the truths of reason, namely, rational cognition, to be the higher truth.

Thus, continental rationalism made light of the cognition of facts, and came to consider that everything could be cognized through reason, finally falling into dogmatism. C. Wolff (1679-1754) is regarded as the representative exponent of rationalistic dogmatism.

B. The Essence of the Object of Cognition

In this section we will inquire into how to view the essence of the object of cognition. Realism holds that the object of cognition exists in the objective world independently of the subject. Subjective idealism holds that the object of cognition exists, not in the objective world, but rather as an idea in the human mind.

1. Realism

There are different kinds of realism. First, there is naive realism, which refers to the common-sense way of looking at things. The object, which is composed of matter, exists independently of the subject's mind, and exists exactly as it is perceived. This is the epistemological view of ordinary people.

Next, there is scientific realism, which holds that the object exists independently of the subject, but maintains that sensation, just as it is, does not convey objectively true knowledge. The way to know reality correctly is to reflect scientifically, through the function of understanding, on the empirical facts obtained from the object, thereby transcending sensation.

Furthermore, there is idealistic realism, which is also called objective idealism. This view maintains that the essence of the world, in other words, the essence of the object, is spirit, or idea, which exists independently of the human mind. Plato, for instance, considered that the essence of things is Idea, which alone is the true reality. He claimed that the phenomenal world is no more than the shadow of Ideas. Along similar lines, Hegel claimed that the world is the self-development of Absolute Spirit.

Finally, there is communist realism, a specific view held by communism. This view states the following: the object is an objective reality existing independently of human consciousness; it can be reflected in consciousness. Nevertheless, the object's reflection in consciousness is not sufficient to convey true knowledge of the

object. One can know true reality by verifying the reflected knowledge through practice.

2. Subjective Idealism

The view of subjective idealism asserts that the objective world does not exist independently of human consciousness, and that its existence can be acknowledged only as long as it appears in human consciousness. Berkeley is the representative exponent of this view. He said, "To be is to be perceived" (*esse est percipi*). Similar positions were held by Fichte (1762-1814), who asserted that it is not possible to say whether or not the non-ego (the object) exists separately from the operation of the ego, and by Schopenhauer (1788-1860), who said, "The world is my representation" (*Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung*).

C. Kant's Transcendental Method

British empiricism fell into skepticism and continental rationalism into dogmatism. These two positions were synthesized by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who established a new view. Kant argued that both positions were false: empiricism, holding that the origin of cognition is experience, disregarded the faculty of reason; and rationalism, considering reason to be almighty, disregarded experience. Kant felt that in order to obtain correct knowledge, one must begin by analyzing the process whereby experience becomes knowledge. In other words, one must examine or critique the faculty of reason.

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant posited the existence of a priori forms of cognition (concepts) in the cognizing subject. The object of cognition is synthesized when the sense experiences, or sensory content (color, smell, shape, sound), which come from the external world, are put in order by the subject's a priori forms ("forms of intuition" and "forms of thought"). In other words, he argued that cognition becomes possible when the sensory content from the object (external world) is perceived by the forms of intuition

(space and time) and is then connected with the forms of thought (categories) whereby the object of cognition is synthesized. Kant organized the forms of thought (categories) into twelve forms as follows:

1. *Quantity*

Unity

Plurality

Totality

2. *Quality*

Reality

Negation

Limitation

3. *Relation*

Substance-and-Accident

Cause-and-Effect

Reciprocity

4. *Modality*

Possibility

Actuality

Necessity

While traditional philosophical systems considered that the object of cognition is grasped as it is, Kant maintained that the object of cognition is synthesized by the subject. In self-praise, he called his way of thinking a “Copernican revolution.” Kantian epistemology is not concerned with knowledge of the object itself; rather, its aim was to explore how knowledge of the object is possible. He named his approach the transcendental method.

After discussing the ways in which knowledge of the phenomenal world (the natural world) becomes possible, Kant inquired whether knowledge of the soul or God is possible. He argued that God and the soul, which have no sensible qualities, cannot be objects of cognition—in other words, they cannot be cognized. He concluded that human cognition is limited to the phenomenal world. It is impossible to cognize the noumenal world, or the world of things-in-themselves, which transcends the phenomenal world. Nevertheless, Kant did not deny the world of things-in-themselves, and in *Critique of Practical Reason*, he attempted to posit its existence as a postulate of practical reason.

II. MARXIST EPISTEMOLOGY

A. Theory of Reflection

Marxism propounds the view that cognition is caused by the reflection, or copy, of objective reality on consciousness. This is known as the “theory of reflection,” or “copy theory.” According to Engels, “we comprehended the concepts in our heads. . . materialistically—as images [*Abbilder*] of real things instead of regarding the real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept.”³ And Lenin referred to “the reflection by the human mind (where there is a human mind) of an external world existing and developing independently of the mind.”⁴

According to Cornforth, the theory of reflection has the following features: (1) Material reality is primary, and its mental reflection secondary; (2) Material reality is reproduced, or reflected, in consciousness, as forms of perceptions and thoughts; (3) Reflection takes place when an active relationship (interaction) is effected between the conscious subject and its external objects; (4) Reflection in consciousness is the product of life activity.⁵

B. Perceptual Cognition, Rational Cognition, and Practice

The reflection of the objective world in human consciousness is not completed all at once. Lenin said, “From living perception to abstract thought, *and from this to practice*,—such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality.”⁶ Along the same lines, Mao Tse-tung stated that the process of the development of knowledge is based on practice and proceeds “from the shallower to the deeper.” He argued that knowledge manifests itself “as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the higher stage, but. . . both are stages in an integrated process of cognition. The perceptual and the rational are qualita-

tively different, but are not divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice."⁷

Practice generally refers to human action upon nature and to the various social activities of man. For Marxist epistemology, revolution is considered the most important practice;⁸ the ultimate aim of cognition lies in revolutionary practice. About this, Mao Tse-tung argues that "the active function of knowledge manifests itself not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but—and this is more important—it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice."⁹

Furthermore, Marxist epistemology asserts that practice—ultimately revolutionary practice¹⁰)—is the criterion of truth. It maintains that in order to determine whether knowledge (thought) is true or not, one has simply to compare that knowledge with reality through practice and to ascertain whether it coincides with reality or not. As an explanation of this point, Marx said that "man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice,"¹¹ and Mao Tse-tung said that "Marxists hold that man's social practice alone is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external world," And Lenin, from the standpoint of social, revolutionary practice, asserted that Marxism conforms with reality and therefore is true, and stated that "the course of development of all capitalist countries in the last few decades, proves only the objective truth of Marx's whole theory in general." Thus, Marxist epistemology was devised as a theory to rationalize revolution, just as were communist materialism, materialist dialectic and the materialist conception of history.

Marxist epistemology argues for certain forms of thought in logical cognition. Logical cognition refers to thinking activities such as judgment and inference, which take place through concepts, where these forms of thought play an important role. Marxist epistemology, which propounds the theory of reflection, considers that the reflection in consciousness of the processes of the

objective world constitutes the forms of thought, in other words, forms of thought are the reflection in consciousness of the forms of existence. The categories—that is, forms of existence and forms of thought—in Marxist epistemology are listed in *The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy* as follows:¹⁴

1. matter, motion, space, time, the finite and the infinite, consciousness, quantity, quality, proportion, contradiction
2. the individual, particular and universal
3. cause and effect
4. necessity and chance
5. possibility and reality
6. content and form
7. essence and appearance

C. Absolute and Relative Truth

The Marxist theory of epistemology asserts that truth is that which exactly reflects objective reality: “If our sensations, perceptions, notions, concepts and theories correspond to objective reality, if they reflect it faithfully, we say that they are *true*, while true statements, judgments or theories are called the *truth*.”¹⁵

Marxist epistemology also holds that knowledge in a particular period of history is partial and imperfect, remaining as relative truth. With the development of science, knowledge continuously reaches out to absolute truth; thus, it acknowledges the existence of absolute truth. It also states that relative truth contains some aspects that are absolutely true and that when these aspects are accumulated, they become absolute truth. Lenin explained this as follows:

Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth.¹⁶

The *limits* of approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such

truth is *unconditional*, and the fact that we are approaching nearer to it is also unconditional.¹⁷

Then, how is the standard of truth elevated? Mao Tse-tung said that it is elevated by the repetition of practice and cognition:

Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level.¹⁸

Kant propounded the view of agnosticism, saying that cognition is effected only as long as the subject synthesizes the object (sensory content), and that it is impossible to cognize the "thing-in-itself." In contrast, Marxist epistemology, taking the position that practice is the criterion of truth, asserts that through practice, man can know a thing-in-itself. In opposition to agnosticism, Engels pointed out:

in Kant's time our knowledge of natural objects was indeed so fragmentary that he might well suspect, behind the little we knew about each of them, a mysterious "thing-in-itself." But one after another of these ungraspable things have been grasped, analysed, and, what is more, *reproduced* by the giant progress of science; and what we can produce we certainly cannot consider as unknowable.¹⁹

D. Necessity and Freedom

Marxist epistemology holds that through rational, or logical, cognition man can know the various laws of nature and society and can understand the necessity that exists within things. By acting in accordance with these laws, man gains freedom. Engels wrote:

Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. . . Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity.²⁰

It is held that when man fully understands natural and social laws, and makes use of them to his advantage, then “the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom” is accomplished.²¹

VIII. UNIFICATION EPISTEMOLOGY

Before critiquing Marxist epistemology, I will introduce Unification epistemology, which is a counterproposal based on Unification Thought; through this process, Marxist epistemology can be criticized and overcome most effectively.

A. The Origin of Cognition

According to Unification Thought, human beings and “all things” are created beings, existing in relationships of subject and object. Man is the lord of all things, and all things are the object intended to give joy to man. Accordingly, the subject of cognition (man) and the object of cognition (all things) do not exist in an accidental or contingent, but rather in a necessary, relationship.

This relationship between man and all things was not understood in the past, and traditional epistemology, therefore, sometimes emphasized the subject and sometimes the object. Rationalism emphasized the subject of cognition, asserting that cognition results from innate ideas or from inferences made by reason, or understanding. In contrast, empiricism attached greater importance to the object of cognition, claiming that cognition is affected when one grasps the object just as it is, through the senses.

Unification epistemology, which holds that man and all things exist in a necessary relationship, asserts that the origin of cognition is the unity of experience and reason (understanding). Information from the object reaches the brain through experience and becomes an idea; at the same time, the subject already possesses ideas within itself (that is, the “prototypes,” which will be explained later), and when the idea of the object (acquired through

experience) and the prototype (the idea already present in the mind) are collated by the function of understanding, cognition comes into being. Then thinking is carried out by reason, through synthesizing and associating the ideas (or the content of cognition) that have been collated, or judged, by the function of understanding.

B. The Essence of the Object of Cognition

First of all, Unification Thought acknowledges that all things exist outside of man—in other words, it upholds realism. Man dominates all things with his creativity—i.e., he processes things to create new things, and also nurtures all things. For that purpose, things must exist outside and independently of man, as objects of his dominion.

Unification Thought maintains that man is the “integration of all things,” the “encapsulation of the universe” (the microcosm). Accordingly, he is endowed with all the structures, elements and essential qualities of all things. In other words, all things are created so as to resemble man symbolically, following the pattern of man. Therefore, man (the subject) and all things (the object) resemble each other.

Man’s mind possesses within his subconsciousness all the ideas regarding his physical body as explained later. Therefore, the ideas in his mind form a resemblance to his physical body; and his body forms a resemblance to all things in the external world. Accordingly, Unification epistemology maintains the existence of things in the external world, and, at the same time, that there exist in man’s mind, ideas resembling all things.

Cognition always accompanies judgment, and judgment can be regarded as an action of a measurement. In order to measure something, one needs a criterion, or standard—and the criterion in cognition is the idea within the subject, which is called the “prototype.” When the prototype (internal image) and the image coming from the object in the external world (external image) are

collated and their coincidence or non-coincidence is determined, a judgment takes place, and that judgment is cognition. Thus, realism and idealism (subjective idealism) are unified in Unification epistemology.

C. Requisites for Cognition

1. Content and Forms

Kant said that cognition occurs only when the sensory content (sense experience) coming from the external object is connected with the a priori forms within the subject, and that the content is given only by the object. In contrast, Unification epistemology asserts that there exists in the subject an image that resembles the content of the object. For example, when one expresses the judgment that something is a rose, it is impossible to make that judgment merely by what Kant called a priori forms. That judgment is possible only when there exists within the subject the content of the rose as an image.

With regards to forms, Kant asserted that within the subject there exist a priori forms of thought (forms of understanding, or categories). Marxism holds that forms of thought are the forms of existence of material reality, and maintains that forms exist externally. On the other hand, Unification epistemology, which posits the resemblance of subject and object, admits the forms of existence of the object and the forms of thought of the subject (in other words, it maintains that forms exist both within and without); but in addition, it also holds that these forms are in a correlative relationship of resemblance.

In short, Unification epistemology holds that there are content and forms in the subject, that there are content and forms in the object, and that cognition comes into being when the two (subject and object) are collated and united.

2. The Autonomy of the Principle and Protoconsciousness

Unification Principle explains that living things grow by means of the “autonomy of the principle,” which refers to the consciousness latent in the body of a living thing—in other words, it refers to “life” itself. This latent consciousness, at the level of a cell, is called “protoconsciousness,” and comes about when “cosmic consciousness,” which fills the universe, becomes individualized by entering the cell. Cosmic consciousness is the mind of God existing everywhere in the universe; it is not, however, the active, creative mind of God nor the ideas contained in His mind. Cosmic consciousness is God's consciousness in a static state, where the functions of intellect, emotion and will are suspended and all ideas and concepts are excluded; in other words, it is pure consciousness or the pure faculties of his intellect, emotion and will. When cosmic consciousness enters a living organism (a human being, for instance), it penetrates the cells, tissues, organs, sensory organs, brain and so on, and manifests itself as individualized consciousness at these various levels.

Cosmic consciousness possesses “perceptivity,” and when it enters the cell, it obtains the information in that cell—in other words, it is able to read the information contained in the DNA of that cell. DNA information is said to be expressed through the mode of arrangement of the four basic constituent molecules from which DNA is assembled, namely, adenine, guanine, thymine, and cytosine. Unification Thought maintains that the information coded in DNA was placed there by God, when He created a living being through the logos, as a record in material form of all the characteristics necessary for that living being to maintain perpetuity (i.e., to preserve its own species) through the succession of generations.

Upon entering a cell, cosmic consciousness reads the DNA information (i.e., the logos) within it and functions according to that

information. This means that the content of all the structures and functions of the cell—as well as the structures and functions of the tissues and organs composed of cells—are projected onto protoconsciousness (or onto a layer of protoconsciousness). The information projected onto protoconsciousness is in the form of an image, called “protoimage.” In short, a protoimage is an image contained in protoconsciousness; in other words, ideas or concepts within the cell.

Protoconsciousness is connected, through the peripheral nerves, with subconsciousness in the lower nerve center. Consequently, this subconsciousness possesses information (protoimages) compositely about the structure and function of all the parts of the body that are under the dominion of the lower nerve center. The protoimages compounded in the subconsciousness are called “images of content.” These images of content, together with the images of form, constitute the prototypes of cognition, as explained in the sections that follow.

3. Forms and Categories

As seen above, the images of content are formed in the internal world without any experience of the external world. Likewise, Unification epistemology also asserts that the images of form (which become the forms of thought) are formed in the internal world without any experience of the external world, as explained below. The elements of the internal world—such as cells, tissues and organs—exist, act and grow by engaging in inner and outer give and receive action within the body, that is, as “individual truth bodies” and as “connected bodies.” In the case of a cell, for instance, the give and receive action among the elements within the cell (nucleus and cytoplasm) corresponds to inner give and receive action, while the give and receive action with other cells corresponds to outer give and receive action. Each type of give and receive action has specific forms and these forms are identical to the forms of existence.

When a form of existence is reflected on a layer of proto-consciousness, it becomes an image which is called “image of form,” or “image of relation.” Through the peripheral nerves, the images of form are connected with subconsciousness in the lower nerve center. Accordingly, subconsciousness possesses the images of content and the images of form of every part of the body, and together these two types of images constitute the prototypes.

These images of form in subconsciousness impose certain restrictions, or a framework, on the act of thinking; they regulate the mode of thinking. This framework imposed on thinking is none other than the forms of thought, or the categories.

Accordingly, Unification Thought establishes a relation of correspondence between the forms of existence and the forms of thought. The basic forms of existence and forms of thought, according to Unification Thought, are as follows:

	<i>The forms of existence</i>	<i>The forms of thought</i>
1	self-existence and prime force	existence and prime force
2	<i>Sungsang</i> and <i>Hyungsang</i>	<i>Sungsang</i> and <i>Hyungsang</i>
3	positivity and negativity	positivity and negativity
4	subjectivity and objectivity	subject and object
5	position and settlement	position and settlement
6	relation and affinity	relation and affinity
7	action and multiplication	action and multiplication
8	time and space	time and space
9	original law and mathematical principle	original law and mathematical principle
10	infinity and finiteness	infinity and finite

It is not the case that the forms of thought exist without any relationship to external reality, as Kant asserted; nor is it the case that the forms of existence turn into forms of thought through reflection, as Marxist epistemology maintains. The reason man has the form of thought of time and space, for instance, is that originally he is a being that exists within time and space. The reason he has the form of thought of subject and object is that originally he is a being that exists with the relationship of subject and object in his physical body (for example, the nucleus and cytoplasm in a cell, the nerves and muscles, etc.). An explanation of these forms will not be given here. (For details, see "Epistemology" in Explaining Unification Thought.)

D. The Method of Cognition

1. Forming a Four Position Foundation through Give and Receive Action

According to Unification Thought, existence, multiplication, action, etc. come about through the give and receive action between subject and object. Multiplication refers to development and generation, and action refers to motion, change and reaction. Cognition, also, comes about through give and receive action, since cognition is the multiplication of knowledge, or the multiplication of ideas and concepts.

In cognition, the human subject needs to be *interested* in, or concerned with, the object, and must be equipped with a prototype corresponding to the object. (This prototype is called "corresponding prototype," or "resembling prototype.") The need for a prototype was discussed earlier; but why must the subject be interested in the object? Since it is essential for the subject to establish a circuit of give and receive action with the object, if the subject is not interested in the object, then no give and receive action will occur and no cognition will take place, even if the subject and object happen to both just be there.

For example, a man walking down the street may be so preoccupied with other matters that he may fail to notice a friend going by. A sleeping lighthouse keeper will not be awakened by the noise of the waves, but will be awakened by the sound of his little child crying, even though the child's sound is not as loud as the noise of the waves. He does not notice the noise of the waves because he is not interested in it; but he perceives the child's cry because he is interested in the child.

On the other hand, the object is equipped with content (attributes, or sensible qualities) and form (forms of existence). When an object and a subject (which has a corresponding prototype) engage in give and receive action, then cognition takes place as a result. The give and receive action has a center, or motivation, which is its purpose. Cognition can be seen from two points of view, namely, structure and process (see figure 5.1). From the point of view of structure, the cognitive activity is the formation of a "Four Position Foundation"; from the point of view of process, it is the formation of a three-step structure of "*Chung-Boon-Hap Action*," or "Origin-Separation-Union Action" (see *EUT*, ch. 1).

2. The Process and Development of Cognition

Cognition follows the Law of Completion in Three Stages, becoming complete through the three stages of perception, understanding and reason. At the stage of perception, the information coming from the external world (that is, sensory content and forms of existence) is conveyed to the various sensory centers of the brain through the sensory nerves, and is then converted into non-unified fragmentary ideas. Thus, at the stage of perception, only sensations, in the form of fragmentary ideas, are acquired; unified knowledge is not accomplished at this stage.

At the stage of understanding, the fragmentary ideas formed at the stage of perception are associated and unified to become an external image, containing the image of content and image of form coming from the object. The external image is then collated

with a corresponding internal image (which also contains image of content and image of form), in other words, with a corresponding prototype within the internal world of the subject. At this point, cognition reaches a certain level of completion.




Fig. 5.1 Four Position Foundation and *Chung-Boon-Hap* Action in Cognition

At the stage of reason, the subject has freedom to draw inferences and proceeds with his thinking in order to gain deeper knowledge, through the synthesis and association of the various ideas and concepts which he has accumulated through past experiences, unrestricted by the conditions of the objects in the external world.

According to Unification Thought, knowledge is acquired in order to satisfy the desire for joy, that is, the desire for the realization of the “purpose of creation.” Following such a desire, man is often not satisfied with his knowledge at any one particular time, and therefore pursues new or more accurate knowledge. For that reason, practice (experiments, observation, and experience) is carried out in relationship to the object. Thus, what brings about the

development of knowledge is the repetition of the circuit of give and receive action between cognition and practice.

3. The Priority and Development of Prototypes

Kant asserted that the forms within the subject of cognition are a priori. In contrast, Unification Thought states that the prototypes within the subject of cognition are composites of two natures, namely, an a priori nature and an acquired nature (i.e., ideas and concepts acquired through experience). These a priori and acquired natures of prototypes are referred to as “the priority of prototypes.” The a priori kind of prototypes constitute the aspect of the prototypes which man has by nature and which consists of protoimages and the images of form within the layer of protoconsciousness. Therefore, when cognition is carried out, the subject of cognition has a priori prototypes as well as acquired prototypes (prototypes acquired through accumulated experience). In cognition, a prototype which corresponds to the external image coming from the object is mobilized from among such prototypes. The mobilized prototype is a corresponding prototype, and is also a prior-existing or antecedent prototype.

Of course, the prototypes with which a child is endowed at the time of birth are still incomplete, because the child’s nerves and sense organs are still undeveloped. Therefore, cognition at that level is necessarily unclear. As the child grows, however, and the nerves and sense organs develop, the prototypes become gradually clear. As new ideas and concepts acquired through experience are gradually added, the prototypes develop in quality and in quantity.

When the subject of cognition encounters an entirely unknown object, he finds no prototype that corresponds exactly to the information, or the external image, coming from that object. Still, by the composition and association of the ideas and concepts which already exist in his mind (the prior-existing prototypes), the subject can form a prototype which corresponds to the information

coming from the object (a corresponding prototype). The collation between the corresponding prototype and the external image will enable the subject to acquire new knowledge. This process of the composition and association of ideas is precisely the process of learning, whereby the subject steadily diversifies and deepens his prototypes.

E. Cognition and Physiological Conditions

1. Mind and Brain

Marxism maintains that the mind is a product of matter (the brain), and that matter (the brain) exists prior to the mind. In contrast, Unification Thought holds that mind and brain exist in a correlative relationship, and that, between them, neither one is prior to the other. When mind and brain engage in give and receive action, there results a mental phenomenon, namely, consciousness. Accordingly, a mental phenomenon is always carried out through both a mental and a physiological process. This holds true also in the case of subconscious phenomena, in which consciousness does not surface.

As mentioned before, cognition is carried out in the three stages of perception, understanding and reason. Many past philosophers, including Kant, have explained these stages as purely mental processes. According to Unification Thought, however, a material (physiological) process must exist in correspondence to a mental process; for man is the union of mind and body, or the union of spirit man and physical man. Accordingly, the three stages of cognition are accompanied by corresponding physiological processes within the brain.

First of all, information about light, sound, taste, smell and so on, enter their respective sensory areas, i.e., the visual center, the auditory center or the olfactory center, and so on, through the peripheral nerves. At each center, the information is converted into

ideas (i.e., ideated), and a perceptual cognition, or sensation, is accomplished.

Next, the ideas acquired through perceptual cognition are gathered at the association area that controls understanding (that is, the *parieto-temporo-preoccipital* association area), to become a united idea, or an external image. Here, the united idea (originating in the external world) and its corresponding prototype (originating in the internal world) are collated, whereby the cognition, or judgment, of the object is accomplished. This is the understanding stage of cognition.

Rational cognition takes place in the frontal association area of the brain, which controls the will, creativity, thinking and inference. Here, free inference or thinking is affected by using the knowledge (the ideas) acquired in the two prior stages. Thus, each of the three stages of cognition is accompanied by a physiological process within the brain (see figure 5.2).

2. Cybernetics and Protoconsciousness

Cybernetics refers to the science of the transmission and control of information in living things and machinery. It was systematized in 1948 by Norbert Wiener, in his book *Cybernetics*.

A living organism (e.g. an animal) receives pieces of information through its sense organs, integrates them in its central nervous system and sends an appropriate direction to an effector (muscle). This is the way cybernetic phenomena occur in living organisms.

The human body has an “autonomic nervous system” which controls autonomically the internal organs. This system has two kinds of nerves, the sympathetic and the parasympathetic. These two kinds of nerves are distributed in pairs in the internal organs and generally conduct opposite actions to each other. Through the autonomic nervous system, information coming from an internal organ is conveyed to the spinal cord and the brain. In certain cases, the information is controlled in the spinal cord, in others it

is controlled in the between-brain (*hypothalamus*) or hindbrain (*medulla oblongata*).




Fig. 5.2. Lateral View of the Left hemisphere of the Human Brain

On the other hand, in the cases where information is received from the external world, and an appropriate response is given (in other words, in the operation of the somatic nervous system), one of two things may take place: either the action is controlled by a reflex center (the spinal cord, hindbrain, midbrain or the like), or it is controlled consciously by the direct operation of the cerebral cortex.

Accordingly, information coming from within the body or from outside is judged at different levels in the hierarchy of the central nervous system, and directives appropriate to the different kinds of information are issued in response to each bit of information. This shows that consciousness is at work in each position of the nerve centers, even though there is a difference of dimension in the manifestation. The cerebral cortex manifests awakened, clear

consciousness; the lower nerve centers store latent consciousness, operating either as instinct or as autonomy (life).

Moreover, even within a single cell, the phenomenon of cybernetics can be observed. For instance, the self-maintenance and multiplication of a cell are carried out by the ceaseless transfer of information from the cytoplasm to the nucleus and by the response to that information by the nucleus. Therefore, one can find autonomy (life) even within a single cell, and the autonomy within the cell is none other than protoconsciousness.

The miotic muscles are involuntary muscles that normally cannot be controlled by the will; it is well-known, however, that these muscles, through training, can come under voluntary control. This phenomenon is called "intentional control." This points to the existence of a continuum of consciousness, where awakened consciousness, latent consciousness and autonomy are connected with one another, although they are different in dimension (see figure 5.3).




Fig. 5.3. The Structure of the Human Brain

3. The Physiological Context of Prototypes

Prototypes refer to the ideas and concepts which the subject of cognition possesses prior to cognition. Another word for this is memory. It has already been explained that man possesses a priori

prototypes and empirical prototypes. If we borrow physiological terms, we can call these “hereditary memory,” and the “acquired memory” obtained through experience.²² Hereditary memory, which here is regarded as consisting of information about the cells, tissues and organs of the human body, is considered to be transferred, through peripheral nerves, from the layer of proto-consciousness to lower nerve centers such as the limbic system where it is stored. More fundamentally however, hereditary memory appears to be related to the molecular arrangement of the DNA.

The process whereby acquired memories are stored and recalled, within a physiological context, has been a frequent subject of scientific research. To a certain extent, the mechanisms of acquired memory have been clarified, but it seems that no definite conclusions have yet been reached.²³

In cognition, memory or stored knowledge is collated with new information coming from the object in the external world, and a judgment is made. Andrée Goudot-Perrot holds a similar view: “The information received by the sensory receptor is collated with the knowledge that was acquired by the sensory center in the cerebral cortex and was stored in the ‘memory’, and judgment is made.”²⁴ This view coincides with the Unification epistemological position which asserts that cognition comes about when the information coming from the external world (the external image) is collated with the prototype coming from the internal world (the internal image), such that a judgment is made as to whether or not the two of them agree.

4. The Encoding of an Idea and the Ideation of a Code

In the creation of the universe, God had an idea, or logos, for each created being. As discussed earlier, the idea (information) for each living organism was encoded and placed within the cell in a material form for the growth and multiplication of the individual,

and for the perpetuity of its species from generation to generation. Unification epistemology maintains that the encoded material form is simply the special arrangement of the four kinds of molecules in DNA. The process whereby information is transformed into a material form is called in Unification epistemology "the encoding of an idea."

As seen before, cosmic consciousness, or the *Sungsang* (mind) of God, which fills the universe, enters the cell and becomes protoconsciousness; protoconsciousness reads the code within the DNA, and obtains all the knowledge concerning the cells, tissues, organs, and other aspects of the living body. In reading the information contained in the DNA, the protoconsciousness converts that information back into ideas. In other words, protoconsciousness perceives the information by the conversion of a code into an idea; that is, through "the ideation of a code."

Both processes of encoding and ideation can also be seen when man cognizes the external world and engages in practice. When the information coming from the external world reaches the sense organs, it becomes an impulse and goes to the upper nerve center (cerebral cortex), passing through the sensory nerves. This impulse is a type of code, which is converted into ideas in the sensory centers (visual center, auditory center, gustatory center, etc.) in the cerebral cortex and then these ideas are represented in consciousness as images. This is the ideation of a code. In practice, on the other hand, the performance of an action originates in a certain idea and will. Then, the idea turns into an impulse (a code) which passes through the motor nerves to move the muscles (the effector), whereby the action is performed. This is the encoding of an idea.

According to cerebral physiology, when an idea obtained through cognition is stored as memory in a certain part of the brain, it is encoded in a certain mode of neural combination. When it is necessary for the encoded memory to be recalled, the consciousness converts the code, understanding it as an idea. In

other words, it can be said that both encoding and ideation also take place in memory storage and recall. For example, neurophysiologists M.S. Gazzaniga and J.E. LeDoux have put forth a similar conception of neural functioning in memory:

Our experiences are indeed multifaceted, and it is our view that different aspects of experience are differentially stored in the brain.²⁵

We may be faced with the fact that memory storage, encoding, and decoding is a multifaceted process that is multiply represented in the brain.²⁶

Encoding and ideation can be seen as a kind of induction phenomenon arising between the *Sungsang*-like mental coil, which carries the idea, and the *Hyungsang*-like physical coil (the neurons), which carries the code—just as electricity moves between the first and the second coil through induction. The mutual conversion of an idea and a code support the assertion that cognition is carried out through give and receive action between mental and physiological processes.

IX. CRITIQUE OF MARXIST EPISTEMOLOGY

A. Critique of the Theory of Reflection

Marxist epistemology states that cognition is a reflection of the external world upon the mind (consciousness), where mind is either a product or a function of the brain. A critique of the assertion that the mind is a product, or function, of the brain was presented in Chapter 2, Section IV, “Idealism and Materialism.”

Here I will criticize the communist view that consciousness, as a product or function of the brain, reflects the external world, whereby cognition is affected. Is it possible that cognition is affected simply through the reflection of the external world by consciousness?

Even if one were to admit that the external world is reflected in consciousness, Unification epistemology would still insist that no cognition could come about unless the subject of cognition possessed a prototype corresponding to the external world as a criterion or standard of judgment. Nor could cognition come into being unless consciousness had the faculty of collation and judgment.

Furthermore, it is necessary for the subject to be concerned with, or interested in the object, because cognition is affected through the give and receive action between subject and object, and without any interest on the part of the subject, no give and receive action can take place. Therefore, even if an external object is reflected on the consciousness of the subject, no cognition will be realized unless the subject is interested in that object. In other words, it is not true that cognition is realized by a passive material process such as mere reflection; rather, cognition is possible only when active mental processes are involved—such as collation and interest on the part of the subject.

B. Critique of the Marxist View of the Process of Cognition

For Marxist epistemology, the process of cognition develops through three stages, namely, perceptual cognition, rational cognition (or logical cognition) and practice. Rational cognition in Marxism corresponds, roughly, to a combination of the two stages of understanding and reason in Unification Thought.

What is questionable here is this: if consciousness is held to be a product or function of the brain and to reflect objective reality, how can it perform logical cognition (such as abstraction, judgment, and inference) and how can it direct practice? There is a great gap between the passive process of reflecting the external world and the active process of engaging in logical cognition and

practice. Yet, no reasonable explanation is given concerning this logical gap in Marxist theory.²⁷

Seen from Unification Thought, logical cognition and practice are not carried out solely through physiological processes in the brain. Rather, the action of cognition is accomplished through the give and receive action between the mind and the brain. In other words, logical cognition and practice result from the fact that the mind, which of itself is endowed with the faculties of understanding and reason, enters into give and receive action with the brain.

Another point to be examined is the role of practice in cognition. Lenin said that cognition moves on to practice, and Mao Tse-tung emphasized that cognition and practice are inseparable. In this respect, Unification Thought has no objection. All things were created as the object of joy for man, and man is destined to dominate all things according to the purpose of creation. Accordingly, it is for the purpose of joy and dominion that he cognizes all things. Through cognition and practice (dominion), a reciprocal circuit of give and receive action is formed between man and all things (see figure 5.4). No cognition can exist apart from practice, nor practice apart from cognition.




Fig. 5.4. Reciprocity between Cognition and Practice

The kind of practice that Marxist epistemology insists upon is aimed at revolution; in contrast, Unification Thought states that neither cognition nor practice is in any way related to revolution. Rather, they are carried out for the fulfillment of the purpose of creation. The fulfillment of the “purpose of creation” refers to the realization of a world in which the subject loves and pleases the object, and while doing so, is himself pleased. This is a world in which God finds joy in loving the creation (especially human beings), and man finds joy by loving God and other people and by subduing all things with love. Therefore, both cognition and practice should be carried out for the purpose of realizing joy through love, both for oneself and for others.

C. Critique of “Absolute and Relative Truth”

Both Lenin and Mao Tse-tung admitted the existence of absolute truth, saying that one continuously approaches absolute truth through the repetition of cognition and practice. When they refer to absolute truth, however, it is not clear what they mean by “absolute.” For Lenin, absolute truth is the sum total of all relative truths. Nevertheless, no matter how many relative truths are added up, they can only form a conglomerate of relative truths and will never become absolute truth. In order to be absolute, a truth must be eternal and universal; in other words, it must be eternal, universal truth, transcending time and space.

The concept of “absolute” cannot be established, unless the existence of an absolute being is admitted and is given as its criterion. From the Unification Thought standpoint, absolute truth refers to the truth of the Absolute Being, that is, God’s truth (or God’s words). It refers to the teachings of God with regard to His nature, His creation and His providence. Such teachings are conveyed to humankind through particular providential persons. Also, if man unites his heart with God’s heart through a life of

faith, his view of values becomes identical to the view of values centering on God and he can reach absolute truth. Therefore, if someone denies God, he can never reach absolute truth, no matter how much he may practice.

Marxist epistemology criticizes Kantian agnosticism, saying that through practice and experimentation it is possible to cognize the thing-in-itself of existing beings. Unification Thought agrees on this point. Nevertheless, Marxist epistemology does not explain why the thing-in-itself can be cognized through experimentation.

Unification Thought maintains that the cognition of the thing-in-itself through practice or experimentation is possible on the following grounds: the *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* of the subject of cognition (man) and the *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* of the object (all things) form a resemblance; man is the integration of all things and is the lord over them; the thing-in-itself of all beings is none other than their *Sungsang*. Each *Sungsang* manifests itself through its corresponding *Hyungsang* and therefore the *Hyungsang* is a phenomenal form of the *Sungsang*. If it is not philosophically established that man and all things exist in the relationship of subject and object and resemble each other, it cannot be said that man cognizes all things completely—no matter how much he may practice. In this sense, Marxist epistemology is erroneous.

D. Critique of “Necessity and Freedom”

Marxist epistemology asserts that freedom is obtained through complete cognition of the laws of nature and society. With respect to the laws of society (putting aside the laws of nature), it has been traditionally considered that law and freedom are in a contradictory relationship. In other words, it is considered that following the law restricts freedom, and pursuing freedom leads to neglecting the law. Therefore, if it is asserted that the way to gain freedom is to cognize the law, then it must be explained how both positions can stand at the same time. This however is not clarified

in Marxist epistemology. Marxists maintain that they have discovered the laws of society, and have built communist society through revolution in accordance with those laws. And yet, freedom has not been realized in the society they have built— on the contrary, it has become even more restricted.

According to Unification Thought, no freedom is possible apart from God's Principle; in other words, freedom can be realized only through the principle whereby God created man and all things. The Principle refers not only to the laws of the natural world, but also to the ethical laws in human society, and, also, to what has been called the "Heavenly Way" in Oriental thought.

The Principle of God operates on the basis of His love. Whoever lives according to this principle can realize love; in addition, he can also obtain freedom, for the original purpose of freedom is to realize love. Thus if one follows the Principle willingly, freedom to realize love is achieved automatically. Anyone who abandons the Principle (law) and behaves according to his own self-centered desires, will become dissolute and eventually will be destroyed.

According to Unification Thought, God created the universe through Logos which is the union of reason and law centered on Heart. Since reason and law are united and the essence of reason is freedom, then naturally freedom should manifest itself when one follows the law (Principle). Thus, the way to explain how freedom and law can be united is simply to point out that God created the universe through the Logos, which is the unity of reason and law.

MARXIST POLITICAL ECONOMY CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL

Karl Marx, who had completely broken with the Hegelians by criticizing Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, and others in *The German Ideology*, also criticized the French Socialist P.J. Proudhon (1809-65) in *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847).¹ During his stay in Paris, Marx had already started his studies of economics (in other words, his critique of capitalist economy); through the critique of Proudhon, Marx advanced further along in his studies. In 1859, Marx wrote *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. By subsequently writing *Capital*, he finally completed his theory of political economy. (The first volume was published in 1867, and the second and third volumes were published posthumously in 1885 and in 1894, edited by Engels.)

As stated earlier, Marx sought to solve the problem of human alienation through the recovery of man's species-being, and through the realization of freedom. In order for that goal to be achieved, Marx asserted that the system of private property should be negated and the products of labor should be given to the workers. For that purpose, he devoted all of his energy to the overthrow of capitalist society.

In order to overthrow capitalism, it was essential to unite the workers and to mobilize them into revolution. In order to do that, however, he had to establish some reasonable cause. Marx must

have been afraid that if capitalists were to make a conscientious effort to improve working conditions through gradual wage increases and through shortening working hours, the workers might be deceived by such temporary policies and consequently, might refuse to engage in violent revolution. Thus, he felt it necessary to educate workers so that they would carry out the task of revolution without fail, unmoved by any sweet-talk of the capitalists or the government. Accordingly, he felt compelled to find a reason whereby capitalism necessarily had to be overthrown.

This can be compared with the need to establish a set of criteria, recognized by everyone, to determine crime and punishment, before judges are authorized to send criminals to prison. Likewise, before overthrowing capitalist society, it was necessary to find and disclose to everyone the crime committed by capitalists. The fact that capitalists were driving workers too hard or treating them like slaves was not, by itself, reason enough to justify the overthrow of capitalism—even though it might justify reforming capitalism. Bad working conditions could be improved through government regulations and through compassion on the part of capitalists, but Marx wanted to show that such improvements were only temporary and could never lead to the emancipation of the workers. Thus, in order to show that capitalism should be overthrown by all means, Marx set about the task of “discovering” the fundamental crimes and contradictions of capitalism. With that aim in mind, he began his studies in economics.

Finally, Marx publicly announced that he had discovered those fundamental contradictions, which he arranged in the form of a theory of value, which became the core of *Capital*. The Marxist theory of value consists of two parts, namely, the labor theory of value and the theory of surplus value. The main points of these theories will be presented below, followed by a critique and counterproposal to them. Based on his theory of value, Marx presented arguments for his view that the collapse of capitalism was necessary and imminent (one could call his view “the theory of the col-

lapse of capitalism"). A critique of those arguments will be presented at the end of the chapter.

I. THE LABOR THEORY OF VALUE: *CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL*

A. The Labor Theory of Value

In the beginning of volume one of *Capital*, Marx points out that the basic form of wealth in capitalist society consists of commodities, and that the study of capitalist economy begins with an analysis of commodities. Thus, he began by presenting an analysis of the essence of commodities, and, based on that analysis, he developed the labor theory of value.

1. Use Value and "Value" and the Twofold Character of Labor

According to Marx, a commodity possesses "usefulness," which is a quality able to satisfy some human need. The expression of usefulness in terms of value is called "use value." For example, a shirt, a piece of bread and a house have qualities which can satisfy the needs for clothing, food and shelter. These qualities are the use values of the shirt, the piece of bread, and the house. In addition to use value, however, Marx ascribes another type of value to commodities, namely, "exchange value," or simply "value."² The exchange value does not appear in a commodity when it is considered by itself; Marx explains that a commodity assumes exchange value "only when placed in a value or exchange relation with another commodity of a different kind."³

The twofold character of a commodity (namely, use value and value) originates from the twofold character of labor—that is, "concrete labor" (useful labor) and "abstract labor." Concrete labor produces the use value of a commodity. It refers to such kinds

of labor as growing rice, spinning, and chopping wood, whereby specific forms of use value are created. Abstract labor refers to labor in general, that is, it refers to the “productive expenditure of human brains, nerves, and muscles.”⁴ While the use value of a commodity is produced by concrete labor, the “value” of a commodity is produced by abstract labor, as Marx said.⁵

Marx said a commodity, has use value and value (exchange value); that use value expresses the quality of a commodity and cannot be quantitatively compared with another use value. In contrast, since exchange value expresses the quantity of labor contained in a commodity, then one kind of exchange value can be quantitatively compared with another. Marx argued that, from the aspect of exchange value, commodities do not have any use value whatsoever; or, as he put it, commodities “do not contain an atom of usevalue.”⁶ Thus, Marx decided to “leave out of consideration the use-value”⁷ of the product of labor—in other words, to “make abstraction from its use-value.”⁸ Once Marx determined that the essence of the value of a commodity is abstract human labor, he asserted that the value of a commodity is equal to the quantity of labor expended to produce it, and that the amount of labor is determined in terms of labor time. Marx explained this as follows:

A use-value, or useful article, therefore, has value only because human labor in the abstract has been embodied or materialized in it. How, then, is the magnitude of this value to be measured? Plainly, by the quantity of the value-creating substance, the labor, contained in the article. The quantity of labor, however, is measured by its duration, and labor-time in its turn finds its standard in weeks, days, and hours.⁹

In sum, a commodity has use value and value (exchange value), but only “value” is of any importance in the process of exchange. As Marx stated, “value” is determined by the quantity of labor and the quantity of labor is determined by labor time. He said, in conclusion, “As values, all commodities are only definite masses of *congealed* labor-time” (italics added).¹⁰

2. Socially Necessary Labor Time

A question arises here as to whether the value of a commodity would be greater if it were made by an idle or unskilled worker, whose labor time naturally was prolonged. Marx answered that question by stating that the value of a commodity is not formed by the labor of any particular individual, but rather by the labor time needed on the average or socially necessary.¹¹ Marx explained that, “the labor-time socially necessary is that required to produce an article under the normal conditions of production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time.”¹²

This means that, for the whole society, the total labor time required to produce a given commodity, divided by the total amount of that commodity produced, is the “socially necessary labor time.”

3. The Reduction of Complex Labor to Simple Labor

Marx explained that there are two types of labor, namely, “simple labor” and “complex labor” (or “skilled labor”), and that complex labor must be converted into simple labor for purposes of comparison. Marx described simple labor as “the expenditure of simple labor-power, i.e., of the labor-power which, on the average, apart from any special development, exists in the organism of any ordinary individual.”¹³ And he asserted that complex labor “counts only as simple labor intensified, or rather, as multiplied simple labor, a given quantity of [complex labor] being considered equal to a greater quantity of simple labor.”¹⁴

Let us suppose that the labor to produce a radio is simple labor; then the labor to produce a television can be said to be complex labor. Let us further suppose that the degree of skill needed to produce a television is ten times higher than that needed to produce a radio, and that it takes ten hours to produce a radio, and also ten hours to produce a television. Then, the labor to produce

a television would be equivalent to ten times the amount of the labor to produce a radio, that is, to 100 hours of simple labor (see figure 6.1).




Fig. 6.1. Reduction of Complex Labor

4. Price and Value

Marx asserted that the value of a commodity is created by the quantity of labor expended to produce it. This value, he said, manifests itself in the process of exchange, that is, through comparison with other commodities. There was a time when commodities were exchanged directly for other commodities in a barter system. For example, one sheep might be exchanged for two axes. With the development of the social division of labor, the commodities which were most frequently used (e.g., livestock, furs, salt, copper and iron) began to play the role of a “universal equivalent,” the role of the medium of exchange. Eventually, precious metals such as silver and gold were raised to the status of a universal equivalent and began to function as money, which is a special kind of commodity serving as the medium of exchange for all commodities. Later on, gold and silver coins gradually came to

be replaced by copper coins and paper money. As a result, all exchange of commodities was transformed into the circulation of commodities in the form of Commodity-Money-Commodity (C-M-C).¹⁵ Commodities came to be exchanged for a certain amount of money (i.e., the price) and money became the standard of measurement for the values of commodities. Thus, Marx described price as exchange value expressed in money.¹⁶

If it is true, as Marx held, that the price of a commodity is determined by the amount of labor time invested in its production, then it follows that the price of that commodity should always remain the same. And yet, prices are always changing according to the fluctuations of supply and demand; in other words, when demand is greater than supply, the price goes up, and when supply is greater than demand, the price goes down. Marx was aware of that fact, and attempted to defend his theory as follows:

If . . . you analyze the movement of market prices for longer periods, you will find that the fluctuations of market prices, their deviations from values, their ups and downs, paralyze and compensate each other; so that, apart from the effect of monopolies and some other modifications I must now pass by, all descriptions of commodities arc, on the average, sold at their respective *values* or natural prices.¹⁷

What Marx is saying is that the price of a commodity at any given moment may deviate from its value, but that over a long period of time, the average price of that commodity coincides with its “value.” Marx referred to this phenomenon as “the law of value,” which operates like a law of nature (see figure 6.2).¹⁸

B. Critique of the Labor Theory of Value

1. Is the Value of a Commodity Created by the Quantity of Labor?

According to Marx, a commodity possesses use value and value (exchange value). This, however, strictly speaking, is illogical. Actually, what he should have said is that a commodity has

use value and exchange value. This conceals his intention to assert that the value of a commodity is the exchange value, determined by the quantity of labor, neglecting use value. Is it the case, though, that the value (exchange value) of a commodity is determined by the quantity of labor invested to produce it, as Marx asserted? A critique of this point follows.




Fig. 6.2. The Fluctuation of Price Centering on Value

First, according to Marx, an article comes to have value as a commodity after labor has been invested in it; in reality, however, there are many commodities which can hardly be said to include human labor. This is the case, for instance, of natural things such as diamonds, coal, oil, natural gas and fish. If it is true, as the labor theory of value claims, that the value of a commodity is created by the quantity of labor invested in it, then, what type of labor made these natural things into commodities?

One might think that the labor invested in these commodities is that of mining, fishing, and transporting. Let us consider the case of oil and natural gas. Once they have been extracted, all that remains to be done is to transport them. (Besides, the extraction of oil and gas today is carried out mainly by machinery, and the participation of labor is very small.) Accordingly, one would have to

say that oil and natural gas become commodities only by being transported. Nevertheless, Marx asserted that essentially the labor of transportation does not create value.¹⁹ In addition, in the case being considered here, the transportation of oil and natural gas is not carried out by human labor, but rather by tankers and pipelines, and the part played by human labor is proportionately very small. Therefore, in the case of oil and natural gas, one cannot say that what made them into commodities was the amount of labor invested in them.

Really, then, how do oil and natural gas come to possess value as commodities? Here we should keep in mind the natural processes which occurred before these products are extracted and transported. One can suppose that the value which they possess and which can turn them into commodities was created by natural forces. In fact, Marx himself had to acknowledge that natural processes are part of the process of production, which he explained as follows:

The process of production may itself be responsible for interruptions of the labor-process, and hence of the labor-time—intervals during which the subject of labor is exposed to the action of physical processes [natural processes] without the further intervention of human labor. . . . This applies, for instance, to the grain, after it has been sown, the wine fermenting in the cellar, the labor-material of many factories, such as tanneries, where the material is exposed to the action of chemical processes.²⁰

If Marx is ready to acknowledge that natural processes can be active in the process of production during certain intervals, there is no reason why he should not acknowledge also that natural processes can be active during the entire process of production. Accordingly, it can be said that oil and natural gas, even without any labor added to them, already possess the value which can make them into commodities (that is, the element of exchange value), and that value is caused by natural forces.

The same can be said with regard to diamonds, coal and fish. These products need to be mined or caught by miners or fishermen, but it is not true that their value is realized by adding that kind of labor to them; rather, they already possess the value which can turn them into commodities, and that value is created by natural forces. This is why people go out to mine and to fish. The labor of miners and fishermen is only a supplement to the process of production, playing the role of complementing the value which exists beforehand as potential.

Second, there are commodities such as commemorative stamps, antiques, wine, and works of art which increase in value as time goes on, coming to cost up to hundreds or thousands of times more than their initial value at the time of production. These cases, also, cannot be explained by the labor theory of value. Marxists may attempt to explain this by saying that what produced the increase in value was the cost of the items of equipment involved in storage, as well as the labor necessary for storage. That kind of cost and that kind of labor, however, is unproductive (according to Marx), and does not create value.²¹ Accordingly, even from Marx's own point of view, these commodities increase in value independently of the cost of storage. In fact, the reason the value of such commodities increases is that their rarity increases as time goes on.

Third, ideas, information, knowledge, etc. are dealt with today as expensive commodities;²² and yet they cannot be measured in terms of labor quantity. This also applies to such things as tickets for concerts, public lectures, and the like.

Accordingly, there are too many commodities which cannot adequately be explained by the labor theory of value. Why, then, did Marx insist that every commodity, without exception, contains labor? The reason was that, by doing so, he could state that the values of all commodities are produced only by laborers, whereby he could create the crimes of the capitalists, and by doing so, he could rationalize his theory of violent revolution. To acknowledge

that some commodities exist without containing any labor would destroy his theory that the value of a commodity is determined by the quantity of labor. It would logically follow that it is possible for capitalists to obtain profit by means of commodities without exploiting workers. In that case, the Marxist theory of violent revolution would lose ground.

Furthermore, another contradiction in Marx's assertion that the essence of the value of a commodity is determined by the quantity of labor contained in it is disclosed in the following. He asserted that an article does not become a commodity simply by containing labor; it must also have use value. He said that "nothing can have value, without being an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labor contained in it; the labor does not count as labor, and therefore creates no value."²³ This statement is equivalent to the assertion that the essence of the value of a commodity is actually its use value. If it is correct to say that "if a thing is useless, then the labor contained in it creates no value," then it should be correct, also, to say that "if a thing is not very useful, then the labor contained in it is also not very useful, and therefore it does not create very much value."²⁴ From this it should follow that the value of a commodity is determined by its use value, or utility.

Nevertheless, Marx never openly admitted that use value is the essence of the value of a commodity; rather, he obstinately insisted that only labor creates value. This is a clear case of deception. His reason for setting up the labor theory of value as the basis for his economic system, and for asserting that the essence of the value of a commodity consists of nothing but labor, was simply to convince the masses of the necessity of revolution, and every time his theory conflicted with reality, he only covered up the difficulty with ad hoc arguments. Thus, under the pretense of clarifying questions which the people might have, he used such expressions as "nothing can have value without being an object of utility," or "if the thing is useless, the labor contained in it creates no value," and the like. By doing so he managed to avoid having

to acknowledge that the essence of the value of a commodity is its use value. Clearly, Marx's labor theory of value contains deception and trickery.

Robert Owen's "Labor Exchange Bank" stands as an historical example of an attempt to implement the exchange of commodities on the basis of the premise that the value of a commodity is identical to the quantity of labor invested in it, measured in units of labor time. In his bank, commodities were exchanged through the medium of labor notes, which were the measure of labor time or working hours. Soon, the commodities which had greater usefulness were gone, whereas the useless or old-fashioned commodities remained behind. A year and a half later, Owen's bank closed, and his attempt ended in complete failure.²⁵ Similarly, in socialist economies today, especially in the Soviet Union, the accumulation of unmarketable, low-quality commodities (in which a lot of labor may have been invested) has become a serious problem. Examples such as these illustrate the false ness of the labor theory of value, or the theory that the value of a commodity is equal to the quantity of labor contained in it.

2. Critique of Socially Necessary Labor Time and Reduction of Complex Labor

According to Marx, in the production of a commodity, the total labor time (necessary in a society) divided by the total number of units (produced in a society) is the socially necessary labor time, which is equal to the value of the commodity. This, however, is a dogmatic assertion, because it is a well-known fact that if a commodity is produced under excellent conditions of production, its value can be high even though the labor time required to produce it is short; and that if a commodity is produced under bad conditions, its value is often low, even though the labor time necessary to produce it is long. Therefore, it makes no sense to regard that average as the value of the commodity. This, actually, is an abuse

of the concept of average, as pointed out by Böhm-Bawerk (more about this point later).

Marx stated that complex labor must be converted into simple labor, but he established no standard with which to determine the degree of skill of a specific type of labor producing a commodity. He described the reduction process as follows:

The different proportions in which different sorts of labor are reduced to unskilled labor as their standard, are established by a *social process* that goes on behind the backs of the producers, and, consequently, appear to be fixed by custom.²⁶ (italics added)

Engels, also, offered an explanation of the reduction process, saying,

This reduction of compound labor is established by a *social process* which goes on behind the backs of the producers, by a process which at this point, in the development of the theory of value, can only be stated but not as yet explained.²⁷ (italics added)

When giving these explanations, both Marx and Engels sound uncertain. What they mean by “reduction is established by a certain process which goes on behind the backs of producers” is simply that the reduction is carried out when commodities are exchanged at a certain rate in the market place. That the reduction is carried out when commodities are exchanged in the market place implies that the quantity of complex labor (as reduced into simple labor) is determined through the process of exchange; is determined by the price of the commodity.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the basic tenet of the labor theory of value is that the value (or price) of a commodity is determined by the quantity of labor contained in it, and that happens before the commodity goes out to the Market. Accordingly, the value of any commodity is determined before it is exchanged in the market place. The theory of the reduction of complex labor, however, claims that the value of a commodity is determined in the market place through the process of exchange. But this is a fal-

lacious “circular argument,”²⁸ because on the one hand, it is saying that the value of a commodity (the price) is determined by the quantity of labor, and on the other hand, that the value of a commodity (price) determines the quantity of labor.

With regard to the calculation of the socially necessary labor time, a Soviet textbook on political economy states the following:

The present level of development of mathematics and electronic computers under planned socialist economy has made it possible to accomplish as accurately as possible the calculation of social labor, not only concerning value but also directly in labor time.²⁹

Nevertheless, it also says,

In order to solve this complicated problem, we need to exercise our ingenuity further with regard to the method to calculate the gross expenditure of labor for the production of the commodities in our economy. As for the reduction of complex labor to simple labor, one may be able to use the experience in the system of wage rates, which regulates the relations of payment for the labor of various technical levels.³⁰

This is a frank admission that there is a continuing difficulty in calculating the socially necessary labor time, even with the assistance of electronic computers.³¹

During Marx’s time, it must have been even more difficult to calculate the socially necessary labor time. And yet, Marx positively stated that the value of a commodity is determined by the socially necessary labor time. This view is obviously false. It is not at all true that the value of a commodity is determined by labor time; therefore, the socially necessary labor time is only a fabricated notion. Accordingly, no matter how much the electronic computer may be developed, the calculation of the socially necessary labor time remains absolutely impossible.

3. Critique of Value and Price

Marx said that the price is a monetary expression of the exchange value (the quantity of labor) of a commodity. And yet, as mentioned before, there are many examples of commodities

which have little to do with labor power, such as natural resources, which become commodities through mining or fishing, but are not produced by any kind of labor; those commodities whose value increases through storage, without any application of labor to them; and commodities such as knowledge and technique, which clearly are not related to labor power. The price of such commodities can never be determined by the standard of the quantity of labor.

Another example is the phenomenon (which occurs frequently in socialist economies) that commodities are found to be of inferior quality, or are not accepted as commodities because they do not suit the taste of consumers, regardless of how great an amount of labor may have been expended in their production. In order to sell them, their prices must be lowered, or since there is no freedom of choice, consumers are compelled to buy them at fixed prices (which are not determined by the quantity of labor contained in them). Thus, the assertion that the price of a commodity is equal to the quantity of labor invested in it in no way conforms to facts.

Marx said that, though prices may fluctuate, nevertheless, on the average, commodities are sold at their natural price (the monetary expression of value). Still, the phenomenon of prices fluctuating up and down centering on a given line, existed only in the age of *laissez-faire* economies. The general tendency today is for prices to rise constantly. Moreover, prices are influenced by supply, demand, controls, planning, agreements, monopolization, and so on. Accordingly, differently from what Marx asserted, the prices of a commodity are not attracted to their "natural prices."

Marx also said that, although there may be some cases in which individual commodities are sold above or below their value, nevertheless, if the commodities of all the branches of production are taken into account, "the sum of the prices of production of all commodities produced in society . . . is equal to the sum of their values."³² In other words, the case exists in which the "law of val-

ue”—that is, the law which says that commodities are produced and exchanged in accordance with the quantity of socially necessary labor expended in making them—does not apply to individual commodities; rather, “the general law acts as the prevailing tendency only . . . [as an] average of ceaseless fluctuations.”³³ This, however, is a groundless assertion—as Böhm-Bawerk criticized it, calling it “the abuse of the concept of average.”³⁴

Furthermore, Marx admitted in the ninth chapter of the third volume of *Capital*, that commodities are exchanged in the market according to “prices of production” determined by the supply/demand relationship. This, however, is a frank admission that commodities are in fact not exchanged according to the “value” indicated in terms of the socially necessary labor time. In other words, Marx himself implicitly admitted that the “law of value” does not apply to reality.³⁵

In the face of so many contradictions in the labor theory of value, what was Marx's reason for asserting that the price of a commodity is a monetary expression of the quantity of labor contained in it? His reason for doing so was that he wanted to rationalize, by any means, the idea that all commodities are crystallizations of the laborers' blood and sweat, and that capitalists contribute nothing to the production of commodities. From that it would follow that any profit obtained from selling commodities should be returned to the workers. Since, however, profit is being appropriated by

capitalists, one should conclude that capitalist society must be overthrown. In sum, the reason why Marx insisted to the end that the price of a commodity is the monetary expression of the quantity of labor is that he wanted to justify violent revolution.

C. The Effect Theory of Value:

A Counterproposal to the Labor Theory of Value

1. *Buying and Selling in the Original Society*

A new theory of value put forward by Unification Thought, as a means of searching for a proper axiology, starts from an inquiry into how buying and selling should have been conducted in the original society, rather than in actual fallen society.

Since man is the unity of spirit and flesh—in other words, the unity of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*, according to Unification Thought—he has the desire for *Sung Sang* values and the desire for *Hyung Sang* values; in other words, he has *Sung Sang* desires and *Hyung Sang* desires. The *Sung Sang* values refer to the values of truth, goodness, and beauty; and the *Hyung Sang* values refer to material values, namely, food, clothing and shelter. The value of commodities is primarily concerned with the latter kind of value.

The desire for values contains two aspects, i.e., “the desire to realize values” and “the desire to pursue values.” The desire to realize values is oriented to “the purpose for the whole,” whereas the desire to pursue values is oriented to “the purpose for the individual.” The purpose for the whole refers to the willingness to contribute toward development or the realization of the welfare of other people, or the larger whole, such as society, the nation, the world and humankind. And the purpose for the individual refers to the pursuit of one's own growth and happiness. The way which is in accordance with the Principle, or the original way, dictates that the purpose for the whole is primary and the purpose for the individual is secondary. Accordingly, the Principle puts the desire to realize values in first place, and the desire to pursue values in second place. Now, the values of commodities will be considered from this original standpoint.

Producers produce the values of commodities, in other words, use values, for consumers. That is an activity of creation based on

their desire to realize value. Producers also try to acquire profit by selling commodities for their own benefit based on their desire to pursue value. Therefore, producers try to pursue profit, while pleasing consumers, by producing commodities with as much utility as possible. Consumers, also, act on the basis of their desire to pursue and to realize value. In other words, consumers, on the basis of their desire to realize value, appreciate the fact that producers create value, and reward producers for that, while pursuing the utility of commodities for their own benefit, on the basis of their desire to pursue value.

In fallen society, however, producers think mainly of pursuing profit rather than thinking of pleasing consumers and consumers think mainly of pursuing the utility of commodities rather than thinking of appreciating and rewarding producers. As a result, a variety of problems arises.

2. The Value of a Commodity

Commodities which are the necessities of life or the means of life have the nature of satisfying the desires of both consumers and producers. Consumers desire the values of the necessities of life, such as food, clothing and shelter—in other words, they desire the utility of commodities. Producers desire profit. In a commodity, the quality that satisfies the desire of the consumer is called “utility,” and the quality that satisfies the desire of the producer is called “profitability.”

A thing can be regarded as a commodity only when it has the two qualities of utility and profitability. If it does not have these two properties, it cannot be either sold or purchased. In fact, free goods such as air and sunlight, whose utility is great, but which have no profitability, cannot be regarded as commodities. Also, such things as do not meet the tastes of the consumer, or things without utility, cannot be regarded as commodities either, no matter how much the producers may want to sell them for profit.

What is it, then, that gives a commodity utility and profitability? It is its usefulness, that is, its quality of being able to satisfy human desires. This is an objective quality which is independent of the subjectivity of individual persons. The use value of a commodity is its usefulness. Usefulness is an objective quality, whereas utility and profitability are subjective qualities. This means that when a consumer looks at a commodity that contains usefulness (use value), the usefulness appears to him as utility; and when a producer looks at the same commodity, the same usefulness appears as profitability.

For example, bread has a quality which can satisfy the desire for food. That quality never changes, and it does not depend on individual preferences, time, or place. This is the usefulness, or use value, of bread. But, given two individuals, one of whom likes bread and the other rice, and supposing each is given a piece of bread, the feeling of satisfaction they would obtain would be different, in other words, the utility of bread would be different. Even with the same consumer, the feeling of satisfaction that he gets when he is hungry is not the same as the feeling that he gets when he is full. The feeling of satisfaction which a consumer obtains when he receives a piece of bread also differs according to the amount of bread that he has before receiving it. Thus, utility is the subjective value which the commodity gives to the consumer.³⁶

The same can be said of producers. Different producers producing the same kind of commodity with the same degree of usefulness derive different feelings of satisfaction from them. The feeling of satisfaction a producer obtains from the same commodity differs depending on business fluctuations and on the quantity of commodities already existing in the market and so on.

3. *The Dual Characteristics of a Commodity and of Labor*

Seen from Unification Thought, a commodity is an individual truth body with the dual characteristics of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*. The *Sungsang* characteristic refers to its invisible, internal function, nature, etc. The *Hyungsang* characteristic refers to its visible, external structure, shape, form, material quality, weight, etc. The *Sungsang* of a commodity is its use value; and the *Hyungsang* is its physical part, such as its shape and structure, the carrier of use value.

But Marx said that in a commodity, there is exchange value (the quantity of labor) in addition to use value. However, once labor power is invested in the production of commodities, it is transformed into their function (that is, their *Sungsang*) on one hand and into their shape and structure (their *Hyungsang*) on the other.

Marx's assertion that a quantity of labor is congealed and preserved within a commodity is false. An analogy of this is the case of the electromagnetic wave sent from a broadcasting station. Once the wave enters the radio, it is transformed into sound waves. It would be totally false to think that the electromagnetic wave is preserved as it is within the radio even after having been transformed into sound waves. Likewise, once a commodity is produced through labor, in other words, once the labor is transformed into the *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* of the commodity, it would be false to think that quantities of labor are preserved within the commodity. Actually, neither within the *Sungsang* nor within the *Hyungsang* is there to be found any element which would indicate the presence of any quantity of *congealed* labor.

Furthermore, Marx contended that the use value and the value (exchange value) of a commodity are based on the twofold character of labor, which he called useful labor (or concrete labor) and abstract human labor. Seen from the Unification Thought standpoint, however, it is not correct to say that there are two kinds of

labor; rather, there are two aspects in labor: technique, or creativity, the *Sungsang* of labor; and physical power, the *Hyungsang* of labor. The two aspects function in unity, in the form of creative or technical power and can never be separated from one another. In other words, every form of labor power is creative, technical power. Therefore, through creative, technical power, human beings can produce commodities with the dual characteristics of *Sungsang* (function) and *Hyungsang* (shape and structure).

With regard to the “value” of a commodity, Marx said that it is formed through abstract labor, which he described as the expenditure of physical, bodily power. Such bodily power, however, represents only the *Hyungsang* aspect of labor, and it is only a means for the realization of human creativity. Therefore, whether the quantity of labor be great or small, or whether labor time be long or short, the essential point is only that the creativity of labor (its *Sungsang*) is manifested and produces a commodity which has use value.

Marx’s mistake was to consider only the *Hyungsang* aspect of labor (which is only a means) and to assert that labor is *congealed* within the commodity.

4. *The Essence of Exchange Value*

In order for commodities to be bought and sold, their values must be compared quantitatively. A question arises here concerning the value (of the commodities) which can be expressed in quantity, in other words, the question concerning exchange value.

Marx excluded use value (usefulness), on the grounds that they cannot be compared quantitatively. He proposed instead the quantity of labor (i.e., labor time) as a basis for comparing the values of Commodities, asserting that this is the essence of exchange value. As seen earlier, however — mostly from the fact that there are commodities that contain no human labor — it is clear that it is wrong to assert that the quantity of labor is the exchange value of a commodity. Then, what is the essence of exchange value? Ex-

change value is something actual, something determined on the spot, at the moment when commodities are bought and sold in the market place. Accordingly, in determining exchange value, one must deal with this actual aspect of the value of a commodity. In other words, one must deal with the nature of value right on the spot where commodities are bought and sold.

The value that a commodity possesses objectively is only use value (usefulness), as already discussed. Use value itself cannot be measured in terms of quantity. But, since commodities are exchanged on the basis of use value (in other words, without use value no exchange could take place), use value serves as the basis for exchange value. Then, in what way is use value connected with a quantitative comparison? To answer this question, it is sufficient to deal with the degrees, or amounts, of satisfaction which the use value of a commodity gives the producer and the consumer, or the seller and the buyer.

Consider the case where two men, X and Y, exchange commodities. X possesses 20 lbs of rice, and Y a pair of shoes. X compares the amount of satisfaction which he would obtain from the use value of the 20 lbs of rice, if he were to keep them, with the amount of satisfaction that he might obtain from the use value of the pair of shoes. If the use value of these shoes gives him greater satisfaction than the use value of the rice, then he expresses a desire to exchange his rice for the pair of shoes. Likewise, Y also compares the amount of satisfaction which he would obtain from keeping the pair of shoes with the satisfaction he might obtain from the 20 lbs of rice. If he sees that the latter is greater, then he accepts the offer of exchange. If he feels that the satisfaction he receives from the 20 lbs of rice is not enough, he may either refuse the exchange altogether, or he might ask for something more, such as an additional 5 lbs of rice. And if he receives what he asks for, the exchange takes place.

Accordingly, the exchange can take place when both X and Y feel that the amount of satisfaction which they can obtain from

acquiring through exchange what is in the other person's possession is greater (or at least not smaller) than the satisfaction which they would obtain if they kept what they have. The fact that the exchange takes place at an agreed-upon ratio means that exchange values for the two things have been determined. Therefore, it is possible to compare the satisfaction effect that one can obtain from the use values of commodities.

This example refers to barter, but if the thing which either X or Y possesses happens to be money, then the exchange becomes one of buying and selling, which, in principle, function in the same way. In other words, the consumer and the producer engaged in buying and selling are comparing the amount of satisfaction they could obtain from the use value of a commodity with the amount of satisfaction they could obtain from a certain amount of money.

As noted earlier, the producer possesses a desire for profit, and the consumer possesses a desire for the utility of a commodity. The use value of a commodity can satisfy these desires by giving a certain amount of satisfaction to both of them. The amount of satisfaction which the use value of a commodity gives to a producer is called the "amount of profitability effect";³⁷ and the degree of satisfaction which the commodity gives the consumer is called the "amount of utility effect." Since satisfaction is a psychological effect that arises on the basis of use value, the amount of satisfaction can be expressed as the amount of psychological effect, or simply, the amount of effect.³⁸

On the basis of the amount of profitability effect and the amount of utility effect, the producer and the consumer sell and buy a commodity for a certain amount of money. In conclusion, the essence of exchange value is not the quantity of labor, but the amount of psychological satisfaction, or the amount of psychological effect.

5. The Determination of Exchange Value

The amount of profitability effect for the producer, and the amount of utility effect for the consumer are both subjective psychological quantities. This subjective quantity, however, must be determined objectively as an exchange value in the market place. Then, how is it determined objectively?

Even though the amount of satisfaction cannot be known to others, the producer and the consumer themselves know that amount of satisfaction, and it can be expressed monetarily. In social life, for instance, often people offer money as a reward for services received from other people by indicating the amount of their gratitude (which is a subjective quantity) with a sum of money. Likewise, the amount of profitability effect and the amount of utility effect, which are psychological amounts, can be expressed with an amount of money.³⁹ However, the monetary expressions on the part of the producer (or seller), and that on the part of the consumer, do not necessarily coincide. Then, how can the two of them come to an agreement? An adjustment of the monetary expressions on both sides becomes necessary as shown below.

Suppose a producer and a consumer are engaged in buying and selling a commodity. Suppose that the monetary expression of the amount of profitability effect which the commodity is expected to give the producer (namely, the "expected amount of profitability effect") is \$15, and the monetary expression of the amount of utility effect which the commodity is expected to give to the consumer (namely, the "expected amount of utility effect") is \$11. In that case, no exchange will take place unless an adjustment of the monetary expressions is made. The monetary expression of a certain amount of satisfaction can be changed by the will (or the desire) of the producer or the consumer. Generally speaking, the producer tries to make his monetary expression as large as possible, while the consumer tends to make his expression as

small as possible. The producer makes his expression on the basis of his desire for profit, which is his purpose for the individual; whereas the consumer does so on the basis of his desire for possession, his purpose for the individual.

This tendency, however, is not necessarily present in all cases. It may vary according to religious and moral motives, and according to the environmental circumstances of either or both parties. There may even be cases where the producer makes his monetary expression smaller and the consumer makes his monetary expressions greater. (Religious and moral motives refer to the purpose of the whole, whereby the producer is willing to please the consumer, and the consumer is willing to express thanks to the producer.) In fallen society, however, centering on the purpose for the individual, generally the producer tries to make his monetary expression as high as possible, whereas the consumer tries to make his monetary expression as low as possible.

Thus, the monetary expressions will eventually come to coincide, either by one side agreeing with the other, or through concessions by both sides. In the example above, the producer and the consumer may yield to each other, agreeing on the price of \$13. When that happens, the amount of satisfaction (the amount of effect) corresponding to this price is the exchange value. In other words, the amount of satisfaction for the producer is the exchange value as seen by the producer; and the amount of satisfaction for the consumer is the exchange value as seen by the consumer. Of course, the amount of satisfaction corresponding to the price may not really be the same for both parties; what is the same is only the monetary expression of those amounts. This theory of exchange value is called the "effect theory of value."

Accordingly, price is determined by an interaction between the producer and the consumer whereby they adjust the monetary expressions of their amounts of satisfaction. Of course, this principle applies when a seller and a buyer determine the price together. What about the cases where the market price is already

fixed? Does the same principle of price determination apply to those cases also? Yes, it does. The producer will produce a commodity when its market price meets the amount of profitability effect he expects, and the consumer will buy a commodity when its market price meets the amount of utility effect he expects. Therefore, this principle holds true even when the market price is fixed.

This principle remains unchanged under any circumstances. In a socialist society, the state (the communist party) determines unilaterally the monetary expression, or the price, based on the amount of satisfaction of the producer, namely, the state. Even in this case however, the consumers will not buy commodities if they feel that the commodities do not meet their expected satisfaction. Nevertheless, there can also be cases where consumers are forced to raise the monetary expression of the amount of utility effect, and to buy commodities at a fixed price, because there are no other commodities available due to the controlled price system — even if the quality is bad and the prices high. Therefore, the law of determination of value — the price of a commodity is determined through the common expression of the amount of utility effect and the amount of profitability effect—holds true as it is, even in socialist society.

Marketing today is becoming an increasingly complex process. Producers and- consumers seldom meet face to face. Upon leaving the hands of the producers, commodities go through several stages of middlemen, until they reach the consumers. But even here, this method of price determination holds true at each stage of the marketing process. In the case where the buyer is a merchant, his amount of satisfaction is still the amount of effect based on the use value of the commodity. His amount of satisfaction, however, different from the case where the buyer is a consumer, is not directly based on the utility of the commodity, but rather the anticipation of profit which he hopes to gain in the next stage of transaction.

The determination price is illustrated in figure 6.3. First, the producer and the consumer expect the effect (the feeling of satisfaction) of profitability and of utility on the basis of the use value of the commodity. Then, they compare the expected amount of effect by expressing it in money. When their monetary expressions disagree, they adjust those expressions until they do agree, and then the agreed-upon expression becomes the price.⁴⁰ What constitutes the exchange value of a commodity is the “expected amount of effect” indicated by the price.




Fig. 6.3. The Determination of the Price of a Commodity

6. Foundations for the Effect Theory of Value

Marx developed the labor theory of value by applying materialist dialectic to economy whereby he asserted that development can occur only through the struggle of opposites. Thus, he dealt with such things as use value and exchange value, concrete labor and abstract labor, wages and profit, production and marketing, commodities and money, workers and capitalists, and so forth—all of which were considered to be in a relationship of opposition, or contradiction.⁴¹ Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that Marx's economic theory of value is materialist dialectic clothed in a garment of economics.

Accordingly, in order to overcome Marx's theory of value at its roots, one must make use of a new philosophy which can cope with materialist dialectic. If one merely criticizes the labor theory of value without overcoming Marx's philosophy (materialist dialectic), one will be able to inflict wounds on the labor theory of value, but not to deal it a fatal blow. The effect theory of value presented here as a counterproposal to the labor theory of value is an application to the theory of value of Unification Thought, which is a philosophical development of the Unification Principle.

The foundations for this theory are based on the Principle of Creation and can be summarized as follows: All beings are mutually connected with one another, each having a dual purpose, namely, a purpose for the individual and a purpose for the whole; the purpose of the creation of the universe is the realization of joy; when a human subject enters into a mutual relationship with an object, which has a certain purpose of creation, the value of that object becomes determined; when a subject enters into a mutual relationship with an object which resembles its own *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*, then there arises joy in the subject; all things have been created as objects of joy for man; when a subject and an object are engaged in harmonious give and receive action centering on a purpose, a united body, or a new body, arises; and so on.

When applied to economics, the concept of “object” is replaced by that of “commodity.” Through this application, the following points have been derived: both producers and consumers engage in economic activities, centering on the purpose for the whole (the desire to realize values), but more directly according to the purpose for the individual (the desire to pursue values); the value of a commodity is determined in the mutual interaction between the producer and the commodity, between the consumer and the commodity, and between the producer and the consumer; the purpose in determining value is the satisfaction, or joy, of both the producer and the consumer; the exchange value of a commodity is the amount of satisfaction, or joy (that is, the amount of utility effect and profitability effect) whose monetary expression is price; and so on. This is the core of the effect theory of value.

II. THEORIES OF VALUE IN ECONOMICS AND UNIFICATION THOUGHT

A. History of the Theory of Value

In the previous section, Marx's theory of value was criticized and a counterproposal to it was presented: the effect theory of value, based on Unification Thought. By examining the history of the theory of value in economics, we will be able to understand the historical significance of the labor theory of value and of the effect theory of value. Therefore, I will present the main points of representative theories of value, from Adam Smith up to the present time.

1. Adam Smith

Adam Smith (1723-90), who is regarded as the most significant representative of classical economics, advocated the “labor-input” theory of value, according to which the value of a commodity is

determined by the amount of labor required to produce it. He also advocated the “command-over-labor” theory, according to which the value of a commodity is measured by the quantity of labor which one can buy or control with that commodity. The command-over-labor theory asserts that the sum of the natural rates of wage, profit, and rent is the value (natural price) of a commodity. This theory was passed down to T.R. Malthus (1776-1834), and was systematized by J. S. Mill (1803-73) as the theory of the cost of production. The labor-input theory was inherited by Ricardo and opened the way for Marx’s labor theory of value.

2. Ricardo

David Ricardo (1772-1823) excluded rent from Smith’s theory of value, arguing that rent cannot be considered a constituent of price since low-grade land does not require any rent. With regard to profit — or the reward for the service of capital — he ignored the change in value due to profit, based on his view that the ratio of profit is small in the cost of production. He maintained the labor theory of value, which says that the value of a commodity (the exchange value) is for the most part determined by the quantity of labor invested in it.

3. Marx

With his labor theory of value, Karl Marx (1818-83) took Ricardo’s labor theory of value to its extreme. He asserted that only labor produces value, and argued that the value (the exchange value) of a commodity is determined by the labor time required to produce it (the socially necessary labor time).

Smith, Ricardo and Marx put forward a theory of value centering on the producer. It should be clarified here that the labor theory of value proposed by Smith and developed by Ricardo explained objectively the economy of early capitalism, whereas Marx’s labor theory of value justified revolution in the guise of an objective analysis of capitalist economy. Thus, Marx’s theory con-

tains such tactics as the abuse and fabrication of concepts. This is the reason why Marx's labor theory of value, in particular, should be criticized and overcome.

4. Jevons

William Stanley Jevons (1835-82), a British economist, asserted that the "degree of the utility," which is the utility of an additional unit of a commodity, decreases according to the increase of the quantity of commodities consumed. He held that what determines value is the final degree of utility, that is, the degree of utility obtained from the last additional unit of a commodity. Based on his theory of utility, Jevons developed his theory of exchange. He presented the following proposition for the determination of the exchange value of goods: "The ratio of exchange of any two commodities will be the reciprocal of the ratio of the final degrees of utility of the quantities of commodity available for consumption after the exchange is completed."⁴² This means that each person continues exchanging until the ratio of the marginal utility of the respective commodities becomes equal to the price ratio. In other words, it means that the commodity price comes to stay at the level which corresponds to the marginal utility.

5. Menger

Carl Menger (1840-1921) of Austria said that value is something meaningful which goods possess when they satisfy human needs. Like Jevons, he argued that as the amount of goods increases, their subjective value (utility) decreases. Since the units of commodities are identical among themselves (that is, they are interchangeable), then the value of a commodity is equal to the use value of the last and least important unit. This was later called "marginal utility" by F. von Wieser (1851-1926), one of his followers.

6. Walras

Léon Walras (1834-4910) of France, emphasized the importance of determining the degree of satisfaction obtained from the last commodity consumed, and referred to that satisfaction as “rarity” (*rareté*). This corresponds to Jevons’s “degree of utility” and Menger’s and Wieser’s “marginal utility.” He made it clear that the condition for maximum utility (or satisfaction) for the consumer is that the ratio between the rarity (or marginal utility) of the two commodities should become equal to that between their prices. He also said that a consumer behaves in such a way as to maximize utility, whereas an enterprise behaves in such a way as to maximize profit and minimize the cost of production; and that there would thus be an equilibrium of supply and demand between the consumer and the producer. (This is known as the theory of general equilibrium.)

Jevons, Menger and Walras developed new theories of value based on the theory of marginal utility in about the same period of time and have, therefore, come to be called the trio of marginal utility revolution. It was their idea of marginal utility which shed light on Adam Smith’s so-called

paradox of value—the question as to why the exchange value (the market price) of diamonds whose utility (or use value) , is small, is high when compared with water, whose utility is great.

7. Böhm-Bawerk

Eugene von Böhm-Bawerk (1851-1914) further developed Menger’s theory of marginal utility, and, together with Wieser, formed the Austrian School. He argued that a commodity contains use value, which is subjective, and exchange value, which is objective. Use value is also called utility, and is described as the degree to which a commodity serves to satisfy the wants of the subject, and varies from person to person, and according to time and place. Böhm-Bawerk said that, as the quantity of goods increases, the in-

crement of utility (marginal utility) gradually decreases, and the marginal utility determines economic activity.

According to Böhm-Bawerk, when people engage in the exchange of commodities, they do so by comparing their marginal utilities. That is how the exchange rate between two commodities, that is, their exchange value, is determined. This is the “objective value” of a commodity. The “subjective value” (use value) is the cause of the objective value, and price is derived from objective value. Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of value is also a theory of marginal utility. The theory of marginal utility as developed by Jevons, Menger, Walras and Böhm-Bawerk is a theory of value centered on the consumer, which holds that the value of a commodity is determined by its marginal utility viewed by the consumer.

8. Marshall

Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) said that the theory of utility and the theory of cost of production play a complementary role. He argued that it would be fruitless to ask whether value is determined by utility or by the cost of production, because it would be like inquiring whether it is the upper blade or the lower blade of a pair of scissors that cuts a sheet of paper. He adopted the theory of marginal utility for the temporary equilibrium established in the market place, holding that utility exerts an immediate influence on price. For a long-term point of view, he adopted the theory of the cost of production, holding that price has to be something that recovers the marginal cost of production — that is, the additional cost required to produce an additional unit; he concluded therefore, that the cost of production controls price. Accordingly, Marshall took an intermediary position between the two theories.

9. Hicks

John Richard Hicks (1904-) of the Keynesian school, developed Walras’s theory of general equilibrium. He argues that consumers behave in such a way that the index of utility — something in which only the relationship of great and small in utility has mean-

ing and which does not call into question the quantitative measurability of utility — may be maximized, and producers behave in such a way that the profit may be maximized. As a result, supply and demand ultimately become equal for all goods under a certain price system, and an equilibrium is established in all markets.

B. Traditional Views of Value Seen From Unification Thought

Looking back at the history of the theory of value in economics since Adam Smith, traditional theories of value up until the theory of general equilibrium were unilaterally centered either on producers (with such theories as the theory of the cost of production and the labor theory of value) or on consumers (with the theory of utility, or the theory of marginal utility)—or else they were a compromise between the two theories as in the case of Marshall. All of them, however, have grasped only one aspect of the determination of value, under certain limited conditions.

Next emerged the theory of general equilibrium, which looked at price fluctuation from the viewpoint that the consumer behaves so as to maximize utility, whereas the producer behaves so as to maximize profit. This theory, however, has not offered an adequate explanation as to the essence of the price of a commodity. In contrast, Unification Thought explains that what constitutes the essence of value is the amount of profitability effect (for the producer) and the amount of utility effect (for the consumer) in buying and selling.

Next to be considered is the difference between traditional theories of value and that proposed by Unification Thought from the point of view of the dual purpose; i.e., the purpose for the individual” and the “purpose for the whole.” According to the theories of value centering on the producer, price is the cost of production plus a certain amount added in the form of profit. This theory is put forward only from the position of the producer. On the

other hand, according to the theories of value centering on the consumer, the price of a commodity is proportional to its utility (or marginal utility). This theory is put forward only from the point of view of the degree of satisfaction of the consumer's needs. Therefore, these two types of theories take into account only the purpose for the individual of either the producer or the consumer.

The theory of general equilibrium attempted to grasp the mutual relationship between the producer and the consumer, but took into account only their respective purposes for the individual. It views price fluctuations from the perspective of the relationship of confrontation between the two sides, in such a way that the producer pursues maximum profit while the consumer pursues maximum utility. Under views of value centered on the purpose for the individual, there can be no essential solution to economic problems such as monopoly, depression, unemployment and accumulation of low-quality goods.

In contrast, Unification Thought maintains that the producer and the consumer must act both according to their purpose for the individual and according to their purpose for the whole (in its original meaning). A producer seeks the profitability effect through his desire to pursue value, which is an expression of his purpose for the individual. Nevertheless, the pursuit of profitability effect must be carried out on the basis of the purpose for the whole, which seeks to benefit the consumers by giving them as much utility effect as possible through enhancing the use value of their commodities, and by providing the consumers with cheaper commodities through cutting production costs. Consumers, on the other hand, pursue the utility effect through their desire to pursue value, which is an expression of their purpose for the individual. This must be based on the purpose for the whole, which should seek to express gratitude to the producer for his accomplishment in creating value. (As mentioned earlier, the effect theory of value

proposed by Unification Thought is based on the philosophical principles of Unification Thought as well as on economic fact.)

Unification Thought looks at the economic structure of the ideal society from the viewpoint of the dual purpose, and asserts that producers and consumers must engage in harmonious give and receive action. This is the basis upon which Unification Thought grasps the reality of all economic phenomena. By harmonious give and receive action, is meant the give and receive action which is based on the harmony between the purpose for the individual and the purpose for the whole, where the purpose for the whole is given priority over the purpose for the individual. This means that every economic theory must have as its premise a certain ethical theory. In other words, Unification Thought puts forward an economic theory which includes both a "business ethics" and a "consumer ethics." Only in this way will there be found fundamental solutions for the many problems of capitalist and socialist economies.

III. THEORY OF SURPLUS VALUE: CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL

A. Theory of Surplus Value

Proceeding further in his analysis of commodities in capitalist society, Marx established the theory of surplus value on the basis of his labor theory of value. The theory of surplus value is the most important aspect of Marx's theory of value. This is the theory which is said to have further developed his labor theory of value and to have disclosed more concretely the fundamental contradictions in the capitalist economic system. Through this theory, Marx attempted to prove that the capitalist economy would inevitably perish.

1. Surplus Value and Profit

One of the conclusions reached by Marx after an analysis of the nature of commodities, which he did as an effort to seek out the contradictions within capitalist society, was that production in capitalist society is essentially the production of “surplus value.” Surplus value refers to the amount of increase in value created by invested capital.⁴³ When considered in relation to the entire invested capital, surplus value takes the form of “profit.”⁴⁴ Surplus value (profit) is a necessary condition for any productive activity in capitalist society. Marx described it by saying that “capitalist production is not merely the production of commodities, it is essentially the production of surplus-value”;⁴⁵ and, “production of surplus-value is the absolute law of this mode of production.”⁴⁶

Marx investigated how capitalists make profit in capitalist society, which is a profit-oriented economic society. At the conclusion of his investigation, he claimed to have discovered that profit arises, not in the process of circulation, but rather in the process of production. Many people think that profit arises when commodities are sold in the market at higher prices than the cost of production, but this is not at all true, according to Marx. He argues that “it is nonsense to suppose that profit. . . springs from surcharging the prices of the commodities, or selling them at a price over and above their value.”⁴⁷ He also wrote: “If equivalents are exchanged, no surplus-value results, and if non-equivalents are exchanged, still no surplus-value. Circulation, or the exchange of commodities, begets no value.”⁴⁸ Even if the seller is able to sell commodities at a price higher than their value, no profit arises as a whole because the buyer pays extra the same amount of money. The seller’s earnings are offset by the buyer’s loss.

Then, where and how is profit actually formed? According to Marx, only labor power produces the value of commodities; he said that “*profits are derived from selling them [the commodities] at their values*, that is, in proportion to the quantity of labor realized

in them,” and that “normal and average profits are made by selling commodities not above but at their real values.”⁵⁰ Engels, saying that “only the process of labor adds new value,”⁵¹ asserted clearly that profit is produced only in the process of labor (the process of production).

Actually, that which is produced in the process of production is not profit itself, but rather an element which has the potential to be actualized as profit. In other words, when a commodity comes out of the process of production, it carries an element which can turn into actual profit when the commodity is sold in the market place. Marx called this element surplus value. The surplus value becomes actual profit in the market place and then goes into the pocket of the capitalist, he said. The question here is to determine which factors of production in the process of production give rise to surplus value. The factors of production comprise raw materials, machinery, labor power, buildings, land, and various other things. Marx contended, however, that out of all of them, only labor power produces surplus value.

2. Constant and Variable Capital

Thus, Marx had to theorize that only labor power (workers) produced profit. For that purpose, he undertook an analysis of capital. Marx described capital as constantly “self-expanding value,”⁵² and the value which “lays golden eggs.”⁵³ In general, capital refers to the various kinds of means of production evaluated in terms of money; but in Marxism, capital refers to the value which produces surplus value for the capitalist through the exploitation of wage-laborers. Accordingly, when capitalists purchase labor power from workers — in other words, when capitalists make them work, whereby surplus value [profit] is produced — at that time their money is converted into capital.⁵⁴

Next, of capital as a whole, Marx called the portion that is transformed into raw materials, buildings, land, machinery, etc., “constant capital,” and the portion that is invested in buying labor

power, "variable capital."⁵⁵ Constant capital refers to capital which cannot multiply itself, which cannot produce profit (surplus value); variable capital refers to capital which changes, which produces profit. In Marx's view, only the capital which is transformed into labor power possesses value-multiplying power. All other things are constant capital which does not produce profit.

The questionable element of constant capital is machinery. Capitalists have been able to obtain profit in great amounts by producing cheap commodities in large quantities through the introduction of new machinery. Thus, it seemed to everyone that machines could produce profit. In order to maintain his position that only labor power produces profit, Marx was compelled to deal with the issue of machinery, and to prove that machinery could not create any profit, no matter how well they might perform. Thus, he argued that "machinery, like every other component of constant capital, creates no new value, but yields up its own value to the product that it serves to beget."⁵⁶ And he concluded that machinery "never adds more value than it loses, on an average, by wear and tear."⁵⁷

Marx regarded machines as constant capital, which does not produce surplus value. Basically, his view is that in the production process, workers transform or change raw materials, handling machinery, tools and so on to produce new products. For example, in a cotton mill, workers spin cotton yarn, applying labor power to the raw material (cotton) using the spinning machine. Yarn produced in this way is a product and a commodity different in form from the raw material.

Marx said that an additional value, which was not present in the elements of production (cotton, machinery, etc.), had been added to the yarn. To elucidate: in the production of cotton yarn, if one invests \$50 worth of raw materials, \$20 worth of machinery (that is, the equivalent of its depreciation), and \$30 worth of labor power, then the total cost of this process of production is \$100. Then the value of the cotton yarn produced becomes, say, \$130. In

other words, an additional value equivalent to \$30 over and above the cost of production is produced. This additional value is the so-called "surplus value."

Marx maintained that the surplus value (the equivalent to \$30 in the example above) was produced only by labor power. The \$50 worth of raw materials is changed in form and quality through the process of production, whereby \$50 worth of value is transferred to the new product. Also, the machinery depreciates gradually, so that a value equivalent to its wear and tear is transferred to the commodities and reappears as part of the commodity value. If, for instance, the depreciation amounts to \$20, then an equivalent of \$20 worth of value is transferred to the new product. Labor power, also, transfers value to the product in the process of production. If we assume that the value of labor power is \$30, then \$30 worth of value is transferred to the product. But labor power, unlike other elements of production, transfers not only its own value to the product, but also some additional value (for instance, the equivalent to an extra \$30). This additional value is surplus value. Marx asserted, then, that labor power is the only source of surplus value. Machines are totally unable to produce any surplus value, no matter how new and how efficient they may be.

Engels argued along the same lines as follows:

The instruments of labor yield only the value which they themselves lose. This is done in different degrees. Coal, lubricants, etc. are totally consumed. Raw materials take on a new form. Instruments, machinery, etc. yield value only slowly and partially, and their wear and tear are calculated empirically. . . . None of the instruments of labor, however, can yield more exchange value than they themselves possess.⁵⁸

In addition, Marx pointed out that though machinery cannot produce value, still it can be used by the capitalist as "a means for producing surplus-value."⁵⁴ Moreover, he argued that machinery is a means for intensifying the exploitation of the workers, saying, "machinery, while augmenting the human material that forms the

principal object of capital's exploiting power, at the same time raises the degree of exploitation."⁶⁰

In this way, through his concept of constant and variable capital, Marx tried to establish clear proofs for his assertion that in capitalist society workers are exploited by the capitalists.

3. Wages and the Value of Labor Power

Marx distinguished labor power from the means of production and classified labor power as variable capital and the means of production as constant capital. But he saw that labor power is also a commodity, which is bought by the capitalists like any other means of production, and he said that labor power is "a commodity, whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption . . . [is] a creation of value."⁶¹ Therefore, labor power, like any other commodity, has a certain value (exchange value).

And how would Marx explain the way in which the commodity of labor power is determined? He explained that the value of labor power, "like that of every other commodity, . . . is determined by the quantity of labor necessary to produce it."⁶² But he pointed out that, unlike other commodities, "the laboring power of a man exists only in his living individuality,"⁶³ and that, accordingly, "the *value of laboring power* is determined by the *value of the necessities* [necessities of life] required to produce, develop, maintain and perpetuate the laboring power."⁶⁴ In short, the quantity of labor (the labor time) necessary to produce labor power (which is a commodity) is identical to the quantity of labor (the labor time) necessary to produce the goods required for the laborer's subsistence, or his necessities.

Concretely, what is the value of the necessities required to produce labor power? (In other words, what is the cost of production of labor power?) Marx described it as "the cost required for maintaining the worker as a worker and of developing him into a worker."⁶⁵ In order for the worker to be able to work every day, he

must maintain his physical body, and for that, he needs to consume a certain amount of goods for his subsistence. So the worker needs the cost of existence. Moreover, the worker must also bear and raise children, so that his children can take over when he becomes senile—just as machinery becomes worn out and needs to be replaced. For that, he needs also the necessary cost of reproduction and nurturing. These are the required expenses for the necessities of the workers. Marx said that the value of these required expenses represents the value of labor power seen as a commodity. The cost of the necessities of life is precisely, wages, which can be described as the monetary expression of the value of labor power, or the price of labor power.

Wages are the price of labor power as a commodity, and not the price of labor, as Marx explains: “What economists therefore call value of labor, is in fact the value of labor-power, as it exists in the personality of the laborer, which is as different from its function, labor, as a machine is from the work it performs.”⁶⁶ Taken as the price of labor, wages refer to monies paid for the function of labor; taken as the price of labor power, wages refer to monies corresponding to the cost of producing labor power as a commodity—in other words, to the cost of the necessities of life. Marx argued that when one refers to wages as the price of labor, concepts such as surplus labor and unpaid labor do not come up at all, ‘which would conceal capitalist exploitation. Accordingly, Marx insisted that wages under the capitalist mode of production are “the price of labor power” and he concluded that “the system of wage labor is a system of slavery.”⁶⁷

Furthermore, Marx distinguished two basic forms of wages, namely “time wages” and “piece wages.”⁶⁸ Time wages are determined by the length of time actually worked by a worker, and can be figured as daily wages, weekly wages, and so on. On the other hand, piece wages are determined by the number of pieces.(units of production) which a worker has been able to produce—in other words, by the amount of his work. Communists

maintain that these two forms of wages, though seemingly different, are identical in that both of them intensify the exploitation of the workers by the capitalists.⁶⁹

4. Necessary Labor and Surplus Labor

If indeed wages were the value of labor power, or the value of the necessities of life, then workers would need to work only as many hours as equivalent to the necessities of life. But the capitalists, the buyers of labor power, never permit the workers to work only during those hours; instead, they make them work beyond those hours, without pay. Therefore, the workers are forced to produce a value which is greater than the equivalent of their labor power.

Marx distinguished two kinds of labor, namely the labor that produces value equivalent to that of the workers' labor power and the labor that creates additional value — calling them “necessary labor” and “surplus labor,” respectively. Marx called the portions of time in a working day corresponding to these two kinds of labor, “necessary labor time” and “surplus labor time.” Obviously, necessary labor time refers to the time required for the worker to produce the necessities of life, or the labor time corresponding to the price of the labor power as a commodity. Surplus labor time is also called “unpaid labor,” in the sense that the capitalist does not pay its equivalent. Surplus value; then, is the value created by surplus labor or unpaid labor.

Suppose a commodity contains twelve hours of labor. If the worker receives wages equivalent to six hours of labor, then the remaining six hours are unpaid labor. The value created during the six hours of unpaid labor is the surplus value, which, according to Marx, is what fills the capitalist's pocket in the form of profit. Clearly, then, by exploitation of the worker, Marx meant the fact that the capitalist takes all the profit (that is, the surplus value produced through unpaid labor), and this is the structural contradiction of capitalist society. In order to eliminate this kind of ex-

ploitation, the capitalist system must be overthrown. This is the bottom-line conclusion of his theory.

5. Absolute and Relative Surplus Value

By paying wages, capitalists make the workers do both necessary labor and surplus labor (unpaid labor), whereby they obtain surplus value for free. To pursue surplus value is the very essence of the capitalist mode of production. Marx said that capitalists use two methods to increase surplus value: the prolongation of the working day and the curtailment of necessary labor time. In Marxist terminology, the surplus value resulting from the prolongation of the working day is called “absolute surplus value” and the surplus value resulting from the curtailment of necessary labor time is called “relative surplus value.”⁷¹

A concrete example of absolute surplus value and relative surplus value would be as follows: suppose there is an enterprise in which the working day is twelve hours, of which six hours comprise the necessary labor time and six hours comprise the surplus labor time. If the capitalist prolongs the working day by two hours, then there results an increase in surplus value from the equivalent of six hours to the equivalent of eight hours. The surplus value that is produced by the prolongation of the working day is absolute surplus value.

In addition, labor productivity may be raised through the introduction of new machinery. When that is done, the value of labor power may fall, for instance, to two thirds of what it was before, which means that the necessary labor time is curtailed to two thirds of what it was before, or to four hours. If the working day remains the same, the surplus labor time will be eight hours. The surplus value produced through the curtailment of necessary labor time resulting from the increase in labor productivity is called relative surplus value (see figure 6.4).




Fig. 6.4. Necessary Labor Time and Surplus Labor Time

As Marx said, “the greed for surplus-labor appears in the straining after an unlimited extension of the working day”;⁷² and in fact, the method which capitalists first used to increase surplus value (profit) was the prolongation of the working day. Nevertheless, the workers’ physical and spiritual limitations impose limits beyond which the working day cannot be prolonged. But Marx said that capitalists would increase profit anyway by introducing machinery, when the working day remained the same or was even curtailed. Of course, Marx then had to prove that such increases in profit had not been caused by machinery, but rather by labor power, and it was for that reason that he created such notions as absolute surplus value and relative surplus value.

If a new and efficient machine is introduced, it can be expected that the commodities produced will be of better quality and in greater quantity than before, and that the price of those commodi-

ties will decrease. Along with this, the value of the necessities of life for the workers decreases, so that in the end, machinery depreciates the labor power of the worker.⁷³ This means that the necessary labor time — that is, the labor time required to reproduce labor power — has been curtailed, and at the same time, assuming that the working day is constant, surplus labor time is increased, whereby (relative) surplus value is increased. About this, Marx said, “Relative surplus-value is . . . directly proportional to [the] productiveness [of labor].”⁷⁴

Thus, Marx argued that capitalists can increase surplus value by curtailing the necessary labor time. This they do by enhancing the productiveness of labor, which means to enhance productivity, both quantitatively and qualitatively, through the introduction of more efficient machinery. If the introduction of efficient machinery plays such an important role in curtailing the necessary labor time, then, why did Marx speak of curtailing labor time only in terms of enhancing the productiveness of labor, rather than in terms of the introduction of more efficient means of production, that is, machinery? His reason was that he wanted to make it clear that machines cannot increase surplus value, and that only labor can do that, through its value-multiplying nature.

Marx also spoke of “extra surplus value” as a special case of relative surplus value.⁷⁵ When a capitalist increases the productiveness of labor through the introduction of new machinery beyond the level which is socially accepted as average, the individual value of the commodity produced becomes lower than the value which is socially accepted as average for that commodity (the social value). And the reason is that the labor time necessary to produce that commodity in that particular enterprise becomes less than the labor time necessary to produce the same commodity which is considered, average for the whole society (the socially necessary labor time). Since, however, the price of that commodity is already determined according to its social value, then the surplus value which that capitalist receives will be higher than the

surplus value which is normally received for that commodity. This is what Marx refers to as extra surplus value. This, however, is only a temporary situation, because soon other capitalists also introduce equally efficient machinery, whereby eventually the social value of that commodity is lowered.

Marx wrote further that in the cases where the working day and the productiveness of labor remain constant, if the intensity of labor is raised — in other words, if the quantity of labor expended in a unit of time is increased — then surplus value can be increased.⁷⁶ This is the method of creating additional surplus value by extracting more work out of the worker within a given unit of time—for instance, by intensifying the supervision of the worker.⁷⁷

B. Critique of the Theory of Surplus Value

1. It is false that machinery is constant capital.

Marx said that machinery “never adds more value than it loses, on an average, by wear and tear,”⁷⁸ and Engels added that “wear and tear is calculated empirically.”⁷⁹ This means that what is transferred into a commodity produced during a specific period of time is only the wear and tear of machinery, within that period of time, calculated according to the method of depreciation.⁸⁰ In other words, Marx and Engels used depreciation, which is used in business accounting, in order to prove that machinery does not create any value. Could this possibly be true? The concept of a value being transferred into a commodity seems reasonable at first glance; nevertheless, it generally applies only in the case of raw materials, and does not apply at all to machinery. The fallacy of Marx’s argument is shown below.

Undoubtedly, machinery wears out gradually when it operates. Likewise, it is true that through wear and tear, the value of machinery decreases. It must be pointed out, however, that the wear and tear of a machine affects only its shape and structure,

whereby its mass decreases, and the value which decreases in proportion to the wear and tear is its exchange value, and not at all its use value. Of course, the performance (use value) of machinery can decrease as a result of the wear and tear of its shape and structure; nevertheless, this decrease in performance is not at all proportional to the actual wear and tear. Actually, good quality machines can function without any performance problems for a certain period of time. The better the performance of a machine, the more commodities (the more value) it can produce. In other words, what gives value to a product is the performance of the machine, rather than the wear and tear on it.

The relationship between the performance and the structure (and shape) of a machine is like that between the mind and the body of a man. There are many people who are handicapped in body, but great in mind. Beethoven, though deaf, achieved great mastery of music; Franklin D. Roosevelt, though handicapped, became a great American statesman. The same can be true of machinery. While it is true that the exchange value of a machine depreciates day by day (especially in terms of accounting), the idea that the machine transfers the amount of its depreciation to its products in the form of value is unfounded dogmatism. For instance, if the exchange value of a machine depreciates \$10 a day, no one can deny that the same machine could perform so as to produce the value equivalent to \$100 or more in the same day. Particularly in the case of a new machine, where the wear and tear is even less, its performance is of high quality and it produces even more value. For that reason, one way for an enterprise to compete with other enterprises in capitalist society is to introduce new machinery.

One can see, then, that the value of commodities is produced, not as the result of the wear and tear of machinery, but rather as the result of the fact that machinery has the function or capability of creating value. For Marx, what produces value is labor power, rather than machinery, and machinery merely aids the produc-

tiveness of labor power. He should, however, have offered proof for his claim that machinery cannot create value and only serves to aid labor power. By applying his method of depreciation, Marx avoided that question.

In addition, Marx's argumentation based on depreciation contains ridiculous contradictions. According to him, what is transferred from the machines into the commodities is only the amount of wear and tear. If this is so, and assuming that other conditions are constant, one would have to say that if machinery depreciates a great deal, then a great deal of value is transferred to the commodities, which increases the price of the commodities. On the other hand, if the amount of depreciation is small, then only a small value is transferred to the commodities, which decreases the price of the commodities. And yet, reality is quite the opposite. When one considers that case of producing the same commodity, it is a reality of the marketplace that those commodities of an excellent quality from an enterprise using new machinery, with less wear and tear, are more expensive than those of a lower quality produced by an enterprise using old machinery with more wear and tear. In this way, Marx's proof of constant capital using the depreciation method is shown to be a sheer deceit.

Today, it can be seen that in a highly automated factory great amounts of commodities are produced and immense profit is made with little need for human labor power. Can anyone still contend that all the profit is produced through labor power? No; that would be unthinkable. Machinery certainly produces as much profit as, or even more profit than, labor power. Marx, in fact, knew well that machinery can replace labor power. This is clear from such words from Marx as:

In manufacture, the revolution in the mode of production begins with the labor-power, in modern industry it begins with the instruments of labor [machinery].⁸¹

Along with the tool, the skill of the workman in handling it passes over to the machine.⁸²

From the time when machinery is introduced into production, the worker becomes a mere “attendant,”⁸³ and “self-acting minder,”⁸⁴ and in Engels’s words, “In mechanical engineering, however, the worker actually being pushed away, the machine competes directly with him.”⁸⁵

It is false to say that machinery, which can replace workers, cannot produce any profit. In fact, when Marx said that “the immediate result of machinery is to augment surplus-value and the mass of products in which surplus-value is embodied,”⁸⁶ he frankly admitted that machinery can produce surplus value, or profit. That machinery produces profit means that machinery is not constant, but variable capital, just like labor power. Accordingly, Marx’s theory that machinery is constant capital is totally wrong. Why, then, did Marx continue to insist that machinery is constant capital? The reason is that, as pointed out earlier, he wanted to find theoretical rationalization and justification for his claim that profit is produced only by workers and that, therefore, the acquisition of profit by capitalists is nothing but the exploitation of workers.

2. It is false that labor power is a commodity.

Marx said that labor power is a commodity that can be found in the market place, and whose consumption results in the creation of value. The value of labor power is determined by the quantity of labor necessary to produce it (that is, by the quantity of labor contained in the necessities of life necessary to reproduce labor power). But is this view of labor power correct?

Commodities are produced in anticipation of demand — in other words, without the expectation of demand, no commodities are produced. Labor power, however, is not created nor maintained within the human body with any expectation of demand. Marx said that labor power is the human ability to produce work through the expenditure of the brain, muscles, nerves, hands, etc. Still, this ability is not an exclusive possession of the laborer.

Statesmen, economists, scientists, educators, artists, religious leaders, and others — all of these possess the same kind of ability. Therefore, one should say, rather, that this ability is man's power to act for the purpose of maintaining his life. This power is the power to create ("creative power") and the power to live ("life power"), and it is not put away in man's body, as if waiting for a demand for it. Therefore labor power is not a commodity. It is something with which man is endowed by nature, and which enables him to live. This creative power manifests itself in the form of various kinds of powers. In laborers, it manifests itself as labor power, in the artist as artistic creative power, in the scientists as the power to invent and to do research.

Marx also said that the laborer consumes the materials of subsistence in order to produce labor power. This, however, cannot be true. As mentioned above, when commodities are the product of labor, they are produced only when there is demand, or when some demand is anticipated. If demand stops, production is suspended. If labor power were a commodity, one would have to say that labor power is produced in response to some demand. In that case, if there were no demand, the production of labor power as a commodity would have to be suspended. In other words, if there were no demand for labor power, then the production of labor power (i.e., the consumption of the necessities of life) would have to be suspended.

For example, unemployment means that the supply of labor power is greater than the demand for it. If Marx's view were correct, then unemployed people should stop consuming the necessities of life, so as to suspend the production of the commodity, labor power. And yet, unemployed laborers cannot stop consuming the necessities of life such as food, clothing, fuel, etc., even for a day. Why is that? The reason is that laborers have to live. Therefore, the consumption of the necessities of life by workers is not an activity for the production of labor power, but rather for human life itself. In other words, workers consume necessities of life not

as a means to produce some commodity, labor power, but rather as a means to sustain and strengthen the “life power” and “creative power,” with which they are endowed. In sum, Marx's assertion that labor power is a product of labor just like any other commodity is entirely false.

3. It is false that wages are the cost of the production of labor power.

Marx said that the value of labor power is equal to the cost of the production of labor power. By that he meant that the wages paid to a laborer are equal to the price of his necessities of life. Then, what did Marx mean by the necessities of life? Essentially, by necessities of life Marx meant a laborer's minimum means of subsistence that would allow him to maintain his own life and to raise children as replacements for his labor power. Marx described the condition of laborers as follows:

The Roman slave was held by fetters: the wage-laborer is bound to his owner by invisible threads.⁸⁷

Moreover, the capitalist gets rich, not like the miser, in proportion to his personal labor and restricted consumption, but at the same rate as he squeezes out the labor-power of others, and enforces on the laborer *abstinence from all life's enjoyments*.⁸⁸ (italics added)

Marx said that the value of labor power is equivalent to the value of the laborer's necessities of life, in a slave-like condition. On the other hand, he also said that the range of human needs and the mode of satisfying them depends “to a great extent on the degree of civilization of a country,”⁸⁹ and that “in contradistinction . . . to the case of other commodities, there enters into the determination of the value of labor-power a historical and moral element.”⁹⁰ Thus, Marx's standard to determine the value of the necessities of life necessary for the production of labor power, is quite vague.

Marx's fundamental point here is to emphasize that the laborer is a slave to the capitalist, and is allowed to live a life only of the lowest standard, barely maintaining his existence. He knew, however, that this is not always the case in reality, and so had to say that "there enters . . . a historical and moral element," to conform to reality. And yet, if it is true that "a historical and moral element" is included in the value of labor power, then how could the expense necessary for that historical and moral element (spiritual element) be measured? And even if it could, that expense could not be included in the cost of the production of labor power. In sum, Marx's assertion that wages are the price of labor power — in other words, wages are the cost of the production of labor power — does not hold true in reality.

As a description of the workers' bleak future, Marx said that:

the very development of modern industry must progressively turn the scale in favor of the capitalist against the working man, and that consequently the general tendency of capitalistic production is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages, or to push the value of labor [the value of labor-power] more or less to its *minimum limit*.⁹¹

Here Marx is claiming that real wages tend to decrease. That is, regardless of how labor productivity is enhanced through the introduction of machinery, the standard of life of the laborer will not improve; on the contrary, the laborer will be increasingly exploited by the capitalist. Did this really happen?

What Marx predicted never happened at all in capitalist economy. P.A. Samuelson stated, based on his analysis of the history of economy, that "there has been a strong upward trend in real wage rates."⁹² Samuelson is not referring to nominal wages (expressed in the amount of money), but rather to real wages (expressed in the amount of the necessities of life), and is saying that throughout this century, wages have been steadily increasing in advanced capitalist countries. Along with that increase, the standard of life of laborers has been improving quantitatively and qualitatively.

From the standpoint of the increase in real wages, it is clear that Marx's assertion that wages are the cost of the production of labor power has proven entirely false.

The reason why Marx viewed the laborer as a slave to the capitalist, was that in his time the living conditions of the laborer were extremely miserable. He saw that the laborer was receiving wages which were barely sufficient to maintain his body so as to allow him to continue his work. But that was true only under the special conditions of that time and is no longer true today. The worker today not only maintains his body to continue his labor, but has enough to spend increasingly large portions of his wages for cultural life. Clearly, then, it is not true that wages are the cost of the production of labor power; rather, wages are the cost of the worker's standard of life.

4. The Fabrication of Concepts

The following concepts, developed in the Labor Theory of Value, are mere fabrications by Marx: necessary labor time, necessary labor, surplus labor time, surplus labor, surplus value, relative surplus value, and absolute surplus value. A brief explanation of them will be given below.

It has been clarified that machinery is not constant capital; that machinery contributes to the production of profit; that labor power is not something that can be produced as a commodity; and that wages are not the cost of the production of labor power (that is, the cost of the production of the necessities of life). Clearly, then, Marx is wrong when he said that "necessary labor time" is the labor time required for the production of the necessities of life; and he was also wrong when he concluded that necessary labor time is the labor time for which wages are paid. In underdeveloped countries, the necessary labor time is likely to be long, because of low productivity; and in advanced countries, the necessary labor time is short, because of high productivity. If that is the case, then in advanced countries, the wages corresponding

to necessary labor time should be much lower than in underdeveloped countries, but in reality they are much higher. This means that wages have nothing to do with necessary labor time and that, therefore, the concept of necessary labor time is nothing but imaginary fabrication.

Accordingly, along the same lines, the concept of “necessary labor” (which produces the equivalent to the value of labor power), the concept of “surplus labor,” or “unpaid labor” (which produces value in addition to the equivalent of labor power), the concept of “surplus labor time” (which is the labor time in addition to necessary labor time), the concept of “surplus value” (which is the value produced by surplus labor), and so on—all of them lose their base. The same applies to “absolute surplus value” and “relative surplus value.” Since machinery, like labor power, can produce profit, when one obtains new profit either by prolonging the working day (absolute surplus value) or by enhancing productivity (relative surplus value), one cannot say that the new profit is just surplus value, derived from surplus labor.⁹³

In sum, these concepts are all imaginary fabrications. What was Marx’s intention in creating such concepts? Very simply, as already mentioned, his intention was to justify the claim that in capitalist society, profit is produced entirely by the laborer, and that when the capitalist gains profit, it means that he is exploiting the laborer. These were not scientific concepts obtained through an objective study of capitalist economy; rather, they were deliberate and deceitful concepts created to rationalize the goal established beforehand of proletarian revolution.

C. Counterproposal to the Theory of Surplus Value

As a counterproposal to the theory of surplus value, several questions will be dealt with in detail. What is profit? How is profit

produced? In what way have capitalists exploited laborers?⁹⁴ All these are questions which must be clarified.

1. The Production and Proper Distribution of Profit

Let us first consider the nature of profit. According to modern economic theory, the total amount of sales made by an enterprise, minus the “user costs,” or material costs (such as the cost of raw materials, fuel and depreciation) is called “value added.” Value added refers to the value which an enterprise has newly created, or the income which it has generated.

Generally, an enterprise pays wages to laborers, interest to financiers and rent to landowners. The expenses for these factors of production, which do not include material capital goods, is called “factor cost.” The value added minus the factor cost is the profit of the enterprise. In other words, the income of an enterprise, minus interest, rent and wages, represents the profit of that enterprise. On the other hand, according to Marx, profit is the value of a commodity minus the cost of expenses (i.e., the cost of the means of production plus the price of labor power, or wages). Interest and rent are to be paid out from the profit.⁹⁵ Accordingly, both in modern economics and in Marxian economics, the wages paid to the laborer are regarded as a cost of production.

In contrast, Unification Thought asserts that what constitutes the profit of an enterprise is the total amount of sales minus the user costs (raw materials, fuel, depreciation, etc.), interest, and land rent. In this view, wages are considered part of the profit. In other words, only user costs, interest and land rent should be regarded as costs in the true sense. The wages which the laborers receive should not be regarded as cost, but rather as a share in the profit obtained by the enterprise (see figure 6.5).⁹⁶

With regard to the concept of an enterprise, traditional economics considers an enterprise to be a profit-making organization centering on entrepreneurs or capitalists. Labor power is regarded as an outside element which is supplied to the enterprise. In con-

trast, Unification Thought asserts that workers as well as entrepreneurs (capitalists) are what constitute the human element of an enterprise.⁹⁷

Cost of Production	Profit (Income of the Enterprise)
Raw Materials Fuels Depreciation Interest Rent	Worker's Share (Wages) Entrepreneur's Profit and Dividends Corporate Tax and Undistributed Profit

Fig. 6.5. The Unification Thought View of Profit

How, then, does an enterprise produce profit? It does so through the “creative power” and the “life power” with which every individual is endowed. A brief explanation of the concepts of creative power and life power follows.

Every living being contains life power within itself. A seed, for instance, is planted in the ground, where it germinates to become a sprout, and then it grows by putting out leaves, branches, flowers, and fruits—and all that through the life power contained within it. And through the fruit, new seeds are multiplied again. A similar process occurs with animals in which a fertilized cell, through its life power, grows through all the intermediary stages to become an adult, parent animal, which in turn multiplies its own young. This means that what creates the plant body (from the seed) or the animal body (from the fertilized cell), is the life power contained within the plant or the animal. A few of the animals have the ability to create things; spiders weave webs, birds make nests, and bees make hives. These are expressions of life power and at the same time, creative power. Thus, growth, multi-

plication and the creation of things (nests, hives, etc.) are all due to life power (creative power).

Man, of course, also has creative power. The creative power with which man is endowed is far more developed than that of an animal. The reason is that, while the creative power of an animal is instinctive, the creative power of man is, in addition to that, also rational, and is thus called "rational creative power," or "technical creative power." With his rational (technical) creative power, man continually creates new ideas and new things, and it is through this power that profit is produced.

The creative power which produces profit in an enterprise is a direct or indirect ability to create the value (usefulness) of commodities. Obviously, the labor power of laborers is a form of creative power, but labor power is not all there is to creative power. The management function of an entrepreneur (capitalist) is also a form of creative power. Today it is not uncommon to find entrepreneurs who participate in the production process, mentally and physically, and sometimes more so than the laborers themselves. Furthermore, machine operation by technical personnel and office management by office personnel are also forms of creative power. When a machine performs its function, it is also exhibiting creative power, because it represents an extension, or an embodiment of the technical creative power of scientists. All of these factors participate in the production of profit and all of them possess creative power.

Taken individually, each one of these factors is incapable of expressing creative power, and therefore cannot produce any profit. They can produce profit only when they enter into give and receive action among themselves and with other material elements, centering on a common purpose. (What is called profit here is in fact just the material, or potential, of profit, and not actual profit itself, as explained in the section "The Essence of Profit" below.) In other words, an enterprise can realize profit through the production of commodities when its various factors (investors, managers,

technicians, office workers, laborers, machinery, raw materials, land, etc.) are engaged in give and receive action under a common purpose. More specifically, production is carried out through the combination of the various types of give and receive action occurring between correlative factors on different levels—namely, the give and receive action between investors and managers, between managers and technicians, between managers and office workers, between technicians and laborers, between laborers and machinery, between the subject part of the machines and their object parts, and so forth.

In a broad perspective, the process of production as a whole can be seen as the give and receive action between the human factor (the subject) and the material factor (the object). In other words, the investors, managers, technicians, office workers, and laborers on one hand are engaged in give and receive action with machinery, raw materials, land, etc. on the other. The framework for looking at an enterprise this way is the notion of subject and object in Unification Thought, where man is said to relate to all things as their subject of dominion, and all things are said to relate to man as his object of dominion. Therefore, profit can be said to be produced through the give and receive action between the human subject and the material object.

From this, it follows that profit is produced jointly by entrepreneurs (investors and managers) and laborers, including technicians, office workers and others. Investors provide the necessary capital for production (machinery, raw materials, land, etc.); managers administrate the enterprise; and laborers provide various kinds of labor power (technical power). Each of them contributes to the production of commodities as a specific kind of creative power.

Since profit is produced jointly by entrepreneurs (investors and managers) and laborers, the wages of laborers should be seen as a reward in the form of a share of the profit. The income of the entrepreneur, also, is a share of the profit, paid in the form of a divi-

dend. In addition, a portion of the profit is given to the government (both national and local) in the form of taxes; and the rest of the profit remains in the enterprise in the form of reserve earnings, or undistributed profit (see figure 6.5). As stated earlier, machinery also contributes to the production of profit, since it is a form of creative power, but does not need to receive any profit, because it is only a material factor of the means of production. The part contributed to the creation of profit by machinery and other means of production should be ascribed to the owner of those means of production (the capitalist) or to the enterprise itself.

Consequently, it is not true that the entrepreneur, or the capitalist, obtains profit through the seizure of surplus value, as Marx contended. The capitalist is naturally entitled to receive a part of the earnings of the enterprise (in other words, a part of the profit, as defined in Unification Thought), because he has exerted creative power either by engaging in business activity or by providing capital for it.

Admittedly, though, in many cases, capitalists have taken an excessive portion of the profit of the enterprise, when compared with that given to the laborers. Therefore, the exploitation of laborers by capitalists is not that capitalists seize the surplus value (profit) produced by the laborers, but rather that capitalists take an undue portion of the profit produced jointly by capitalists and laborers.⁹⁸ Accordingly, the solution to this problem is to be found in a proper and equitable distribution of profits, which is a matter of business ethics.

In economics up until today, the wages received by laborers and the profit received by capitalists have frequently been regarded as opposed to each other. Marxism represents the most extreme example of this kind of thinking. Only one aspect of reality was grasped, in which capitalists and laborers are regarded as pursuing only their own individual purposes — where capitalists only pursue higher profits and laborers higher wages. In other words, traditional economics (especially Marxism) has reflected

the nature of fallen society, which is composed of self-centered fallen people.

In contrast, Unification Thought formulates an economic theory based on original man and original society, as a means of changing fallen society towards its original ideal. It maintains that the capitalist and the laborer must pursue not only the purpose for the individual, but also the purpose for the whole, giving priority to the latter. To pursue the purpose for the whole means to work in the service of the prosperity of the enterprise as a whole, and beyond that, for the prosperity of the country and the world.

But how can such things be done? They can be done in an enterprise when the capitalist and the laborers form a family-like relationship of heart and create the atmosphere of a big family. In that situation, there would be no such thing as the capitalist taking an excessive share of the profit or the laborers struggling for higher wages. In the family which has attained the original ideal, there is no such thing as a member plundering another; instead, each would strive to contribute to the prosperity of the whole family, loving one another. In traditional economics, wages have been regarded as a cost, because the enterprise was regarded, not as a family formed of capitalists and laborers together, but rather as a profit-making organization, centering on the capitalists.

2. The Essence of Profit

What is profit, and how does it arise in business activities? Marx said that profit is formed by labor power in the process of production. What results from the process of production, however, is not profit itself, but rather the cause, or the material, of profit. From the Unification Thought standpoint, this is the use value, or usefulness, of a commodity. When a commodity is sold in the marketplace, actual profit expressed in money is gained at that moment on the basis of that material.⁹⁹ Just as the trunk, leaves, flowers, etc. of a plant come out of its seed, so actual profit

is formed in the market from the material which corresponds to a seed.

What, then, is the essence of profit? Profit is the reward which the consumer (society) gives to the enterprise for having served him through the creation (realization) of value. The creation (realization) of value refers to the fact that someone has created the use value of a commodity, by exerting his creativity; or has offered some benefit or convenience to consumers by storing or transporting that use value; in other words, by providing service to society. In short, profit is "the social reward given to an enterprise for the accomplishment of its activity of creating value."

Since the enterprise has served and pleased the consumer through the value it has created, the consumer pays the price set by the enterprise, which is the cost of production plus an added amount of money. By doing so, the consumer gives a reward to the enterprise in the form of a certain amount of money added to the cost of production. The amount paid as reward is the profit. Thus, the prerequisite for an enterprise to make a profit is to offer some service or to provide some utility to the consumer. Of course, people in fallen society are usually not mindful about giving any reward to the producer. However, from the Unification Thought standpoint, it follows that, when a consumer pays for a commodity, he not only pays for the cost of production, but also gives a reward.

It may seem wrong to regard profit as a reward. Nevertheless, a consumer buys a commodity only when the expression of the amount of his satisfaction matches the price of that commodity (where price represents a sum of money equivalent to the cost of production plus profit). Thus, profit may be regarded as a reward.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, when the consumer agrees to pay the price requested by the enterprise, he is unconsciously agreeing to give the enterprise a reward. This is especially true because the price is not something which the enterprise determines at will, but rather something which is affected by the social conditions of

supply and demand. In a sense, then, the price may be seen as having been approved by society (the consumers as a whole).

As mentioned earlier, if exchange value (price) is expressed as a psychological amount, it is the amount of satisfaction or the amount of utility effect for the consumer. Likewise, if profit is expressed as a psychological amount, it is essentially the amount of gratitude, and its monetary expression will be actual profit. Obviously, the amount of gratitude (which corresponds to profit) is part of the consumer's amount of satisfaction (which corresponds to price), but people in fallen society are not well aware of the amount of gratitude.

Since creation of value refers to the exercise of man's creativity, it includes not only labor, but also many other kinds of activities, such as various kinds of service, scientific research, and artistic activity. Accordingly, not only primary and secondary industries but also tertiary industry (commerce, transportation, communication, public works, education, information, leisure, etc.) can produce profit.

Next, the traditional theories of profit will be presented, and a comparison between them and the Unification Thought view of profit will be made. According to P.A. Samuelson, the following are among the traditional theories of profit.¹⁰¹

a) Profit as "Implicit" Factor Returns

Profit may be regarded as earnings of self-use factors as follows: the return on the personal work provided by the owner of the enterprise (implicit wages); the rent return on self-owned natural resources (implicit rent); and the return which is the equivalent to interest on the owner's capital (implicit interest).

b) Profit as the Reward to Enterprise and Innovation

This view defines profit as the temporary excess returns to successful innovators and entrepreneurs. According to Joseph Schumpeter, routine management work only earns wages, which

cannot be regarded as profit. Profit is something which arises as a result of true entrepreneurship and innovation.

c) Profit as Linked with Uncertainty

Frank Knight proposes the theory that profit is linked with uncertainty, because innovation always accompanies uncertainty. Oil discoveries, fortunate patents, marketing and speculative successes are examples of the chance elements in profit.

d) Profit as a Risk Premium

Profit can also be described as a premium paid to compensate for people's natural aversion to risk, in order to encourage investors to take risks. Economic activities involving risk must give a "risk premium," in addition to the regular interest on investment. This is the economist's traditional view of profit. According to this view, price (competitive price) is as follows:

competitive price = wage + interest + rent + profit as risk-premium

e) Profit as a "Monopoly Return"

Profit can be viewed as the earnings gained through monopoly. First of all, there is the competitive rent of "natural scarcities." The rent obtained from owning the best land is an example. Next, there is the gain a monopolizer obtains from "contrived scarcities." The gain from the cornered land or from monopolized commodities is an example.

f) Profit as Marxian Surplus Value

The Marxian theory of profit has been stated above, and therefore is omitted here.

As can be seen, there are many different traditional views of profit, and every one of them maintains that profit is the return on which the entrepreneur obtains, and regards the wages received by workers as a cost of production. Unification Thought, however, asserts that, because labor power should not be dealt with as a

commodity, but rather as part of personality, wages should not be dealt with as a cost of production, but instead should be included in the income, or the profit, of the enterprise, obtained jointly by the entrepreneur and the workers. Thus, there is a basic difference between traditional views of profit and the Unification Thought view of profit. A brief comment on the traditional views of profit from the position of Unification Thought is presented here.

The Unification Thought position is that profit is “the social reward given to an enterprise for the accomplishment of its activity of creating value.” The views of profit as “implicit factor returns,” as “reward to enterprise and innovation,” as “linked with uncertainty,” as a “risk premium,” and so on, can all be seen as different expressions of the Unification Thought view of profit, because all of them can be seen as referring to profit as a reward for creating value and for serving the consumers and society. The theory of profit as a “monopoly return,” especially in “contrived scarcities,” considers only the pursuit of self-centered profitability, disregarding service to society; and, Marx’s theory of surplus value holds that only the laborer creates value, as discussed earlier. Consequently, neither of these theories is in accord with the Unification Thought view of value.

IV. CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC LAWS OF CAPITALISM DEVELOPMENT

The labor theory of value and the theory of surplus value constitute the core of Marxist economics. Based on these theories, Marx formulated the economic laws of the development of capitalist society, which, according to him, led to the inevitable collapse of the capitalist relations of production. These laws can be listed as follows: the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, the law of the impoverishment of the working class, and the law of the centralization of capital. (The first law is explained in *Capital*, Vol. 3, and the latter two are explained under the title “The

General Law of Capitalist Accumulation," in *Capital*, Vol. 1). A criticism of these laws is presented below.

A. Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall

According to Marx, as capitalism develops more and more, constant capital (the part of capital expended to buy machinery, raw materials, etc.) will grow larger, and variable capital (the part of capital expended to buy labor power) will decrease proportionately. This is called the rise in the "organic composition of capital." As a result, the "rate of profit," namely the ratio of surplus value to the total capital invested in an enterprise, will constantly fall, as long as the "rate of surplus value" (i.e. the "degree of exploitation") — namely the ratio of surplus value to variable capital — remains constant.¹⁰²

The meaning of this law is as follows: when a capitalist introduces new machinery which enables him to save in the process of production and to produce commodities at a price below the market price, whereby he can obtain more profit, other capitalists will eventually introduce new machinery in the same way. Ultimately, the market price itself, for that commodity, will become cheaper. Thus, in order to win in their competition, capitalists race one another in purchasing new machinery. They constantly have to bring in improved machinery and new methods of production, and for that purpose, they must constantly expend capital. As this process is repeated, the capitalist's rate of profit becomes lower and lower. In other words, the amount of profit, when compared with invested capital, becomes smaller and smaller. This law can be expressed in formulas as below.

Let us assume that variable capital is v , constant capital is c , surplus value (profit) is s , and the rate of profit is p' . The p' will be as follows:

$$p' = \frac{s}{c + v}$$

If the numerator and denominator are divided by v , then p' will be as follows:

$$p' = \frac{\frac{s}{v}}{\frac{c}{v} + 1}$$

Here, if we assume that the rate of surplus value s/v remains constant, then the rate of profit, p' , will decrease, because the organic composition of capital c/v will increase.

Marx attached here the condition of "if the rate of surplus value s/v is constant." As explained earlier, however, machinery also contributes to the production of profit, in the same way as, or even more than, labor power. Therefore, it is impossible that s/v will be a constant, in spite of the introduction of new machinery.

I will examine Marx's formula of the rate of profit, ignoring his condition that the rate of surplus value (degree of exploitation) is constant. Generally, accounting in an enterprise follows a yearly cycle. The part of capital put aside for machinery corresponds to the depreciation expense. If the depreciation expense is indicated as d , then that will become the cost of machinery (which corresponds to constant capital c). Now the formula for the rate of profit is as follows:

$$p' = \frac{s}{v + d}$$

In examining the fluctuation in the rate of profit between old and new machinery, assume that wages, the cost of machinery and profit are respectively v_1 , d_1 , and s_1 , when using the old machinery. When using the new machinery, assume that they are v_2 , d_2 , and s_2 . Suppose in addition that market conditions are constant. Now, I will examine the change of the rate of profit in several cases:

(1) When new machinery is introduced, assume that wages and the cost of machinery (depreciation expense) remain the same as at the time the old machinery was in use (i.e., $v_1 = v_2$, $d_1 = d_2$). Then the commodity will be improved in quality and increase in quantity, because generally speaking the new machinery will show an improvement in performance. Therefore, surplus value will increase (i.e., $s_1 < s_2$). Accordingly, we get the following:

$$\frac{s_1}{v_1 + d_1} < \frac{s_2}{v_2 + d_2}$$

The rate of profit will increase.

(2) When new machinery is introduced, assume that wages are constant, and at the same time, the products produced by the old machinery and by the new machinery are identical in quality and quantity. Then, the depreciation expense of the new machinery should be less than that of the old. Therefore, $v_1 = v_2$, $s_1 = s_2$, and $d_1 > d_2$, giving us:

$$\frac{s_1}{v_1 + d_1} < \frac{s_2}{v_2 + d_2}$$

The rate of profit still increases.

(3) If, by introducing new machinery, the quality and the quantity of the commodities are improved, the depreciation expense decreases, and wages are constant, then (since $v_1 = v_2$, and $d_1 > d_2$, and $s_1 < s_2$) we will have:

$$\frac{s_1}{v_1 + d_1} < \frac{s_2}{v_2 + d_2}$$

This time, the rate of profit will increase remarkably.

(4) Then take the case where, by increasing the number of machines, or by introducing new machinery, the depreciation expense of the machinery becomes greater. Such cases, however, are cases where production is also expanded. Then, d_1 will be less than d_2 ($d_1 < d_2$), but, since generally the degree of improvement in the quality and quantity of products is greater than the degree of increase in machinery expense, then s_2 will be much greater than

s_1 ($s_1 \ll s_2$), and, assuming that wages remain constant ($v_1 = v_2$), the result for the most part will be:

$$\frac{s_1}{v_1 + d_1} < \frac{s_2}{v_2 + d_2}$$

The rate of profit increases.¹⁰³

In reality, however, due to changes in market conditions, not all the commodities produced are sold. Accordingly, though the quality of the products is improved and their quantity increases, still that does not necessarily result in an increase in profit. In this context, the increase in the rate of profit is annulled, and the end result is that the rate of profit remains almost constant. In fact, P.A. Samuelson points out that in advanced capitalist nations, "instead of observing a fall in the real rate of interest or profit, we actually observe their oscillation in the business cycle but no strong upward or downward trend in this century."¹⁰⁴

Contrary to what Marx had predicted, the rate of profit has not shown any tendency to fall, but instead has maintained a rather constant state. This means that the ratio of profit to gross capital has been constant. In other words, profit has increased side by side with the increase in gross capital. Accordingly, it has been possible for wages to increase as well. For these reasons, the capitalist economic system has continued to grow steadily, especially in this century.

Admittedly, in advanced capitalist nations, there are sometimes signs of decreases in the rate of profit. Nevertheless, such phenomena are not based on Marx's law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. According to Marx, what causes the rate of profit to fall is the constant increase in the capital for machinery (i.e., the constant rise in the organic composition of capital). In reality, however, the main factors which have caused the rate of profit to fall in advanced capitalist nations have been a decrease in effective demand and an increase in wages. The rate of profit falls because a great amount of capital is invested in labor power, which

has lower profit yield. (Note that the concept of profit used in this critique is the one proposed by Marx, which is different from profit in Unification Thought.)

B. Law of the Impoverishment of the Working Class

The law of the impoverishment of the working class refers to the fact that, since capitalists seek only to maximize profit, they constantly lower wages¹⁰⁵ on one hand, and on the other, they dismiss great numbers of workers through the introduction of machinery, causing a great number of people to become unemployed (the so-called “industrial reserve army”), whereby the number of poor people increases.

Marx discussed this as follows:

The modern laborer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth.¹⁰⁶

The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of its growth, and, therefore, also the absolute mass of the proletariat and the productiveness of its labor, the greater is the industrial reserve army. . . . The greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labor-army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus-population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to its torment of labor.¹⁰⁷

Thus, Marx said that with the growth of the productive forces in capitalist society, the poverty of the workers increases. Here, Marx is referring not only to relative poverty (the status of having less than the rich), but also to absolute poverty (actual deterioration of workers’ living conditions). Actually, Marx wrote that the life of a laborer is the life of a slave, which is evident in the following words:

It [the bourgeoisie] is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave [the laborer] within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him.¹⁰⁸

However, economic reality today shows clearly that Marx's law of the impoverishment of the working class is entirely false. Wages (real wages) show a tendency to rise constantly, in spite of the curtailment of labor time due to frequent introduction of new machinery with technological innovation. The capitalist is making a lot of profit (in the sense adopted by Marx), though the wages of the laborer are raised. According to Samuelson, real wages have steadily and largely been rising since the publication of *Capital* until -the present time, and the lowering of wages has been merely a temporary phenomenon. He writes as follows:

And real wages, instead of falling or remaining constant in the century since Marx's 1867 *Das Kapital*, turn out, on statistical examination, to have been rising dramatically under industrial capitalism.¹⁰⁹

There is available an agreed-upon record of facts about real wage trends in the last century. Real wages have risen steadily and strongly in the last century. . . . Ford workers get real wages ten times what their great-grand-fathers got because their present-day productivity enables that wage to be paid.¹¹⁰

Two graphs, found in Samuelson, showing the rising trend of real wages and the curtailment of average labor time, can be seen in figures 6.6 and 6.7. As these graphs show, in advanced capitalist nations, real wages have risen remarkably while, simultaneously, labor time has been curtailed. As a result, laborers have become wealthier and have come to devote more time to cultural life. It can be said, then, that instead of the law of impoverishment, what has operated in capitalist society has been the "law of enrichment." This contrasts sharply to the reality of socialist nations, where, though labor time has been prolonged to the maximum degree (through forced labor), still the gross national income has not risen to any considerable degree, and laborers have been suf-

fering dire poverty. Therefore, it can be said that the “law of impoverishment” has operated, not in capitalist, but rather in socialist society.

What about Marx’s assertion concerning relative poverty, namely, that the laborer becomes relatively poor when compared with the capitalist? As table 6.1 shows, a comparison of the income distribution of capitalist nations with the income distribution of the Soviet Union shows no particular difference between them. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Soviet Union, a socialist nation, has an especially even distribution of income, nor can it be said that in capitalist society, relative poverty has increased.



Fig. 6.6 The Upward Trend in Real wages in the United States

Here it must be pointed out that the role played by labor unions in the increase of wages has been significant. It has often happened that capitalists have taken excessive amounts out of the earnings of the enterprise, while laborers have been left in a disadvantageous position. To cope with this situation, workers have

formed labor unions, which can negotiate with capitalists or can apply pressure on them. As a result, wages have risen.




Fig. 6.7. Curtailment of Average Working Hours in Advanced Western Countries

Still, the labor movement referred to here does not necessarily mean a communist labor movement. Labor movements organized by communists are different in quality from general labor movements, in the sense that they serve as a preliminary stage for the accomplishment of violent revolution, and also in that their primary purpose is not really to obtain wage increases for the workers.

Composition of employed population	Income Distribution (%)				
	Japan		USSR	UK	USA
	1951	1958	1965	1954	1959
Upper Class (¼)	46	52	55	47	53
Upper-middle Class (¼)	26	26	20	29	24
Lower-middle Class (¼)	19	15	14	14	17
Lower Class (¼)	9	7	11	10	6

(Calculated from the Lorentz curve of income distribution for different nations. But as for the case of the Soviet Union, it is derived from an estimate by H. Kato.)

Source: Hiroshi Kato, *Theory of Economic System* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Toyokeizai Shimposha), p. 154.

Table 6.1. Comparison of Income Distribution in the Soviet Union with that in Capitalist Nations

When confronted with the upward trend of wages resulting from labor movements, communists assert their view that this trend is a temporary phenomenon. They obstinately insist that laborers cannot but be impoverished, since the tendency of wages to fall is an inevitable law of capitalist economy. A Soviet textbook on political economy states the following:

The struggle of the working class can manage to stop the decline of wages and to win a wage increase for a certain period of time. This struggle is the factor which counteracts the declining tendency in the average level of wages. At the same time, the economic struggle of the working class cannot get rid of the laws of capitalism, including the law of the value of labor power, nor can it abolish the system of capitalistic enslavement, nor can it emancipate the worker from exploitation and poverty.¹¹¹

This dogmatic assertion, which disregards reality completely, is based upon the bias in favor of communism of the materialist conception of history, which regards labor movements as a part of the revolutionary movement. Such assertions are no more than a justification for violent revolution.

C. Law of the Centralization of Capital

In order to increase profits, capitalists compete with one another to make good quality commodities in large amounts, by the introduction of new machinery. The owners of small businesses often lose in this competition and decline. Their capital will come to be centralized in a small number of large capitalists. In other words, the “expropriation of capitalist by capitalist”¹¹² begins to take place. This is called the law of the centralization of capital.

As capitalists transform a part of their surplus value into capital, the scale of their capital grows larger, and this phenomenon is called the accumulation of capital.¹¹³ The centralization and accumulation of capital operate in an intertwined way; according to Marxist theory, the middle class should decline and society should necessarily be divided into two classes; that of the rich capitalists who are in the minority, and that of the non-possessing masses who make up the absolute majority. In Marx’s view, therefore, there necessarily occurs “an accumulation of misery [poverty], corresponding with accumulation of capital.”¹¹⁴

Undeniably, the centralization of capital occurs today, as seen in the case of a cartel which seeks to eliminate excessive competition among participating enterprises by means of price and sales agreement; in the case of a trust, which puts participating enterprises under a unified command; and in the case of a conglomerate (*Konzern*), which is a huge group of enterprises belonging to different industrial sectors, combined in a single corporate system.

Nevertheless, even if this is so, it cannot be said that all capital has been centralized in the hands of a small number of capitalists, as Marx predicted. As we know, in capitalist economy, large enterprises often take the form of corporations. A corporation is a system under which a number of stockholders invest money jointly, possess in common the means of production, and receive a distribution of the profits according to the amount of their investment. The property of an incorporated enterprise does not be-

long to individuals, but rather to a juridical person, namely the corporation itself. Therefore, contrary to what Marx said, the tendency is not for all capital to be centralized in the hands of a small number of individuals, but rather for a large part of it to be decentralized and spread out among the population.

Capitalist society is based on free-market economy carried out mostly by private; corporate enterprises. In contrast, communist society is based on centralized economy, where the entire nation forms a single enterprise, managed by the state. Under the name of "joint ownership" (or "social ownership"),¹¹⁵ the state enterprise in communist society is in fact controlled unilaterally by government bureaucrats under the dictatorship of a single party, which is sometimes controlled by a single man. This is indeed a monopolistic enterprise, where the centralization of capital has been carried to its extreme. Accordingly, if the centralization of capital is to be denounced, then the finger should be pointed at the communist party, which has become a supreme monopolistic capitalist.

In capitalist society today, the number of small businesses has increased; tertiary industries, such as service industries and the information industries have expanded at a high rate; and the middle class has grown considerably. Therefore, instead of two widely separate classes, as Marx had predicted, what we see today is that the gap between the very rich and very poor is narrowing with the rapid growth of the middle class. If this trend continues, then the economic situation of the capitalist and the laborer will tend to merge into the middle class, in such a way that the society whose external appearance is that of a capitalist system may, in reality, become a classless society.

It is clear, then, that Marx's economic laws of the development of capitalism, which are called the theory of the collapse of capitalism, are irrational and entirely unfounded. The reason behind Marx's exaggerated assessment of the situation in capitalist society, whereby he depicted the exploitation of the worker by the

capitalist as the inevitable, fundamental contradiction of capitalism, was simply that he wanted to justify violent revolution. For this reason, he fabricated his "laws."

One final point should be included here. Our critique of Marx's view of capitalism should not be taken as an effort to conceal the economic contradictions and ills within capitalist society, or to defend the capitalist system in any way. The purpose of the critique presented here has only been to show that, Marx's way of grasping these contradictions and his criticism of them are totally wrong. Undeniably, capitalist society must be reformed at all costs, but the only way possible to bring about that reformation is through a spiritual revolution based on spiritual values established on the foundation of God's love, rather than through violent revolution based on the theory of material values (the labor theory of value), as Marx would have it.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY

In the preceding chapter I criticized Marx's economic theory—i.e., *Capital*, especially, his labor theory of value and theory of surplus value—and also resented a counterproposal to it. One additional strong point that demonstrates the falsity of *Capital* is the situation of existing socialist economies. Especially, the reality of the economy of the Soviet Union—the first nation to carry out a proletarian revolution and to put socialism into practice, and the largest and leading nation in the socialist bloc today—provides evidence for this.

In this chapter I will present the Marxist theory of the construction of socialism and communism. Then, together with a discussion of the reality of the Soviet economy, a representative of socialist economy, I will criticize that theory. Finally I will analyze the causes which lead to the stagnation of the Soviet economy.

I. THEORY OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

A. The Transition Period

In Marxist theory the transition from capitalism to communism does not take place instantaneously, but goes through a certain

period (transition period).¹ In *Political Economy: A Textbook* (hereafter cited as the *Textbook*), published in the Soviet Union in 1962, the transition period is described as follows:

The transition period from capitalism to socialism begins with the establishment of proletarian power and is completed with the realization of the task of socialist revolution—the establishment of socialism, the first phase of communist society.²

Socialism is characterized by the following features: (1) dictatorship of the proletariat; (2) socialization of the means of production; and (3) planning of the economy. Communists maintain that, through dictatorship of the proletariat, not only the socialization of the means of production, but also the collectivization of agriculture and the socialization of industry can be accomplished.

1. The Socialization (Nationalization) of the Means of Production

The term “means of production” is used to refer to the objects of labor (raw materials) and to the instruments of labor (machinery, buildings and equipment). To socialize, or nationalize the means of production means to confiscate the means of production from the bourgeoisie (the capitalist class) and to transfer them to the proletariat (the working class). In other words, the ownership of the means of production is changed from private ownership to social (or state) ownership. This process is explained in the *Textbook* as follows:

Socialist nationalization is the revolutionary expropriation of the property of the exploiting classes by the proletarian state and its conversion into state, socialist property, i.e., into the property of the whole people.... Through this process, the key economic sectors of the nation are handed over to the workers, and this constitutes the economic foundation for dictatorship of the proletariat.³

The aim of socialist revolution is to replace private ownership in the means of production with social ownership, whereby all exploitation of man by man is abolished.⁴

2. The Collectivization of Agriculture

If farm management were to remain under private control, based on private property, then capitalism would necessarily revive. Accordingly, the socialist collectivization (cooperative organization) of farming is an indispensable condition for uprooting capitalism, and only through that can farmers be freed from exploitation and ruin. This matter is explained in the *Textbook* as follows:

Petty commodity production based on private property inevitably gives rise to capitalist elements, spontaneously and in large scale. Therefore the socialist collectivization of farming is an indispensable condition for eradicating the capitalist root within the economy.⁵

The only way for peasants to be freed from exploitation and ruin is to move onto the socialist path through cooperatives.⁶

3. The Socialization of Industry

The development of heavy industry (especially mechanical engineering) is a necessary condition for socialism's attainment of complete victory. The development of heavy industry will bring about abundant production of consumer goods, while improving the cultural level of the people. According to Lenin, "a large-scale machine industry capable of reorganizing agriculture is the only material basis that is possible for socialism."⁷ The *Textbook* explains this matter:

Socialist industrialization stands primarily on the foundation of heavy industry and its core, mechanical engineering.⁸

The socialist development of heavy industry is not for its own purpose, It creates the foundation for the technological re-equipment of all branches of the national economy, including the foundation for a rapid acceleration of the production of consumer goods and for a systematic improvement of the material and cultural standards of the workers in urban as well as in farming areas.⁹

This concludes the summary of the theory of the transition period. We have seen that the first step toward building a socialist economy is the socialization of the means of production through dictatorship of the proletariat.

B. The Phase of Socialism

1. Socialism as the First Phase of Communist Society

In his *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Marx described the transition period from capitalist society to communist society as

a communist society . . . just as it *emerges* from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.¹⁰

Socialism is described as “the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society.”¹¹ A similar description is given in the *Textbook*:

Socialism and communism, which are two phases of the same socioeconomic formation, differ with regard to the development of their economy and the maturity of their social relations. The transition from the lower phase of communism to its higher phase is a law-governed historical process, and no stage should be bypassed. . . . Communism arises and develops on the basis created as the result of the victorious establishment and consolidation of socialism, the first phase of the communist formation.¹²

In summary, the emergence of communist society occurs in two phases, according to communist theory. The first, or lower phase, is socialism; and the second phase, or higher phase, is communism.

2. The Aim of Socialist Production

In communist theory the aim of socialist production contrasts sharply with the aim of capitalist production. According to Lenin, socialism comes about through the introduction of “planned or-

ganization of social production to insure the well-being and many-sided development of all the members of society.”¹³ As a description of the aims of the two types of society, Stalin said that “the aim of capitalist production is profit-making. . . . The aim of socialist production is not profit, but man and his needs, that is, the satisfaction of his material and cultural requirements,”¹⁴

Following these views, the *Textbook* points out that, while in capitalist society the aim of production is the attainment of profit, in socialist society, however, the aim of production is “the steady improvement of the material well-being and cultural standards of the people,”¹⁵

3. Features of the Development of the Socialist Economy

According to textbooks of political economy from the Soviet Union, the development of the socialist economy has the following features, or laws:

The first feature is “proportionate development of the economy.” Under the capitalist economy, production is carried out anarchically and disproportionately, resulting in monopolistic capital and excessive production. Under socialism, however, the economy develops proportionately, which means that it maintains balance among its various branches:

With the disappearance of the contradictions of capitalism, there will be no place for disproportionate economic development, as is inherent to capitalism. . . . The planned, proportionate development of the national economy is the economic law of socialism. This law requires that the development of all the economic spheres follow a single, planned guideline established by society, and that all branches and elements of the national economy be maintained in good balance.¹⁶

The second feature is “steady growth of the economy,” described as follows:

Under capitalism, economic development proceeds circularly, and becomes suspended cyclically; on the contrary, the socialist

economy is liberated from panics, and develops at a high, stable growth rate based upon the ratio determined by the socialist state according to the economic law and requirements of society.¹⁷

The third feature is the “steady growth of labor productivity”:

Socialism removes the obstacles to growth of labor productivity inherent in capitalism and provides the broadest opportunities for it. Socialist organization of social labor systematically unites the working people, free of exploitation, with means of production corresponding to the latest advances of sciences and engineering.¹⁸

The fourth feature is “thrifty and efficient economy”:

The planned economy of socialism enables society to free itself from the enormous waste of social labor, which is inherent to the capitalist economy and results from competition and anarchy of production, The socialist economy can make thrifty and efficient use of resources at the level of the enterprise as well as at the level of the entire national economy, as new resources for production and development are discovered.¹⁹

In conclusion, the Marxist theory of socialism considers the socialist economy to be in every way superior to the capitalist economy.²⁰

C. The Phase of Communism

Marx envisioned communism as a society where productive forces are developed to a high degree and wealth is abundant for everyone. Its guiding principle would be “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”²¹ In that society, there would be no difference between mental and physical work,²² labor would become a joyful activity, and society would be classless, with all people completely equal. And the state, the organ of class oppression and law enforcement, would wither away.”²³

There are marked differences between socialist and communist societies, In socialist society people receive goods “according to work”; there remains a distinction between mental and physical

work, and between town and country, with antagonism between them. Thus, social distinctions still exist. In contrast, in communist society people would receive goods according to their needs, and there would be no discrimination nor antagonism of any kind.²⁴

The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), adopted at the 22nd Congress in 1961, describes communism as follows:

Communism is a classless social system with one form of public ownership of the means of production and full social equality of all members of society; under it, the all-round development of people will be accompanied by the growth of the productive forces through continuous progress in science and technology; all the springs of collective wealth will flow more abundantly, and the great principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' will be implemented. Communism is a highly organized society of free, socially conscious working people in which public self-government will be established, a society in which labor for the good of society will become the prime, vital requirement of every one, a necessity recognized by one and all, and the ability of each person will be employed to the greatest benefit of the people.²⁵

II. CRITIQUE OF SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM BASED ON REALITY

What are the real facts in socialist society today? Has the socialist economy reached a remarkable level of development and has exploitation of man by man been eradicated, as the theory of the construction of socialism and communism had promised? The actual situation is not at all what the theory would claim. Rather, reality has turned out entirely opposite to theory.

A. Critique of the Theory of the 'Transition Period

I. Critique of the Socialization (Nationalization) of the Means of Production

Communists claimed that they would eradicate all exploitation of man by man by transferring the means of production from private to social ownership. But have the workers and farmers indeed been emancipated by the socialization of the means of production?

Let us examine income distribution in the Soviet Union a representative socialist nation, as compared with income distribution in capitalist countries. Where is it more equitable? On which side are earning' differentials smaller? The facts show that no special difference can be found between the two types of economy (see figure 6.1 in chapter 6). If anything, earning differentials in advanced capitalist nations are smaller than in the Soviet Union. Communists have promised that "the lowest level and the highest level of wages would come remarkably close together,"²⁶ but the facts have not turned out that way. Therefore, there is no basis for the claim that, through the socialization of the means of production in socialist nations, exploitation has ceased and equality has been attained.

Moreover, even though socialist society should have become a "classless society," in reality it is not at all. The proletariat was supposed to have taken over, creating a class-less society; instead, the communist party has become the master of socialist society. Consequently, a "new class society" has come into being, where the privileged class, the communist party, dominates the masses of people. Under the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, inequality in wealth and rights between the privileged class and the masses has become established; laborers and farmers have been placed in a practically permanent slave-like relation of sub-

ordination. The socialization of the means of production implies in reality the bureaucratic control of the economy by the “new class,” which calls itself the representative of the workers.

Milovan Djilas, former Vice President of Yugoslavia, describes clearly what the nationalization of the means of production is all about:

Gradually material goods were nationalized, but in fact, through its fight to use, enjoy, and distribute these goods, they became the property of a discernible stratum of the party and the bureaucracy gathered around it.²⁷

Initially, the state seizes all means of production in order to control all investments for rapid industrialization. Ultimately, further economic development has come to be guided mainly in the interest of the ruling class.²⁸

Along similar lines, Ota Sik, former Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, has the following to say about the nationalization of the means of production:

In a strict sense, nationalization did not turn out to be socialization; rather, it turned out to be no more than bureaucratization. The workers have become more alienated than in capitalist society in the process of production.²⁹

2. Critique of the Collectivization of Agriculture

Lenin declared revolution under the banner of “peace, land, bread,” and in 1917 he issued the “Decree on Land” whereby land was nationalized, and the land confiscated from big land owners was given to peasants. Moreover, motivated by the necessity of increasing the production of foodstuffs, Lenin adopted the “New Economic Policy” (NEP 1921), which granted farmers the free cultivation of their land and the free disposal of their crops, after paying a food tax. Of course, such policies radically contradicted the communist view on the nationalization of land. Indeed, when the time was right, Stalin forcefully implemented the collectivization of agriculture and the nationalization of land, starting with the First Five-Year Plan (1928).³⁰

The peasants strongly resisted collectivization, but their resistance was countered with atrocious and violent suppression, as is seen in these testimonies:

After the massive slaughter of livestock, the resistance of the *Kolkhoz* farmers took the shape of absenteeism and retreat to the individual pieces of land left to them.³¹

The obverse side of the expansion of the working class is the shrinkage of the peasantry. Forty years ago rural smallholders made up more than three-quarters of the nation; at present the collectivized farmers constitute only one-quarter. How desperately the peasants resisted this trend, what furious violence was let loose against them, how they were forced to contribute to the sinews of industrialization, and how resentfully and sluggishly they have tilled the land under the collectivist dispensation— all this is now common knowledge.³²

The communist regime not only confiscated land from the peasants, but also established the policy of buying crops from them at very low prices and selling industrial products to them at very high prices, thus raising capital. This was done in order to accomplish industrialization, in other words, in order to introduce machinery and technology purchased from abroad. Thus, in order to implement the socialization of industry, a large amount of capital was concentrated in the Soviet Union—the same kind of concentration of capital for which Marx accused capitalist society. G. Martinet explains this as follows:

The scars left by the compulsory collectivization have never been healed. The eminent Polish economist, Oscar Lange, once told me that the system established in the thirties was perceived as a feudal system of exploitation, the lord being this time not the noble, but the state, and the money raised from the peasants being used not to build cathedrals, but factories. A single example will illustrate this: in 1935, the Soviet State would buy a quintal (100 kg) of rye for 8 rubles and would sell it for 93 rubles to its own mills, where the consumers would get it for a corresponding price. The peasants never forgave this form of “primitive accumulation.”³³

Stalin himself, who enforced the collectivization of agriculture, admitted that fact:

The way matters stand with the peasantry in this respect is as follows: it not only pays the state the usual taxes, direct and indirect; it also *overpays* in the relatively high prices for manufactured goods—that is in the first place, and it is more or less *underpaid* in the prices for agricultural produce—that is in the second place. This is an additional tax levied on the peasantry for the sake of promoting industry.³⁴

This has been the actual situation of the collectivization of agriculture in the transition period. Have farmers been emancipated? Has agriculture been developed? The answer to both questions is no.

The following facts clearly show the failure of the collectivization of agriculture and the nationalization of land. Farmland in the Soviet Union has all been nationalized (collectivized) with the exception of about 1 to 30%, which was granted as private property. The share of livestock and crops produced on private land is quite significant when compared with that produced by the rest of the country. Kenzo Kiga pointed out that in 1965 the private farms of the Soviet Union (no more than 3% of the whole land) produced 10.7% of the entire production of dairy cattle, 8.7% of the entire production of pigs, and 37.7% of the entire production of goats.

Moreover, if the side businesses of the *Kolkhoz* (collective farms) are added, then the share of dairy cattle produced on private property would amount to 42.0 %, the share of pigs would amount to 28.8%, and the share of goats would amount to 83.0%.³⁵ For further information see tables 7.1 through 7.3 below.³⁶

As these tables show, good results in agriculture have not been obtained either in *Sovkhoz* (state farms) or in *Kolkhoz* (collective farms); in contrast, side businesses (private property) in the *Kolkhoz* and private farming, whose farming area is no more than 3% of the whole, show quite a large ratio of livestock. In crop yield,

also, the proportion put out by the side businesses in the *Kolkhoz* is considerably large. This means that when Soviet farmers were assigned private possessions, they would eagerly engage in cattle raising and farming, but when they were assigned to state or collective farms, they would not work as eagerly.

	1928	1940	1950	1959	1960	1962	1964
Sovkhoz and other state-owned enterprises	1.5	8.8	10.9	30.0	36.1	44.0	45.0
<i>Kolkhoz</i>	1.2	78.4	82.7	66.4	60.2	53.0	52.0
side businesses by <i>Kolkhoz</i> workers	1.0	3.0	4.0	2.7	2.2	—	—
Private side businesses by workers	—	0.5	1.1	0.9	1.1	3.0	3.0
Private farming and others	96.3	9.4	1.3	0.01	0.04		

Source: K. Kiga, *Communist Economy* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Hanawashobo, 1967), vol. 1, p. 14.

Table 7.1. Percentages of Total farming Area by Management Type

		1941	1951	1958	1961	1965
Sovkhoz and other state-owned enterprises	milking cows	4.7	7.4	12.5	20.9	23.0
	pigs	11.9	14.9	21.9	25.3	30.0
	goats	1.1	1.0	2.4	2.8	4.0
<i>Kolkhoz</i>	milking cows	20.4	49.2	43.7	47.8	35.0
	pigs	29.9	50.4	45.0	46.6	42.0
	goats	24.0	46.2	13.6	15.3	13.0
side businesses by <i>Kolkhoz</i> workers	milking cows	45.5	32.0	30.7	19.8	cows 42.0 pigs 28.2 goats 83.0
	pigs	31.3	25.9	23.8	17.5	
	goats	53.4	32.9	48.1	44.1	
private side businesses by workers and private farming	milking cows	29.4	11.4	13.1	10.7	cows 42.0 pigs 28.2 goats 83.0
	pigs	26.9	8.8	9.3	8.7	
	goats	21.5	19.9	35.9	37.7	

Table 7.2. Percentages of Total Livestock Production by Management Type

Indeed, the collectivization of agriculture and the nationalization of land has been carried out by force in the Soviet Union; as it turned out, however, the productivity of *Sovkhoz* and *Kolkhoz* has

been lower than that of private farming. And this reality has troubled Soviet authorities since the beginning of the Stalin era.

		1957	1958	1959
The USSR as a whole	potatoes	87,813	86,527	86,561
	vegetables	14,766	14,865	14,774
<i>Sovkhoz</i>	potatoes	3,000	3,090	4,732
	vegetables	1,310	1,422	2,037
<i>Kolkhoz</i>	potatoes	26,348	25,066	25,153
	vegetables	6,008	5,785	4,878
side businesses by <i>Kolkhoz</i> workers and others	potatoes	56,916	57,042	54,959
	vegetables	6,374	6,692	6,774

Source: K. Kiga, *Communist Economy*, 1:17.

Table 7.3 Annual Yield of Potatoes and Vegetables by Management Type

Since 1979, the agriculture of the Soviet Union has been in a severe slump, so much so that the output of crops for 1981 was not made public. The Soviet Union, which once exported crops to European nations, now finds itself having to rely heavily on agricultural imports from the West.

3. Critique of the Socialization of Industry

Communists have stated that, in order to bring about the complete victory of socialism, they had to develop heavy industry and mechanical engineering, which was to be the basis for the abundant production of consumer goods and for the improvement of the material well-being and cultural standards of laborers and farmers. Have these promises ever been fulfilled? The answer again is no. In the *Textbook* it is said that:

the socialization of industry is the necessary condition to secure the technological and economic independence of the countries of the socialist bloc from the imperialist bloc, as well as the defense force of the socialist countries, The development of heavy indus-

try is the material basis for producing modern weapons, necessary for the defense of the socialist countries.³⁷

They claim that the development of heavy industry is for defense, but in reality it is used as a means to stand in a superior military posture vis-à-vis the West and to rule the communist bloc, preventing any possibility of revolt. Furthermore, it is not true that the socialization of industry (especially the development of heavy industry) has been a basis for producing consumer goods for the people; they themselves have made it clear that “the development of heavy industry is the material basis for producing modern weapons.”

Moreover, the socialization of industry has been accomplished by sacrificing the living conditions of laborers and farmers. The *Textbook* frankly admits this, as follows:

The construction of socialism in the Soviet Union was extremely difficult. In order to create heavy industry in a short period of time, the people had to make extraordinary sacrifices. During that time, the production of consumer goods was sharply curtailed in the Soviet Union. It became increasingly difficult to satisfy the wants of the workers, and the rate of increase of real wages became very small,³⁸

They also claimed that the socialization of industry “would, after a certain period of time, guarantee the necessary conditions for a rapid increase in the consumption by the people,”³⁹ but in reality, laborers and farmers have been called upon to sacrifice not only during the so-called transition period, but after that as well, even until today.

By imposing an austerity life-style on its people, the Soviet Union has continuously increased its military power, always striving to attain military superiority over the United States, The intention of the Soviet Union is to make the world tremble before its military might and to bring other nations into the communist bloc, The Soviet military buildup, far from being a means for defense, is actually a plot to conquer and bolshevize the world by force.

B. Critique of the Phase of Socialism

1. Critique of Socialism as the First Phase of Communism

The Eighth Congress of Soviets (December 1936), under the leadership of Stalin, proclaimed “the completion of the building of socialism in the main,” and adopted the so-called Stalin constitution. The 18th Party Congress of the CPSU announced that:

through the Second Five-Year plan (1933-37), the first phase of communism—socialism—had in the main been built and that the USSR had entered a new period of development, a “period of the *completion of the building of a classless socialist society and the gradual transition from socialism to communism.*”⁴⁰

Stalin proclaimed “the complete victory of socialism,” while the Soviet Union was yet far from reaching the conditions described as the first phase of communism. On the basis of the alleged victory of socialism, Stalin stated that the Soviet Union had entered the phase of building a communist society. His reason for saying that was to impress the world with the rapid economic development of the Soviet Union, to advertise to everyone the superiority of socialism, and also to inspire communist movements in capitalist society. When, in 1952, Stalin published *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, communists all over the world loudly proclaimed that the period of the transition into “communism” had come, and announced that the “Last Days of history,” the “world of abundance,” Marx’s Utopia of “the millennial kingdom,” were at hand.⁴¹ (see figure 7.1)

In May 1957, after the denunciation of Stalin (1956) following his death in 1953, Premier Khrushchev said in *Pravda*, with uplifted spirit, that “by 1980, the Soviet Union would be standing at the threshold of communism, which Marx once dreamed of”; and at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, held in 1959, it was proclaimed that “the complete and final victory of socialism” in the Soviet Union had been achieved, and that the Soviet Union had passed on

to the “period of the full-scale building of communism.”⁴² In the same congress, Khrushchev boastfully said,

After 1965, probably another five years will be needed to overtake and surpass the United States for per capita industrial production, This means that by that time, and perhaps even earlier, the Soviet Union will advance to first place in the world both for total production and for per capita production, *This will be a historic victory for socialism in its peaceful competition with capitalism in the international arena.*⁴³




Fig. 7.1. Stalin’s Model for the Development of Communist Society

According to the model of the Program of the CPSU (Khrushchev’s model), the period from 1917 to 1936 was the “period of transition from capitalism to socialism”; the period from 1936 to 1959 was the “period of the building of developed socialist society”; the period from 1959 to 1980 was the “period of the building of communism”; and the period after 1980 was the “period of communism.” Khrushchev’s model is shown in figure 7.2.

In the late 1950’s, especially after the success of the Russian satellite *Sputnik I* (1957), the myth of the supremacy of the socialist system became widely acclaimed, and it seemed that the “east wind” was overwhelming the “west wind.” That was a golden

age for socialism. The Free World felt shocked and threatened by these events.




Fig 7.2. Khrushchev's Model for the Development of Communist Society




Fig. 7.3. Brezhnev's Model for the Development of Communist Society

Later Khrushchev lost his position (1964), and his easy, optimistic outlook was criticized. After that came Leonid Brezhnev's "theory of developed socialism," which was announced in his speech at the 24th Congress of the CPSU (1971). The new constitu-

tion of 1977 (the “Brezhnev Constitution”) clearly stated that Soviet society had entered the stage of developed socialism,

Brezhnev’s model (figure 7.3) replaced Khrushchev’s “period of the building of communism” with the “period of developed socialism.” In contrast to Khrushchev, who had boldly proclaimed that his age was the period for the building of communism, Brezhnev did not use the term “communism” to refer to his age. Furthermore, in contrast to Khrushchev’s model, which announced that 1980 would mark the advent of communist society, Brezhnev’s model made no mention of when communist society would begin.

As time passed from Stalin to Khrushchev and to Brezhnev, Marx’s ideal of communist society became more and more remote, rather than nearer. Actually, there is no guarantee that communist society will ever be realized. Therefore, Marx’s assertion that socialist society (established through the dictatorship of the proletariat) is the first phase of communist society, is nothing but dogmatic, wishful thinking, with no foundation in reality.

2. Critique of the Aim of Socialist Production

Communists insist that the aim of capitalist production is to obtain for the capitalist, surplus value, through exploitation, while the aim of socialist production is to provide material well-being for all the people and to improve every one’s cultural standards. Are these claims true? Is the economic structure of capitalism necessarily one of exploitation? And does the socialist economic structure necessarily carry put production for the benefit of all the people?

Communists charge that the “militarization of the economy” in capitalist society is inevitable;⁴⁴ but which side is more involved in militarizing the economy by exploiting and oppressing the people? and at the sacrifice of consumer goods? A comparison can be made by looking at the percentages of the gross national product (GNP) used as military expenditure. Statistical data indicate that

military expenditure represents 8% of the GNP in the United States, 3% in Europe, 1% in Japan, and 10-15% in the Soviet Union. Clearly, the economy of the Soviet Union is much more intensely militarized than that of Free World nations.

It is indeed false that socialist production seeks the improvement of the material well-being and cultural standard of the people. Externally, the aim of socialist production is the communization of the world; internally, it is the defense of communist dictatorial government. The strong preferential treatment given to armaments in the Soviet Union, contrasted with the bleak, austerity life-style of the Soviet people, clearly indicates that the "official" aim of socialist production is merely a fiction disguised as an ideal.

3. Critique of the Features of the Development of Socialist Economy

The points of the theory of the development of socialist economy are the following: proportionate (or balanced) development of the economy, steady growth of the economy, steady growth of labor productivity, thrifty and efficient economy, etc. Each one of these will be criticized below.

a) Critique of the "Proportionate Development" of the Economy

The proportionate (balanced) development of the economy in communism does not mean that every area of the economy should develop at the same average rate. This concept actually refers to a disproportionate development, which maintains the relation of a certain ratio based upon a preferential treatment of heavy industry, which is directly connected with military power build-up. The Textbook explains this matter as follows:

The proper correlation between the production of means of production and the production of consumer goods can be referred to as the most important ratio in the development of national economy under socialism. In order to determine this ratio, one must

start with the principle of the priority development of the production of the means of production. This means that heavy industry should develop at a higher rate than the sectors producing consumer goods.⁴⁵

Excessive emphasis on heavy industry naturally leads to little emphasis on consumer goods, and this, concretely, brings about a low level of life. The communist claim with regard to the proportionate development of the economy is a propaganda device to give people the illusion that the whole economy is developing uniformly and to reinforce on the people the idea of the superiority of the communist economic system—while all along they are just developing a limited area of the economy (heavy industry and military power). As mentioned earlier, the policy of industrialization centered on heavy industry was carried out by force and at the sacrifice of the living conditions of the masses.

b) Critique of the “Steady Growth” of the Economy

During the five decades after the communist revolution of 1917, and especially during the Stalin period, the Soviet Union progressed from an underdeveloped agricultural nation to a developed industrial nation, comparable to the United States. What caused the rapid economic development of the Soviet Union? The implementation, through a dictatorial system of government, of policies such as inhuman pressure on laborers, the imposition of poverty, and the preferential treatment of heavy industry, whereby they sought to reach the goals of their planned economy. R. Moorsteen and R. Powell, two American scholars who have done research on the Soviet economy, describe the reality of the great leap of the Soviet economy during the Stalin period:

The increase in outputs reflects sources of growth which were, for the Soviet population, immensely costly: the rapid increase of the capital stock and consequent sacrifice of current consumption; the conversion of rural into urban labor, in substantial part by the violent measures of collectivization; the increased employment of women at the expense of their household functions;

and, for previously non-Soviet peoples, the acquisition of resources by territorial expansion. These were not costs voluntarily incurred but costs imposed upon the population by the exertion of compulsion of the severest sort.⁴⁶

In the sixties, however, this Stalinistic policy of “growth by force” gradually reached its limits—in other words, there were definite limits to the human wave tactics of labor investment, and further economic growth was no longer expected.

When faced with these difficulties, the Soviet Union decided to colonize and exploit the Eastern European countries under the guise of a socialist international division of labor. The economist Alvin Toffler explains:

After World War II, with troops and the threat of invasion, [the Soviets] helped install or maintain “friendly” regimes throughout most of Eastern Europe. These countries, more industrially advanced than the USSR itself, were intermittently milked by the Soviets, justifying their description as colonies or “satellites.” . . .

While the Americans built the IMF-GATT-World Bank structure, the Soviets moved toward Lenin’s dream of single integrated world economic system by creating the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and compelling the Eastern European countries to join it. COMECON countries are forced by Moscow not only to trade with one another and with the Soviet Union but to submit their economic development plans to Moscow for approval. Moscow, insisting on the Ricardian virtues of specialization, acting exactly like the old imperialist powers vis-à-vis African, Asian, or Latin American economies, has assigned specialized functions to each Eastern European economy.⁴⁷

There was, however, a certain limit to Soviet economic growth based on this exploitation of the Eastern European countries, just as there was a limit to the exploitation of workers within the Soviet Union. “Growth by force” eventually reached its limits both domestically and internationally. Yet the *Textbook* states that “the socialist economy develops steadily at a rapid pace following an upward trend based on ratios determined by the socialist country

according to economic laws and the needs of society.”⁴⁸ Today, however, hardly any one takes the economic laws of socialism seriously, even the communists themselves.

c) Critique of the “Steady Growth” of Labor Productivity

One of the economic “laws” of socialism claims that labor productivity grows steadily. When the method of human wave tactics of forced labor reached its limits, the Soviet economy had no alternative but to place its hopes on technological development for the improvement of labor productivity. And yet, no “steady growth of labor productivity” has ever occurred either in industry or in agriculture. Growth was noticeably lacking in industry. An example is given by Haruki Niwa as follows:

The statistics provided by N.M. Kaplin, R.H. Moorsteen, and G.W. Nutter show that labor productivity in the Soviet mining industry hardly improved through the period of the First Five-Year Plan. The original goal of that plan (to be reached by 1932) was finally achieved thirty years later, around 1960.⁴⁹

The *Textbook* admits this lag in the labor productivity of the Soviet economy. It says that “in 1961 the level of the productivity of labor in the Soviet Union, compared with that in the United States, was between one half and two fifths for industry and about one third for agriculture (the rate for agriculture is the average for 1958-61).”⁵¹ The same source predicted that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in *per capita* output during the decade of 1961-1970.⁵¹ Nevertheless, the lag in labor productivity persisted even later than that time, as if it were inherent to the Soviet economy. Among the reasons for the lack of growth in labor productivity in the Soviet Union have been the following: the workers’ lost desire to work due to the imposition of forced labor, the stagnation of technological innovation under the centralized management system, low efficiency in most aspects of the economy, and so on.

d) Critique of the “Thrifty and Efficient” Economy

Communists claim that socialist planned economy is thrifty and efficient, in which, contrary to what happens in capitalist economy, there is no room for waste of labor. Is this really true? Stalin made the following relevant remarks:

It is necessary, in the first place, that our industrial plans should not be the product of bureaucratic fancy, but that they should be closely co-ordinated with the state of the national economy, taking into account our country’s resources and reserves . . . Among us there is sometimes a fondness for drawing up fantastic industrial plans, without taking our actual resources into account. . . . It means noisily proclaiming ambitious plans, drawing thousands. and tens of thousands of additional workers into production, raising a great hullabaloo and later, when it is discovered that funds are inadequate, discharging workers, paying them off, incurring immense losses, sowing disillusionment in our constructive efforts, and causing a political scandal. . . .

It is necessary, in the second place, to reduce and simplify our state and co-operative apparatus, our budget-maintained and self-maintained institutions, from top to bottom, to put them on sounder lines and make them cheaper, The inflated establishments and unparalleled extravagance of our administrative agencies have become a by-word. . . .

It is necessary, in the third place, for us to wage a determined struggle against every species of extravagance in our administrative bodies and in everyday life, against that criminal attitude towards the people’s wealth and state reserves which has been noticeable among us of late. We see prevailing among us now a regular riot, an orgy, of all kinds of fetes, celebration meetings, jubilees, unveilings of monuments and the like, Scores and hundreds of thousands of rubles are squandered on these “affairs,” . . . It is high time to understand that, with the needs of industry to provide for, and faced by such facts as the mass of unemployed and homeless children, we cannot tolerate and have no right to tolerate this profligacy and this orgy of squandering. . . .

It is necessary, in the fourth place, to conduct a systematic struggle against theft, against what is known as “carefree” theft, in

our state bodies, in the co-operatives, in the trade unions, etc. There is shamefaced and surreptitious theft, and there is bold-faced, or "carefree" theft, as the press calls it.⁵²

Passages such as these, accurately describing the failures in the Soviet system in such terms as "the failure of the fantastic and ambitious plans," "the necessity of the simplification of the state apparatus," "extravagance in the administrative bodies," "carefree theft," "the mass of unemployed and homeless children," are evidence taken from Stalin's own words that no one can claim that the socialist planned economy is a thrifty, efficient and superior system,

The situation described by Stalin did not improve during Khrushchev's period. The *Textbook* points out that the warehouses of the nation were full of inferior commodities, while consumers lacked the commodities they really needed:

While individual enterprises are carrying out the plans in the expression of value, they continue to produce such goods as cannot satisfy the needs of the people. . . . While these goods are accumulated in the warehouses of the enterprises and of commercial organizations, only a few goods needed by the consumers are produced. In the report of the Central Committee at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU Khrushchev said, "The time has come when we must raise more sharply the question of greatly improving the quality of all goods. The variety of goods in our shops is often not wide enough, although warehouses are often chock-full of 'unmarketable goods.' What kind of goods are these? Poor quality goods that nobody will purchase, The demand for footwear, for instance, is not being fully met, although footwear to the value of more 1,500 million rubles has accumulated in warehouses."⁵³

As a result, there arose the strange phenomenon of the accumulation of goods, together with long lines of shoppers in the Soviet Union and in Eastern European countries, from the fifties up to the present time.⁵⁴ In the light of such facts, no one can claim that

the Soviet socialist economy is a thrifty, efficient economy; in fact, exactly the opposite has turned out to be the case.

4. The Failure of the Socialist Economy

As stagnation gradually takes hold of the Soviet economy, criticism against Soviet economy policies are beginning to be heard among scholars. Under these circumstances, Y. G. Liberman, professor of economics at the Kharkov State University, published a paper in September 1962 entitled "The Plan, Profits, and Bonuses," which argued for a decisive reform of traditional economic policies. Liberman advocated two main points, namely, greater independence for enterprises through the improvement of centralized planning, and greater emphasis on material incentives for enterprises through evaluation of the profitability they have achieved.

Khrushchev supported Liberman's plan, and because of that, a mood in favor of economic reform swept the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. A battle between the conservative and reformist wings ensued. After the fall of Khrushchev, Premier Kosygin who was in charge of the economy in the Brezhnev-Kosygin administration, proposed the "new economic reforms" which incorporated Liberman's ideas in the September (1965) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee. The main points of Kosygin's plan were: respect for the independence of enterprises, the granting of material incentive, and a new adjustment of prices. In January 1966, this plan was put into practice in 43 enterprises from 17 industrial branches. By the end of 1969, the new system had been implemented in 36,000 enterprises of the mining and manufacturing industries.⁵⁵

More concretely, the reform plan of the "new economic reforms" had the following features: (1) The enterprises were to set goals as high as possible, and those enterprises which managed to achieve their goals would receive an "incentive fund" to be used to improve working conditions or to be given out as bonuses. The

purpose of that plan was to lead the enterprises to set very high goals on their own. (2) The enterprises that managed to reduce production costs and to increase profit were also given the incentive fund in the same way. (3) The standard used to measure achievement was changed from production output to amount of sales. (Previously, the enterprises that produced more had been considered more successful, which resulted in stockpiles of unmarketable goods. The reforms were implemented as a means to rectify that situation.)

After this economic reform was put into practice, it looked as if the Soviet economy would stabilize to a certain extent. Still, the reform was implemented within the framework of the traditional system of planned economy, and eventually it came to a standstill due to various internal contradictions.

In the Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in December 1969, the results of the economic reforms were evaluated. Shortly after that, it was decided to adopt a method similar to the one used in the Stalin period, including such features as political pressure, strict enforcement of ideological standards, and rigid administrative controls. In spite of that, the Soviet economy has grown more and more stagnant in a downward trend. In other words, neither the new economic reforms, nor the return to strict ideological standards have been able to reverse the downward trend of the Soviet economy (see figure 7.4).

In the late seventies, the Soviet economy almost came to a standstill. The sovietologist Hiromi Teratani says the following:

The annual average growth rate of the GNP was still 3.8% by the early seventies, by the late seventies it fell to 2.8%. (According to the official report on industrial production, the average was 5.7% in the early seventies and 4.5% in the late seventies), The growth rate of the GNP from the eighties to the end of this century is estimated at 2.1%—or, at best, 3.1%. . . . The main cause is the decline in the productivity of labor. The average growth of the productivity of labor was 1.3% in 1965-70, but it was -0.1% in 1970-75 and -0.3% in 1976-80.⁵⁶




Fig. 7.4. Growth Rate of the Soviet Economy

Thus, the Soviet economy increasingly shows its stagnation. But why, in spite of all these problems, has it continued to be alive and has not yet collapsed? There are several reasons for this: (1) unyielding pressure on the worker; (2) the plunder of labor through the international system of the division of labor (COMECON); (3) economic cooperation with (in fact, dependence on) the West; (4) abundant natural resources; (5) forced labor (that is, the exploitation of the labor of prisoners and anti-revolutionary elements in labor camps); and so forth.

Furthermore, there is in the Soviet Union a so-called “second economy,” which consists of black-market, and capitalist-style, underground private enterprises. It is commonly admitted that this second economy is a necessary complement for the smooth operation of Soviet business. In tractor factories, for instance, when a tire cannot be obtained through official channels, someone with connections with the second economy may be able to acquire

it through illegal means.⁵⁷ Such private enterprises, however, are not socialist, but rather capitalist enterprises. This is evidence that the capitalist business system is superior to the socialist business system, and the Soviet economy has begun to change itself qualitatively by incorporating an anti-socialistic business system.

C. Critique of the Phase of Communism

Over thirty years have passed since the death of Stalin, who announced the beginning of communist society. Moreover, the year 1980, which Khrushchev had marked as the date for the beginning of communist society, has also passed. According to prediction by Stalin and Khrushchev, the Soviet society should have entered the phase of communism by now. And yet, the economy of the Soviet Union, which implemented the socialization of the means of production and carried out the planned economy through the dictatorship of the proletariat, has now come to a standstill rather than reaching paradise on earth (communist society). In this context, Brezhnev made no mention of a specific date for the coming of communist society.

Contrary to the communist ideal that classes should vanish, a new class has emerged in Soviet society, the so called *nomenklatura*,⁵⁸ a privileged class of bureaucrats, whose rule over the masses has become completely established. Also, contrary to the communist ideal that the state should perish, the Soviet state has acquired more and more power. What about the principle of distribution according to need, which is considered the fundamental principle of communism? Such a thing can hardly be hoped for in the present day Soviet Union. Has, at least, the socialist principle of distribution according to work (the first phase of communist society) ever been realized? The answer again is no.

As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union is plagued by inequality in wealth as much as, or even more than capitalist society, Moreover, an important point in the Soviet Union is not so much the

amount of income a person receives, but rather the privileges associated with position.

Konstantin M. Simis, a lawyer who was deported from the USSR, tells of the existence of special shops, the *Kremlyovka* at various locations in the buildings of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. These shops sell high-quality food stuffs never seen in ordinary stores, and their prices are lower than ordinary prices. Such special shops cater only to those who have special passes, the members of the privileged class.⁵⁹ In the Soviet Union one can also find “dollar shops,” where purchases can be made only with foreign currency. These shops sell Western goods and high-quality Soviet products. Prices in these stores are low, but only those who have access to foreign currency or to vouchers backed up by foreign currency—namely the privileged class—can shop in them.⁶⁰

In the Soviet Union, the higher the rank of an individual the greater his privileges and the wider his access to all kinds of goods. Simis describes the situation as follows:

For about eleven years I followed the career of a Central Committee official of my acquaintance, and I was able to observe how, as he moved up the official ladder, the spectrum of privileges he received subtly and gradually changed. When he arrived in the apparatus of the Central Committee as a lowly *instruktor*, or agent, he was given 80 rubles' worth of Kremlin vouchers per month, and had the use of a Central Committee car only for himself personally when on official business. He was given the use of a state *dacha* outside Moscow, but only for the summer, and with no maid service. . . .

But the years went by, and my acquaintance rose to the lofty rank of deputy head of one of the most important and prestigious departments within the Central Committee. When he reached that rung on the ladder he could buy food in the *Kremlyovka* without any limits, and in even more privileged and tightly closed shops in the system. . . . And that *dacha*, which now was his all year round, was serviced by a maid and a cook. .

There is also an elite in the Soviet Union that stands beyond all these categories: the members of the Politburo, those thirteen to fifteen people who make up the highest body in the party apparatus, the body that in reality governs the state. Without restrictions, and completely free of charge, they get anything they want in any quantity.⁶¹

In contrast, ordinary people are able to obtain only the bare necessities of life, of very low quality. The food situation is bad, and people have to queue up for hours, not for luxuries, but for everyday items. Medical facilities are also very inadequate.

Thus, the promised distribution “according to needs (or “according to work”) has never been put into practice in the Soviet Union. Then, what kind of distribution is being practiced? It is distribution “according to power” or “according to position,” whereby only the members of the privileged class receive according to their needs. Thus, while the communist ideal proclaims a society without classes and a society where people receive according to their needs, what has actually appeared is a society with a privileged class, which exploits and oppresses the masses of people. Clearly, the promise of the coming of communist society is only a fictitious fantasy.

III. CAUSES OF THE STAGNATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Through the dictatorship of the proletariat, the means of production in the Soviet Union have been socialized and a planned economy has been implemented; and yet, the expected results have not been harvested—as pointed out above. Theoretically, after the means of production had been socialized and the social ownership of profit (surplus product) put into practice, all the contradictions contained in capitalist society should have vanished without a trace and the points mentioned below should have been effectively accomplished, together with a rapid growth

of the economy—and the Soviet Union should have become an earthly paradise.

Theoretically, in communist society the following points should be reached: (1) classes are abolished and human nature emancipated; (2) productivity grows rapidly and the people's welfare is promoted; (3) capital is accumulated by social profit; (4) depression and unemployment are prevented through eliminating anarchic production; (5) a reasonable distribution of production assets and social indirect capital (public property) is achieved; (6) priority sectors receive preferential distribution of economic resources; and (7) the balance of international payments is well maintained.

Such goals should have been reached in the Soviet Union, but Soviet reality has generally displayed quite the opposite phenomena. The main points are as follows: (1) a new class has emerged, and human nature (freedom) is oppressed; (2) productivity is stagnant; (3) the quality of commodities is low due to the suppression of a free market economy; (4) goods are stockpiled and resources wasted; (5) projected goals are not accomplished, and forced labor is imposed as a result; (6) human resources are wasted due to the enforcement of planned management; (7) a reasonable distribution of resources has not been attained, and resources are wasted; (8) there is an imbalance between supply and demand; (9) economic accounting (profit-and-loss accounting) is impossible, resulting in a decline of capital efficiency (the waste of capital);⁶² (10) the motivation to produce has declined, resulting in the enforcement of wage discrimination as a means to prevent that decline (whereby wage inequality has increased); (11) consumer goods are in low supply and people's standard of living has suffered due to the enforcement of policies giving preference to heavy industry; (12) agricultural products are sold at low prices, bringing about the impoverishment of farmers; and so forth.

Why has such a contrast between what should theoretically have been achieved in the Soviet Union and what its actual situa-

tion turned out to be? There are three main reasons: in the first place, the Soviets have abolished the free market, thus ignoring the price-adjusting function of the free market system; secondly, they have blocked the freedom of business activities and have excessively expanded and enforced centralized economic planning; thirdly, they have pursued a policy of expansionism. Each of these would be discussed below.

A. Abolition of the Free Market System

In the Soviet Union, where the free market system is curbed and centralized planning is imposed, all prices are determined by the State Planning Commission (*Gosplan*), and once a price is determined, it seldom changes. In fact, prices hardly changed from 1955 to 1967.⁶³ In such a situation, the following circumstances arise:

First, since economic accounting (profit-and-loss accounting) is impossible there, one cannot determine whether the management of an enterprise is in the red or in the black.⁶⁴ In order to develop an enterprise, entrepreneurs need to understand the real situation of the ever-fluctuating economy, and for that need to do economic accounting from time to time. But under controlled prices (resulting from the abolishment of the free market) economic fluctuations are not reflected in prices, and economic accounting is impossible. Consequently, cases of capital waste recur again and again.

Second, since consumer preferences are neglected, it is difficult for commodities needed by the people to be produced; moreover, it often happens that unnecessary commodities are produced in large quantities, causing the accumulation of unmarketable goods. The labor market and the market of consumer goods perform a market role to a certain extent, but they are limited. The market of production assets, the capital and money market are completely controlled.⁶⁵

Third, the function of restoring economic balance is obstructed, because the economy does not work on the basis of the law of supply and demand (the law which states that the economy maintains its balance in a way such that if the price rises, supply increases and demand decreases, and if the price falls, demand increases and supply decreases).⁶⁶

Fourth, in the Soviet Union, where the profit is included in the price beforehand and is officially determined, it never happens that the profit fluctuates according to the circumstances of supply and demand, as it does in a free market economy. In a free market economy, the amount sold minus the cost of production is considered to be the profit. In contrast, in the Soviet Union the profit is already included in the price at the time of production, and is not transferred back to the enterprise. Thus, profit is regarded as a kind of cost, under the name of "profit."⁶⁷ Accordingly, the situation is such that the enterprises' desire for profit cannot be exerted.

B. Blocking Free Enterprise and Enforcement of Planned Economy Management

In a centralized planned economy, the central planning committee makes all the important decisions of all the enterprises of the country. Decisions on the quality and quantity of raw materials and other supplies, the quality and quantity of commodities to be produced, the scale of the enterprise; and so on, are not left to the enterprises themselves, but rather are made by the central administration and then conveyed to each enterprise. A rationing system allocates raw materials and other supplies to each enterprise; managers are not given the freedom to purchase what they need to conduct their business. Under such a situation, it is difficult for high quality commodities to be produced, and materials can easily be wasted.

Since the enforcement of planned management is spread too widely and by force, if there happens to be a failure at any stage of the enforcement of the plan, then immediately the supply of materials to other sectors is suspended; this causes a chain reaction whereby sometimes many factories come to a standstill, Such a chain reaction of bottleneck is described by Haruki Niwa:

To consider a concrete case: suppose a certain coal mine fails to produce its quota of coal according to plan. As a result, the mine becomes unable to deliver a promised amount of coal to the iron mills on a scheduled day. Then, the iron mills are unable to avoid a decline in production. . . . Then, the production of the factories using iron is delayed, and that delay will then extend to the next stage. . . . This bottleneck gives rise to idle equipment and to unemployment, which cause another kind of bottleneck, bringing about more idle equipment and more unemployment, and . . . in this way, finally resulting in total paralysis of the economy, such that the shortage of materials becomes severe.⁶⁸

In order to prevent such a situation, the economic plan must be laid out in excruciating detail, and must be implemented relentlessly. In order for that to happen, obedience from the enterprises must be absolute. Thus, an “absolute order” to carry out the plan at any cost is issued. Since workers are asked to sacrifice more than they are rewarded for, they begin to dislike their jobs. Their willingness to produce decreases, and along with it, productivity necessarily declines.

Then, in order to achieve their quotas, there is an even greater increase in measures to intensify labor, such as standard-imposing forced labor. The coercive imposition of planned management of the economy, however, inevitably results in economic stagnation, As mentioned before, economic reforms were attempted in 1965, whereby partial decentralization of the economy was implemented and material incentives for enterprises instituted, but that was only a secondary measure. The supply of needed primary production assets were, just as before, still controlled at the center, and capital investment was never decentralized.

Why does the central government still maintain control over the supply of production assets? The answer is that the central government wishes to maintain its power while refusing to share the wealth it has acquired. On this matter, Milovan Djilas writes that “the Communist leaders really believe that they know economic laws and that they can administer production with scientific accuracy. The truth is that the only thing they know how to do is to seize control of the economy.”⁶⁹

Therefore, the reason the central government insists on maintaining the centralized planned economy is not for the sake of developing the socialist economy nor for the sake of promoting the well-being of the working masses, but rather for the purpose of monopolizing power and wealth. The enforcement of centralized planned management of the economy not only causes economic stagnation, but also gives rise to corruption throughout the entire Soviet economy. Moreover, that corruption constitutes yet a further cause of economic stagnation. Konstantin Simis explains the reality of corruption within the Soviet economy as follows:

Since the actions of all managers are strictly predetermined and they have no freedom of choice in making management decisions, there would appear to be no place for corruption in the economic system. But in fact, it is just this hypercentralized and hypercontrolled management system that has engendered such all-pervasive corruption in industry that it is fair to say that alongside the official economic system a second, unofficial economic system has arisen and is functioning. These are so closely interconnected that the first, official system is incapable of functioning without the support of the second, the unofficial system—that is, without recourse to corrupt means.

The official economic system confronts the manager of an enterprise or construction project with a tough demand: to fulfill the assigned plan on time and completely. . . .

This happens so often in Soviet industry that it can be said that, as a rule, the state planning and supply organs do not provide construction projects with sufficient equipment and materials.

But the duty to fulfill the plan is nonetheless binding on project and enterprise managers; they are faced with the need to procure, by any and all means, everything not supplied by the state, everything without which their plans cannot be fulfilled. What means, then, do they use? There exists no legal way to procure the needed goods in the Soviet Union. But there is one way by which everything required to “give the plan” can be obtained: corruption. . . .

Court cases and articles in the Soviet press have shown quite definitely that plant, factory, and construction project representatives are compelled to bribe officials in the ministries, Gosplans, and committees that deal with supplies—high-, middle-, and low-level officials alike.⁷⁰

C. The Pursuit of Expansionism

The Soviet Union has continuously followed a policy of expansionism for world communization. Through direct and indirect means, it attempts to invade the Third World and the West by using various forms of overt and covert strategy and tactics. With huge expenditures, it has been spreading its propaganda and intelligence activities throughout the world; especially it has been building arms on a large scale as a means to invade weaker nations and to threaten the free world militarily. All these things have been done on the basis of wide-spread plundering of the working masses in the attractive guise of socializing the means of production and the ownership of profit.

In order to fill their military arsenals, the Soviets needed to develop heavy industries, which require immense amounts of natural and human resources. But these industries are not of the kind that contribute directly to economic growth, such as the industries of production assets. Therefore, the people receive nothing in return from the immense amount of wealth which the masses themselves have accumulated with their own sweat, and that wealth has been, and continues to be, spent in the pursuit of expansionism, which has nothing to do with the well-being of the people,

Moreover, in order to prevent any stumbling block to their expansionist program, they have imposed even more labor on the people, and in order to prevent any explosion of complaints by the masses, they intensified repression.

Thus, it is clear that the causes of the stagnation of the Soviet economy are the abolition of the free market system, the blocking of free enterprise, the excessive expansion and enforcement of planned management, the pursuit of expansionism, and so on. Such causes are common phenomena in almost all socialist countries, to one degree or another.

D. The Fundamental Cause of the Stagnation of the Soviet Economy

Generally speaking, the causes of the economic stagnation of the Soviet Union and other communist countries are as discussed above, though in varying degrees in different countries. There are, however, still more fundamental causes, and in order to grasp them, we need to examine the theoretical basis of the Soviet economy.

According to Marx's economic theories, capitalism is a system wherein capitalists exploit workers by depriving them of surplus value (profit). The fundamental contradiction of capitalism is that capitalists take possession of profit which rightfully should go to the workers. Accordingly, if the capitalist system were overthrown and a socialist society established, whereby profit (surplus products) would be restored to the workers, then every type of social contradiction would be solved. The productive forces would come to develop freely and an ideal society, much superior to capitalist society, would be realized.

Accordingly, from the time of the revolution up until the sixties the Soviet Union has endeavored to apply, as literally as possible, Marx's economic theories, namely, the labor theory of value and the theory of surplus value. Since the sixties the Soviets have con-

tinued to follow these theories, even though their economic policy has been somewhat revised, The same situation holds true for almost all the other communist countries to one degree or another, Among them, the Soviet Union is the country which has tried to apply Marx's economic theories most literally, That the socialist economy of the Soviet Union is founded on the labor theory of value and the theory of surplus value can be seen from the following passages from the *Textbook*:

In socialist society, labor and product have, respectively, the aspects of necessary labor and surplus labor, and necessary product and surplus product, but this distinction in socialist society does not have the antagonistic nature which it has in the social formation based on the exploitation of man by man [capitalist society].⁷¹

Necessary labor under socialism is labor for oneself, which produces necessary product, most of which is distributed among the workers engaged in production, according to the quantity and quality of each worker's labor, and is used to satisfy the individual and family needs of the workers.⁷²

Surplus labor is the labor exerted for the interest of society, and produces surplus product. This surplus product is used to meet social needs, such as the expansion of production, the development of education, health, national defense, the welfare of the elderly and the handicapped.⁷³

Commodities produced in socialist society have use value and value [exchange value]. In other words, in socialist society a commodity has a two-fold character, which is determined by the two-fold character of the labor embodied in it.⁷⁴

The value of a commodity is created under socialism from abstract labor, a special form of expression of the directly social labor.⁷⁵

In the socialist economy, the antagonistic contradiction between use value and value [exchange value], which is linked with the possibility of crisis of overproduction, does not exist.⁷⁶

The value of products in socialist society can be divided into three parts; (1) the value of consumed means of production; (2)

the value of the product created by necessary labor; (3) the value of the product created by surplus labor. The first two parts of social value are expressed in the costs of production in socialist enterprises. . . . Costs of production, therefore, consist of the expenditure of past labor embodied in the means of production and living labor expended on making a given product.⁷⁷

The cost price includes in monetary form the value of the consumed means of production and the value of the product produced by necessary labor. The remaining part of the value of the products in socialist society—namely, the value of the product for society, produced by surplus labor—finds monetary expression in net income. The value of the surplus product produced in the socialist national economy as a whole finds monetary expression in the form of the net income of society.⁷⁸

By economic custom the net income of an enterprise is called profit. In socialist society, the capitalist relation of exploitation is eradicated. Therefore, the net income (called profit) of a socialist enterprise differs radically from capitalist profit. Under Socialism it is the working men themselves, the possessors of the means of production, that create net income; these working men use this net income for themselves.⁷⁹

Clearly, the content of these quotations is in accordance with Marx's labor theory of value and theory of surplus value. In addition, the *Textbook* says that "since capital has been eliminated, the category of employment of labor power by capitalists has also been eliminated. Labor power has ceased to be a commodity. Therefore, there is no such thing as surplus value."⁸⁰ Accordingly, the *Textbook* gives the impression that the law of value working in socialist society is different from the law of value (as Marx understood it) working in capitalist society.

Nevertheless, this is merely a pretension that a new theory of value, containing new concepts, is applied in socialist countries, but this theory is not substantially different from Marx's labor theory of value and theory of surplus value (as applied to capitalist society). The only difference is that in capitalist society the surplus value, produced by workers, is taken by capitalists, while in

socialist society (where the means of production have been socialized) the surplus value is called “surplus product” and belongs to the workers or to society, and the essence of profit is not surplus value but “net income.” While in capitalist society the workers’ situation worsens to dire poverty, in socialist society they come into abundance and prosperity. Also, while in capitalist society the productive forces inevitably reach a dead end, in socialist society they develop steadily.

In spite of these claims, as already explained, the socialist economy is stagnant, in contrast with the striking economic development of advanced capitalist nations. Through socialist revolution, the exploitation of laborers by capitalists has ceased, but another kind of exploitation, even more severe than that in capitalism, has surfaced in socialist nations, namely, the violent and oppressive rule of the people by the privileged communist class, the communist party leaders. As a result, the human nature of the people has come to be repressed to an even greater degree than in capitalism.

Why is that so? The reason is that Marx’s economic theories, namely the labor theory of value and the theory of surplus value, are wrong, and also that these wrong theories have been put into practice, just as they are, as the law of value for socialism.⁸¹ Marx invested his entire heart and soul into writing *Capital* (in which he proposed the labor theory of value and the theory of surplus value) in order to rationalize the socialization of the means of production and the social ownership of profit, calling for the abolition of private property. But it is now as clear as daylight that his economic theories are wrong. The fundamental cause of the economic stagnation of the Soviet Union lies, indeed, in the fallacy of Marx’s economic theories. It is materialist dialectic and the materialist conception of history that give philosophical support to Marx’s economic theories. Therefore, the cause of the fallacy of Marx’s economic theories lies, after all, in the fallacy of materialist dialectic and the materialist conception of history.

These causes, however, must be traced back to Marx's theory of human alienation, which served as the fundamental basis for his materialist dialectic, materialist conception of history, and economic theory. As discussed earlier, in his theory of human alienation, Marx concluded that the way to recover human nature was to overthrow capitalist society and abolish private property. Marx then developed his materialist dialectic, materialist conception of history, and economic theory in order to rationalize, from the point of view of philosophy and economics, the abolition of private property and the overthrow of capitalist society.

Accordingly, the ultimate cause of the stagnation of the socialist economy and the oppression of human nature in communist society lies in Marx's erroneous theory of human alienation. In conclusion, a new theory of human alienation is urgently needed to correct the mistakes of the communist theory, while curing the ills of capitalist society (which Marx rightfully pointed out), to bring true liberation to all humanity.

A CRITIQUE AND COUNTERPROPOSAL TO MARX'S THEORY OF HUMAN ALIENATION

I. COMMUNISM AND MARX'S THEORY OF HUMAN ALIENATION

As stated in Chapter 1, Hegel considered that when the idea of law is realized through the state, man will necessarily change from selfish man to rational man; and that was supposed to have happened in Prussia, which Hegel expected to become the rational state. In reality, however, the bureaucratic politics of Prussia became corrupt, and man did not become rational man. Feuerbach insisted that the way to receive human nature is for man, by denying God, to restore to himself his species-being, which had been objectified. And yet, whether or not people followed Feuerbach's opinion, the actuality of man's life was not reformed at all.

Based on this criticism of Hegel and Feuerbach, Marx considered that human nature was alienated because the laborer was deprived of his labor product. In other words, the essence of man's alienation is "the alienation of the labor product from the laborer." The conclusion of Marx's theory of human alienation

was that the emancipation of man would be accomplished through the transcendence (later, abolition) of private property, which was regarded as the labor product that had become the private possession of the capitalist.

Here mention must be made of the relationship between Marx's early theory of human alienation and his theory of communism developed later, especially in *Capital*. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the completion of *The German Ideology* by Marx and Engels marked the turning point where Marx's early theory of human alienation disappeared. Actually, among those conducting research on communism (whether or not they happen to be communists themselves), there are two main points of view; (1) Marx's early theory of human alienation was superseded by *Capital* and therefore should be ignored; and (2) the theory of human alienation is the starting point and origin of *Capital*, and therefore should be regarded as very important. It is unmistakably clear that *Capital* developed on the basis of, and as an extension of Marx's earlier theory of human alienation, as explained in the two points which follow.

The first point is that Marx's aim in developing communist theory was the predetermined goal of the realization of freedom. He developed his theory with materialist dialectic, which is a reversal of Hegel's idealistic dialectic, and he set the aim of realizing freedom under the influence of Hegel's "realization of a rational state" and "realization of freedom"—as discussed in Chapter 4. Having adopted a materialist position, Marx had necessarily to put forward an inductive style of argumentation, just as if he were drawing conclusions on the basis of objective facts, in his theory of history and economics. In fact, the development of all of Marx's logic gives the impression that his logic is inductive and objective. But a closer analysis of his theory reveals that it hides a goal and a direction which are determined deductively beforehand.

The second point is that Marx never retreated from his earlier theory of alienation, which stated that human alienation in capi-

talist society is alienation from the labor product. He actually gave further clarification of it, replacing the theory of human alienation with the economic problem, as discussed below.

In *Capital* Marx characterized capital and the capitalist as follows: capital is seen as the “self-expanding value,”² “a live monster that is fruitful and multiplies,”³ and “dead labor, that, vampire-like, only lives sucking living labor, and lives the more, the more labor it sucks,”⁴ and the capitalist was described as “capital personified,”⁵ or “the agent of capital.”⁶

Such expressions show that in *Capital* Marx looked upon “capital” and the “capitalist” as the roots of evil, which have deprived the laborer of his labor product and of his human nature. Then, what is capital? According to Marx, Capital is the means of production that has become the private possession of the capitalist, and it is the means of production whereby the laborers are exploited;⁷ capital is not a thing but a social relationship between persons in the process of production.⁸ Accordingly, the word “capital” can refer to capitalist relations of production as well as to the capitalist system itself. Therefore, the root cause of evil, which has robbed the laborer of his labor product, is also the economic system called “capitalism.”

Furthermore, in the section of *Capital* entitled (the so-called) “Primitive Accumulation,” Marx gives the following explanation of how capital came to be formed:

This *primitive accumulation* plays in Political Economy about the same part as *the original sin* in theology. Adam bit the apple, and there upon sin fell on the human race. . . . The legend of theological original sin tells us certainly how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the history of economic original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this is by no means essential. . . . And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority that, despite of all labor, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the wealth of the few that increases constantly although they have long ceased to work.⁹ (italics added)

“Primitive accumulation” refers to the accumulation of capital that became the starting point of the capitalist mode of production; its representative process is typified by the “enclosure” of land in England from the end of the fifteenth century through the end of the eighteenth century. “Primitive accumulation” refers to the violent “expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labor,”¹⁰ whereby the masses were transformed into wage laborers. Marx said, “capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.”¹¹

In sum, according to Marx, what gave rise to the alienation of its labor product from the laborer was either “capital” or “capitalist” or “capitalism;” actually, this can be traced back to the “primitive accumulation of capital,” which corresponds to original sin in Christianity and can be called the ultimate origin of Marx’s view of human alienation,

This leads to the conclusion that *Capital* clearly is an extension of Marx’s theory of human alienation. Therefore, *Capital* can be regarded as an alienation theory in the garb of economics. In other words, *Capital* is merely a theory that enumerates (actually, that fabricates) more capitalist crimes to expose more concretely the guilt of capitalism, which Marx had already pointed out in his theory of human alienation. Moreover, the enumeration of crimes was made in a deductive manner in order to rationalize the pre-determined aim of the “abolition of private property” and the overthrow of capitalism by violent revolution.

Then what has become of communist society—at least, the socialist society that has fully matured and has come very close to communist society—established according to *Capital* (which is based on Marx’s theory of human alienation)? In present-day communist society (especially in the Soviet Union), private property has indeed been abolished and labor products have been returned to the hands of the workers though only nominally, following to Marx’s theory. And yet, factual evidence shows that the re-

sults are entirely different from what Marx's theory had promised: (1) Marx promised that "all the springs of co-operative, wealth flow more abundantly"¹² in communist society; in actuality, however, communist society displays excessive economic stagnation, when compared with advanced capitalist nations. (2) Marx promised that the "true realm of freedom"¹³ would be realized; in actuality, however, people in communist society are deprived of freedom, and human rights have been cruelly trampled upon. (3) Marx denounced the fact that labor in capitalist society is not voluntary, but "forced labor,"¹⁴ and Engels promised that "labor [would] become a pleasure instead of being a burden"¹⁵ in communist society. In actuality, however, labor in communist society has become far more obligatory and painful than in capitalist society, to the extent that "forced labor" is almost regarded as another name for communism. (4) Marx promised that the products of labor would be distributed under the principle of "to each according to his needs"¹⁶; in actuality, however, distribution according to *power* and according to *position* has come about.

What is the reason for such drastically different results? The reason is that Marx made certain fundamental errors: first, his grasp of the essence of human alienation was wrong; second, his understanding of capitalist society (which he regarded as the basis of human alienation) was incorrect; and third, his method of solving the problem of human alienation was false. A concrete explanation of each of these points will follow.

II. MARX'S ERRORS IN DEALING WITH HUMAN ALIENATION

A. Erroneous Grasp of the Essence of Human Alienation

1. No Regard for Human Personality

Marx regarded the alienation of labor product from the laborer as the essence of human alienation. This alienation from labor product is, in short, material alienation. As a materialist, Marx viewed the problem of human alienation from a material perspective.

Seen from Unification Thought, however, the physical body (*Hyungsang*) is supposed to be controlled by the mind (*Sungsang*), Therefore, external, material life (*Hyungsang*) is determined by the function of the internal mind (*Sungsang*). Therefore, with regard, also, to material alienation, its cause should have been looked for in the function of the mind. I will explain this point next,

According to Unification Thought, the human mind is the unity of "spirit mind" (the mind of the spirit man) and "physical mind" (the mind of the physical man), since man is the united being of "spirit man" and "physical man." The spirit man refers to the spiritual being that can be perceived through the five spiritual senses and is meant to live eternally in the spirit world after the death of the physical man. The physical man refers to the material body that can be perceived through the five physical senses. The function of the spirit mind is to pursue the values of truth, goodness, beauty and love; the function of the physical mind is to carry out physical life, namely, the life of food, clothing, shelter and procreation.

Originally the spirit mind and the physical mind were supposed to engage in give and receive action respectively as subject and object. In other words, man's original way of life is primarily

to live a life of value, in such a way that the spirit mind controls the physical mind, and secondarily to live a life of food, clothing, shelter and procreation. Due to the Human Fall, however, man has lost his original way of life such that the physical mind has come to dominate the spirit mind. For this reason, man has come to attach little importance to the life of value, while thinking highly of individualistic material life,

Accordingly, the reason the alienation of labor product from the laborer has arisen— other words, the exploitation of laborers by capitalists has occurred—is that the physical mind of the capitalist has taken control of his spirit mind, whereby he has become self-centered and has pursued only an individualistic material life. Capitalists, centering on their physical minds, have come to disregard the values of truth, goodness and beauty, and accordingly, have lost their own value as human beings. Moreover, they failed to recognize the value and personality of laborers as human beings, and have regarded them merely as a kind of commodity, or as the means to acquire profit. The laborers employed by such capitalists were no more than objects of exploitation for the capitalists. As a result, the laborers' personality, or their essence as human beings, was ignored, and they were treated as commodities, or as material beings.

Therefore, laborers were first alienated from their human value and personality before they became alienated from their labor product. According to Unification Thought, there are two kinds of values, namely, spiritual values (truth, goodness, beauty and love) and material values (commodities values, pursued in the life of food, clothing and shelter). The former are called *Sungsang* values, the latter, *Hyungsang* values. The basis of human personality consists of spiritual values. That laborers have their human value alienated means that their spiritual values and personality have been ignored or discarded.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the loss of human value, laborers and capitalists are not different. The only difference is

that while the laborers were robbed of their value and personality or, while their value and personality were ignored, the capitalists willingly discarded theirs, becoming centered on the physical mind. Thus, since the personality and values of laborers were alienated (ignored), their labor product was, as a result, alienated. This does not mean, however, that if laborers were not exploited by the capitalists, they would automatically live an original life of value. Because of the Human Fall, every man tends to deviate from the pursuit of spiritual values toward an individualistic material life centered on the physical mind. Laborers are no different from capitalists in this respect. Even if exploitation should cease, laborers would not be able to live a life of value without making efforts to restore the original way of the spirit mind and the physical mind.

During his time in Paris, Marx was indignant at the fact that the worker's personality was ignored and oppressed, accusing capitalists of treating the workers as mere commodities. Yet, Marx never admitted that the alienation of spiritual values, or personality, is the essence of human alienation; rather, what he considered the essence of human alienation was the alienation of labor product (material values), which is merely a resultant phenomenon.

2. Distorted View of Capital

Marx, in viewing the "alienation of labor product from the laborer" as the essential problem within the capitalist economic structure, concluded that capital—that is, the value that expands itself steadily through sucking the living blood of labor—is the main *culprit* of the problem of alienation and exploitation. Here, capital refers to privately owned means of production under the capitalist relations of production.

Marx's distorted view of capital can be summarized in the points described below. First, he held that capital (which is a mere thing—means of production, money) multiplies value through exploiting laborers, as if it were a rapacious animal. This is the

same as saying that a knife is a lethal weapon that never stops seeking blood, no matter how it is used or who uses it, Marx explained his views as if the desire to multiply value existed within capital itself, when in reality such desires exist only within the *mind* of the man possessing capital, the capitalist.

The second point is that Marx depicted capital as existing only in capitalist society. This is actually false; it was intended as grounds for denouncing capitalist society.¹⁷ In reality, capital does not cease to exist in socialist society, rather, it becomes state capital, which is highly centralized. In socialist countries, the structure of exploitation changed from exploitation of laborers by capitalists to exploitation of laborers by the communist party.

The third point is his concept of “primitive accumulation” (which gave rise to capital) as corresponding to the original sin in Christianity. Is this view correct? If primitive accumulation corresponded to original sin, then it would be the starting point of exploitation. Still, a question would remain as to why in primitive accumulation the wealthy farmers at that time mercilessly expropriated the means of production from the masses of people. From the standpoint of Unification Thought, “enclosure” was an event carried out by people who had discarded their human value, or personality, and were pursuing selfish desires only. In other words, the material accumulation in the name of primitive accumulation was preceded by the spiritual accumulation of selfish desires. This, however, Marx failed to understand.

Thus, Marx made a fundamental error at the starting point of the formulation of his thought, which led him to take a wrong direction. Ignoring the fact that human alienation originates from inner problems of the mind, Marx put forward the view that the fundamental cause of human alienation is the external, physical formation of capital, asserting that the alienation of labor product is the essence of human alienation.

3. The Idolization of the Proletariat

As stated above, Marx dealt with human alienation as an economic problem, and would not deal with it as a personal, ethical problem. And yet, the following expressions in *Capital* show that Marx, from an ethical standpoint, looked upon the capitalist class as absolutely evil, as if capitalists were devils.

[The capitalist's] soul is the soul of capital. . . . Capital is dead labor, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labor, and lives the more, the more labor it sucks.¹⁸

The Roman slave was held by fetters: the wage-laborer is bound to his owner [the capitalist] by invisible threads.¹⁹

The expropriation of the immediate producers [by the capitalist] was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious.²⁰

While denouncing the human nature of the bourgeoisie, Marx never questioned the human nature of the proletariat and its representatives, the communists. On the contrary, he dogmatically deified and glorified them, saying that the proletariat is the heart of the emancipation of man,²¹ and the “class that holds the future in its hands.”²² Marx also argued that history has developed up to the point “where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.”²³ In other words, according to Marx, the proletariat was absolutely good. As Nicolas Berdyaev pointed out, “the proletariat is the only class that is innocent of the original sin of exploitation”;²⁴ “the ‘proletariat’ is a mythical notion and, at the same time, the supreme value, good and justice—a positive power.”²⁵

The fact that Marx, while regarding the bourgeoisie as evil, idealized (actually, idolized) the proletariat and its representatives, the communists, arbitrarily regarding them as unconditionally good, was Marx's fatal mistake. In reality, the alienation of human nature is not confined to one class, but rather is common to all human beings. As Milovan Djilas pointed out, communists have

been able to maintain certain moral standards of devotion, sacrifice, comradeship, etc, while engaged in the struggle for revolution; but once they attain power (and contrary to Marx's expectations), their moral standards disappear and their leaders are transformed into intolerant and hypocritical rulers.²⁶ The communists, who had portrayed themselves as representatives of the righteous, gradually became coldhearted, cruel, inhuman oppressors. In this way Marx improperly idolized the proletariat and the communists. This is also one of the reasons for the failure of communist theory.

B. Erroneous Grasp of the Nature of Capitalist Society

Marx's grasp of the nature of capitalist society was also erroneous. The reason is that he emphasized only the economic aspect, which is the *Hyungsang* of society, and attached little importance to the political and religious aspects, as if they were mere derivatives of, or accessories to, the economic aspect. As a result, he failed to take into account the extent to which democracy, the political idea of capitalism, and Christianity, the basis of the value perspective of capitalism, had contributed to the development of the capitalist economy.

In such advanced capitalist nations as Great Britain, France and the United States, the revolution did not occur, contrary to Marx's prediction that revolution would occur first in advanced capitalist countries. In such nations, the economy has been growing at a comparatively steady pace. This is because democracy, supported by Christian values, has gradually been providing solutions, though imperfectly, to the economic contradictions and defects of capitalism, through various levels of give and receive action, without people being aware of it.

Why was it that Marx did not consider Christianity and democracy to be able to improve the contradictions and ills of capitalist

society? What prevented him was his theory of “basis and superstructure,” according to which the superstructure (religion, politics, etc.) is determined by the basis (the relations of production, or the economy). According to Marx’s theory, Christianity and democracy, which are the superstructure of capitalist society, are supposed to serve and strengthen the capitalist relations of production, which are the basis. In other words, they should work to the advantage of the ruling class, the capitalist class. Marx concluded that one could not expect the exploitation of workers by capitalists to be abolished through the power of religion and politics; rather, the problem of human alienation could only be solved by overthrowing the economic system of capitalism. In this way, Marx failed to recognize the contributions of democracy and religion (Christianity) to the development of capitalism.

C. False Method of Solving the Problem of Human Alienation

1. The Establishment of Materialist Dialectic

Marx considered the essence of human alienation (or the alienation of the species-being) to be alienation of labor product. Accordingly, the restoration of alienated human nature (or the recovery of the species-being) necessarily had to be the abolition of private property, the socialization of the means of production, and the social ownership of profit. How was that to be accomplished: through peaceful means or through violent means? Marx chose violent means. The reason is that he thought that all the attempts to accomplish reform in a peaceful way (such as attempts by the British and French Utopian socialist movements) had ended in failure. In addition, he was a man with a militant disposition.

His adoption of violent means (struggle) needed philosophical justification. His response to that need was the application of materialist dialectic. He borrowed Hegel’s dialectic, eliminating from it the idealistic aspects, and linked it with materialism, whereby

materialist dialectic was established. As discussed earlier, the key point of materialist dialectic is that natural and social development occurs through the struggle of opposites within things or within societies. With materialist dialectic, he philosophically rationalized violent revolution, that is, the overthrow of the system of private property. In this point, he made a great mistake.²⁷

Struggle is not always bad in social reform, but the problem is that he justified "struggle for development" philosophically and made it into a law.²⁸ A law is something which holds true at all times and at all places; therefore, if struggle is made into a law, then any kind of struggle can be justified, no matter how much slaughter and violence it may involve, as long as the purpose of that struggle is justified. Furthermore, whether a purpose is proper or not depends on the subjective view of the leaders. The higher the position of a leader, the more arbitrarily he can establish his own purpose, whereby he can sanction any kind of atrocities without any feeling of guilt. As Berdyaev states, any evil can be transformed into good in the name of proletarian revolution:

Marxism considers evil as the pathway to good. The new society, the new man, is born of the growth of evil and darkness; the soul of the new man is formed by negative emotions, by hatred, revenge and violence. This is the demoniacal element of Marxism and it is called dialectic. Dialectically, evil passes over into good, darkness into light. Lenin proclaimed that everything was moral which served the proletarian revolution. He knows no other definition of good. From this it follows that the end justifies the means, every sort of means. The moral impulse in human life loses all independent significance, and that is undoubted dehumanization.²⁹

Making struggle into a law invites not only the deterioration of the quality of struggle, but also the limitlessness of its quantity. The struggle which Marx needed was actually only violent struggle to overthrow capitalism. But since he set up struggle as a law governing the development of the natural world and society, struggle came to be regarded as inevitable for the development of

society even after revolution succeeded, Accordingly, it has turned out that struggle can erupt at any time and at any place, if necessary.

Concerning communist violent revolution, Milovan Djilas stated that in the revolutions of the past, violence was a necessary evil, and when a revolution was over, violence ceased to exist; but the communists regard violence as continually necessary for development, even after revolution:

In earlier revolutions, revolutionary force and violence became a hindrance to the economy as soon as the old order was overthrown, In Communist revolutions, force and violence are a condition for further development and even progress. In the words of earlier revolutionaries, force and violence were only a necessary evil and a means to an end. In the words of Communists, force and violence are elevated to the lofty position of a cult and an ultimate goal.³⁰

Communist dictators have been able to kill so many people because they regard struggle as an activity proper to the law of development. For the same reason, power struggle never ceases in communist society. Moreover, if struggle is made into a law, then people will easily think it natural to hate others, because struggle is accompanied by hatred, and that will hinder communal life and national development. The rulers would then fear that the ruled might resist out of hatred, and would strengthen their dictatorial system.

According to Unification Thought, no development is possible through struggle; development occurs through harmonious give and receive action between subject and object. The chronic stagnation of the Soviet economy is a direct result of the violation of the law of give and receive action. The law of supply and demand, which regulates the market, is an instance of the law of give and receive; and free enterprise activities, also, consist of various levels of give and receive actions. And yet the Soviet economic policy has restrained such give and receive actions, so the growth and

development of the Soviet economy have lagged. It was not dialectical struggle, however, that enabled the Soviet economy to reach, in spite of its stagnation, its present level; rather, it was, first, the imposition of forced labor, and second, the action of give and receive, which was partially carried out through the activity of the people's original mind.

Marx mistakenly interpreted the essence of human alienation as the alienation of labor product. Even if that were so, he should not have considered struggle (class struggle and violent revolution) as a law of development. If he had advocated only the struggle (peaceful struggle) to promote the labor movement, then at least a part of the lost human nature could have been successfully recovered through persevering with that movement for a long time—even if that movement, in the short run, might have been unsuccessful. This is because, within such a peaceful struggle, there is a lot of room for give and receive action to take place. This is evident from the situation of workers in advanced capitalist countries, such as Great Britain, where workers have engaged in peaceful movements, without any revolution. In these advanced countries, the standard of life of the workers has improved to an extraordinary degree when compared with the standard of life of the workers in Marx's days, and the treatment of workers today is considerably more humane.

2. The Establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

Through the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the rationalization of struggle attained through the materialist dialectic became even more thorough. With this, the movement proceeded in a direction completely opposite to that of "communism as the emancipation of man," which was Marx's original goal.

Marx said that during the transition period from capitalism to communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat must be carried

out.³¹ And Lenin stated that this point is the very essence of Marxism:

Everybody knows that this [the dictatorship of the proletariat] is the very *essence* of Marxist doctrine.³²

To confine Marxism to the theory of the class struggle means curtailing Marxism, distorting it, reducing it to something acceptable to the bourgeoisie. Only he is a Marxist who extends the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*.³³

The dictatorship of the proletariat is hailed as “the power of the majority” and is said to represent “the keen interests of the working people.” But communists also say that, in reality, in order to build socialist society, a communist party must be set up as the vanguard of the proletariat, in order to guide the backward portion of the population, namely the working people and farmers. This means, then, that the dictatorship of the proletariat is actually the “dictatorship of the communist party.” Stalin made this point as follows:

The working class without a revolutionary party is an army without a General Staff. The Party is the General Staff of the proletariat.³⁴

In this sense it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat is, in essence, the “dictatorship” of its vanguard, the “dictatorship” of its Party, as the main guiding force of the proletariat.³⁵

These points of view put forward by Stalin originated from Lenin.³⁶ In defining the term “dictatorship” in the context of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin said that it is “nothing more or less than authority untrammelled by any laws, absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever, and, based directly on force.”³⁷ At the same time, however, Lenin insisted that the dictatorship of the proletariat is also proletarian democracy, and that “proletarian democracy is *a million times* more democratic than any bourgeois democracy.”³⁸

The above gives a brief idea of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but how has that idea been implemented in actual revolution? The dictatorship of the proletariat is supposed to be “the dictatorship of the exploited majority [the proletariat] over the exploiting minority [the bourgeoisie].”³⁹

Nevertheless, after the bourgeoisie was overthrown through revolution, instead of the dictatorship of the proletariat, what came about was the “dictatorship of the communist party over the proletariat.” (The bourgeoisie is either purged or, through brain washing, incorporated into the proletariat.) And then, much in the same way as there appeared the party as the leader of the proletariat, there appeared an individual as the leader of the party, and this resulted in the “dictatorship of an individual over the proletariat.”

About the reality of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Milovan Djilas states that:

a dictatorship of the proletariat which would be directly operated by the proletariat is a pure Utopia, since no government can operate without political organizations. Lenin delegated the dictatorship of the proletariat to the authority of one party, his own. Stalin delegated the dictatorship of the proletariat to his own personal authority—to his *personal dictatorship* in the party and in the state. Since the death of the Communist emperor, his descendants have been fortunate in that through “collective leadership” they could distribute authority among themselves. In any case, the Communist dictatorship of the proletariat is either a Utopian ideal, or a function reserved for an elite group of party leaders.⁴⁰ (italics added)

The result is the emergence of a villainous class society in which a communist dictator and his bureaucrats rule the masses with violence. In reference to this situation, Djilas stated that “this is a class whose power over men is the most complete known to history;”⁴¹ and Berdyaev stated that “this new Soviet bureaucracy is more powerful than that of the Tsarist régime. It is a new privi-

leged class that can exploit the masses pitilessly.”⁴² Michael S. Voslensky stated that “the *nomenklatura* is the exploiting class of Soviet society. No man can take this truth out of the world through any propaganda.”⁴³

In addition, the dictatorship of the proletariat (the rule of the masses by the communist leaders), which was supposed to exist only during the transition period into communism, has never actually ended, and will continue as long as the communist regime lasts. As Berdyaev puts it, “those who are in power in [Soviet Russia] acquire a taste for power and desire no changes, which are unavoidable for the final realization of communism. The will-to-power becomes satisfying in itself and men will fight for it as an end and not as a means.”⁴⁴

III. A RETURN TO MARX'S STARTING POINT

As mentioned earlier, communist society today has become the opposite of what Marx expected: instead of realizing the ideals of freedom, peace and prosperity, communist society has trampled freedom underfoot, has destroyed peace, and has given rise to widespread economic ills. The reason for this is that Marx's theory of human alienation itself, which was the starting point of Marxism, was false.

Marx started his thought system with a clear awareness of the need to deliver people (the workers) from the pains, fears, poverty, miseries, crime, and disorder of the capitalist society of his time, seeking to liberate (recover) their human nature (species-essence). Concern over such problems is not unique to Marx, but has been shared by many religionists and philosophers in the East and in the West, throughout the ages. Therefore, it can be said that Marx's starting point was the same as the starting point of these other thinkers, Starting from the same point, religionists and phi-

losophers have gone in directions that are different from one another,

One such path was the path followed by Marx, who set out to retake the product of labor as a means to solve the same problem, namely, the rescuing of human nature (the salvation of man) from social disorder and suffering. His was an atheistic, materialistic direction. Among the many other thinkers who, besides Marx, looked for a solution for the human problem, some took a theistic direction, others walked a humanistic path, and others followed an existentialist way. Among the religious leaders who sought solutions for the problem of human alienation, Confucius proposed the way of Heaven, and established Confucianism; Gautama Buddha proposed the way of *Nirvana* according to the ideal of *tathagata* (self-realization) and mercy, and established Buddhism; Jesus proposed a way of life according to God's Word and love, and established Christianity; and Muhammad proposed the way of life according to Allah's word, and established Islam. Likewise, Rev. Sun Myung Moon proposed a life centered on God's truth and love, teaching Divine Principle and Unification Thought, in order to solve the problem of human alienation, and started the Unification Movement.

The idea of human emancipation proposed by Marx, if expressed religiously, corresponds to salvation from sin. Nevertheless, because of his failure to grasp the essence of human alienation, Marx, though furiously denouncing the inhumanity of capitalist society, proposed the philosophy which was unable to recover human nature. On the contrary, his philosophy fostered a society which was not different from the capitalist society he criticized—actually, a society in which human nature is more severely abused than in capitalist society. Berdyaev speaks of it as follows:

In Marx, especially during his younger days, when he still kept traces of German idealism, there were possibilities of a *new humanism*; he began with a revolt against dehumanization, but later he himself was influenced by the process of dehumanization,

and in relation to man, communism inherited the sins of capitalism.⁴⁵ (*italics added*)

If Marx were alive today to see the reality of communist society, he would surely realize the error of his theory of human alienation, and would feel compelled to search for a new solution. I fervently hope that communists today will understand that Marx's theory of human alienation is wrong, and will be ready to seek for a new way to recover man's lost nature. Undoubtedly, communists must desire, consciously or unconsciously, to attain genuine and complete recovery of human nature. In this context, a theory of human alienation, based on Unification Thought, is presented below, in the hopes that it will be received as a viable counterproposal to Marx's theory of human alienation.

IV. UNIFICATION THOUGHT VIEW OF HUMAN ALIENATION

A. The Original Human Nature

As stated earlier in this chapter (Section II A), what man lost originally was not what Marx called labor or labor product, but human value and personality. Accordingly, human alienation is the alienation (loss) of human values and personality. The value of human beings consists of the noble and respectable characteristics of truth, goodness and beauty; and personality refers to a well-rounded character whereby man can lead a life of truth, goodness and beauty through his own responsibility.

The foundation for the values of truth, goodness, and beauty, as well as for a well-rounded character, is true love, or God's love. The purpose for which man was created is for him to realize love through the family base; accordingly, the original goal of a life of value is the realization of love. To live a life of truth, goodness and beauty means to love, serve and please, with God's love, one's family, neighbors, society, nation, state and the whole of humanity.

When one practices God's love, the love of God is expressed as truth in his intellectual activity, as goodness in his moral activity, and as beauty in his emotional, and artistic activity. In other words, value is the form of the expression of love.

Consequently, that man has lost his value and personality means that he has lost love (God's love). Love is the core of the original human nature; by losing love, man in fact lost the original human nature. Thus, human alienation is the alienation of love and, at the same time, the alienation of the original human nature. Accordingly, before presenting the Unification Thought view of human alienation in concrete terms, I will discuss the original human nature,

The man with original nature is an individual who has perfected a well-rounded personality and can lead a life of the values of truth, goodness and beauty. At the same time, it can be said that the man who resembles God is a man with original nature; the reason is that man was originally created to resemble God upon maturation. According to Unification Thought, man resembles God in the aspects of the unity of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* harmony of positivity and negativity, individuality, heart, logos, creativity and so on. Accordingly, the original human nature refers to the human attributes that resemble these attributes of God. An explanation of each attribute of the original human nature follows.

First of all, to resemble God in the unity of the *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* of God means that the individual perfects his personality by becoming a "united body of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*," in its original form. This refers to the state in which the spirit mind and the physical mind are engaged in harmonious give and receive action in the positions of subject and object respectively. It is the function of the spirit mind to pursue the values of truth, goodness and beauty; and it is the function of the physical mind to pursue the life of food, clothing and shelter. That the spirit mind is subject and the physical mind is object means that the life of values is primary and the life of food, clothing and shelter is

secondary. The life of values, which pursues truth, goodness and beauty, takes priority over the life of food, clothing and shelter. Since love is the basis of the values of truth, goodness and beauty, the subject/object relationship between the spirit mind and the physical mind is realized centered on love.

Second, the resemblance of the harmony of God's positivity and negativity refers to the coming together of a husband and a wife as a "harmonious body of positivity and negativity." This happens when a man and a woman, after attaining individual perfection through the unity of their *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*, become husband and wife and harmonize with one another centering on God's love. When a man, together with a woman, resembles the unity of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* in God and the harmony of God's positivity and negativity, he and she become perfect human beings and become a couple, standing as representatives of the universe; as such a couple, they are entitled to be lord of creation. If Adam and Eve, the first human ancestors, had become husband and wife centering on God's love and had formed a family, then God's creation of the universe would have been completed at that time. Due to their Fall, however, God's creation has remained unfinished until today.

Third, man possesses the aspect of resembling one of God's Individual Images. The Individual Image in God is a concrete, individual idea, or picture, existing in the mind of God, The man who fully resembles the Individual Image in God according to which he was created is called a "being with individuality." God possesses innumerable Individual Images, and each person is created in the likeness of one of those images. God's intention is to experience joy by perceiving His Individual Images embodied in the individuality of human beings, as each person uniquely displays one of His Individual Images. For this reason, man's individuality is an exceedingly precious characteristic.

Fourth, man is a "being with heart," resembling the heart of God. Heart is the "emotional impulse to seek joy through love,"

namely, the “impulse for joy,” and the “impulse for love.” Heart is the most essential of the attributes of God, God is the duality of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* and what exists innermost in the *Sungsang* is heart, which is an irrepressible emotional impulse. Without heart, God did not have to create the universe and man. Though He is omniscient and omnipotent, still God could have chosen to remain all by Himself; but because He is a God of heart and wants to have joy through love, He could not but create man as His object of love and joy. And, because man has inherited God’s heart, he also needs an object of love and joy. Therefore, God could not but create all things as the object of man to make him joyful. Thus, man, who has inherited the same impulse of heart, has the irrepressible impulse to seek joy by practicing love (true love). In other words, it is the original nature of man to seek to obtain true joy by loving God, other human beings and all things, by being loved by God and other human beings, and by receiving beauty from all things.

Fifth, man is a “being of *logos*,” or a “being with norm,” following the pattern of the *logos* of God. *Logos*, in Unification Thought, refers to the unity of reason and law. Therefore, to follow *logos* means to follow the law with the free exercise of cognition and judgment by reason. There are *Hyungsang* laws (natural laws) and *Sungsang* laws (ethical laws or norms). In order to be a “being of *logos*,” an individual must observe the *Sungsang* laws, namely, the ethical laws or norms.

Sixth, man is a “being with creativity,” endowed with God’s creativity. Creativity refers to the ability to create ideas and things. More specifically in Unification Thought terminology, creativity refers to the ability to form an inner four-position-foundation and an outer four-position-foundation. The formation of an inner four position foundation refers to the process whereby the Inner *Sungsang* (or the function of intellect, emotion and will within the *Sungsang* or mind) and the Inner *Hyungsang* (or the ideas, concepts, mathematical principles, original laws within the *Sungsang*)

engage in give and receive action centering on a purpose, and establish a design, or plan. The formation of the outer four-position-foundation refers to the process whereby the *Sungsang* (or the design established by the inner four-position-foundation) engages in give and receive action with the *Hyungsang* (matter), centering on a purpose, and produce a new substantial being ("new body"). In other words, this refers to an actual creation through the use of matter (*Hyungsang*) and according to a design. (see figure 8.1) God's creativity is centered on heart and therefore on love. Accordingly, the creativity within the original human nature is also centered on love.




Fig. 8.1. Formation of the Inner and Outer Four Position Foundations

The original human nature resembles God in terms of the six aspects discussed above. The common base existing among these various aspects is true love, or God's love. The give and receive actions between *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*, and positivity and

negativity in man are centered on God's love. Man's individuality, logos, and creativity are also based on God's love, with heart as the very basis of love. In short, man is "loving man" (*homo amans*).

Traditionally, man has been looked upon in different ways, such as *homo sapiens* (man of intellect), *homo faber* (man the maker), *homo oeconomicus* (economic man), *homo liberalis* (free man), *homo religiosus* (religious man), and so on. Indeed, man has all of these aspects, but none of them has grasped the real essence of man, namely, heart and love—in other words, man is *homo amans*.

B. The Loss of the Original Human Nature

Due to the Fall of Adam and Eve, the first human ancestors, man lost God's love and his original nature. A symbolic record of the Human Fall is found in Genesis, where Adam and Eve are said to have eaten the forbidden fruit. The meaning of this symbolic narrative is thoroughly explained in the "Fall of Man" of *Divine Principle* (HSA-UWC, 1973). The main points of this teaching will be presented here.

If Adam and Eve had obtained complete spiritual growth, together with their physical growth, and had fully developed their personality, then they would have become husband and wife under God's blessing, would have loved each other, multiplied children and become parents. Parents and children would have loved one another centered on God. Their family would have been God-centered, realizing true parental love, true conjugal love and true children's love. These are manifestations of God's love, appearing divisionally in the family in three forms. The God-centered unity between husband and wife, whereby children are multiplied, is the formation of the family four position foundation. (see figure 8.2) If the three forms of divisional love had been realized and the family four position foundation had been perfected, God would have been able to dwell with man, and God's purpose of creation would have been realized.




Fig. 8.2. The Family Four Position Foundation

Adam and Eve should have reached the completion of their growth through fulfilling their portion of responsibility. God gave them His commandment in such a way that, by observing the commandment with their own efforts and by their own free will, they would have been able to attain complete growth. The core of the commandment was “you shall not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.” The meaning of that was that they should not engage in sexual love until they had reached physical and spiritual maturity, and until God had blessed them as husband and wife.

God’s intention in giving man the commandment to control himself according to his own free will was to give man His own creativity and to allow him to stand in the position of lord of creation. Man differs significantly from an animal in that an animal lives only according to instinct and never strives for a better life; only man constantly strives for a better life, spiritually and physically.

And yet, during their growth period, Adam and Eve did not observe God's commandment and engaged in an illicit relationship, following the temptation by Satan, the fallen archangel. As a result, God's purpose of creation was destroyed and Adam and Eve separated themselves from God, entered into the dominion of Satan, and came under Satan's yoke. As a result, they lost their original human nature. The reason is that, due to the Fall, they became unable to receive God's love and God's love is the core of the original human nature. Due to the Human Fall, all the descendants of Adam and Eve, that is, all of humanity have also fallen into the condition of having lost their original human nature. This point is explained more concretely below.

First, man has lost the aspect of his original nature as a united body of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*. In other words, proper give and receive action between man's spirit mind and physical mind, centering on God's love (heart), has become impaired.⁴⁶ And that happened because the relationship between the spirit mind and the physical mind was reversed, whereby man came to live centering on the physical mind. As a result, though man has an inner desire to live a life of value in accordance with his spirit mind, yet it is difficult for him to practice and persevere in that kind of life. Though he may temporarily lead a life of value, under the influence of his conscience, still he may easily again yield to the impulses of his physical mind.

Second, man has lost the aspect of his original nature as the harmonious body of positivity and negativity. When husband and wife love each other centering on God, then God abides in their marriage; their family is filled with God's love and overflows with harmony and joy. Such a couple should exert dominion over all things (all other created beings); but couples in fallen society do not have the qualifications for that.

The phenomenon of the destruction of family ethics today is a clear proof of the loss of man's harmony between positivity and negativity. When a man and a woman get married, they hope to

form an eternal couple; but because the love between them is not truly centered on God, their self-centered tendencies may gradually manifest themselves and they may disregard the standards of conduct between husband and wife, which may eventually result in disunity between them. The disunity between husband and wife (or between father and mother) gives rise to the neglect of the standards of conduct between parents and children, and between brothers and sisters, which may result in disunity between all of them. If this goes far enough, it will end in the tragedies of divorce, runaways, suicide, murder and so forth. Family breakdown influences social life, causing immorality, crimes, etc. It is no exaggeration to say that the fundamental cause of social disorder lies in the deterioration of the standards of family ethics.

Third, man has become unable to express fully that aspect of the original human nature as a being with individuality, through which his Individual Image existing in God is manifested. Every man has been created to realize his value whereby he expresses his precious individuality given by God; and yet, he has become unable to manifest his original individuality. Since individuality is derived from each person's Individual Image in God, the further man separates himself from God, the more obstructed the manifestation of his original individuality becomes. This explains why man's individuality is so terribly neglected in God-denying communist society.

In the free world, respect for human individuality is advocated oftentimes from a humanistic viewpoint. Most humanists view man as an evolved higher animal, but from this view one cannot derive the basis for an argument that would guarantee the dignity of human individuality. As a result, humanists have lacked confidence in pointing out the errors of communism, and instead, have often allowed themselves to be influenced by communist ideas. In other words, humanists cannot reject the ideas proposed by communists, who likewise view man as an evolved higher animal. Instead, they have been prone to sympathizing with them. Thus,

communists make use of humanists to advance their revolutionary aims. But the history of communist revolutions shows that once those humanists have served the communists' purpose and are no longer useful, they are mercilessly purged.

Fourth, due to the Fall, man has become unable to inherit God's heart or God's love. One can obtain true joy and peace when one lives a life of value centered on giving and receiving God's love. That is, when one lives a life of value centered on God's love. But fallen man is unable to inherit God's love; he lives centered on unprincipled love, or selfish love, and materialistic desires. As a result, he cannot experience true joy and peace. Besides, quarrels and scandals are continuously taking place in human society due to the conflict of values. In spite of everyone's fervent desire for peace, reality today shows that peace is further and further away, and the reason is that man's separation from God is increasingly widened.

Fifth, man has lost the aspect of the original human nature as a being with logos (norm). It is in the context of the restoration of this lost aspect of the original human nature that, since ancient times, religions have been teaching the norms that man ought to live by. Today, however, religions have lost their spiritual leadership, and mostly due to that, norms have become meaningless to people, whose only concern is freedom. But freedom without norm is mere self indulgence. That is the reason why in free society, confusion abounds. According to Unification Thought, norms do not restrict freedom; for true freedom can be realized only through the observance of norms, Originally freedom is the freedom to realize God's love, and norms are also norms to realize God's love.

Sixth, man has become unable to exercise true creativity. True creativity is derived from God's creativity, and must be based on God's heart and love. Fallen man's creativity, however, has often been selfish and centered on individual purpose. Problems such as pollution, the abuse of natural resources, the degeneration of

art, and the development of aggressive weapons have resulted from fallen creativity, or creativity without true love. With the recovery of true creativity, which is centered on heart, such problems will cease: pollution will disappear, natural resources will be cared for properly, true art will flourish and science will advance rapidly toward the peace and prosperity of humanity.

C. The True Recovery of Human Nature

The errors of Marx's theory of human alienation have already been discussed. In this section, an analysis based on Unification Thought will be presented, disclosing the reason why Marxism, besides failing to solve the problems of human alienation, has become a thought that alienates human nature even further. Finally, based on Unification Thought, the method for the true recovery of human nature will be presented.

As stated earlier, what human alienation is all about is the fact that man became separated from God's love, became dominated by Satan (the subject of evil), and started a life style based on self-centered love and desires. Accordingly, the fact that Marxism, rather than becoming a thought which could overcome human alienation, became instead a thought which has worsened man's alienated condition, means that if man acts in accordance with Marxism, he will eventually be dominated by Satan. The reason for this conclusion is explained below.

First, Marxism is thoroughly atheistic. According to Unification Thought, all of the aspects of the original human nature are based on God's love. As a result, the way to recover the original human nature is completely blocked to the communists, who are thoroughly atheistic, consciously and blatantly denying God. Satan's dominion over them has been strengthened.⁴⁷ This explains why communists, while calling themselves *representatives* of the proletariat, or of the people, have in reality become the oppressors of the people; the reason is that they have become separated from God's love and have come under the control of Satanic, self-

centered love and desires. Unless they can love people with parental love based on God's love, they cannot become true *representatives* of the people.

Second, Marx argued that the essence of human alienation is the alienation from labor product, which is external; he refused to recognize any internal or mental causes. This means that he did not see sin within man himself, but instead ascribed all causes of alienation to capitalists and capitalism. Consequently, communists cannot see that every human being, due to the Fall, has come under the dominion of Satan and is alienated from the original human state. Communists have also lost their original state and contain as much evil, or even more evil, than capitalists. Nevertheless, communists will never admit their evil nature. Moreover, they are extremely adept at denouncing the corruption of capitalist society and the vices of capitalists. They are just like the hypocrites to whom Jesus spoke when he said, "Why do you see the speck that is in your brother's eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye?" (Matt. 7:3, RSV).

Third, Marx stated that the profit (surplus value) obtained through the product of labor is created solely by laborers, and insisted that laborers should recover it by force. As stated in chapter 6, profit is not produced solely by laborers, but rather through a joint effort by capitalists and laborers. Therefore, exploitation lies not in the appropriation of surplus value, but in an unfair distribution of profit. Accordingly, what is needed is a movement calling for the fair distribution of profit, not violent revolution. Perhaps such a movement will not solve the problem of alienation at its roots, but at least it may improve the economic situation. Communists have attempted the forcible seizure of profit (actually, the seizure of power), insisting that all profit should belong to laborers. Such attempts are in accordance with Satan's self-centered desire to take possession of things, and as a result, communists have become slaves to Satan.

Thus, communism is indeed a thought controlled by Satan. Berdyaev correctly perceived communism as a religion that surrenders to Satanic temptation:

Communism, both as a theory and as a practice, is not only a social phenomenon, but also a spiritual and religious phenomenon. And it is formidable precisely as a religion. It is as a religion that it opposes Christianity and aims at ousting it; it gives in to the temptations Christ refused, the changing of stones into bread and the kingdom of this world.⁴⁸

In fact, communism seeks world domination centering on economics (bread) while rejecting the word of God (stones).

I will now show the way to recover human nature by means of Unification Thought. In a nutshell, it is through receiving God's love that man can recover the original human nature. This refers to the recovery of a personality that can realize the values of truth, goodness and beauty centering on God's love, God's love is absolute. Therefore, the values realized through God's love are absolute values, namely, absolute truth, absolute goodness and absolute beauty. Accordingly, the recovery of human nature comes about through the realization of absolute values by receiving God's absolute love ("absolute" means eternal and universal, transcending time and space).

How can that be accomplished? It can be accomplished through a correct understanding of God, through a correct understanding of the purpose for which God created man, and through the completion of personality, family, and dominion over all things according to God's words. To complete one's personality means that one receives God's words and practices them and realizes the state where the spirit mind dominates the physical mind by overcoming many temptations and enlightening the spirit mind. The completion of the family refers to the realization of God's love in the family, which comes about when husband and wife love each other and when parents and children love one another while following the word of God. The completion of dominion over all

things refers to the completion of the ability for man to dominate the natural world and society with love after completing his personality and family.

If people, especially the leaders of society, recover their human nature this way, then all the contradictions and irrationalities which, as Marx pointed out, exist in capitalism, can be solved easily and radically. Since the *Sungsang* is the subject and the *Hyungsang* is the object, it is natural that, if the solution of the *Sungsang* aspect (the reformation of the human spirit with truth and love) is attained, then the *Hyungsang* aspect (the solution of economic problems) will follow.

D. A Movement for New Values Based on Unification Thought

The Unification Thought method for solving human alienation is based on the most fundamental teachings of traditional religions; to practice, in the true and proper way, God-centered love (*agape*) as taught in Christianity, mercy (*maitri* as taught in Buddhism, benevolence (*jen*) as taught in Confucianism, and love centered on Allah as taught in Islam. These religions have guided humanity until today in order that man, who lost his value due to the Fall, may realize absolute love and absolute value.

In order to practice God's love, mercy, benevolence, and Allah's love, one must live in accordance with the words of Jesus, Buddha, Confucius and Muhammad. Words refer to norms and values, but today such teachings have lost their persuasive power. The reason is that they lack sufficient logic and proof to satisfy contemporary people, who are accustomed to the scientific way of thinking. Another reason is that religion, ethics, and morality are not given any importance today, due to the prevailing mood of materialism in society and to the materialistic emphasis in education. What is more, there is a concerted effort to destroy values by communism.

The destruction of values by communism will be explained. As stated earlier, communism is a system of thought that intensifies human alienation. From the aspect of values, communism is a thought system which aims at the destruction of values. Communism drives people toward revolution by denying traditional religious values, Whereas traditional religious values are generally concerned with the salvation of the individual, communism, in contrast, demands that social problems such as poverty and discrimination must be solved rather than focusing on individual salvation. It maintains that God's love, mercy, benevolence, and Allah's love are conceptual and impracticable. It insists that people must choose either the side of the proletariat or the side of the bourgeoisie, and that true love is class love and comradeship. Traditional religious values stand powerless before such attacks; moreover, traditional religions have often become contaminated by communism and have lost their persuasive power. As a result, many of their believers have fallen away. Moreover, a tendency to support communism is now emerging in religions, especially within Christianity.

Also, through its strategy of the unified front, communism is making a systematic and concerted effort to destroy values. Suppose, for example; that there are three hostile forces, A, B, and C (either individuals, or groups, or nations) standing against communism. If A is the strongest, communists will move to unite with B and C in an attempt to isolate A. If there is any antagonism between A and B, or between A and C, however small that antagonism maybe, communists will attempt to exacerbate it. If A commits a mistake, communists will spread it far and wide with great exaggeration, not excluding fabrications. They will increase the feelings of distrust that B and C may have against A, provoking strong hostility toward A. They attempt to increase the separation between A and B, and A and C by using such methods as, for instance, criticizing as feudalistic such values as "children should practice filial piety toward their parents," "the people should be

loyal to the state," and "employees should provide service to their company." Once they succeed in overthrowing A, communists then unite with C in order to overthrow B, the next target. They will try to separate B from C by following the same method. Thus, the united front is a strategy that comes together with the effort to destroy values.

We need today a movement for new values, which can protect traditional values from the communist onslaught. Such a movement must revitalize and unite traditional values, elevating them to a new dimension. In other words a movement for the unification of value perspectives should be initiated. This movement must firmly establish an absolute value perspective by revitalizing traditional values through providing them with new theological, philosophical, and historical grounds. Why is it possible to unify traditional value perspectives? Even though different religions have arisen and have developed independently of one another throughout history, all these religions have been guided by the same absolute being, and have merely expressed the one truth in different ways, according to different places and different periods.

To give theological grounds is to clarify the existence of the absolute being, which serves as a basis for all value perspectives—such as God in Christianity, *tathata* in Buddhism, Heaven in Confucianism, and Allah in Islam—in a logical way, so as to convince modern man. In other words, what is needed today is a new ontology presenting a new way to deal with the existence of the Absolute Being. In addition to that, this new ontology must also clarify God's purpose of creation, and must answer the fundamental questions as to why God created the universe.

To provide philosophical grounds is to clarify the following: natural laws and ethical laws are manifestations of the "Way of Heaven," and, just as when created beings in the universe follow natural laws, harmony and order appear in the universe and beauty is realized in the natural world, so, when people observe

ethical laws in their family and social life, harmony and order is maintained in human society and love is realized.

To give historical grounds means to clarify that the law of cause and effect, referred to by Mencius as the law of retribution, has worked in history, such that “those who follow Heaven will survive, and those who rebel against Heaven will perish.” In other words, the law of indemnity has worked throughout history. Historical grounds should make it clear that history is the history of the restoration of its original position and status. It must show that though evil may conquer good and enjoy temporary prosperity, it will, nevertheless, inevitably perish; on the other hand, though good may be persecuted and temporarily defeated by evil, it is destined ultimately to triumph.

Today a movement for new values which can achieve such goals is urgently sought after. As an answer to these urgent needs of our times, Unification Thought, put forward by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon, has appeared and will deal with them effectively.

Conclusion

Many communist countries have been established on the basis of Marx's theory, with the goal of establishing an eternal ideal society in which freedom is realized, after having overthrown capitalist society and eradicating all its contradictions and irrationalities. And yet, these countries have not realized freedom; on the contrary, they have restricted freedom even more, unable to prevent their failures in the political, economic and social spheres from being exposed. To escape such a crisis, communist dictators have been undertaking imperialist aggression, both covertly and overtly, in all corners of the world.

The leaders of the free world, who too often have been deceived by communist strategy, are now awakening, though belatedly, and a strong anti-communist front is being formed on a world-wide scale. At the same time, tenacious movements for liberation are sprouting within communist nations. As a result, communist authorities find themselves having to face strong resistance both internally and externally. This is only natural, because, according to the Heavenly Law, those who oppose that law must bear the consequences; accordingly, those who deceive the people through false propaganda and engage in destruction, terror, murder, etc., must inevitably pay a price for their crimes.

Nevertheless, the force of the communist movement has not been weakened; on the contrary, communism continues to spread and harass people every day. What is the reason for that? The reason is simply that communist theory and strategy have not yet been effectively crushed. Many people within the free world remain content with only criticizing communist tyrannical rule and economic bankruptcy, while closing their eyes to communist theory itself. As long as this attitude towards communism continues, the actual threat of communism will not vanish; miserable circumstances must inevitably continue. Unless communist theory

and strategy are thoroughly crushed, the germs of communism will keep their infectious power in full force and will continue to spread.

Then, what kind of method can be effective against communist theory and strategy? The only effective method is to present a logical and systematic critique and counterproposal to communist theory; in other words, to establish a theoretical system that will include a value perspective that can overcome communism, and to present a theory that can solve the problem of human alienation. The present work has been put together in the hopes that it will be exactly that kind of theory. The ideas proposed here result from a systematization of the thought of Rev. Sun Myung Moon and are meant to be applicable to the concrete, actual situation; this is not at all an unrealistic theory. This is a practical theory whose victorious efficacy over communism has already been proven by the fact that in direct confrontation with communists, they are either forced to admit defeat or become silent. The fact that such a theory has appeared at this time, coupled with widespread ills in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres within communist society, can be seen as evidence that the end of communism is near at hand. In *Capital* Marx wrote the following:

Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class. . . . The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production. . . . Centralization of the means of production and socialization of the labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.¹

On the contrary, the knell that is sounding is that of the communist system, which is beginning to suffer from the widespread rebellion of the people within communist society, and which is beginning to feel the pressure from the awakening of free people

outside communist society. Marx also wrote at the outset of the *Manifesto*, “A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of communism.”² A specter is an evil spirit that performs its wrongdoings under the cover of night, but goes away with the rising of the sun. This specter, which has deceived and injured innumerable people for more than a century, since the *Manifesto* was published, now approaches its fated extinction. From the beginning it has been a mirage, devoid of any truth, and that the light which will drive away the darkness has now begun to rise.

This light refers to a new truth arising from the East. The emergence of the “sunrise of the East” was predicted by Rabindranath Tagore:

When this conflagration consumes itself and dies down, leaving its memorial in ashes, the eternal light will again shine in the East,—the East which has been the birth-place of the morning sun of man’s history. And who knows if that day has not already dawned, and the sun not risen, in the Easternmost horizon of Asia? And I offer, as did my ancestor rishis, my salutation to that *sunrise of the East*, which is destined once again to illumine the whole world.³ (italics added)

In accordance with Tagore’s prophecy, the light of truth is now rising in the skies of Asia; in the presence of this light, the specter is now beginning to vanish.

Notes

Short titles are generally used in the text and notes. A few of the most frequently cited short titles are listed below. In addition, the following abbreviations are used:

Abbreviations

HSA-UWC	The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity
<i>JSW</i>	J. Stalin, <i>Works</i>
<i>LCW</i>	V.I. Lenin, <i>Collected Works</i>
<i>MECW</i>	Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, <i>Collected Works</i>
<i>MESW</i>	Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, <i>Selected Works</i>
<i>SWM</i>	<i>Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung</i>

Short Titles

<i>Contribution</i>	<i>A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy</i>
<i>Fundamentals</i>	<i>Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism</i>
<i>I.E., Textbook</i>	Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., <i>Political Economy: A Textbook</i>
"Introduction"	"Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law. Introduction"
"Konspekt"	"Konspekt über 'Das Kapital' von Karl Marx"
"Manifesto"	"Manifesto of the Communist Party"
"Manuscripts"	"Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844"
"Socialism"	"Political Economy: Socialism"

1. Marx's Theory of Human Alienation

1. For example, in Koichi Mori's *Today and Alienation* (in Japanese) (Shin-Nippon Shuppansha, 1970), a book influenced by the Japanese Communist Party, the following is stated: "The theory of 'estranged labor' could be seen, if it is translated in economic terms, as the bipolar differentiation of the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist and the accumulation of wealth and of poverty, and as the first-step expression of the theory of exploitation, accumulation, and impoverishment. However, it is yet immature, and full of defects as to theoretical content itself. This view was corrected as Marx deepened his study, bringing maturity to Marx's early economic theory. . . . As explained above, it is obvious that *Manuscripts* is a transitional product in the process of Marx's formulation of scientific theories, and any unconditional praise of this work by bourgeois or revisionist theorists is quite of the mark" (pp. 76-78; my translation).
2. Wataru Hiromatsu writes in *On Young Marx* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1971): "As a boy, Marx must have tasted various miseries due to the conversion of his family, mere child as he was. Was he allowed to go to elementary school? Even this is questionable. There is no document, so far, which shows that he received a regular education at an elementary school. It can be imagined that he was, not only segregated as a Jew and alienated as a convert to Christianity by fellow Jews, but also he may have been deprived of the opportunity to receive an elementary school education" (p. 15; my translation).
3. The poem "Invocation of One in Despair," which Marx wrote in 1837, expresses well his feelings of hatred against God:
So a god has snatched from me my all
In the curse and wrack of Destiny.
All his worlds are gone beyond recall!
Nothing but revenge is left to me!
On myself revenge I'll proudly wreak,

On that being, that enthroned Lord,
 Make my strength a patchwork of what's weak,
 Leave my better self without reward!
 I shall build my throne high overhead,
 Cold, tremendous shall its summit be.
 For its bulwark—superstitious dread,
 For its Marshall—blackest agony.
 Who looks on it with a healthy eye,
 Shall turn back, struck deathly pale and dumb;
 Clutched by blind and chill Mortality,
 May his happiness prepare its tomb.
 And the Almighty's lightning shall rebound
 From that massive iron giant.
 If he bring my walls and towers down,
 Eternity shall raise them up, defiant,

(MECW 1:563-64)

Furthermore, in the foreword to his doctoral dissertation, the "Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophies of Nature" (March, 1841), Marx stated: "Philosophy makes no secret of it. The confession of Prometheus: 'In simple words, I hate the pack of gods,' is its own confession, its own aphorism" (MECW 1:30).

4. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 10.
5. We can see Hegel's view that the essence of man is something rational, in the following statements; "The laws of morality are not accidental, but are the essentially Rational" (*The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree [New York: Dover Publications, 1956], p. 39): "On his objective side man accords with his concept inasmuch as he is mind, in a word a rational entity, and has in his own nature as such the character of self-knowing universality" (*Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, 95).

Hegel stated that the essence of reason is freedom: "Reason is Thought conditioning itself with perfect freedom" (*The Philosophy of History*, 13). He also said that "the nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite—*Matter*. As the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom" (*Ibid.*, 17).

Hegel explained that freedom "is its own object of attainment, and the sole aim of Spirit. This result it is, at which the process of the World's History has been continually aiming; and to which the sacrifices that have ever and anon been laid on the vast altar of the earth, through the long lapse of ages, have been offered. This is the only aim that sees itself realized and fulfilled; the only pole of repose amid the ceaseless change of events and conditions, and the sole efficient principle that pervades them. This final aim is God's purpose with the world" (*Ibid.*, 19-20),

According to Hegel, "The state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom; and it is an absolute end of reason that freedom should be actual" (*Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, 279). He also describes the state as "the actuality of concrete freedom" (*Ibid.*, 160).

6. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p.820.
7. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (New York: Friedrich Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 8.
8. Noboru Shirotuka, *The Thought of Young Marx* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1970), p. 35 (hereafter cited as *Young Marx*).
9. Marx, "Debates on the Freedom of the Press," *MECW* 1:158-59.
10. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. S.W. Ryazanskaya, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), pp. 19-20 (hereafter cited as *Contribution*).

11. Ibid., 20.
12. Marx expressed his criticism of liberal legislation as follows: “In regard to *civil law*, the most liberal legislations have been confined to formulating and raising to a universal level those rights which they found already in existence. Where they did not find any such rights, neither did they create any. They abolished particular customs, but in doing so forgot that whereas the wrong of the estates took the form of arbitrary pretensions, the right of those without social estate appeared in the form of accidental concessions” (“Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood”, *MECW* 1:232).
13. Marx gave the following description of the situation: “Another urban deputy, however, refuted him with the profound argument ‘that in the forest areas of his region, at first only gashes were made in young trees, and later, when they were dead, they were treated as fallen wood,’ It would be impossible to find a more elegant and at the same time more simple method of making the right of human beings give way to that of young trees” (Ibid., 226).
14. Marx, *Contribution*, 20.
15. Feuerbach’s *Essence of Christianity* was greeted enthusiastically by the young Hegelians of his day. Marx was among them, as is manifest in the following testimony by Engels: “One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it, Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much—in spite of all critical reservations—he was influenced by it, one may read in *The Holy Family*” (Engels, “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy,” *MESW* 3:344).
16. Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. G. Eliot (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1957), p.14.

17. Ibid.
18. Ludwig Feuerbach, "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy," in *The Fiery Book: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach*, trans. with an introduction by Zawar Hanfi (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), p. 167.
19. Ibid., 168.
20. Ibid.
21. Changing Feuerbach's words from, "thought comes from being," to "mind [spirit] is the . . . product of matter," Engels made it clear that he considered Feuerbach's view to be connected with pure materialism. He said, in fact, that "the course of the evolution of Feuerbach is that of a Hegelian—a never quite orthodox Hegelian, it is true—into a materialist. . . . Our consciousness and thinking, however suprasensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter. This is, of course, pure materialism. But, having gotten so far, Feuerbach stops short" ("Ludwig Feuerbach", *MESW* 3:348).
22. Engels described this as follows: "Feuerbach's idealism consists here in this: he does not simply accept mutual relations based on reciprocal inclination between human beings, such as sex love, friendship, compassion, self-sacrifice, etc., as what they are in themselves—without associating them with any particular religion which to him, too, belongs to the past; but instead he asserts that they will attain their full value only when consecrated by the name of religion" (Ibid., 354).
23. Marx stated in his letter to Arnold Ruge (March 13, 1843) that he could not avoid relying on Feuerbach's humanism (naturalism), while complaining that his humanism was in different to poli-

tics: “Feuerbach’s aphorisms seem to me incorrect only in one respect, that he refers too much to nature and too little to politics. That, however, is the only alliance by which present-day philosophy can become truth” (*MEC W 1* :400)

24. Marx, “Letters from the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*”, *MECW 3*:137.
25. *Ibid.*, 144,
26. According to Hegel, “civil society contains three moments: The mediation of need and one man’s satisfaction through his work and the satisfaction of the needs of all others—the *System of Needs*” (*Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, 126).
27. *Ibid.*, 123.
28. For Hegel, “the abstract actuality or the substantiality of the state consists in the fact that its end is the universal interest as such and the conservation therein of particular interests since the universal interest is the substance of these” (*Ibid.*,164).
29. Hegel points out that, “just as civil society is the battlefield where everyone’s individual private interest meets everyone else’s, so here we have the struggle (a) of private interests against particular matters of common concern and (b) of both of these together against the organization of the state and its higher outlook” (*Ibid.*, 189).
30. In describing the mediation by civil servants, Hegel said that “civii servants and the members of the executive constitute the greater part of the middle class, the class in which the consciousness of right and the developed intelligence of the mass of the people is found” (*Ibid.*, 193).

With regard to the mediation of the Estates, he said that, “regarded as a mediating organ, the Estates stand between the government in general on the one hand and the nation broken

up into particulars (people and associations) on the other. Their function requires them to possess a political and administrative sense and temper, no less than a sense for the interests of individuals and particular groups. At the same time the significance of their position is that, in common with the organized executive, they are a middle term preventing both the extreme isolation of the power of the crown, which otherwise might seem a mere arbitrary tyranny, and also the isolation of the particular interests of persons, societies, and Corporations. Further, and more important, they prevent individuals from having the appearance of a mass or an aggregate and so from acquiring an unorganized opinion and volition and from crystallizing into a powerful bloc in opposition to the organized state" (ibid.,197).

31. Ibid., 291.
32. Hegel stated this as follows: "Here at the standpoint of needs. . . what we have before us is the *composite* idea which we *call man*" (Ibid., 127).
33. Shirotuka refers to this work by Marx as follows: "This criticism was made between March and August 1843, and refers to the criticism of Chapters 257-313 of *Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, but the portion from chapter 257 to chapter 260 was lost, and the entire remaining portion (chapters 261-313) was published later under the title of *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* by D, Rjasanov" (*Young Marx*, 92; my translation).
34. As a description of the reality of the bureaucracy, Marx said that "the bureaucracy has the state, the spiritual essence of society, in its possession, as its *private property*. . . . Within the bureaucracy itself, however, spiritualism becomes *crass materialism*, the materialism of passive obedience, of faith in authority, of the mechanism of fixed and formalistic behavior, and of fixed principles, views and traditions. In the case of the individual bureaucrat, the state objective turns into his private objective, into a *chasing*

after higher posts, the making of a career" ("Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law," MECW 3:47).

35. Marx stated as follows: "Finally, man as a member of civil society is held to be man in *the proper sense, homme* as distinct from the *citoyen*, because he is man in his sensuous, individual, *immediate* existence, whereas *political* man is only abstract, artificial man, man as an *allegorical, juridical* person. The real man is recognized only in the shape of the *egoistic* individual, the true man is recognized only in the shape of the *abstract citoyen*" (Ibid., 167).
36. Shiotsuka writes as follow: "Marx grasps civil society generally in this way. Men in civil society have been deprived of his essence as a species, communality, and universality by the political state, and degraded into egotistical isolated individuals" (*Young Marx*, 107; my translation).
37. Marx, "On the Jewish Question," MECW 3:168,
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 167.
40. Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law. Introduction," MECW 3:175 (hereafter cited as "Introduction").
41. Ibid., 176.
42. Ibid., 186.
43. Ibid., 187.
44. Ibid. In this quotation from MECW, the word "abolition" had been used to translate the German *Aufhebung*, but I have instead substituted "transcendence," (See also note 67).

45. Shirotsuka said, "What is important here is that Marx, who had been analyzing civil society until then from the angle of the philosophy of law, and had been searching after a radical method of the liberation of man, had now to find the heart of the liberation of man in the economic being of the proletariat, Of course, in this *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, Introduction*, Marx is seeking in philosophy the brains of the liberation of man, and that position is consistently with that of law and philosophy. Nevertheless, the analysis of civil society from the legal and philosophical perspective has come to a limitation, and is naturally demanding the analysis of civil society from another angle, that is, from the economic angle" (*Young Marx*, 121-122; my translation).
46. Marx, "Introduction," *MECW* 3:177,
47. Toshikazu Nagano explains that what made Marx take action toward the theory of revolution was his indignation and rebellion against Prussia, and his separation from his family, especially from his mother and elder sister Sophie, with the loneliness that resulted from it. That separation came about when Marx, who was born from a Jewish family, boldly decided to marry Jenny von Westphalen, of Prussian high-class society, in spite of the opposition of both families. Nagano says that, "it was in *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, Introduction* that Marx's assertion of revolution appeared for the first time, This treatise was written in December 1843. Its publication was in the *German-French Annals* the next year. Prior to this treatise Marx wrote a main treatise, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*. This was written from March to August 1843. Between the two treatises, or in July 1843, Marx ran to Jenny, leaving everything. When we see this process, we can never think that the above-mentioned state-of mind of Marx was irrelevant to his building up the theory of revolution" (*Research into the Depths of Marx's Consciousness* [in Japanese][Tokyo: Kokusai-tocho, 1972], pp. 99-100; my translation).

48. Vinogradskaja gives the following explanation of Marx's conflict with his mother: "There occurred the problem of dividing the inheritance in July this year (1842), after one of Marx's relatives died. The relatives convinced Marx's mother to oppose him, on account of the fact that he had left them (referring to his marriage), and had thrown away his job as a lawyer, going against his father's will" (*The Life of Mrs. Marx* [in Japanese] [Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1973], p. 68; my translation).

She also points out that "Marx was living of the property of his parents, but it was barely enough for one person. But this time as was mentioned before, he was deprived of his means of subsistence and became unable to receive the inheritance he had expected" (*Ibid.*, 70).

49. Shirotsuka writes about that as follows: "As several researchers have already pointed out, I imagine that Marx possibly read about [the negation of private property by the proletariat] from a work by Lorenz von Stein, *Der Sozialismus und Kommunismus des Heutigen Frankreichs* (The socialism and communism of today's France, 1842). This work by Stein is a detailed and systematic introduction to the reality of French socialism and communism, based on his studies in France. . . . The proletariat is described there as a unity into which they gather together consciously for the purpose of the negation of private property, and that can be said almost to coincide with the content of the word 'proletariat' which Marx understood at that time" (*Young Marx*, 121-122; my translation).

50. In "The Holy Family," Marx and Engels said that "Proudhon makes a critical investigation—the first resolute, ruthless, and at the same time scientific investigation—of the basis of political economy, private property. This is the great scientific advance he made, an advance which revolutionizes political economy and for the first time makes a real science of political economy possible. Proudhon's treatise *Qu'est-ce que la Propriété?* is as im-

portant for modern political economy as Sayés' work *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?* for modern politics" (MECW 4:32).

51. Ibid., 35-36. In this quotation I have substituted "transcend" for the original "abolish." (See also note 67).
52. Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," MECW3:235 (hereafter cited as "Manuscripts").
53. Ibid., 271-72.
54. Marx described this aspect of alienation, saying that "the object which labor produces—labor's product—confronts it as *something alien*, as a *power independent* of the producer. The product of labor is labor which has been embodied in an object, which has become material: it is the *objectification* of labor. Labor's realization is its objectification. Under these economic conditions this realization of labor appears as *loss of realization* for the workers; objectification as *loss of the object and bondage to it*; appropriation as *estrangement*, as *alienation*" (Ibid., 272).
55. In discussing capital, Marx suggested that it is labor product in private possession, when he explains capital as "private property in the products of other men's labor" (Ibid., 246).
56. Marx said that "capital is thus the governing power over labor and its products" (Ibid., 247).
57. Marx explained this aspect by asserting that "the alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an *external* existence, but that it exists *outside him*, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien" (Ibid., 272),

58. Marx argued as follows: “What, then, constitutes the alienation of labor? First, the fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. . . . His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is *forced labor*” (Ibid., 274).
59. Marx’s explanation was that, “in estranging from man (1) nature, and (2) himself, his own active functions, his life activity, estranged labor estranges the species from man. It changes for him the *life of the species* into a means of individual life. First it estranges the life of the species and individual life, and secondly it makes individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life of the species, likewise in its abstract and estranged form. For labor, *life activity, productive life* itself, appears to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species—its species-character—is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species-character. Life itself appears only as a *means to life*” (Ibid., 276).
60. Marx admitted that “animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc, But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal reproduces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. . . . It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life” (Ibid., 276-77).

61. According to Marx, "an immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor, from his life activity, from his species-being is the *estrangement of man from man*" (Ibid., 277).
62. Marx and Engels, "The Holy Family," MECW 4:36.
63. Marx, "Manuscripts," MECW 3:332-33.
64. Ibid., 280.
65. Ibid., 296.
66. Ibid., 297.
67. Ibid., 300. In this quotation from MECW, the term "abolition" is used to translate the German word *Aufhebung*, but this is not a correct translation. Usually either "transcendence" or "sublation" is used for *Aufhebung*. I have therefore substituted "transcendence" for the original "abolition." In his Paris days, Marx never used, with regard to private property, the term *Abschaffung*, which corresponds to "abolition."
68. Marx and Engels, "The Holy Family," MECW 4:36-37.
69. Marx writes about the circumstances at that time in the *Contribution*, as follows; "When in the spring of 1845 [Engels] too came to live in Brussels, we decided to set forth together our conception as opposed to the ideological one of German philosophy, in fact to settle accounts with our former philosophical conscience. The intention was carried out in the form of critique of post-Hegelian philosophy" (p. 22).
70. Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," MECW 5:49.
71. Ibid., 38-39.

72. Marx, "The Poverty of Philosophy," *MECW* 6:212.
73. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," *MECW* 6:519 (hereafter cited as "Manifesto"),
74. *Ibid.*, 482.
75. *Ibid.*, 496.
76. *Ibid.*, 498,
77. *Ibid.*
78. *Ibid.*, 519.
79. Marx, "Manuscripts," *MECW* 3:297.
80. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," *MECW* 6:498.
81. When Marx renounced his German citizenship, at the end of 1845, he declared his commitment to the revolution and to the overthrow of Germany. In a study of Marx's depth psychology, Nagano writes, "We see fluctuations in Marx's life in 1845. Soon after seeking refuge in Brussels, pressed and driven by dire circumstances, he finally renounced his German citizenship at the end of the year. None of his biographers paid serious attention to that event. . . . Those of us, however, who are interested in psychology, cannot take that event so lightly. Can any man ever discard his fatherland, where he was born and raised, as easily as if he was throwing away a rock picked up by the roadside or as if he was just blowing his nose? Such a thing can never be affirmed. When he renounced his citizenship, I suppose that Marx decided to separate completely from Germany, and even to become hostile to it. The fact that Marx renounced his citizenship was not a simple decision or action, but rather a part of a far-reaching decision and plan of action for the future, which was to revolutionize Germany and overthrow it. It was for such

a resolution and plan of action that he renounced his citizenship" (*Marx's Consciousness*, 182; my translation).

82. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), 763
83. Shirotuka points out that "regrettably the direct source to know when Marx started his studies of early socialism and communism in earnest seems not to have been found yet today. But roughly speaking, it seems to be around the time when Marx moved to Paris. For, as I mentioned in Chapter 5, in *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law. Introduction* (Dec.1843), which he wrote first after he moved to France, Marx's thought changed considerably compared with *On the Jewish Question*, which he had written two months before; and he made the proletariat as a class the object for his consideration for the first time, and sought in the proletariat for the bearer of human liberation" (*Young Marx*, 147; my translation).
84. Shirotuka says that, "since Engels went to England in late 1842, he came close to early British socialism partly because of Hess's influence, and kept company with the leaders of the labor movements including the Chartists, and had grasped the reality of these thoughts and movements with his personal experience. Therefore, Engels's story must have been quite valuable to Marx, who, at that time, was studying mainly early French socialism or communism and labor movements" (*Young Marx*, 181; my translation).
85. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," *MESW*3:121.
86. *Ibid.*, 122.
87. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," *MECW* 6:516, footnote a.
88. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," *MESW* 3:125-26.
89. *Ibid.*, 125,

90. In the “introduction,” Marx said that, “as philosophy finds its *material* weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its *spiritual* weapons in philosophy. . . . The *head* of this emancipation [liberation of man] is *philosophy*, its *heart* is the proletariat” (MECW 3:187).

2. Communist Materialism: Critique and Counterproposal

1. Lenin, “On the Significance of Militant Materialism,” *LCW* 33:227.
2. Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” *MECW* 5:8.
3. Lenin, “ ‘Left-Wing’ Communism—an Infantile Disorder,” *LCW* 31 :25.
4. Stalin, “The Foundations of Leninism,” *JSW* 6:92.
5. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), pp. 328-29.
6. *Ibid.*, 347.
7. M. Cornforth, *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, vol.1 of *Dialectical Materialism; an Introduction*, 5th ed. (London; Lawrence & Wishart, 2976), pp. 12-13.
8. The realization of the Kingdom of Heaven is accomplished through the perfection of God’s three great blessings, This is explained in detail in *Divine Principle* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1973), Chapter one, section 3, “The Purpose of Creation.”
9. The fundamental cause and root of the human Fall are clarified in detail in *Divine Principle*, chapter two.

10. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, 347.
11. Cornforth, *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, 27-28.
12. Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) wrote in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (London: J.M, Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1910) that Christianity gradually permeated the people's minds under the persecution of the Roman empire, and finally set up the flag of victory, as follows: "A CANDID but rational inquiry into the progress and establishment of Christianity may be considered as a very essential part of the history of the Roman empire.. While that great body was invaded by open violence, or undermined by slow decay, a pure and humble religion gently insinuated itself into the minds of men, grew up in silence and obscurity, derived new vigor from opposition, and finally erected the triumphant banner of the Cross on the ruins of the Capitol" (vol. 1, p. 430).
Gibbon wrote further that, "as the happiness of a future life is the great object of religion, we may hear without surprise or scandal that the introduction, or at least the abuse of Christianity, had some influence on the decline and fall of the Roman empire" (Ibid. 4:106). Thus Gibbon insisted that Christianity was one of the factors which led to the fall of the Roman empire.
13. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, trans. Clemens Dutt (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1954), p. 25.
14. Cornforth, *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, 36-37.
15. Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1957), p.14.
16. Ibid., 207.

17. Feuerbach, "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy," in *The Fiery Brook*, 168.
18. Though Feuerbach said that, "thinking comes out of being," nevertheless he was not a mechanistic materialist to insist that thinking is a function of the brain. According to Engels, Feuerbach said the following: "To me materialism is the foundation of the edifice of human essence and knowledge; but to me it is not what it is to the physiologist, to the natural scientist in the narrower sense, for example, to Moleschott, and necessarily is from their standpoint and profession, namely, the edifice itself. Backwards I fully agree with the materialists; but not forwards" (*MESW* 3:349).

Although Feuerbach took a materialist position, criticizing Hegel's idealism, he started from man as a sensuous being, understanding that mere materialism could not explain human society. On the other hand, Engels criticized Feuerbach, saying that he had not seen human society on the basis of materialism, even though Engels was sympathetic to Feuerbach's criticism of mechanistic materialism: "Feuerbach is quite correct in asserting that exclusively natural-scientific materialism is indeed 'the foundation of the edifice of human knowledge, but not the edifice itself.' For we live not only in nature but also in human society, and this also no less than nature has its history of development and its science. It was therefore a question of bringing the science of society, that is, the sum total of the so-called historical and philosophical sciences, into harmony with the materialist foundation, and of reconstructing it thereupon. But it did not fail to Feuerbach's lot to do this. In spite of the 'foundation', he remained here bound by the traditional idealist fetters" (*MESW* 3:351).

19. Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," *MECW* 5:39-41.
20. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," *MECW* 5:6.
21. Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach," *MESW* 3:361

22. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," MECW 5:8.
23. S. H. Lee, *Explaining Unification Thought* (New York; Unification Thought Institute, 1981), p. 11.
24. Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, 4.
25. Feuerbach, "Principles of the Philosophy of the Future," in *The Fiery Brook*, 227.
26. *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang* are Korean terms which can roughly be understood as "internal character" and "external form," respectively. They cannot, however, be accurately translated into English, and will, therefore, be used in this book in their Korean form. Every existing being has the dual characteristics of *Sungsang* and *Hyungsang*. *Sungsang* refers to the invisible, functional aspects of the existing being—such as mind, instinct and life; *Hyungsang* refers to the material aspect of the existing being—such as body, mass, shape and structure.
27. Marx and Engels distinguished two streams in French materialism, as follows: "There are *two trends in French materialism*; one traces its origin to Descartes, the other to Locke. The latter is *mainly a French development* and leads directly to socialism. The former, *mechanical materialism* merges with French *natural science proper*. . . . *Mechanical French materialism* adopted *Descartes' physics* in opposition to his metaphysics, His followers were by profession *anti-metaphysicians*, i.e., *physicists*. This school begins with the physician, *Le Roy*, reaches its zenith with the physician *Cabanis*, and the physician *La Mettrie* is its center. . . . Just as *Cartesian materialism* passes into *natural science proper*, the other trend of French materialism leads directly to *socialism* and *communism*" ("The Holy Family," MECW 4:125, 130).
28. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, 248.

29. Ibid., 271.
30. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, 246.
31. Ibid., 41.
32. Lenin, "Certain Features of the Historical Development of Marxism," *LCW*, 17:42.
33. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, 239.
34. Ibid., 248.
35. Ibid., 249.
36. Ibid., 250.
37. Ibid., 116.
38. O.W. Kuusinen, *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, trans. Clemens Dutt (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p.32 (hereafter cited as *Fundamentals*).
39. Kenzo Awata, "Explanatory Remarks" in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (in Japanese), translated with commentary by Awata (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1975), p. 215.
40. At the time of Mendeleev, the number of known elements was 63, but now 103 kinds of elements are known. Out of those, 91 are elements which exist naturally, and 12 are artificial; yet even the artificial elements are nothing but derivatives from the natural elements, and show the same regularities as the natural elements.
41. Today, scholars of brain physiology insist that the nature of cognition (perception) cannot be fully explained solely by research on the physiological structure, function, etc. of the brain, and

that the interaction of consciousness as spirit and the brain as matter must be admitted. John C. Eccles insists that perception is affected by the interaction between the “conscious self” (or the pure self) and the brain.

In saying that the substance of life lies in DNA, many biologists insist that questions relating to life can be explained completely through a better understanding of the genetic code. DNA may be called the fundamental form of matter which bears life phenomena, but it cannot be called life itself. In the Unification Thought view, the DNA molecule is the *Hyungsang* aspect, while life itself is its *Sungsang* aspect. Thus, the DNA molecule is merely the base for life, or that which carries life.

Lyall Watson, for instance, in his book *Lifetide* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), states that life is not determined only by the DNA genes; he argues that there is another system, a “contingent system,” which is paired with the genetic system. The activity of life—which he calls “lifetide”—appears through the interaction of these two systems. He describes this contingent system as a spiritual system, which contains some biological elements in addition to that which Carl Jung called the “collective unconscious.”

Furthermore, scientists cannot explain how or why the DNA genetic code has arisen. The molecular biologist, Jacques Monod, for instance, in his book *Chance and Necessity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971), frankly admits that “the major problem is the origin of the genetic code and its translation mechanism. Indeed, instead of a problem it ought rather to be called a riddle” (p. 143).

42. Engels, “Ludwig Feuerbach,” *MWSW*, 3:345-46.
43. Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947), p.
44. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p.16.

45. M. Cornforth, *Theory of Knowledge*, vol. 3 of *Dialectical Materialism: an Introduction*, 4th ed. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), p. 11,
46. Someone might object, saying that, even though an electric wave is converted into a sound wave, nevertheless, the sound wave itself is produced by the radio, and therefore the radio can be regarded as a device that generates sound. But for two reasons this objection does not hold: first, no radio can produce any sound unless it receives electric waves from a transmitting station; and second, when a sound wave from a radio is in the form of speech, it can convey meaning to a listener—in other words, it is nothing but a reproduction of speech transformed into electric waves at a broadcasting station. Therefore, the radio is neither a device which generates sound, nor (in the strict sense) one which generates sound waves.
47. With regard to spirit as a product of the brain, sources have been quoted above. With regard to spirit as a function of the brain, Lenin wrote that “the mind does not exist independently of the body, . . . mind is secondary, a function of the brain, a reflection of the external world” (*Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, 77).
48. Stalin, “The Foundations of Leninism,” *JSW* 6:92.
49. Mao Tse-tung, “On Practice,” *SWM* 1:304.
50. Genesis 2:7, RSV.
51. Man is a dual being composed of “spirit self” and “physical self,” The spirit self is created as subject to the physical self as object, and after human death, in other words, after the physical body has perished, the spirit self is meant to live eternally in the invisible world (the spiritual world). What is generally called a soul approximately corresponds to the spirit self,

52. The “original mind” refers to the unity resulting from the give and receive action between the spirit and physical minds, where the spirit mind is in the subjective and the physical mind in the objective position. Had human not fallen, but rather had perfected oneself, this mind would be the “original mind.” After the human fall, however, the human mind is often distorted and cannot be called original mind.
53. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, 248.
54. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 75-76.
55. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 15.
56. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, 170.
57. Ibid., 173.
58. Ibid., 174.
59. Ibid., 177.
60. Marx and Engels, “The German Ideology,” *MECW* 5:40-41.
61. Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” *MECW* 5:7.

3. Materialist Dialectic: Critique and Counterproposal

1. Diogenes Laërtius (early third century B,C.) said in *The Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers* that Aristotle called Zeno of Elea the inventor of dialectic.
2. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* Hegel discusses “the objectivity of Heraclitus which takes the dialectic itself as principle. . . . Thus with Heraclitus the philosophic Idea is to be met with in its speculative form. . . . Here we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my

Logic" (trans. E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson, [Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press, 1974] 1:279).

He also said that Heraclitus elevated subjective dialectic to an objective level. And Engels said that Heraclitus was the true inventor of the dialectic: "The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians. . . . This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus" (Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," *MESW* 3:126-27).

3. Hajime Nakano argues that "Kant's dialectic may be described as something that is fundamentally based on the tradition of the dialectic of Zeno-Aristotle. It succeeds it, but does not allow it to pass away as a passive thing; rather it lends to it academic significance by instilling in it a new criticalness" (*Dialectics* [in Japanese] [Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, 1973], p. 129; my translation).
4. These three propositions are dealt with in the *Grundlage der Gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (Foundation of the entire science of knowledge), 1794.
5. Nakano makes the following comment on the status of the dialectic before Hegel; "Fichte's triadic form of thesis-antithesis-synthesis not only has something in common with Hegel's dialectic, but can also be certainly considered the forerunning form of Hegel's dialectic—that is, the mediating form of infinite and finite in Fichte's way of thinking" (*Dialectics*, 133; my translation).
Fichte said in *Grundlage der Gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* that thinking is infinite and at the same time finite, and that infinity can be connected to an object (i.e., finiteness) through contradiction.
6. It is said that it was G.V. Plekhanov, the first to introduce Marxism into Russia, who coined the term "dialectical materialism."

7. The meaning of “in itself,” “for itself,” and “in and for itself” can be described as follows: First, there is the notion of being, which is being “in itself,” existing just as it is; second, being “in itself” is negated to become that which stands opposite to itself, namely otherness, and this is being “for itself,” Third, the state of otherness is negated and returns to itself again as the negation of negation, and this final stage is being “in and for itself.”
8. The triad “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” was not proposed by Hegel himself, though it is generally used to explain Hegelian dialectic.
9. Hegel’s “notion” or “concept” (*Begriff*) does not have the connotation of universality, as does the term “concept” in formal logic in which all the particularities have been abstracted and only common characteristics remain. “Notion” self-develops from “being,” the most abstract notion without content, into the individual, concrete notion. And the notion which has become most real, in other words, the notion which has become the essence (logos), was called by Hegel “idea” (*Idee*).
10. Engels expressed his approval of this fact in “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy,” as follows: “According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist—unknown where—from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world, It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the *Logic* and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself by changing into nature, where, without consciousness of itself, disguised as the necessity of nature, it goes through a new development and finally comes again to self-consciousness in man. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history from the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy” (*MESW*, 3:361-62).

11. Marx, *Capital*, 1;19-20.
12. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 168-69.
13. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, 62.
14. *Ibid.*, 17.
15. Engels points out that “all three [laws] are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of *thought*: the first, in the first part of his *Logic*, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the whole of the second and by far the most important of his *Logic*, the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. . . . If we turn the thing round, then everything becomes simple, and the dialectical laws that look so extremely mysterious in idealist philosophy at once become simple and clear as noonday” (*Dialectics of Nature*, 62).
16. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 7.
17. *Ibid.*, 7.
18. *Ibid.*, 8.
19. *Ibid.*, 11.
20. Lenin, “On the Question of Dialectics,” *LCW*, 38:358.
21. *Ibid.*, 358.
22. Marx expressed his dialectical position in contrast to Hegel’s dialectic, by arguing that “real extremes cannot be mediated precisely because they are real extremes. Nor do they require mediation, for they are opposed in essence. They have nothing

in common; they do not need each other, they do not supplement each other. . . . The *sharply-marked character of actual opposites*, their development into extremes, Which is nothing else but their self-cognition and also their eagerness to bring the fight to a decision, is thought of as . . . something harmful" ("The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law," MECW, 3:88-89).

23. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 32.
24. That man exists in relationships of "up and down," "front and back," and "right and left" is an idea explained in Unification Thought (See "The Connected Body," in S.H. Lee, *Explaining Unification Thought*, 76-79).
25. The term "things" here refers also to living beings, such as man, animals, and plants. To be more precise, the term "beings" should be used rather than "things." Nevertheless, in order for this theory to be developed in correspondence with dialectical materialism, the expressions "things" will also be used.
26. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 13.
27. In those days, there were massive losses of winter crops in the Ukraine, because of cold-weather damage, so that vernalization was viewed as an effective measure to deal with the damage. In fact, however, the effect that Lysenko had advertised never happened, and vernalization disappeared naturally. It seems that the transformation of winter wheat into spring wheat conducted by Lysenko, was not a hereditary change in the wheat, but rather a mere fluctuation in the characteristics of the wheat, which had nothing to do with so-called heredity. As for the rise and fall of Lysenkoism, it is explained in detail in *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*, by Z.A. Medvedev (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
28. Mao Tse-tung expressed views similar to those of Marx: "We may add that the struggle between opposites permeates a proc-

ess from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute. The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things" ("On Contradiction," *SWM* 1:343).

29. *Ibid.*, 343-44.
30. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, 211.
31. *Ibid.*, 17.
32. Not only "growth," but also "evolution" is included in the concept of development. Of course, the interaction between the mouth and the anus relates to development in the sense of growth, but not in the sense of evolution.
33. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 144-45.
34. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, 295.
35. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 145.
36. *Ibid.*, 32.
37. Also, Engels mentions the following additional examples of contradiction (page numbers are from *Dialectics of Nature*, except where noted):
 - Attraction and repulsion in motion (p, 72)
 - Heredity and adaptation (p. 211)
 - Identity and difference (pp. 214-16)
 - Positive and negative in electricity (p. 216)
 - Chance and necessity (p. 217) .
 - Analysis and synthesis (p. 223)
 - Induction and deduction (p, 226)
 - Motion and equilibrium (p. 246)

Subtraction ($a - b$) and addition ($-b + a$); division (a/b) and multiplication ($a \times 1/b$); powers (x^2) and roots ($\sqrt{x^4}$) (pp. 257-58)

Straight and curved (p. 264)

Impact and friction (p. 279)

Light and darkness (p. 287)

Organic life and its development (*Anti-Dühring*, 145)

A critique of each of these examples is omitted, but they are instances of either two correlative aspects of a thing (the majority of them); or phenomena in which one occurs in connection with the other (e.g., impact and friction); or related pairs in which one is a particular case of the other (e.g., motion and equilibrium: equilibrium is the same as standing-still, which is a particular case of motion), None of these examples are cases of contradictory elements.

38. Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics," *LCW* 38:357,
39. Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," *SWM* 1:313,
40. *Ibid.*, 314.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Cornforth, *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, 109.
43. Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," *SWM* 1:313.
44. Cornforth, *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, 100.
45. Seen from Unification Thought, everything has within itself a subject element and an object element which are in a correlative relationship, and these two correlative elements are called "correlatives" (or "paired elements"). Correlatives are complementary and cooperative elements centering on a common purpose.

According to materialist dialectic, on the other hand, there are two contradictory elements in everything. While in Hegel's dialectic opposites were based on unity, in materialist dialectic unity is only nominal, and struggle, or repulsion, is essential.

46. In 1968 I had the opportunity to meet a North Korean communist spy, an intellectual, who had been captured and was jailed at the Taejon Prison in South Korea. With the consent of the prison director and the chief of administration, I visited him twice a week. From March to September of that year we debated various topics of communist theory. I would sharply criticize communist theory from the standpoint of Unification Thought, and the spy would do his best to defend the communist view.

After a few encounters, the spy began to recognize the errors of his theory. One example of the topics we debated was the law of contradiction of the materialist dialectic: whether in an egg the embryo becomes a chick through struggle with the yolk and the white, or whether it becomes a chick through cooperative interaction between the yolk and the white, with a common purpose. At first, the spy opposed the Unification Thought proposition, but later he accepted that the embryo, the yolk, the white, etc., all exist with the common purpose of bringing forth a new chick, and that, therefore, the action between the two is not struggle, but rather cooperation and harmony. He also accepted that the phenomenon of hatching is not an instance of struggle, but rather simply the fact that the already-formed chick breaks out of the egg shell in the same way that one takes off an item of clothing that is no longer needed.

47. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 14,

48. Marx, *Contribution*, 21.

49. Marx, *Capital*, 1:763.

50. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 151.

51. Cornforth, *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, 82,
52. In explaining the law of the transformation of quantity into quality, Engels also gives the following instance: "Here therefore we have a whole series of qualitatively different bodies, formed by the simple quantitative addition of elements, and in fact always in the same proportion. This is most clearly evident in cases where the quantity of all the elements of the compound changes in the same proportion. Thus, in the normal paraffins C_nH_{2n+2} , the lowest is methane, CH_4 , a gas; the highest known, hexadecane, $C_{16}H_{34}$, is a solid body forming colorless crystals which melts at $21^\circ C$ and boils only at $278^\circ C$. Each new member of both series comes into existence through the addition of CH_2 , one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen, to the molecular formula of the preceding member, and this quantitative change in the molecular formula produces at each step a qualitatively different body." (*Anti-Dühring*, 153) These facts, however, do not confirm the communist theory that when a gradual quantitative change (i.e., the increase in the number of component CH_2 units) reaches a certain point, a qualitative change will arise with a leap. As Engels says, "this quantitative change in the molecular formula produces at each step a qualitatively different body," which means that both quantitative and qualitative changes take place simultaneously and gradually, though discontinuously.

Cornforth explains this law by giving the following example: "But development means, not getting bigger, but passing into a qualitatively new stage, becoming qualitatively different. For example, a caterpillar grows longer and fatter; then it spins itself a cocoon, and finally emerges as a butterfly. This is a development, A caterpillar *grows* into a bigger caterpillar; it *develops* into a butterfly" (*Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, 81).

This is a mere illustration of the fact that the quality and the quantity of a thing change simultaneously and continuously. A caterpillar does not become a cocoon instantly, neither does a cocoon become a butterfly instantly. A caterpillar forms a co-

coon gradually, and then, inside the cocoon, gradually turns into a butterfly through a chrysalis.

53. Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," *SWM*, 1:333.
54. Cornforth, *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, 99.
55. *Ibid.*, 98.
56. Marx and Engels gave no detailed explanations of the law of the negation of negation; they only offered examples of it. Marx, for instance, said that "the capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labor of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation" (*Capital* 1:763). Engels touches on the topic of the negation of negation in *Anti-Dühring*, (pp. 155-70), but he also, only offers examples.

I have chosen, therefore, the explanation put forward in Kuusinen's *Fundamentals*, which has been publicly recognized by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In that work it is written that "the negation of an old quality by a new one in the process of development is the natural result of the operation of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. For a struggle of mutually exclusive aspects and tendencies occurs in each object, phenomenon or process, and this struggle leads ultimately to the "negation" of the old and the appearance of the new. But development does not cease when one phenomenon is "negated" by another that comes to replace it. The new phenomenon that has come into being contains new contradictions. At first these may be unnoticeable, but in the course of time they are bound to show themselves. The "struggle of opposites" then begins on a new basis and in the long run leads inevitably to a new "negation" (p. 101-102).

In his *Dictionary of Materialist Dialectic* (an edition translated from the original Russian into Japanese; Tokyo: Nauka

Co., 1943), Ishchenko explained the “law of the negation of negation” by asserting that “all the states and objects expose in their own development opposition and negation; next as they further develop, they sublimate and negate this negation, and as a result, the opposing moments become synthesized and unified into a higher unity, into a new state; in its subsequent development, this unity manifests its own negation, and thus sublimes itself again” (p. 201). In addition, Ishchenko explained “negation,” saying that it is “an action opposite to affirmation, When a thing is considered from the standpoint of its movement, it can be said to contain its own negation, and the thing becomes its own opposite, by being negated while developing” (p. 200).

As can be seen, our definition given in the main text corresponds to an arrangement and summary of the statement made above.

57. Lenin, “Karl Marx,” *LCW* 23:54.
58. Lenin, “Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic,” *LCW* 38:221-22.
59. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 9.
60. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 169.
61. Lenin, “Conspectus,” *LCW* 38:225.
62. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 168.
63. *Ibid.*, 162-63.
64. Kuusinen presents a similar view, as follows: “the negation of an old quality by a new one in the process of development is the natural result of the operation of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites” (*Fundamentals*, 102).
65. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 163.

66. Engels referred to perennial plants and to animals that do not die at the moment of laying eggs or giving birth: "We are not concerned at the moment with the fact that with other plants and animals the process does not take such a simple form, that before they die they produce seeds, eggs or offspring not once but many times; our purpose here is only to show that the negation of the negation really does take place in both kingdoms of the organic world" (*Anti-Dühring*, 163).

Here Engels stated that "we are not concerned . . . with" the case of perennial plants and those animals which produce offspring many times, but this is sheer sophistry. For him, negation in the examples of barley and a butterfly meant "withering" and "dying." However, perennial plants do not "wither" by fructification, and the animals (for example; hens) which lay eggs many times "do not die" by laying eggs. Therefore, Engels's concept of "negation" is not appropriate here at all. Accordingly, we knew that his explanation of the law of the negation of negation is an empty theory with no basis in nature.

67. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 164.

68. Marx, *Capital* 1:763.

69. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 33.

70. *Ibid.*, 15-16.

71. *Ibid.*, 17.

72. Marx stated that with Hegel, the dialectic "is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell" (*Capital* 1:20).

73. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," *MECW* 6:498.

74. Marx, *Capital* 1:20.

4. The Materialist Conception of History: Critique and Counterproposal

1. F. Engels, "On the History of the Communist League," *MESW*3; 178. In the preface to the English edition of 1888 of the *Manifesto*, Engels expressed a similar view point, as follows: "This proposition which, in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology, we, both of us, had been gradually approaching for some years before 1845. . . . But when I again met Marx at Brussels, in spring, 1845, he had it ready worked out, and put it before me, in terms almost as clear as those in which I have stated it here" (*The Communist Manifesto*, [New York: Penguin Books, 1967] p. 63).
2. Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," *MECW* 5:41-42.
3. Engels, "Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx," *MESW* 3:162.
4. Marx, *Contribution*, 20-21.
5. Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach," *MESW* 3:365-66.
6. *Ibid.*, 366.
7. According to Engels, "the materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged" ("Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," *MESW* 3:133).
8. Marx, *Capital* 1:177.

9. Ishchenko, *Dictionary of Materialist Dialectic*, 122.
10. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 31.
11. Man is a dual reality (dual man) consisting of "spirit self" and "physical self." The spirit self consists of "spirit mind" (subject) and "spirit body" (object); and the physical self consists of "physical mind" (subject) and "physical body" (object). The spirit mind pursues the spiritual values of truth, goodness, and beauty; the physical mind pursues the material values connected with food, clothing, and shelter.
12. Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," *MECW* 5:41-42.
13. Marx, *Contribution*, 193.
14. *Ibid.*, 197.
15. Marx, *Capital* 3:820.
16. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), p,78.
17. A textbook on Marxism-Leninist philosophy states that the Marxist theory of society singles out "from the totality of social relations *production relations as the most important and definitive.*" (F. V. Konstantinov, ed., *The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy*, trans. Robert Daglish [Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982], p.240.)
18. The capitalist relations of production, for instance, are relations into which the capitalist and the workers enter, while engaged. in production; such relations are determined by the political leaders of society. Therefore, when the leaders change through revolution, the relations of production can also be changed to another form. In fact, in many countries, revolution was

brought about and socialist relations of production (communist relations of production) were implemented. Though capitalist society (free society) has many problems—since it is a fallen human society—its leaders (especially the top leaders) are, relatively speaking, in the position of fulfilling the providence of God; on the contrary, the leaders of the communist society are, relatively speaking in the position of opposing the providence of God. Accordingly, the leaders of free society should lead their people in the direction of God’s wishes; since however they have not done that, free society has fallen into disorder.

19. Marx, “Letters: Marx to P.V, Annenkov in Paris,” *MESW* 1:518.
20. Maurice Cornforth, *Historical Materialism*, vol. 2 of *Dialectical Materialism: an Introduction*, 3rd (rev.) ed. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), p.58.
21. Marx, *Contribution*, 20.
22. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 40-41.
23. Marx and Engels, “Manifesto,” *MECW* 6:519.
24. Marx, *Contribution*, 20.
25. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* , 31.
26. *Ibid.*, 34.
27. Marx, *Contribution*, 21.
28. Fetters are shackles, used to confine the feet; symbolically they refer to something that restricts freedom..
29. Stalin asserted that “the history of social development is at the same time the history of the producers of material values themselves, the history of the laboring masses, who are the chief

force in the process of production and who carry on the production of material values necessary for the existence of society" (*Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 30).

30. Thus, the importance of desire must be recognized as one of the driving forces of revolution and social development. Indeed, as stated in our critique and counterproposal to the development of productive forces, Marx, Engels, and Stalin have recognized, albeit reluctantly, that desire is an important factor in the development of productive forces. This means that communists must acknowledge that history has developed not materialistically, but spiritualistically—or at least by materialistic and spiritualistic factors. That however, would be equivalent to negating the materialist conception of history.
31. E. Gibbon asserts in *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* that the propagation of Christianity was one of the factors which led to the fall of the Roman Empire (Vol. 1, p. 430 and vol. 4, p. 106).
32. Marx, *Contribution*, 20.
33. Stalin, *Marxism and Problems of Linguistics* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), p.3.
34. Communists today regard the superstructure as "ideas" and "institutions." According to an East German communist textbook, "the superstructure is the totality of the ideas which characterize a certain society and the corresponding institutions. The superstructure, therefore, embraces the totality of ideas, conceptions, moods, social feelings, and demands in the areas of politics, law, ideology, morality, arts, etc.—which are formed on the basis of material social relations and which are the means for men to express their social or class interests; as well as the totality of political, legal, cultural, and other institutions (such as the state, the political parties and organizations, the cultural institutions, and the educational systems)" (G. Redlow et al., *Einführung in den Dialektischen und Historischen Materialismus*

[Introduction to dialectical and historical materialism] [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1971], p.346; my translation).

35. Cornforth, *Historical Materialism*, 81.
36. Stalin, *Marxism and Problems of Linguistics*, 7.
37. Ibid., 8. Along similar lines, an East German textbook on Marxism states, "The productive forces, whose development in the last resort underlies the whole process of history, act on social life only together with the relations of production, and mediated through them." (A. Kosing, ed., *Marxistische Philosophie, Lehrbuch* [Marxist philosophy: textbook] [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1967], p. 232; my translation).
38. Marx, *Contribution*, 21.
39. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," MECW 6:503.
40. Engels, "Letter to J. Bloch in Königsberg" MESW 3:487.
41. Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," MECW 5:36,
42. Stalin, *Marxism and Problems of Linguistics*, 5.
43. Cornforth, *Historical Materialism*, 96-97; see also *Materialism and the Dialectical Method*, 22.
44. Marx, *Contribution*, 217.
45. Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," MECW 5:32.
46. Ibid., 436-37.
47. Cornforth, *Historical Materialism*, 44.

48. Engels, "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State," *MESW* 3:328.
49. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," *LCW* 25:392.
50. Engels, "The Origin of the Family," *MESW* 3:330.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," *LCW* 25:400-401.
53. *Ibid.*, 474.
54. *Ibid.*, 407-408.
55. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 333-34.
56. Djilas, *The New Class*, 151-56.
57. The term "social formation" is used by Marx in *Capital*; it is explained in Konstantinov's *Marxist-Leninist Philosophy* as follows: "The social-economic formation is a definite type of society, an integrated social system functioning and developing according to its own specific laws on the basis of the given mode of production. The economic skeleton of the social-economic formation is formed by the historically determined production relations" (p. 241).
58. With regard to the progress of the economic social formations. Marx wrote the following: "in broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society" (*Contribution*, 21). By "Asiatic mode of production" he meant a communal mode of production, and by "ancient mode of production" he meant the slave mode of production. And though it is not mentioned here, it is obvious that what comes after the modern bourgeois (capitalist) mode of production is the socialist (communist) mode of production.

Kuusinen's *Fundamentals* argues that "the conclusion that the history of mankind constitutes a succession of socio-economic formations is based on scientifically verified knowledge of the past. Mankind as a whole has passed through four formations—primitive-communal, slave, feudal, and capitalist—and is now living in the epoch of transition to the next formation, the communist formation, the first phase of which is called socialism" (p. 154).

59. Today it seems that the term "primitive communal society" (*Urgemeinschaft*) is generally used in Communist texts, but actually it means the same thing as "primitive communist society" (*Urkommunismus*). Actually, Marx himself employs both terms in *Capital*. The reason is that he intended to connect communist society with primitive communal society from the standpoint of returning. In other words, Marx saw communist society in the future as the primitive communal society which will return on a higher level (*Capital* 1:763). In other words, he held that primitive communal society which has returned to itself on a higher level after passing through class societies in accordance with the law of the negation of negation, is the classless communist society. Engels argued this point by asserting "all Indo-Germanic peoples began with common property. Among almost all of them it was abolished, negated, in the course of social development, extruded by other forms—private property, feudal property, etc. To negate this negation, to restore common property on a higher plane of development, is the task of the social revolution" (*Anti-Dühring*, 411).
60. Cornforth, *Historical Materialism*, 121.
61. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," *MESW* 3:19.
62. Engels, "Socialism, Utopian and Scientific" *MESW* 3:149-50.
63. Marx, *Contribution*, 22.

64. A. Kosing, *Marxistische Philosophie, Lehrbuch*, 238-39.
65. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," JSW6:100.
66. Marx, *Contribution*, 21.
67. According to Unification Thought, in the providence of restoration, the Jewish history and the subsequent Christian cultural history, namely the Western history, are the central providential histories—and other histories are peripheral providential histories.
68. Marx, *Capital* 3:820.
69. Hegel's terms "*Recht-Moralität-Sittlichkeit*" seem to have been variously translated by different scholars. P. Edwards, for instance, in his *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: McMillan Publishing Co. & The Free Press, Vol. 3, p. 442) translates them as "law-subjective morality-social morality"; S. E. Stumpf, in his *Philosophy: History and Problems* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., p. 334) translates them as "right-morality-social ethics"; and C. J. Friedrich, in his *The Philosophy of Hegel* (New York: The Modern Library, pp. 237, 252 & 260) translates them as "abstract right-morality-ethics." In this text I adopted the translation "law-morality-ethics."
70. According to Hegel, Idea develops itself in order to realize freedom. Nature is Idea in the form of otherness, it lacks consciousness, and has little freedom. But after Idea develops itself and reaches the level of organics (plant, animal), it manifests itself through man, and then it recovers consciousness and freedom. That is to say, while developing from subjective spirit into objective spirit, Idea actualizes a greater level of freedom. Accordingly, law--morality-ethics is the process of realizing freedom. Accordingly, in Hegel, the state, which is the final stage of development of Idea, is the embodiment of freedom. Hegel expressed it as follows: "the State is thus the embodiment of ra-

tional freedom, realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form" (*The Philosophy of History*, 47).

Also, Hegel stated that the purpose of world history is to reach the rational state, where freedom is actualized: "The inquiry into the essential destiny of Reason—as far as it is considered in reference to the World—is identical with the question, *what is the ultimate design of the World?* And the expression implies that that design is destined to be realized" (*Ibid.*, 16). "The State is the Idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human Will and its Freedom. It is to the State, therefore, that change in the aspect of History indissolubly attaches itself; and the successive phases of the Idea manifest themselves in it as distinct political *principles*" (*Ibid.*, 47). "The state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom; and it is an absolute end of reason that freedom should be actual" (*Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, 279).

71. Hegel explained the rational state by asserting that the "two realms [a mundane realm and a realm of mind] stand distinguished from one another though at the same time they are rooted in a single unity and Idea. . . . The true reconciliation which discloses the state as the image and actuality of reason has become objective. In the state, self-consciousness finds in an organic development the actuality of its substantive knowing and willing; in religion, it finds the feeling and the representation of this its own truth and an ideal essentiality; while in philosophic science, it finds the free comprehension and knowledge of this truth as one and the same in its mutually complementary manifestations, i.e. in the state, in nature, and in the ideal world, [Thus, objective spirit passes into the stage of Absolute Spirit of art, religion, and philosophy]" (*Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, 222-23).
72. Hegel asserted that the rational state would have the form of a constitutional monarchy: "The government rests with the official world, and personal decision of the monarch constitutes its apex; for a final decision is, as was remarked above, absolutely

necessary. Yet, with firmly established laws and a settled organization of the State, what is left to the sole arbitrament of the monarch is, in point of substance, no great matter. It is certainly a very fortunate circumstance for a nation, when a sovereign of noble character falls to its lot" (*The Philosophy of History*, 456).

73. When Marx said that nature develops in accordance with the dialectic of contradiction, he is by no means expressing a conclusion that he obtained through observing nature. He is simply accepting unconditionally what Hegel said. In other words, the notion of the dialectical development of nature is not Marx's own invention, but rather a mere imitation of, or plagiarism from, Hegel.
74. Marx, *Capital* 1:8
75. *Ibid.*, 1:10.
76. Hegel regarded Frederick the Great of Prussia as the monarch that would be able to actualize the rational state. He wrote that "Frederick the Great not only made Prussia one of the great powers of Europe as a Protestant power, but was also a philosophical King—an altogether peculiar and unique phenomenon in modern times, There had been English Kings who were subtle theologians, contending for the principle of absolutism: Frederick on the contrary took up the Protestant principle in its secular aspect; and though he was by no means favorable to religious controversies, and did not side with one part or the other, he had the consciousness of Universality, which is the profoundest depth to which Spirit can attain, and is Thought conscious of its own inherent power" (*The Philosophy of History*, 437-38).
77. Marx, "Manuscripts," *MECW* 3:296.
78. Marx, *Contribution*, 20.

79. Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," *MECW* 5:38-39.
80. In his work, Shirotzuka argues that in *The German Ideology* there is a shift in Marx's position with regard to communism. He points out that in the parts considered the original basic manuscript, communism is clearly regarded as a means to overcome human alienation; but in the parts of the manuscript considered to have been revised and written later, the question of alienation was deleted, and the focus was shifted to social and historical problems (*Young Marx*, 387- 94).
81. Lenin, "Frederick Engels," *LCW* 2:29.
82. Marx, *Contribution*, 210-11.
83. *Ibid.*, 19.
84. Sidney Hook, *Marx and the Marxists* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1955), p. 35.
85. Due to the human Fall, the world of God's ideal of creation (that is, the kingdom of heaven on earth) was not realized, and was left in the world of God's ideas; at the same time, it was left as an ideal within the depth of man's original mind. In order to actualize the ideal world (as well as the ideal man), God has implemented His providence throughout history. Such history is called the history of the providence of restoration, or simply, the history of restoration. Here restoration refers to the actual recovery of the lost idea.
86. Marx and Engels, "The German Ideology," *MECW* 5:38-39.
87. In the Middle Ages, peoples' original nature was restrained due to secular degradation within the Catholic Church. Thus, in the sixteenth century a quest for the original human nature began actively, both internally and externally. The internal quest took the form of the movement of Religious Reformation, which

aimed at the establishment of freedom of faith. This movement eventually came to establish the Abel-type democracy, which was based on freedom of faith. On the other hand, the external quest took the form of the movement of humanism. Within the stream of humanism, first the Renaissance brought about a way of life that attached importance to man and nature; next, the Enlightenment established a Cain-type democracy, based mostly on atheistic and materialistic view points; and finally, there arose communism, which is an extreme form of atheism and materialism.

88. Karl Jaspers described it as follows: "It would seem that this axis of history is to be found in the period around 500 B.C. in the spiritual process that occurred between 800 and 200 B.C. It is there that we meet with the most deepcut dividing line in history. Man, as we knew him today, came into being. For short we may style this the 'Axial Period'" (*The Origin and Goal of History*, trans, M. Bullock [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 3953], p. 1).
89. Jaspers also asserted that the Axial Period is "an historical mystery which progressive research into the facts of the situation renders increasingly great, The Axial Period, with its overwhelming plenitude of spiritual creations, which has determined all human history down to the present day, is accompanied by the enigma of the occurrence, in these mutually independent regions, of an analogous and inseparably connected process" (*Ibid*., 13).
90. HSA-UWC, *Divine Principle*. (New York: The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973), pp. 227-230.
91. The proper role of the law of repulsion is to strengthen give and take action. After the human Fall, however, the struggle between subjects in human society became manifest. Accordingly, the law of repulsion became the cause of struggles in history.

5. Marxist Epistemology: Critique and Counterproposal

1. Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," *SWM* 1:296.
2. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), 2:167.
3. Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," *MESW* 3:362
4. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, 250,
5. Cornforth, *Theory of Knowledge*, 26-34.
6. Lenin, "Conspectus of Hegel's Science of Logic," *LCW* 38:171,
7. Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," *SWM* 1:298-99.
8. Kuusinen's *Fundamentals* says the following: "Dialectical materialism defines practice as a process in which man, a material being, acts upon his material environment. Practice is the entire activity of man in altering the world, and primarily his productive and social and revolutionary activity"(p. 134).
9. Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," *SWM* 1:304.
10. Kuusinen's *Fundamentals* states that "the criterion of the truth of social theories can only be the productive and practical revolutionary activities of the masses" (p, 135).
11. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," *MECW*5:6.
12. Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," *SWM* 1:296.
13. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, 129-30.

14. Konstantinov, *Maxist-Leninist Philosophy*, 1 23-46.
15. Kuusinen, *Fundamentals*, 119.
16. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, 121.
17. *Ibid.*, 122.
18. Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," *SWM* 1:308.
19. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," *MESW* 3:102.
20. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 136-37.
21. *Ibid.*, 336.
22. Andrée Goudot-Perrot, *Cybernetics and Biology* (in Japanese), trans. Jun Okuda et al. (Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 1970) p. 105 (my translation).
23. The short term memory, of several seconds in duration, is considered to be based on a repetitive electric circuit. On the other hand, the long term memory, lasting from several hours to several years, is considered to have as a carrier a group of neurons forming a special chain, to whose synapses a change has been brought about (the nervous circuit theory). But, there is another theory which proposes that memory is made possible by such substances as the memory nucleic acid or the memory protein, remaining long in the neurons (the molecule theory). Then, where, in the brain, is long-term memory stored? According to the Diagram Group's *Brain: A User's Manual* (New York: Berkeley Books, 1983): "Long-term event memory is stored in the hippocampus and in the cortex of the frontal lobes. The cortex of the temporal lobes is crucial to abstract memory. The thalami are also important to long-term memory" (p. 275).
24. Goudot-Perrot, *Cybernetics and Biology*, 89.

25. M.S. Gazzaniga and J.E. LeDoux, *The Integrated Mind* (New York: Plenum Press, 1978), 132.
26. *Ibid.*, 134.
27. Kuusinen's *Fundamentals* asserts that the leap from perceptual cognition to logical cognition (abstract thought) is "dialectical" as follows: "Sensations, perceptions and notions acquired through sense experience form the basis of knowledge; its point of departure. But cognition does not stop there. It goes farther, rising to the level of abstract thought. The Marxist theory of knowledge recognizes the qualitative difference between these two levels. Far from divorcing them, however, it perceives their dialectical interconnection" (pp, 122-23).

6. Marxist Political Economy: Critique and Counterproposal

1. Marx moved to Paris and began his study of economics. At that time he became acquainted with Proudhon. Marx esteemed Proudhon highly at first, and in *The Holy Family* (September-November 1844), he defended Proudhon against Edgar Bauer's attack on Proudhon's *What is Property?* (1840). Later, however, (as Engels pointed out in the introduction to the first German edition of *The Poverty of Philosophy*), Marx and Proudhon, who had been very close and often would stay up all night engaged in discussions, gradually grew apart in their viewpoints. Eventually Marx wrote *The Poverty of Philosophy*, which was a sharp critique of Proudhon's *The Philosophy of Poverty*. Marx's criticisms of Proudhon are based on two points, as follows:

First is his criticism of Proudhon's view on the value of labor. According to Marx, Proudhon, while insisting on the labor theory of value, saying that the value of a product is determined by labor time, at the same time, he failed to measure the value of labor by the same standard, that is, the labor time required to

produce it. Proudhon regarded the value of labor as equal to wages. As a result, he asserted that wages correspond to the cost of the production of a commodity, and that the only worker needed to receive a certain share of the product.

Secondly, Proudhon considered only the quantity of labor, disregarding the qualitative differences of labor. In contrast to this, Marx considered that when one determines the value of a product by the quantity of labor, it must be based on the premise that the quality of labor is the same. And as stated elsewhere in this work, Marx considered that labor as the standard to determine the value of a product must be equalized labor (abstract human labor). In other words, the reason why labor can become the standard of value is that the problems connected with the quality of labor can be solved by the reduction of complex labor to simple labor, which makes it possible to determine the value of labor only through quantitative differences.

2. Marx, *Capital* 1:60.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 44.

5. Ibid., 46.

6. Ibid., 38.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid, 44.

11. Ibid. 39.

12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 44.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 105.
16. Marx, "Wages, Price and Profit," in *MESW* 2:47.
17. Ibid., 54.
18. Marx, *Capital* 1:75, 1:356.
19. Marx asserted that the "cost of circulation," generally speaking, does not produce any value, in other words, it is an unproductive cost. He wrote as follows: "*The general law is that all costs of circulation which arise only from changes in the forms of commodities do not add to their value. They are merely expenses incurred in the realization of the value or in its conversion from one form into another. The capital spent to meet those costs (including the labor done under its control) belongs among the faux frais of capitalist production*" (*Capital* vol.2:[Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967] 152).

And yet, Marx asserted that the cost of transportation can be regarded as producing value and that, since transportation is necessary for the realization of use value, the transportation industry can be seen as an "additional process of production," prolonged in the process of circulation (Ibid., 153).

Thus, while saying that the process of circulation (which includes transportation labor) generally does not add any value to a commodity. Marx also asserted that the labor performed in transportation can produce value, thereby making his conception obscure. What Marx wanted to do was to maintain his position that only productive labor produces value, but since that seemed to be against reality, he was forced to admit that the la-

bor performed in transportation is an additional process of production.

At any rate, Marx considered the labor performed in transportation to be merely additional, or auxiliary, labor, seen from the standpoint of producing value. In other words, he did not regard transportation labor as an essential labor for producing value. Accordingly, even from Marx's point of view, oil and natural gas cannot but be regarded as commodities, even if no transportation labor is added to them.

20. Marx, *Capital* 2:125.
21. Marx wrote that "at all events the capital and labor-power which serve the need of preserving and storing the commodity-supply are withdrawn from the direct process of production. On the other hand the capitals thus employed, including labor-power as a constituent of capital, must be replaced out of the social product. Their expenditure has therefore the effect of diminishing the productive power of labor, so that a greater amount of capital and labor is required to obtain a particular useful effect. They are called *unproductive costs*" (Ibid. 2:141-42).
22. Ideas, information and knowledge do not become commodities if they just remain as they are. They become commodities only when, usually through some investment of capital, they are made into something which can serve society.
23. Marx, *Capital* 1:41.
24. This is pointed out by Shinzo Koizumi in *Common Knowledge in the Critique of Communism* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1976), p. 162.
25. Shinzo Koizumi explains this as follows: "Owen's Labor Exchange Bank was established in London on September 3, 1832. Its system was that producers should bring to the bank the products they wanted to sell, and the consumers would buy

what they liked from the bank's warehouse. Prices were determined by cost, and labor notes equivalent to the cost of the commodities sold were given to producers. The producers, in turn, could use those notes to buy whatever goods they wished from the bank. Assume, for example, that a shoemaker has spent two shillings of raw materials and ten hours of labor to produce a pair of shoes. Let us suppose that he receives ten one-hour notes for his ten hours of labor and four one-hour notes for the two shillings he spent (by converting six pence for one hour), a total of fourteen notes. The shoemaker, then, would be able to buy whatever he wanted with the fourteen notes.

Owen's bank appeared to be successful during its first four months of operation. It was reported that every week, six hundred pounds worth of goods were exchanged. But difficulties would often come up, the biggest of which was that there was not much one would want in the bank, even if one had brought one's product and had received labor notes according to the described method. The things people liked most were in short supply, whereas useless and old fashioned goods quickly began to stockpile. What is important to note is that the producers were very intent on earning as many labor notes as possible, since the prices of the commodities were determined by the cost, rather than by the consumer's demand. For example, tailoring four jackets with a certain amount of cloth was more profitable than tailoring two pairs of trousers with the same amount of cloth, and such things actually took place. Raw materials became scarce. Eventually, the troubled bank took the anomalous measure of paying for raw materials in ordinary money in order to treat them favorably, though it issued labor notes for productive labor. It was almost the same as if the bank had already gone bankrupt. In fact, the bank had to be closed in May, 1834, about a year and a half after its opening.

This is a rather small event, but theoretically it gives an extremely interesting exemplification. It shows that a bank went bankrupt due to the imbalance between the labor cost of the products and the amount of regard for the needs of the consumers. This shows that a scheme like that will end in failure,

without any doubt, whether in the case of a small bank, or in the case of a whole society” (*Common Knowledge*, 158-59; my translation).

26. Marx, *Capital* 1:44.
27. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 236.
28. In *Karl Marx and the Close of His System* (1896), Böhm-Bawerk pointed out that to determine the quantity of socially necessary labor through the reduction of complex labor to simple labor is a form of “reasoning in a circle.” He said, “Good! We will let that pass for the moment and will only inquire a little more closely in what manner and by what means we are to determine the standard of this reduction, which, according to Marx, experience shows is constantly made. Here we stumble against the very natural but for the Marxian theory the very compromising circumstance that the standard of reduction is determined solely by the actual exchange relations themselves. . . . Under these circumstances what is the meaning of the appeal to ‘value’ and ‘the social process’ as the determining factors of the standard of reduction? Apart from everything else it simply means that Marx is arguing in a complete circle.” (*Karl Marx and the Close of His System*, edited with an introduction by Paul M. Sweezy [New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1949], p. 83).
29. Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, *Political Economy: A Textbook* (in Japanese), 4th ed., (Tokyo: Godo Shuppansha, 1963), vol.4, p.799 (my translation) (hereafter cited as *Textbook*).
30. *Ibid.*, 4:799-800.
31. And even after the publication of the *Textbook* in the Soviet Union (1962), there has been no report that the socially necessary labor time has been successfully measured through the use of computers.

32. Marx, *Capital* 3:159-60.
33. Ibid., 161.
34. According to the Modern Economics Research Association's, *Fifteen Major Economic Theories of the World* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Fujishoten, 1982, p.87), Böhm-Bawerk's critique of Marx is described as follows: "According to Marx, the law of value does not apply individually, but only through the whole, as an average. In terms of average, the disagreement between value and price is offset, in such a way that they will concur. This is Marx's logic. But Böhm-Bawerk says that this is an abuse of the concept of average. When a certain commodity fluctuates between Y40 and Y60, it is correct to say that the average price is Y50. But when a certain commodity always remains at Y40 and another commodity always remains at Y60, and one says that the average price is Y50, that means something entirely different. Marx took the concept of average which should apply to the former case and applied it to the latter case. The important point here is to determine the reason why a certain commodity always costs Y40 while another always costs Y60—and not that the average between the two is Y50. This is Böhm-Bawerk's objection" (my translation).
35. Marx said, "Now, if the commodities are sold at their values, then, as we have shown, very different rates of profit arise in the various spheres of production, depending on the different organic composition of the masses of capital invested in them. But capital withdraws from a sphere with a low rate of profit and invades others, which yield a higher profit. Through this incessant outflow and influx, or, briefly, through its distribution among the various spheres, which depends on how the rate of profit falls here and rises there, it creates such a ratio of supply to demand that the average profit in the various spheres of production becomes the same, and values are, therefore, converted into prices of production" (*Capital* 3:195-96). Thus, Marx admits

that commodities are not actually exchanged according to their “values” (determined by the amount of labor), but rather that they are exchanged at the “prices of production” which are determined by supply and demand.

Yet, if commodities are not bought and sold at their “values,” this would mean that Marx’s theory of value developed in the first volume of *Capital* does not hold good in reality. In *Karl Marx and the Close of His System*, Böhm-Bawerk criticized this point, saying that “Marx’s third volume contradicts the first. The theory of the average rate of profit and of the prices of production cannot be reconciled with the theory of value” (p.30). Concerning this matter, Samuelson states that no answer has been given to Böhm-Bawerk’s critique. Actually, he points out that Marx was aware of this problem, saying that “although [Marx] promised to clear up the contradiction between ‘price’ and ‘value’ in later volumes, neither he nor Engels ever made good this claim. On this topic the good humored and fair criticisms of Wicksteed and Böhm-Bawerk have never been successfully rebutted (Paul A. Samuelson, “Economics and the History of Ideas” *American Economic Review*, March 1962).

36. The satisfaction, or the “utility effect,” which a consumer receives from a commodity becomes smaller as the amount of commodities consumed increases. For example, compared with the satisfaction one obtains when acquiring a television set for the first time, the added satisfaction one obtains from a second television set is smaller. Furthermore, the added satisfaction which one would obtain when acquiring a third television set would be even smaller. The utility of a commodity, which includes the variable of the amount of commodities consumed, corresponds to the “marginal utility” which marginalist economics speaks of—in other words, additional utility obtained from an additional unit of commodity.
37. It should be noted that the “amount of profitability effect” does not refer to the amount of satisfaction related only to profit, but

rather to the amount of satisfaction related to how much money can be obtained through a given commodity.

38. This theory is obtained by applying the law of give and receive action in Unification Thought. When a subject and an object engage in give and receive action, a certain result (effect) is always manifested. Since satisfaction is the psychological effect resulting from the give and receive action between the producer and the commodity, or the consumer and the commodity, it is possible to express satisfaction with a concept of effect.
39. In order to indicate the amount of effect (or the amount of satisfaction) in terms of money, one must make use of a certain standard. With regards to the “amount of profitability effect” for the producer, what serves as the standard for measuring it is the cost of production of the commodity, and generally the producer will indicate his amount of satisfaction at an appropriate price, which is above the cost of production. There are, however, cases where the producer may express the amount of his satisfaction in terms of an amount below the cost of production—such as, for instance, the case where the usefulness or utility of the commodity deteriorates due to a relative decline of its quality, or its utility decreases due to excessive production; or the case where the cost of production of a commodity is too high compared with similar commodities sold by other companies; or the case where the demand for the commodity abruptly decreases due to economic depression; and so forth. The amount of satisfaction is a subjective, psychological effect. On the other hand, with regard to the “amount of utility effect” for the consumer, he expresses the amount of his satisfaction in terms of money, taking as the standard the market price of similar commodities and his own financial situation. .
40. Unification Thought holds that exchange value is established at the moment of the transaction of buying and selling, and therefore, it views price as determined by the interaction between producer and consumer. This price is called “bilateral price.”

When the price is determined one-sidedly by the producer (who, of course, considers the various factors that are relevant to price determination), that price is called “unilateral price.” The unilateral price is the price which the producer hopes to obtain in selling his commodity. In many cases, however, the actual sale takes place at a lower price, in response to an offer by the consumer.

In other words, the unilateral price and the bilateral price do not always coincide. Of course, if the consumer chooses to buy the commodity at the price set by the producer, obviously that price assumes the nature of a bilateral price in the market place.

The theory of price in Unification Thought is based on the law of give and receive action. Accordingly, it is the theory of bilateral price, which is determined at the scene of transaction. The price determined by the give and receive action between the producer and the consumer, namely, the bilateral price, is, from the producer’s standpoint, the “profit price” (the price for profit); and from the consumer’s standpoint, it is the “utility price” (the price for utility).

41. Marx stated in “Afterword to the Second German Edition” of *Capital* that the “last great representative [of British Political Economy], Ricardo, in the end, consciously makes the antagonism of class-interests, of wages and profits, of profits and rent, the starting-point of his investigations, naively taking this antagonism for a social law of Nature” (vol. 1, p. 14). Taking up Ricardo’s view, Marx formulated the theoretical system contained in *Capital* within the framework of materialist dialectic, which was a materialistic inversion of Hegel’s idealistic dialectic. In *Capital* he mentions the following kinds of oppositions:
- antithesis between use value and value (exchange value) (1:86,114);
 - contradiction between useful labor (concrete labor) and abstract labor (1:114);
 - antagonism between money and commodity (1:87,138);

circulation capital in contrast to productive capital (2:170-71);
antagonism between laborers and capitalists (2:57);
antagonism between the instruments of labor (machines) and the laborer (1:430-32).

42. W. Stanley Jevons, *The Theory of Political Economy*, 5th ed. (New York: Augustus M, Kelly, 1957), p.95.
43. As an explanation of surplus value, Marx stated that "the exact form of this process is therefore M-C-M', where M' = M + ΔM = the original sum advanced, plus an increment [M stands for money, and C for commodity]. This increment or excess over the original value I call 'surplus value.' The value originally advanced, therefore, not only remains intact while in circulation, but adds to itself a surplus-value or expands itself" (*Capital* 1:150).
44. Marx described profit as the converted form of surplus value, as follows: "In its assumed capacity of offspring of the aggregate advanced capital, surplus-value takes the converted form of *profit*. Hence, a certain value is capital when it is invested with a view to producing profit, or, there is profit because a certain value was employed as capital. Suppose profit is p. Then the formula $C = c + v + s = k + s$ turns into the formula $C = k + p$, or the value of a commodity = cost-price + profit" (*Capital* 3:36).
45. Marx, *Capital* 1:509,
46. Ibid., 618.
47. Marx, "Wages, Price and Profit," *MESW* 2:54.
48. Marx, *Capital* 1:163.
49. Marx, "Wages, Price and Profit," *MESW* 2:54.

50. Ibid., 61.
51. Engels, "*Konspekt über 'Das Kapital' von Karl Marx,*" *Werke* 16:264 (my translation) (hereafter cited as "*Konspekt*").
52. Marx, *Capital* 1:153.
53. Ibid., 154.
54. Ibid., 169.
55. Marx wrote the following: "That part of capital then, which is represented by the means of production, by the raw material, auxiliary material and the instruments of labor machinery, buildings, land, etc., does not, in the process of production, undergo any quantitative alteration of value. I therefore call it the constant part of the capital, or, more shortly, *constant capital*.
On the other hand, that part of capital, represented by labor-power, does, in the process of production, undergo an alteration of value. It both reproduces the equivalent of its own value, and also produces an excess, a surplus-value, which may itself vary, may be more or less according to circumstances. This part of capital is continually being transformed from a constant into a variable magnitude. I therefore call it the variable part of capital, or, shortly, *variable capital*" (*Capital* 1:209).
56. Marx, *Capital* 1:387.
57. Ibid.
58. Engels, "*Konspekt,*" *Werke* 16:264.
59. Marx, *Capital* 1:371.
60. Ibid., 395.
61. Ibid., 167,

62. Marx, "Wages, Price and Profit," *MESW*2:56,
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.*, 57.
65. Marx, "Wage Labor and Capital," *MESM* 1:158.
66. Marx, *Capital* 1:538.
67. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," *MESW* 3:23.
68. Marx, *Capital* 1:543-58.
69. According to *Textbook*, time wages increase the capitalist's exploitation of the workers by prolonging the labor time per day (that is, by making laborers work longer and longer), while the wages (per day, week, month) remain the same. On the other hand, piece wages increase the exploitation of the workers by continuously driving them to greater intensity (that is, by pushing them to work harder and harder) (I.E., *Textbook* 1:171-76).
70. Marx said the following: "That portion of the working-day, then, during which this reproduction [of labor] takes place, I call 'necessary' labor-time, and the labor expended during that time I call 'necessary' labor. . . . During the second period of the labor-process, that in which his labor is no longer necessary labor, the workman, it is true, labors, expends labor-power; but his labor, being no longer necessary labor, he creates no value for himself. He creates surplus-value which, for the capitalist, has all the charms of a creation out of nothing. This portion of the working-day, I name *surplus labor-time*, and to the labor expended during that time, I give the name of *surplus-labor*" (*Capital* 1:216-17).

71. Marx said, "The surplus-value produced by prolongation of the working-day, I call *absolute surplus-value*. On the other hand, the surplus-value arising from the curtailment of the necessary labor-time, and from the corresponding alteration in the respective lengths of the two components of the working-day, I call *relative surplus-value*" (*Capital* 1:315).
72. Marx, *Capital* 1:237.
73. *Ibid.*, 395.
74. *Ibid.*, 319.
75. *Ibid.*, 316-19.
76. Marx stated that "increased intensity of labor means increased expenditure of labor in a given time. Hence a working-day of more intense labor is embodied in more products than is one of less intense labor, the length of each day being the same" (*Ibid.*, 524).
77. Hiroyuki Okamoto's *Scientific Socialism* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Shin-Nippon Shuppansha, 1977), a recognized textbook of the Japanese Communist Party, states that the surplus value acquired through the increase of the intensity of labor can be regarded as absolute surplus value: "Intensifying labor is an important method for the capitalist to increase exploitation. . . . In this case, the value created in a working day is increased, even though the value of labor power [wages] remains the same. Accordingly, the relative worth of the portion which necessary labor occupies in the working day becomes less, and, as a result, the relative worth of the portion of surplus labor increases. In this context, the surplus value which results from the intensification of labor has the appearance of relative surplus value. Here, though labor time remains the same, still more labor is actually extended, and therefore it can be said that the intensification of labor is the same as the prolongation of labor time—in

other words, the surplus value based on the intensification of labor has a substantial resemblance to absolute surplus value" (p.312; my translation).

78. Marx, *Capital* 1:387.
79. Engels, "Konspekt," Werke 16:264.
80. In order to argue the point that machinery is constant capital, Marx used the method of depreciation as employed in the accounting system of an enterprise. Marx's intention in relating the matter of machinery with depreciation is clear from the letters he exchanged with Engels: "By the way, can you tell how long it takes before machinery needs to be replaced, for example, the machinery of your factory?" (Marx to Engels, March 2, 1858, *Briefwechsel zwischen Marx und Engels* 2:366; my translation) "With regard to the question of machinery, it is hard to say anything definite about it. At any case, Babbage is very wrong. The most accurate standard is the percentage that factory owners annually write off on machinery for wear and tear and repair. By doing so, he depreciates the total costs of his machinery in a certain period of time. This percentage is usually 7 1/2%; accordingly, machinery is covered through annual depreciation due to its use in 13 1/2 years. Therefore, it can be renewed without any loss." (Marx to Engels, March 4, 1858, *Ibid.*, 367)
81. Marx, *Capital* 1:371.
82. *Ibid.*, 420.
83. *Ibid.*, 381, 403.
84. *Ibid.*, 457.
85. Engels, "Konspekt," Werke 16:284.
86. Marx, *Capital* 1:445.

87. Ibid., 574.
88. Ibid., 594.
89. Ibid., 171.
90. Ibid.
91. Marx, "Wages, Price and Profit," *MESW* 2:74-75.
92. Paul A. Samuelson, *Economics*, 11th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980), p.691.
93. According to Marx, the capitalist's way of increasing surplus value is to prolong the working day to the maximum (absolute surplus value), or, if this is impossible, to curtail the necessary labor time by raising productivity while keeping the working day fixed (relative surplus value).

In saying, however, that "the more the productiveness of labor increases, the more can the working-day be shortened" (*Capital* 1:530), Marx stated that the labor time within a day can be shortened. This means that Marx was well aware of the fact that the capitalists of his day were forced to curtail labor time, and yet they could still increase profit by the introduction of new and efficient machinery.

What forced the capitalists of his day to curtail labor time was, first, the fact that many conscientious social reformers (for example, the utopian socialists) denounced the inhumane treatment of workers by capitalists; second, the fact that the struggle of the workers through such means as sabotage and the destruction of machinery was intensified; and third, the fact that the government had established labor laws attempting to improve working conditions by such things as the curtailment of working hours.

Evidently, what enabled profit to increase in spite of the fact that working hours had been curtailed was the introduction of

good and efficient machinery. Nevertheless, Marx continued to pretend that the theory of surplus value was right, when he said, "the more the working-day is shortened, the more can the intensity of labor increase" (Ibid. 1:530).

94. The kind of laborer Marx originally referred to was a physical laborer engaged directly in productive activity. Now, however, what communism calls laborers are the various kinds of employees in the industrial sector (transportation, commerce, banking, etc.), in the service industries (education, medicine, etc.), and so forth. This is clearly different from the concept of "laborers" which Marx had in mind. This seems to be a manifestation of the strategy of the communist party, which seeks to involve all sections of the working class in its revolutionary movement.
95. Marx wrote that, after payment has been made, out of surplus value (profit), to the landowner as rent and to the money-lending capitalist as interest, what remains is the profit, which the employing capitalist (entrepreneur) takes: "*The surplus value, or that part of the total value of the commodity in which the surplus labor or unpaid labor of the working man is realized, I call profit. The whole of that profit is not pocketed by the employing capitalist. The monopoly of land enables the landlord to take one part of that surplus value, under the name of rent. . . . On the other hand, the very fact that the possession of the instruments of labor enables the employing capitalist to produce a surplus value . . . enables... the money-lending capitalist to claim for himself under the name of interest another part of that surplus value, so that there remains to the employing capitalist as such only what is called industrial or commercial profit*" (Marx, "Wages, Price and Profit," MESW 2:61).
96. The Unification Thought view that wages are something distributed from profit does not exist in traditional economic theories. After World War II, a new concept was developed in business administration, that the purpose of the management of an

enterprise should be, not only the pursuit of profit for the capitalist, but also the pursuit of wages for the workers.

Heinrich Nicklisch (1896-1946), for instance, included reward to workers and profit together, and called them the “result.” He insisted that the “result” is the purpose of management. Through this concept, wages were seen as the distribution of the “result” rather than the payment of expenses (Shoichi Ohashi, et al., *Theory of Management Participation* [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1979) p.70).

A.W. Rucker asserts that the enterprise’s purpose of management should be the attainment of “value added,” and that, wages should be the distribution from the value added. Similar views to this one are the theory of the “creation of value,” by M. R. Lehman, and the theory of the “contributing value,” by P. F. Drucker (Shun-ichiro Miya, *A Story of Value Added* [in Japanese] [Tokyo: Nihon-Jitsugyo Publishing Co., 1982], pp.48-56).

Basically, such ways of thinking are in agreement with Unification Thought. In traditional economics, however, theories have been formulated with the assumption that enterprises pursue profit, which represent the earnings of the entrepreneur. Accordingly, Unification Thought has changed the meaning of the concept of profit, and has asserted that wages should be distributed from profit.

97. Both modern economics and Marxian economics regard the enterprise as a profit-making organization centering upon the entrepreneur. In contrast, in business administration, especially in Germany, a view of management was developed whereby the enterprise is seen as something which is commonly owned, both by capital and by labor, both by the investor (or manager) and the workers—the “theory of communal management.” The person who systematized this view was the above-mentioned Nicklisch. Guido Fischer’s theory of “partnership in management,” which viewed the enterprise as a union in partnership of the workers and the capitalists, is also of the same kind (S. Ohashi, *Theory of Management Participation*, 67-78).

In Unification Thought, the enterprise is seen as a community and at the same time a family, consisting of the manager

and the employees. Accordingly, Unification Thought is in agreement with these new views, which regard the enterprise as a community of labor and management. Nevertheless, the new views lack a family perspective. To view the enterprise as a family means, in a nutshell, to view it as an ethical organization, centered on heart and based on family ethics.

98. According to Samuelson, "much of hostility toward profit is really hostility toward the extremes of inequality in the distribution of profit that comes from unequal factor ownership" (*Economics*, 585). This view is in agreement with the Unification Thought position that exploitation results from the fact that capitalists take an excessive amount out of the earnings of the enterprise.
99. Profit in an enterprise is the total income (the amount sold) for a certain period of time minus the total cost of production. Accordingly, in the case where the "actual profit is formed at the scene of the transactions of commodities," this does not refer to the sale of a single commodity, but rather to the whole amount of commodities sold at a certain period of time.
100. Speaking from the standard of the Principle, it seems correct to assume that in the original world, only the cost of production would be indicated as the price of a commodity, and the consumer, when buying that commodity, would pay the cost of production plus a certain percentage of the price of production in the form of a reward and as a token of appreciation towards the producer. In a fallen society, however, this would never work. Accordingly, the producer in a fallen society demands a price that includes the amount of the cost of production plus an added percentage of the cost of production in the form of profit. But this must be seen as a transformation of the original standard of buying and selling commodities. Accordingly, it is not at all wrong to view the essence of profit as a reward.
101. Samuelson, *Economics*, 579-85.

102. Marx wrote that “the gradual growth of constant capital in relation to variable capital must necessarily lead to a gradual fall of the general rate of profit, so long as the rate of surplus value, or the intensity of exploitation of labor by capital, remain the same” (*Capital* 3;212).

103. The way of criticizing Marx’s “law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall” by using the inequality:

$$\frac{s_1}{v_1 + d_1} < \frac{s_2}{v_2 + d_2}$$

was first presented as the inequality:

$$\frac{m}{v + d} < \frac{m'}{v' + d'}$$

by Won-Ku Yoon in his *Critical Conquest of Marxism* (in Korean) (Seoul: Shin Jae-Yang Sa, 1961).

104. Samuelson, *Economics*, 691.

105. Marx asserted that “the general tendency of capitalist production is not to raise, but to sink the average standard of wages” (“Wage Price and Profit,” *MESW* 2:74).

106. Marx and Engels, “Manifesto,” *MECW* 6:495.

107. Marx, *Capital* 1:644.

108. Marx and Engels, “Manifesto,” *MECW* 6:495-96.

109. Samuelson, *Economics*, 681.

110. *Ibid.*, 756.

111. I.E., *Textbook* 1:192.

112. Marx, *Capital* 1:625.

123. Ibid., 613.

114. Ibid., 645.

115. According to Motonobu Hironishi, socialism is based on “joint ownership,” and, Marx never asserted that the socialist system should be based on “state ownership” (nationalization). The joint ownership which Marx spoke about refers to direct “social ownership,” in other words, ownership by the people. That is essentially different from state ownership. Lenin misunderstood and misused Marx’s concept of joint ownership, and fraudulently substituted the concept of state ownership for joint ownership (Motonobu Hironishi, “How to Persuade Leftists [in Japanese],” *Nijusseiki* [June 1970]).

Referring to nationalization, the *Manifesto* says that “the proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible” (*MECW* 6:504). The same *Manifesto*, however, states that “by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production” (Ibid.).

Hironishi argues that Marx’s own idea is that nationalization is unreasonable and barren, and that state ownership is untenable and cannot be protected for long (*Misinterpretation of Capital* [in Japanese] [Tokyo: Seiyusha, 1965], pp. 181-84). In other words, state ownership is not socialism itself, but rather “merely the means for the purpose of letting the bourgeois idea of law tremble” (Ibid., 184), and in the 1860’s, European socialists (Marx included) had abandoned nationalization as a means to their goals (Ibid., 186).

This interpretation by Hironishi is noteworthy. If Marx’s real meaning is as described by Hironishi, then it can be said that

the type of society which Marx aimed at as a means to realize the emancipation of man, the realization of freedom, is best represented, not by communist countries today (including the Soviet Union), where the state (or the Communist Party) owns everything, but rather by non-governmental corporations (stock companies), which are jointly owned. Marx himself said that stock companies are "social undertakings as distinct from private undertakings," and he sees them as "the abolition of capital as private property" (*Capital* 3:436). Accordingly, Hironishi argues that it is possible to make smooth progress from stock companies toward the direction of communism, as Marx had thought (*Misinterpretation of Capital*, 224).

From this perspective, one should conclude that the concept of violent nationalization of the means of production is not Marx's own concept, strictly speaking, but rather a concept which exists within Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, Marxism-Leninism is something essentially different from the communism which Marx envisioned. It has completely deviated from the direction of the "emancipation of man," or the "realization of freedom," which was Marx's starting point.

Admittedly, Marx insisted that, though a temporary measure, the proletariat should use violence to take the means of production away from the bourgeoisie. He plainly states that "the Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be obtained only by the forcible [violent, *gewaltsam*] overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution" ("Manifesto," *MECW* 6:519).

The result obtained from violent revolution (i.e., the communist regime) will necessarily have to be protected through violent means. Consequently, even though in theory Marx aimed at social ownership (joint ownership), in actuality it would not be possible to avoid state ownership. If the social ownership which Marx spoke of is to be realized, one must resort only to a peaceful, non-violent, revolution. And yet, Marx denied all the traditional moral views of value, and emphasized violent revolution on the basis of materialistic dialectic, which is

a new, militant view of value. This explains why Lenin was led to adopt terrorism as the strategy and tactic of communist movement, and to replace social ownership with state ownership. Consequently, the burden of the responsibility for the establishment of centralized economies by means of state ownership in present-day communist society still rests on Marx's shoulders.

7. The Collapse of the Socialist Economy

1. According to Marx, "between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*" (Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," *MESW* 3:26). It was Lenin who developed the concept of the transition period, identifying it as the period from capitalism to socialism (i.e., the first phase of communist society). Lenin said, "Marx spoke of the entire period of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the period of transition from capitalism to socialism" ("Greetings to the Hungarian Workers," *LCW* 29:388).
2. I. E., *Textbook*, 3:494. This book (the 4th revised and enlarged edition; Moscow, 1962) was never translated into English and the original Russian edition has been difficult to access. Accordingly, there has been no recourse but to translate from the Japanese edition.
3. *Ibid*, 3:515. See also: G. A. Kozlov, ed., *Political Economy: Socialism* (hereafter cited as *Socialism*) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p.27. Kozlov's *Socialism* together with his *Political Economy: Capitalism* constitute an all-out revision of I.E., *Textbook*. Though the contents are not identical (because the former were published during the Brezhnev period and the latter under Khrushchev) there are still similarities between them. Thus, the

related pages of Kozlov's books are also included for the benefit of the readers.

4. I. E., *Textbook* ,3:493, (See also Kozlev, *Socialism*, 20).
5. *Ibid.*, 3:572. (See also Kozllov, *Socialism*, 30.)
6. *Ibid.*, 3:570-71.
7. Lenin, "Third Congress of the Communist International," *LCW* 32:459.
8. I. E., *Textbook*, 3:541. (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 41).
9. *Ibid.*, 3:542, (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 41),
10. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," *MESW* 3:17.
11. *Ibid.*, 19.
12. I. E., *Textbook*, 4:992-93. (See also Kozlov, *Socialistn*, 19-20).
13. Lenin, "Revision of the Party Programme," *LCW* 24:468.
14. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, 78-79.
15. I. E., *Textbook* 3:687. According to the Programme of the CPSU, "the aim of socialism is the increasingly complete satisfaction of the growing material and cultural requirements of the people through the continuous development and perfection of social production" (Kozlov, *Socialism*, 82).
16. *Ibid.*, 3:708-9. (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 94-95).
17. *Ibid.*, 3:737. (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 94),
18. Kozlov, *Socialism*, 170.

19. I. E., *Textbook*, 3:738.
20. Kobayashi in *Scientific Socialism* argues as follows: "Now one third of mankind has entered socialism. This shows the supremacy of socialism over capitalism in many ways, including price stability, solution to the problem of unemployment, full availability of social security, and equal rights for both sexes" (Eizo Kobayashi, ed., *Scientific Socialism* [in Japanese] [Tokyo: Shin-Nippon Shuppansha, 1977], p. 308).
21. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," *MESW* 3:19.
22. "Communism means that the essential difference between mental work and physical work is eliminated" (I, E., *Textbook* 4:1022).
23. "Along with [the classes] the state will inevitably fall" (Engels, "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State," *MESW* 3:330).
24. "Only after all these preliminary conditions have been satisfied in their entirety will it be possible to pass from the socialist formula, 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work', to the communist formula, 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'" (Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, 71).
25. Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *The Road to Communism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 192.
26. I. E., *Textbook*, 4:1030.
27. Djilas, *The New Class*, 56.
28. *Ibid.*, 103.

29. Kiga, ed., *Lectures on Comparative Economic System*, 156-57.
30. Martinet says the following: "February 1928: The Central Committee alerts the Party about the gravity of the situation in the countryside. It is the beginning of the move toward overall collectivization. In the meantime, stock is confiscated, forced loans are organized and direct buying and selling in the villages is proscribed . . . January 1930: The great offensive is launched for agricultural collectivization. Cultivated land in Kolkhozes goes from 1,300,000 hectares in 1928 to 4 million in 1929, 15 million in 1930 and 75 million in 1933. . . . A near totality of the land now belongs to the Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes. The old revolutionary intelligentsia is broken and the budding agrarian bourgeoisie is totally liquidated" (Gilles Martinet, *Les Cinq Communismes* [The five communisms] [Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1971], pp. 53-54, 62; my translation).
31. Martinet, *Les Cinq Communismes*, 62.
32. Isaac Deutscher, *The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.50.
33. Martinet, *Les Cinq Communismes*, 62.
34. Stalin, "Plenum of the C.C., CPSU (B.), July 4-12, 1928," *JSW* 11:167.
35. Kenzo Kiga, *Communist Economy* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Hana-washobo, 1967), 1:16-17.
36. These tables were constructed by Kenzo Kiga on the basis of statistical data shown in *Soviet National Economy* (annals) (Moscow, 1964, 65) and in *Agriculture of the Soviet Union* (in Japanese) (The Association for the Statistics of Agriculture and Forestry, Tokyo, 1963) (original Russian edition was published by the USSR Central Bureau of Statistics, Moscow, 1960).

37. I.E., *Textbook*, 3:544. (See also: Kozlov, *Socialism*, 41).
38. *Ibid.*, 3:557.
39. *Ibid.*
40. P. N. Fedoseyev, ed., *The Marxist-Leninist Teaching of Socialism and the World Today*, trans. D. Skvirsky (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), p. 166.
41. Haruki Niwa, *The Dilemma of Socialism* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1970), p. 14. In addition, an organ paper of the USSR carried the following commentary: "The Fifth Five-Year Plan determines a new, powerful upsurge of the national economy of the USSR and ensures a further substantial advance in the material well-being and cultural development of the people. The accomplishment of the Fifth Five-Year Plan will be a big stride forward along the pathway of advancing from Socialism to Communism." ("For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy," dated October 31, 1952).
42. Kuusinen, *Fundamentals*, 791. Khrushchev made a similar statement at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU held in 1961 (in CPSU, *The Road to Communism*): "The chief result of the activities of the Party and the people is the complete and final victory of socialism in the USSR. A great feat of world-wide historic impact has been accomplished. Mankind has been furnished with a science, tested in practice, on the establishment and development of socialism." (p.173) "The historical limits of the draft Programme are 20 years. . . . We base ourselves on strictly scientific estimates, which indicate that we shall, in the main, have built a communist society within 20 years." (pp. 194-95)
43. Kuusinen, *Fundamentals*, 849. See also CPSU, *The Road to Communism*: "In the course of the second decade, by 1980, our country will leave the United States far behind in industrial and agricultural output per head of the population." (p. 269)

44. "Essential changes are brought about in the development of capitalism by the new phenomena inherent in the period of general crisis of capitalism, such as the growth of state-monopoly capitalism, the intensification of market problems, chronic idle state of enterprises, chronic mass unemployment, world wars, and the increasing *militarization of the economy*" (italics added) (I. E., *Textbook*, 2:434). Also, "*Militarization of the economy* is inseparably linked with the reinforcement of state-monopoly tendencies in imperialist states" (italics added) (Kuu-sinen, *Fundamentals*, 330).
45. I. E., *Textbook*, 3:710. (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 96.)
46. Richard Moorsteen and Raymond P. Powell, *The Soviet Capital Stock 1928-1962* (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p. 292.
47. Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave* (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1980), pp. 95-96.
48. I. E., *Textbook*, 3:737.
49. Niwa, *The Dilemma of Socialism*, 71.
50. I. E., *Textbook*, 3:772. Kozlov's *Socialism* says, "In 1975 Soviet labor productivity had reached 54 per cent [of that of the United States] in industry but the gap in agriculture is still much wider" (p. 462). This shows clearly that labor productivity in industry and in agriculture did not make any considerable growth compared with that of the USA, even after 1961.
51. I. E., *Textbook*, 4:996.
52. Stalin, "The Economic Situation of the Soviet Union and the Policy of the Party," *JSW* 8:137-43.

53. I. E., *Textbook*, 4:784-85. (See also CPSU, *The Road to Communism*, 102-3).
54. Tsuneaki Sato says the following: "In the case of the Soviet Union, the main stockpile of unsold goods were ready-made clothes, knitted goods, cloth, shoes, table ware, furniture, sewing machines, toys, etc., about half of which were clothing items. The stock of ready-made clothes was swollen up to three times in amount between 1959 to 1963. It is estimated that the amount of low-quality goods stockpiled in the retail commercial network (not including foodstuffs) came to about 20 billion rubles (or about \$22 billion at the official exchange rate) in 1964. Since this was more than the level of the USA during the depression, if it had been an event which had happened in a capitalist nation it could very well be called a "panic." At the same time, new commodities and high-quality goods remained in extremely low supply, and the "lines" of consumers did not disappear at all. There came about, then, the strange phenomenon of the accumulation of goods on one hand, and lines of consumers representing frustrated purchasing power on the other. . . . This description refers to the situation of a decade ago, but the situation today seems not essentially different. The difference today is that in addition to the durable consumer goods normally accumulated (sewing machines, etc.) new kinds of durable consumer goods are now also accumulating such as television sets and washing machines." Tsuneaki Sato, *The Socialist Economy Today* [in Japanese] [Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1975], pp. 124-25)
55. Niwa, *The Dilemma of Socialism*, 92-93.
56. Hiromi Teratani, *How to Read the Soviet Union* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Green Arrow Shuppan-sha, 1982), pp. 92-93.
57. *Ibid.*, 95.

58. In the Soviet Union today, the privileged class is called *nomenklatura*, and the Sovietologist Hiromi Teratani gives the following explanation of it: "The privileged people of the highest class in the party are called *nomenklatura*. Originally this name refers to a list of the positions of the privileged leaders; by extension, it now refers to the system according to which people in privileged positions can send orders from above to subordinates. In the Soviet Union, the people belonging to the *nomenklatura*, including the members of their family, amount to three million, which is equivalent to 1 or 2% of the whole population" (Teratani, *How to Read the Soviet Union*, p. 53).
59. Konstantin M. Simis, *USSR: The Corrupt Society* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp, 39-40.
60. Teratani, *How to Read the Soviet Union*, 42.
61. Simis, *USSR: The Corrupt Society*, pp. 45-46.
62. In the Soviet Union, capital is frozen and is free of interest. Therefore, Kiga points out, "an adequate standard with which to measure how much loss is brought about by the delay in capital for construction is lacking in the Soviet Union" (Kiga, *Communist Economy* 1:150). As a result, the efficiency of capital falls. This phenomenon occurs because a market of capital is not formed. Kiga also points out the following: "That the efficiency of capital is low is a remarkable phenomenon in investment for fixed capital, especially in capital for construction. It is pointed out, regarding capital for construction, there are many cases of waste of capital causing certain factories to be left unfinished for long periods, such that it takes a much longer time until completion than what was originally scheduled, and such that more is spent than was planned, to an extent which is hard for capitalist nations to imagine" (Ibid., 150).
63. Abram Bergson, *Planning and Productivity under Soviet Socialism* (New York: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1968) p.47. Note also

that in the Soviet Union it is not true that prices are fixed because they are determined by the quantity of labor. Rather, they are fixed because they are officially determined; they do not change for a long time only because the technique required for revising them is difficult.

64. Niwa, *The Dilemma of Socialism*, 24.
65. *Ibid.*, 35.
66. *Ibid.*, 37.
67. *Ibid.*, 29.
68. *Ibid.*, 38-39.
69. Djilas, *The New Class*, 104.
70. Simis, *USSR: The Corrupt Society*, 134-35, .
71. I.E., *Textbook*, 3:655-56. (See also: Kozlov, *Socialism*, 158).
72. *Ibid.*, 3:656. (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 158).
73. *Ibid.*, 3:656. (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 159).
74. *Ibid.*, 4:782, (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, pp. 130, 156).
75. *Ibid.*, 4:782. (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 131).
76. *Ibid.*, 4:784. (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 131-32).
77. *Ibid.*, 4:808, (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 259). Note that necessary labor refers to the labor equivalent to wages. This shows that in the Soviet Union, also, wages are nothing but the price of labor, in accordance with the labor theory of value. In other words, the view of wages in the Soviet Union is the same as the view of

wages proposed by Marx, exactly the same view he obtained from analyzing capitalist society.

78. *Ibid.*, 4:813.

79. *Ibid.*, 4:814. (See also Kozlov, *Socialism*, 265-66).

80. *Ibid.*, 3:655.

81. Abram Bergson, an American expert in Soviet economy, also points out the labor theory of value as the primary factor restricting the growth of the Soviet economy, as follows: "As a source of inefficiency in the functioning of these agencies [superior agencies], however, the formidable nature of their task has only been compounded by another factor not so clearly predicted in theoretic discussion even by critics. I refer to the strange economic principles which the superior agencies seem often to apply, These are the principles that are founded on the labor theory of value that Marx espoused. . . . But prices also diverge from scarcity values for other reasons. Thus, it is Marx's labor theory of value rather than the magnitude of the task of superior agencies that accounts for another notable defect of Soviet industrial price formation: the failure at any time to account for interest on fixed capital and rent on scarce natural resources" (*Planning and Productivity under Soviet Socialism*, 46-47).

8. Critique and Counterproposal to Marx's Theory of Human Alienation

1. The view that alienation theory is overcome in *Capital* is mentioned in note 1 of Chapter 1. And the view that *Capital* is the extension of alienation theory is illustrated by the following statement by Masanori Shimizu: "The theory of human alienation bears academic fruit in *Capital*, which is today's system of the materialization of man, and acquires its expression in the form of the disclosure of the fetishism of commodity, money

and capital" (*The Theory of Human Alienation* [in Japanese]) [Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten, 1982], p.73.

2. Marx, *Capital* 1:153.
3. Ibid.,195.
4. Ibid.,233. "As capitalist, he is only capital personified. His soul is the soul of capital" (Ibid., 233).
6. "The capitalist is merely capital personified and functions in the process of production solely as the agent of capital" (Ibid., 3:819).
7. Marx, *Capital* 1:767; I. E., *Textbook* 1:125.
8. Marx, *Capital* 1:766; I. E., *Textbook* 1:125.
9. Marx, *Capital* 1:713
10. Ibid., 762.
11. Ibid., 760.
12. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," *MESW* 3:19,
13. Marx, *Capital* 3:820.
14. Marx, "Manuscripts," *MECW* 3:274.
15. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, 349.
16. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," *MESW* 3:19.
17. Communists claim that "under socialism there is no category of capital" (Kozlov, *Socialism*, 249), and such terms as "fund" or

“assets” are used instead of “capital.” But this is just a name change; the substance remains the same.

18. Marx, *Capital* 1:233.
19. *Ibid.*, 574.
20. *Ibid.*, 762.
21. Marx, “Introduction,” *MECW* 3:187.
22. Marx and Engels, “Manifesto,” *MECW* 6:494.
23. *Ibid.*, 495.
24. Nicholas Berdyaev, *The Russian Revolution* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961), 67.
25. *Ibid.*, 69.
26. M. Djilas, *The New Class*, 151-56.
27. Lenin further developed Marx’s position on the role of violence in revolution, At the Seventh Party Congress (1918), he proclaimed that “Marxists have never forgotten that violence must inevitably accompany the collapse of capitalism in its entirety and the birth of socialist society. That violence will constitute a period of world history. . . . This epoch, an epoch of gigantic cataclysms, of mass decisions forcibly imposed by war, of crises, has begun . . . and is only the beginning” (“Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B),” *LCW* 27:130). Lenin also said, “In principle we have never rejected, and cannot reject, terror. Terror is one of the forms of military action that may be perfectly suitable and even essential at a definite juncture in the battle, given a definite state of the troops and the existence of definite conditions” (*LCW* 5:19).

28. In Unification Thought, the struggle between good and evil is treated as a law of history. This is not a law of development, but a law that turns the direction of history at a certain stage of the development of history (it is also called the law of turning). The law of the struggle between good and evil, however, is not the same kind of law as natural laws, which operate all the time. That law operates intermittently, in accordance with the providence. The problem with Marx's law of struggle is that it is described as a law of development and as a law equivalent to natural laws, which operate all the time. As the result, struggles are allowed to happen at any time and at any place for the development of society.

29. Berdyaev, *The Russian Revolution* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961), p.183.

According to Lenin, lying and deception can be good if they serve the revolution. He said that "telling the truth is a bourgeoisie prejudice" (Annenkov, "Reminiscences of Lenin," *Novy Zhurnal* [New York: New Review Inc., 1961], vol, 65, p. 247). He also said that "petty-bourgeoisie truthfulness, . . . Philistine belief in good intentions, . . . is the root of evil in our revolution" (*Rabochy*, 14 September 1917). These quotations and the ones in notes 27, 30, and 40 of this chapter are cited by Albert L. Weeks in "Lenin: Secular Messiah or Depraved Despot?" *New York City Tribune*, 23 April 1985.

30. Djilas, *The New Class*, 21-22. Concerning violence, Lenin declared: "Major questions in the life of nations are settled only by force" ("Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," *LCW* 9:132).

31. Marx wrote that "between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*" ("Critique of the Gotha Program," *MESW* 3:26).

32. Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky" *LCW* 28:233.
33. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," *LCW* 25:417.
34. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," *JSW* 6:179.
35. Stalin, "Concerning Questions of Leninism," *JSW* 8:39.
36. Lenin says that "the Party is the leader; the vanguard of the proletariat, which rules directly" ("Once Again on the Trade Unions," *LCW* 31:235); and also: "by the dictatorship of the proletariat we actually mean the dictatorship of the organized and class-conscious minority of the proletariat" ("The Second Congress of the Communist International," *LCW* 31:235); "We say, yes, it is a dictatorship of one party!" ("Speech at the First All-Russia Congress," *LCW* 29:535).
37. Lenin, "A Contribution to the History of the Question of the Dictatorship," *LCW* 31:353,
38. Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," *LCW* 28:248.
39. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," *JSW* 6:118.
40. Djilas, *The New Class*, 80. As a matter of fact, it was Lenin who pointed out the necessity of dictatorship by a single individual. He said that "the dictatorship of individuals was very often the expression, the vehicle, the channel of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes" ("The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," *LCW* 27:267); and that "revolution demands . . . that the people *unquestioningly obey the single will* of the leaders of labor" (*Ibid.*, 269). Finally he asserted that the communist party must ensure that the people perform "the task of unques-

tioningly obeying the will of the Soviet leader, of the dictator" (Ibid., 270).

41. Ibid., 69.
42. Berdyaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism*, 128.
43. Michael S. Voslensky, *Nomenklatura* (Vienna: Verlag Fritz Molden, 1980), p.220 (my translation).
44. Berdyaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism*, 128.
45. Ibid., 183. In fact, Marx himself said in his Paris days, that communism aims at "the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man" ("Manuscripts," *MECW* 3:296). He also said that communism is "humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of private property" (Ibid.,341). He concluded that communism is "positive humanism"(Ibid., 342).
46. While still in the growth process, in the state where he has not yet fully incarnated the heart of God, man experiences, though partially, the love of God through faith; and while his spirit mind and physical mind are engaging in give and receive action centering on that love, he grows and finally completes his personality. This give and receive action, however, has become greatly impaired due to the Human Fall.
47. Berdyaev also clearly states that the communist tyrannical rule, which disregards human nature, comes from its denial of God: "All the untruths of Communism come from its Godlessness and inhumanity; the falseness of the sanguinary coercion by which it wants to found social justice, the falseness of the tyranny that cannot bear man's dignity; its admission of every conceivable means to further the end it considers as supreme and unique; rancor, hatred and revenge as a way of obtaining perfect life, the brotherhood of men" (*The Russian Revolution*, 80).

48. Ibid., 55-56.

Conclusion

1. Marx, *Capital* 1:763.
2. Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," MECW 6:481.
3. Rabindranath Tagore, *The Spirit of Japan* (Tokyo: The Indo-Japanese Association, 1916), p. 35.

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